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This dissertation explores how the imagined semiotic mode of the unconscious, illiterate 
“savage” was instrumental to twentieth-century technologies of production in two 
respects: firstly, in the context of a global division of labor, as a way to disqualify certain 
groups’ intellectual products from the category of intellectual property; and, secondly, in 
disciplines of aesthetic production, as an imaginary model on which to base new 
technologies of design and communication. In my dissertation, Savage Mind to Savage 
Machine: Techniques and Disciplines of Creativity (1870-1985), I argue that class 
inequalities under capitalism have been linked to the ongoing formulation of two 
distinct—albeit tacit—categories of epistemic subjectivity: one whose creative 
intellectual processes are believed to constitute personal property, and one whose creative 
intellectual processes—because these are deemed rote or unconscious—are not regarded 
as the property of those who wield them. This epistemic apartheid exists despite the fact 
that the unconscious psyche or, as I call it, the “Savage Mind,” was, at the same time, 
repeatedly invoked by modernist designers in their efforts to formulate creative 
technologies, ones that tended increasingly towards digital modes of production. 
 
The history I examine in the dissertation reveals how modernist design has implicitly 
constituted itself as the process through which unconscious, magical creativity becomes 
consciously systematized and reified as technological, scientific forms of production. The 
dissertation is structured around four disciplinary paradigms of design, which collectively 
span the late nineteenth to late twentieth centuries—industrial design, architecture, 
environmental design, and media arts—and asks how and why each of these sub-
disciplines invoked “savage thought” to develop new methods of creativity. While it is 
well-known that Europe’s avant-gardes often imitated the visual forms of so-called 
primitive societies, there is scant scholarship accounting for how the alleged thought 
processes of an “originary” intelligence—gleaned from the theories of anthropologists, 
psychologists, and other social scientists—were translated into modernist design 
methods. Designers in fact hoped to discover in “primitive” and magical thought specific 
intellectual mechanisms for linking designed things to larger contexts of signification, a 
search that dovetailed with early endeavors in the field of Artificial Intelligence to devise 
computational languages and environments. The Savage Mind thus lies at the heart of 
new media technologies, even while intellectual property in those technologies remains 
the purview of a scientific elite. 
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INTRODUCTION: Epistemic Apartheids: 
The Unequal Ownership of Thought and Technics 
 
 
Modern Architecture and the Invention of Intellectual Property 
In his Discourse on Inequality, Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously contrasted man in a state of 
nature with the “true founder of civil society”: the first man who fenced in a piece of land, 
called it his own, and found people to actually believe him. Because ownership of material 
property is, as Rousseau suggests, a somewhat extraordinary notion, liable to contestation, its 
persistence is bolstered through myriad cultural, political, and military institutions. However, 
around the time that Rousseau was writing this Discourse a much more esoteric conception of 
ownership—specifically, that of “intangible” or intellectual property—came into existence.1 
Accordingly, the cultural and political apparatuses required to justify the existence of this new 
form of property grew more elaborate. In the late eighteenth through the late nineteenth 
century, the concept of intellectual property was first developed in England in legal debates 
dealing with the problem of the technologically reproduced text. Soon copyrights—in contrast 
to the previous rights to technical inventions held under royal auspices and limited to short 
periods of time—were applicable to literary works for longer and longer durations, before then 
being applied to textiles, and then to all designed objects.2 Indeed, what occurred with the vast 
expansion of intellectual property in the modern period, in tandem with the gradual destruction 
of craft guilds, may have no less decisively redistributed wealth than did the infamous land 




landed property, twentieth-century architecture was implicated in the changes wrought by the 
advent of this new category of possession. By systematizing and thereby claiming intellectual 
priority over prevalent methods of creative production, modernist designers worked towards 
establishing their intellectual ownership of common productive means. 
I contend that what is regarded as twentieth-century modernist design—its visual 
characteristics, its discourses, and its techniques—may owe much to the prior invention of 
intellectual property. Two major tendencies support this thesis: firstly, the shift in the 
eighteenth century towards architects’ preoccupation with the idiom of language. Whereas 
architecture had always played a leading role in constituting landed property, intellectual 
property was first theorized and legalized in litigious arguments concerning the technologically 
reproducible literary work, a fact that might explain architects’ subsequent and enduring 
fixation with understanding their work as somehow linguistic in nature. Contemporaneously 
with the eighteenth-century beginnings of modern architectural discourse, there arose a search 
for what has been called an architecture parlante, most famously in the work of Claude-
Nicolas Ledoux. The mid-nineteenth-century libraries designed by Henri Labrouste, with their 
verbal inscriptions and quasi-linguistic denotations, have been subseqeuntly described as a 
seminally modern response to Victor Hugo’s formulation “the book will kill the building”.3 The 
twentieth century gave rise to architects’ obsession with “communication”, followed by 
postmodern architects’ insistence on the idiom of language. Finally, in the late twentieth-
century architects such as Yona Friedman, Christopher Alexander, and Nicholas Negroponte 
coded architecture towards the eventual development of design software. Because literary 




virtue of its claims to communicating universal truths, I argue that modernist architects’ 
contemporaneous pursuit of a language-like architecture owed much to the conceptualization of 
intellectual property. This dissertation thus presents analyses of certain semiotic discourses that 
were key to modernist design theory, arguing that distinct semiotic modes were thought to 
pertain to minds that, respectively, could and could not constitute their works as property. 
The second reason that we might interpret modernist design as arising from a conception of 
intellectual property is more complex. In eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England, lawyers 
defending the legitimacy of intellectual property followed the protocol established in the 
sciences and engineering, whereby a discovery of natural principles did not constitute 
intellectual property; however, the translation of those principles into a particular use could. 
That is, it “was necessary to show that abstract principles had been reduced to practice, that 
Nature had been individualised or activated.”4 Effectively then, what allowed an author (and 
publisher) exclusive ownership of a technologically-reproducible text was its unique 
individuality—ascribable only to the author—and, at the same time, its conveyance of universal 
truths. What the text contained had to be both completely particular and completely subject to 
generalizable laws.5 What we see emerging in architecture contemporaneously with these legal 
debates was a growing propensity to argue for both the utter uniqueness of a work and its 
application of universal laws. This implicit and aporetic claim of authorship (comprised by the 
term “genius”) and the contradictions it entailed forms a leitmotif in the history of modernist 
design that has gone largely unnoted. 
But architecture was not a literary work and could not be technologically reproduced verbatim. 




architecture, a discipline in which the division of labor between architect and craftsman, as well 
as the practice of copying decorative motives, standard forms, and techniques, had long 
preceded the technological reproducibility of texts. Because copying from precedents was 
normal practice in architecture—and had to be normal practice due to the necessity of standard 
craft techniques or, later, of mass-produced components—the real question to be asked was: 
what was the real original for any given architectural specimen? If the originality of the 
architectural work—the first criterion for an author to claim intellectual property—was 
therefore elusive, then the second criterion—the formulation of universal principles—was 
equally so given the abundance of different architectural styles known to Europeans in the 
eighteenth century and onward. Archaeological expeditions in Greece and then Egypt, in 
addition to the knowledge of diverse architectures gleaned by colonists and missionaries, led to 
various debates over style and precedent during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. At the 
heart of these debates was a tacit question of property: of what architecture was proper to a 
given nation at a given point in history and how to reconcile such proprietary claims with the 
obvious derivations borrowed from distant times and places. Yet far from discouraging 
architects to follow literary authors in attempting to establish their work as proprietary in 
nature, these obstacles only gave impetus to tendencies which we now deem characteristic of 
architecture’s modernity. To meet the aporetic criteria of an architecture that bore the stamp of 
uniquely original authorship yet that also offered an exposition of universal principles, an 
architect would need to deduce from the diversity of world architectures a unique argument for 




Architectural history surveys often commence around the year 1750 with the advent of Marc-
Antoine Laugier’s Essay on Architecture.6 Typically though, little account is given for why a 
French clergyman’s quarrel against non-Grecian architectures should form such a seminal text 
of architectural modernity. The Essay begins with a flight of speculative fancy as Laugier 
imagines primitive man’s first architectural construction, the “primitive hut” (cabane 
primitive), which, Laugier argues, forms the correct model for all subsequent architectures as 
evinced by the superior works of ancient Greece. I discuss Laugier’s reasoning in greater detail 
in the work to follow, suffice to say for the moment that his Essay posits an architectural 
original which nonetheless requires the architect’s (or theorist’s) authorial intervention in 
translating this example into modern relevance. The extrapolation of universal principles from 
the prior—though purely mythical—originary model (and really from the putative thought 
processes of primitive man who makes the model) establishes a collaboration between 
universal principles and authorial originality. The architect’s role thenceforth would be to posit 
apodictic laws underlying architectural production—often ascribed to natural intellectual 
processes—and then to conjure unique architectural configurations based on these universal 
rules. In many cases this reasoning draws explicitly from so-called “primitive” intellectual 
methods and archetypes. As with Claude Lévi-Strauss’s reliance on “primitive” societies 
(though he didn’t endorse the term “primitive”), raw, natural, or originary intellectual processes 
are sought in non-European intellects and their products. What allows Europeans to then claim 
“savage” intellectual processes as constitutive of Europeans’ intellectual property is a 
constructed binary (which I will explain in the following section) between conscious and 
unconscious intellectual production, the latter of which is excluded—de facto if not de jure—




history I detail constitutes a certain history of structuralism) was essentially a project of 
rendering conscious the supposedly unconscious modes of the semiotic imagination, which 
helped to establish a kind of ownership over those modes. Furthermore, structuralist thought 
tended—directly and indirectly—towards the development of computer technologies. What I 
call Savage Thought was therefore instrumental to those technological developments. 
More than a history properly speaking, this dissertation can be read as a theoretical presentation 
of twentieth-century computer technologies, adduced through design practices and discourses. 
Yet, for the most part it does not focus on aspects of design that were explicitly linked to 
computational concerns. Instead, by analyzing a few discrete discursive constellations, my 
research shows that the methods of modernist design were often similar to those of 
computation, a fact that is ascribable not only to industrial modes of design production but also 
to an abiding concern with “owning” the intellectual processes of design. The sequence of 
historical contexts I present do not add up to a teleology whereby proto-computational thought 
leads inexorably to computation; thus I don’t offer a smooth linear sequence of events or an 
entire discursive whole; rather, these piecemeal histories analyze the kinds of thinking and 
making that eventually—and often only incidentally—helped make computer technologies 
possible. This coincidence owes in part, I argue, to the criteria for intellectual property 
described above according to which designers sought to render particular examples of world 
architecture into universalizable types and, relatedly, to render conscious the workings of 
unconscious thought in order to lay claim to those methods. It so happened that these strategies 
easily converged with the research agenda of Artificial Intelligence and other computational 




Yet, I would not wish to overstate this convergence as purely coincidental in its causes. If 
designers’ non-computational endeavors dovetailed with computer science this was largely due 
to shared concerns. Computational thought resembled modernist design methods insofar as 
both sought to systematize and codify various processes. The fact that I have organized this 
dissertation around four sub-disciplines of design—namely, the industrial arts, architecture, 
environmental design, and the media arts and sciences—points to a historiographic model of 
sorts premised on the fact that disciplines exist at the juncture of discourse and economic 
production.7 Or, put another way, disciplines conjoin material and intellectual practices to the 
point of rendering the two quite indistinguishable. Disciplinarity thus serves as an apposite 
historiographic ground for research into questions of intellectual property, given that the latter 
required a framework for rendering things that should have belonged to discourse (such as texts 
or eventually code) into material economic property. The subtitle of this work, “Techniques 
and Disciplines of Creativity”, intentionally makes use of the double sense of the term 
“discipline” as does Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish. While Foucault invokes the term 
usually in the sense of regimentation (through coercive or non-coercive means), he also hints at 
how epistemic disciplines correspond to the act of disciplining.8 Similarly, the following 
history shows that regimens for increasing creative productivity—i.e., for disciplining 
creativity—were formulated through the development of academic design disciplines. For this 
reason, educational institutions and programs play a central role in the histories I present, such 
as the Public Industrial Arts School of Philadelphia, the Bauhaus, the Aspen Institute of 
Humanistic Studies, the Great Books of Western Civilization program, departments of 
Environmental Design and Environmental Psychology in the United States and Great Britain, 




Architecture Machine Group. With most of these institutions, modes of directing the creative 
imagination towards burgeoning paradigms of production gave rise to distinctive new 
disciplinary regimes, most notably that of “design” itself. 
It wasn’t until the late nineteenth century that “design” first emerged as a category of 
disciplinary training.9 Whereas the pedagogical methods of art academies and craft guilds 
focused on imparting the skills specific to a given product or material, whether it be painting or 
pottery, design was to serve as the basis for the whole range of artistic disciplines by 
establishing means shared in common by all. This mostly involved a shift of emphasis toward 
the kinds of drawing skills that would be relevant to fine arts and crafts alike, often by 
emphasizing basic shapes and patterns, silhouette drawing (rather than shading), flat 
projections (rather than perspective), hand-eye coordination, and the mastery of basic tools. 
Emerging in the most heavily industrialized nations—first, in England, then in the northeast 
United States, and finally the Weimar Republic—institutes of design were instrumental in 
introducing the distinction between designer and producer, even where they purported to do the 
opposite, such as at the Public Industrial Arts School of Philadelphia and at the Bauhaus, two 
institutions that I explore in some detail in this dissertation. By differentiating between, on the 
one hand, the systematic comprehension of techniques for creative conceptualization, and on 
the other hand, the material realization of those conceptualizations, design pedagogy aided the 
industrialization of artistic production and, concomitantly, the division between intellectual and 
manual labor. In thus introducing a disciplinary approach to human creativity—indeed, seeing 
creativity as the thing to be trained rather than instilling expertise over a particular artistic 




what would become toward the end of the twentieth century the discipline of media arts and 
sciences. This dissertation thus traces an arc from the industrial arts to the media arts. 
The opening chapter of this dissertation identifies the new discipline of industrial art training as 
key to the notion that artistic design comprised the conscious systematization of unconscious 
intellectual techniqes. The increasing industrial production of artistic commodities naturally 
threw the category of creation (or creativity) into question. The problem of who owned the 
rights to technologically reproduced works entered into design discourse most clearly with the 
gradual replacement of craft guilds by large factory-based means of production. In my first 
chapter, I thus look at how designers—such as many at the Weimar Bauhaus—sought to 
differentiate themselves from factory workers by establishing their intellectual ownership over 
technologically reproducible works. Not wishing to lend themselves to the drudgery of mass-
production, nor wanting to simply produce one-off works in antiquated (or resuscitated) “hand-
crafted” tradition, Bauhäuslers often struck a vexed compromise. To establish themselves as 
original artists vis-à-vis technologically reproducible works, they distinguished between the 
rote processes of unconscious (or machinic) reproduction and the designer’s conscious science 
of reproducing the creativity of the unconscious. This approach is particularly explicit in the 
case of one of the Bauhaus’s antecedent institutions, the late nineteenth-century Public 
Industrial Arts School of Philadelphia whose founding director, the ethnologist Charles 
Godfrey Leland, tried to systematize the supposedly unconscious creative methods gleaned 
from his studies of Native Americans and European gypsies into a new pedagogical science of 
design. His mystical interest in possession, similar Johannes Itten’s spiritual practices at the 




technologically reproducible work: Taking individual ownership of other societies’ creative 
methods entailed a retreat from one’s individual consciousness even while one’s property over 
those methods relied on the claim to be consciously systematizing them. In this chapter I argue 
that Bauhaus culture’s strange mixture of rationalism and mysticism, which has perplexed 
many scholars, was in fact largely attributable to the aporetic nature of intellectual property. 
If Bauhäuslers during the inter-war period fell back on methods of spiritual possession as a way 
of contending with the aporia of intellectual property, the group of post-World-War –II 
designers I look at in Chapter Two favored a process of what—for lack of a better word—I call 
translation. Even the tendency towards mysticism evinced most strongly by one of the primary 
protagonists of this chapter, the architect Aldo van Eyck, took the form of poetic invocations 
rather than religious ritual. By looking at the discourse of the international architecture group 
Team Ten, and at some of the design practices connected with this discourse, I interrogate how 
the trope of translation operated as a way to establish one’s intellectual mastery over 
geographically disparate architectures often in colonial and neo-colonial contexts of 
urbanization.  Effectively, Team Ten discourse posited a distinction between “vernacular” 
architectures and their own modernist translations thereof as a way to establish not only the 
legitimacy of colonial constructions but also Europeans’ intellectual command over global 
architectures. Using this history of colonial urbanization to shed light on the difficulties of 
Walter Benjamin’s “Task of the Translator” (and vice-versa), I argue that, thus contextualized, 
the “debt” which, according to Benjamin, the original owes to the translation, takes on a 
pernicious and often quite literal meaning. “Translation” effectively operates as a method of 




order to lay claim to the universality and rationality of their methods, Team Ten architects 
sought to reduce diverse global architectures to a set of common denominators and form from 
them a lingua franca of design types. This chapter therefore explores the nature of the semiotic 
relationship between vernacular architectures and the putatively universal language extracted 
from them, arguing that translation operates here as a way of maintaining an uneasy balance 
between the assumption of hierarchical difference (i.e, as the binary: tradition/modernity or 
vernacular/lingua franca) and the claim to sympathetic adaptation of particular traditions. 
Effectively, by shuttling between vernacular particulars and modern universals, modernist 
architects’ tacit efforts to establish intellectual priority enacted at the urban-architectural scale 
the larger contradictions of colonial and neo-colonial governance. 
Subsequently, Chapter Three examines how this vexed relationship between particulars and 
universals was encoded in a burgeoning post-War conception of the environment. I argue that 
the power of this term, “environment”, derived not only from its twentieth-century conflation 
with the terrestrial globe (as others have noted) but rather from its simultaneous retention of its 
prior referent, namely immediate or proximate surrounds.10 The environment’s double 
referent—pointing at once towards self-contained local milieus and to dispersed global 
exchanges—was reflected in a new discourse on communication and media that sought to 
maintain racial or economic difference within the connectivity of a global sphere. Effectively, 
the United States’ ownership—qua “management”—of global resources was maintained 
through an implied intellectual grasp of global communication (both physical and semiotic 
communication) and a concomitant implication that other societies dwelt only in the semiotic 




of an environmental discourse, this chapter brings together the practices of Aspen’s director of 
design, Herbert Bayer, proceedings from the International Design Conferences at Aspen over 
the course of two decades, semiotic theories of “the African Mind” (formulated as part of the 
effort to suppress the Mau Mau anti-colonial movement), and Marshal McLuhan’s 
ethnopsychiatric-derived conception of environmental media. Together, these strains 
demonstrate how a magical semiotic mode attributed to tropical environmental conditions was 
taken as a model for new electronic communications even while colonial powers invoked the 
magical thought of tropical people as a way to justify economic exploitation in the tropical 
zone. At the same time, the global model promulgated by the United States and NATO 
members—one in which a unified global network of resources was nonetheless bifurcated into 
first and third worlds—depended on its own version of magical thought, one that shaped the 
world through new techniques of global representation.   
In the fourth and final chapter, “Media Arts”, I turn to the MIT Media Laboratory and to its 
founders’ earlier involvement in the 1970’s with MIT’s Architecture Machine Group and in the 
early 1980’s with Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s Centre Mondial Informatique (CMI). At 
these institutions the fabrications of semiotic difference described in the preceding two chapters 
were developed further into two separate forms of subjectivity related to personal computing 
technologies: Computer programmers would possess full consciousness of the workings of this 
new productive tool, whereas computer users would, by dint of graphic interfaces and the like, 
acquire only the basic skills necessary to operate the machines without understanding their 
underlying principles. The ideal computer user was thus imagined as a subject who straddles 




literate society (and possibly, per Media Lab rhetoric, even remaining non-literate him- or her-
self). This peculiar epistemic condition was foregrounded by the projects undertaken at the 
Media Lab’s precedent laboratory, the Architecture Machine Group, whose researchers 
contrived to build an intelligent machine with the capacity not only to design vast housing 
projects but also to involve slum-dwellers of the global south in the process of their own 
relocation into standardized housing. This project, along with others subsequently undertaken 
at the Media Lab, assigned to its intended users (often people inhabiting the ghettoized margins 
of large cities) the apparent role of autonomous agents by substituting computers for human 
authority. However, these people’s lack of intellectual property in the new digital tools of 
production threatened to further reinscribe the epistemic divisions pertaining to existing class 
apartheids. This chapter therefore examines how a new quasi-urban and quasi-literate subject of 
the global south was formulated by the Media Lab’s canny adaptation of the new liberal global 
economic policies of the 1980’s.  
Whereas in this last chapter intellectual property becomes an explicit issue of contention, 
leading to heated international negotiations over the terms of technology transfer, in the greater 
part of my dissertation intellectual property assumes a less overt role. What was at stake for 
designers was not usually outright ownership of their ideas but rather something more subtle—
the social hierarchies existing between those who designed versus those who technologically 
reproduced the designs of others (or, in the case of architecture, those who inhabited the 
designs of others). I’m thus not referring literally to copyright so much as to a form of self-
owning, self-conscious subjectivity ascribed to classes of people acknowledged as intellectual 




centuries, according to which intellectual labor is denied to people a priori on the basis of a 
supposedly innate lack (whether biologically or environmentally determined) of intellectual 
consciousness over means of production, which, in turn, excludes them from access to 
intellectual labor and, hence, consciousness over means of production (often tantamount to 
education). As such, the economic inequalities inherent to capitalism are naturalized as arising 
from people’s presumed epistemic modes. As I will describe at greater length in the following 
section, a society’s alleged tendency to magical thought was said to exclude it from the analytic 
modes of consciousness needed to grasp the modern means of production. Where the real 
aporia of intellectual property becomes apparent is in designers’ own recourse to the same 
techniques of magical thought ascribed to the Savage Mind. What this dissertation chronicles is 
the efforts of designers to differentiate their methods of magical thought from its “savage” 
sources, usually by stressing their own consciousness over its inner workings. Appurtenant to 
these efforts was the subtle construction of a semiotic apartheid designating who did and who 
did not have rights to own their intellectual means of production. 
 
Pentecostal Technologies and the Building of Babel: Towards a Different History of 
Structuralism 
In borrowing from Lévi-Strauss the expression “savage thought” (or, in its normal English 
translation, “the savage mind”), I am identifying a trope that extends far beyond Lévi-Strauss’s 
coinage. Throughout the long twentieth century, whether explicitly or implicitly, the human 
sciences have sought to determine the mechanisms of semiotic thought.11 Psychologists, 
anthropologists, and ethnopsychiatrists, to name a few, have often done so through recourse to 




intellectual tendencies of children (a recurring theme throughout this dissertation), of so-called 
primitive societies, of the illiterate classes, or even of certain “artistic” animal species. Indeed, 
many of the designers and theorists who appear in this dissertation tended to conflate one 
society with another. For the more racist of these protagonists, Africans and African-Americans 
were often interchangeable, as were children and so-called primitives. What all such humans 
allegedly shared was an unconscious intellectual facility, whether for the acquisition of 
language, for the development of other quasi-semiotic systems, or for creative production more 
generally. The Savage Mind (which I henceforth write capitalized, as a proper noun, to mark it 
as a historically-specific discourse, rather than as an actual thing) could be found more or less 
anywhere since it was the projection of an epistemic approach, one that sought to decode 
human consciousness (and human unconsciousness) for purposes of reproducing its 
operations.12 As I have mentioned, such endeavors on the part of designers stemmed from an 
interest in codifying the processes of human creativity, often with a specific interest in the 
semiotic aspects of the aesthetic imagination. Likewise, in the human sciences the most 
familiar conceptualizations of Savage Thought, such as Sigmund Freud’s notions of magical 
thought and the unconscious, Lévi-Strauss’s “savage thought”, and Marshal McLuhan’s 
concept of non-Western media—all of which I will discuss in this dissertation—were 
preoccupied with the semiotic aspects of human thought. 
The semiotic preoccupation, however, had at its origin an economic impetus: the establishment 
of common operating languages for productive purposes. In the final chapter on media arts, this 
is realized as actual computer operating systems. In the earlier chapters though, the notion of a 




forms: A common “language” often comprises a method of architectural pattern-making, 
codified artistic techniques, or the electronic media connecting the “global village”. The lingua 
franca of productive means is always tacitly posited against the unconscious vernaculars from 
which it claims to consciously derive its logical methods. From this hierarchical division what I 
call a semiotic apartheid emerges between those who supposedly possess and those who don’t 
possess their own intellectual and semiotic mean used to justify an enforced division between 
intellectual and manual labor. The theme of Babel which runs throughout this dissertation, 
frames the problem resulting from semiotic apartheid: On the one hand, the semiotic apartheid 
justifies the division of labor (required to construct the tower of Babel) while, on the other 
hand, too great an apartheid frustrates the communication—or the common grounds of 
productive means—needed to complete the work of construction. It is not accidental that the 
figure Babel is so recurrently invoked by the protagonists of this dissertation, as it epitomized 
the aporia of the capitalist division of labor: this division would require that people think in 
different “languages” (i.e. epistemic modes) that nonetheless communicated to each other 
across difference. 
The ways in which the character of divided labor began to be transformed in Europe around the 
eighteenth century are bound up with the development of new categories of human subjectivity. 
In this regard, my work relies heavily on some insights set forth by Etienne Balibar in a short 
piece entitled “Possessive Individualism Reversed: From Locke to Derrida”.13 In this article, 
Balibar charts the critical history of one particular formula of exceptionalism originating in 
liberal political philosophy. This formula—for him most succinctly articulated by John 




the ownership of material property (e.g., privileges of nobility deriving from land ownership) 
but also on natural property within oneself. (Here, Balibar teases out the double meaning of 
propriété, which in French signifies both “property” and “self”.) Accordingly, it would seem 
that all humans—all of them in possession of a “self”—must possess the same unalienable 
political rights. And yet Locke condoned slavery. Locke’s justification for slavery, Balibar 
explains, might be found in his subsequent clause of exception to the “unalienable” 
circumstance of owning property-in-oneself: Only the person possessing full intellectual 
mastery over the entire productive processes in which he participates truly owns himself and 
thus has property in himself and thus can claim political rights. In other words—Balibar 
doesn’t say precisely this, but it can be inferred from his analysis—political rights within a 
liberal framework were granted or withheld according to a division of labor which was 
construed as a division between intellectual mastery and non-intellectual drudgery. Because the 
slave and (eventually) the proletarian and peasant were deemed to labor as automata—that is, 
not understanding the larger techno-social process of production that their labor partook in—
they did not truly own themselves. Even when suffrage had been extended to all non-colonized 
subjects, these new owners of de jure political rights still were de facto non-owners of their 
own intellects, insofar as subjugated peoples—subjugated by dint of poverty, colonization, 
race, or gender—supposedly lacked consciousness of their own means of production. 
One particular version of this liberal construction of intellectual ownership/non-ownership—
relevant to a history of modern design—appears in Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel’s 
description of the “master-slave dialectic”, according to which the slave comes into full 




is to say, through his craftsmanship. I will return to this idea and to Susan Buck-Morss’s 
critique of Hegel in the proceeding chapter of this dissertation. What should be stressed here, 
however, are the ways in which Marx’s theory of alienation corresponds to the Hegelian 
construction of the slave’s initial state of merely infantile consciousness. For Marx, alienation 
is manifest in the historical circumstance of commodity fetishism, resulting from the 
commodity’s reification of the social relationships inherent to capitalist labor. The proletariat’s 
operation of gaining consciousness over the historical-material conditions of production is to 
reveal to them, behind the commodity-fetish, the whole system of abstract relations responsible 
for imparting to that sensuous object its mystical character. This description of emerging class 
consciousness resembles, however, the demystifying methods with which structuralist sciences 
approached the putatively magical and primitive habits of non-Western societies. For Marx, 
coming-into-consciousness depends on extrapolating from the commodity-fetish the abstract 
principles which conferred its magical character. Where this dissertation seeks to intervene in 
Marxist method is by interrogating how the concept of coming-into-consciousness, at least in 
its secular, modern form, may in fact have conformed to capitalist bourgeois precepts tied to 
notions of intellectual proprietorship.   
While in some cases coming-into-consciousness involved analyzing the actual technical means 
of artistic production (as Arindam Dutta has shown to have been the case with nineteenth-
century British bureaucratization of Indian technical arts), in the histories I explore the 
bourgeois epistemic project consisted more in attempting to expose the underlying intellectual 
mechanisms responsible for producing aesthetic-semiotic systems: for producing, that is, a 




architects, who were loosely influenced by structuralist anthropology, the presumed structural 
relationships between objects were of far greater value than the particular objects themselves. 
To understand how such semiotic-aesthetic relationships were formulated was tantamount to 
understanding the human mind itself. The point was to consciously reproduce the unconscious 
intellectual operations which led to the formation not of mere objects but, rather, of meaningful 
imbrications of objects, signs, and social practices. It was believed that the relationships 
interpolated between an object and all other aspects of a society—whether material, ritualistic, 
or economic—formed a dense semiotic fabric in which words and things were not cloven 
asunder, as they were believed to have been in Europe since early modernity. The reason then 
for the bourgeoisie to project the phenomenon of unconscious thought onto the Savage Mind 
was that the upper classes’ economic privileges derived from their professed conscious analysis 
of that which lay beneath the appearance of things: whether these be the subconscious 
mechanisms beneath conscious thought, the social relations concealed beneath the fetish, the 
universal structures underlying particular myths, the evolutionary genealogies hidden by the 
particularity of individual species, or simply the general principles that might be abstracted 
from anything under the sun. If fetishization—the special prerogative of the Savage Mind—
involves a magical operation of substitution (investing an object with relationships external to 
its material particularity), then it must be understood that de-fetishization—the special 
prerogative of the bourgeois mind and linked to its coming-into-consciousness—involved an 
equally magical operation of sublimation, whereby the non-material relations inhering to a 




The various processes of substitution, association, and translation which designers extrapolated 
from the Savage Mind could easily fall under the category of semiotic operations, since 
designers understood these operations as ways of producing meaningfulness. However, the 
strict definition of semiotics as comprising sign systems must be expanded here to account for 
the disciplinary practices and discourses included in this dissertation. Modernist designers as 
well as anthropologists and psychologists looked at systems of meaning that did not usually 
involve signs as such. They regarded aesthetics, social practices, and taxonomic thinking as 
constituting non-sign-based semiotic frameworks. The sociological and anthropological turn 
taken by many modernist architects in the decades following World War II resumed the old, 
Enlightenment-era search for an “architecture parlante”, albeit with the understanding that 
architecture did not speak through signs but instead through less literal means, such as 
associations with a society’s habits, myths, or everyday objects. When I wish to stress this 
distinction (i.e., from semiotics qua sign systems) I will use the term “quasi-semiotic”; 
however, in most cases I assume semiotics to include non-sign-based systems of meaning as 
well. By understanding twentieth-century semiotics—and, relatedly, structuralism—to be 
concerned with non-sign-based systems, we can proceed to understand how an epistemic bent 
towards analyzing mechanisms lying structurally below the surface of things (and below the 
surface of thought) was not so much an end in itself as it was—often—a means of reproducing 
the techniques of the subconscious mind. 
This brings me to the broader purpose of this dissertation, which is not so much to redress an 
“omission”, i.e., the exclusion of the Savage Mind from design historiography. Nor does this 




inextricably entangled with the construction of semiotic apartheids. In presenting this figment 
called the Savage Mind, the following work seeks, rather, to challenge a persistent and seminal 
assumption regarding modernity: namely, that straightforward structuralist analysis comprised 
the arch-epistemic mode of twentieth-century techno-scientific production. Narratives 
analyzing early-modern European science often begin with Europeans’ “discovery” of a split—
or an arbitrary relation—between sign and referent or, relatedly, between surface appearance 
and structure. Against this narrative, I would argue that hegemonic practices during the past 
century, if not longer, actually tended quite relentlessly towards the opposite. Scientific, 
aesthetic, and technological pursuits have sought the magical recuperation of an indissoluble 
unity between sign and referent, aiming to bypass signs in favor of sub-semiotic forms, forms 
that I call “pentecostal technologies”. The economic division between a class of intellectual 
laborers and a class of non-intellectual laborers corresponds to the binary opposition between 
the structuralist mind (broadly understood as an attribute of the intellectual classes’ tendency 
towards dispassionate analysis) and that persistent object of structuralist study, the Savage 
Mind. It is the intention of this dissertation to show, therefore, that the structuralist myth of the 
sign’s disenchantment (i.e., its arbitrariness) has been integral to a more pernicious, tacit myth: 
that of a world naturally divided into two forms of human subjectivity, one inherently 
disenchanted—i.e., conscious of its methods of production; the other, in an unconscious state of 
enchantment. Intellectual property was thought to derive largely from a canniness to underlying 
“structures”, whether these be grammars, productive processes, natural principles, or cognitive 
mechanisms. Pentecostal technologies provided a way of bridging—while nonetheless 
maintaining—the semiotic apartheids arising from this presumed divide between the 




sought to overcome the Babelian confusion resulting from semiotic apartheids through recourse 
to pentecostal techniques. This did not dismantle the apartheids but rather rendered them 
operable. 
This is not to suggest that a structuralist methodology need necessarily lend itself to a 
dichotomy between intellectual owners and non-owners. (To the extent that my own work may 
be considered a structuralist undertaking—one truly indebted to Lévi-Strauss himself—, I 
prefer to think that, like any epistemological method, a structuralist approach can be used to 
chip away at structuralism’s own mythic encrustations.) Nor, it should be added, are the 
protagonists appearing in this dissertation necessarily racists in their thinking. On the contrary, 
several of them—Charles Godfrey Leland, Seymour Papert, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Aldo van 
Eyck—emphatically avowed intellectual equality of all humans. Yet their working methods 
participated in an intellectual framework that tended often towards class apartheids. To better 
explain why the structuralist method has provided both philosophical and technological 
scaffolding for a division between intellectual and rote labor, it would be helpful to clarify how 
I’m using the term structuralism, which is two-fold. First of all, I use it in reference to scholars 
whose work has lent itself (or was believed to lend itself) to research in communication 
technology and cybernetics. The arbitrariness of the phoneme vis-à-vis its referent, as described 
by Ferdinand de Saussure and as taken up by Information Theory and cybernetics, does not 
inherently imply a particular form of intellectual subjectivity. However, the fact that 
structuralist linguistics rose to prominence during African colonization and during a period of 
advanced technological warfare (i.e., spanning the two World Wars and the Cold War), pushed 




described in Chapter Three, colonial ethnopsychiatrists claimed that African intelligence was to 
be distinguished from European intelligence because the former was cognitively unable to 
recognize the arbitrary relation between sign and referent. On the other hand, the post-war 
cybernetic project of producing self-regulating machines, which was dependent on various 
branches of structuralist thought presumed a distinction between meta-intelligence and 
automatic intelligence. In other words, there was a class of people who were intelligent about 
intelligence (i.e., conscious about the operations of consciousness) and there was a class of 
people and machines whose intelligence was not self-conscious and thus relied to some extent 
on methods of programming. 
The second way I use the term structuralist is in reference to various modernist architects, 
design pedagogues, and technological designers, most of whom never described themselves as 
structuralists and several of whom were probably quite unaware of what structuralism was.15 I 
read their endeavors as structuralist, however, in light of their shared interest in developing 
basic codifiable techniques of creative production. Whether treating aesthetic forms as semiotic 
assemblages built out of aesthetic “grammars”, or treating the techniques of human imagination 
and representation as similarly comprised of a finite set of elementary means, the methods 
advocated by the designers presented in this dissertation tended towards processes of 
technologically reproducible intelligence, even in cases where the designers in question were 
not especially engaged with technological methods. Structuralist methodology in its more 
reductive forms always bears a kinship to technological reproducibility. Disciplining creativity 
in such a way that the distinction between design and technological reproduction might easily 




This brings me to a final point concerning the implied interlocutors of this work. My choice to 
look at how creativity has been disciplined throughout the long twentieth century—which 
implies that discipline is not inimical to creativity, but inherent to it—is situated against a 
recent strain of post-structuralist discourse loosely—perhaps incorrect—termed Deleuzean 
which assumes that an embrace of the flexibly evolving structure of reality constitutes some 
kind of weapon against stultifying, rationalist, and reductive epistemic frameworks (such as 
structuralism).16 The fact that such theories unwittingly reproduce the discourses of both 
structuralism and capitalism (both of which in fact understood structures as enabling flexible 
evolution and play) is surely indicative of a need for further historical understanding of what 
structuralism actually did in the world during the twentieth century (for, as this dissertation 
argues, magical synthesis in the form of pentecostal technologies was, even more than analytic 
reduction, structuralism’s real bent). On the other hand, this dissertation assumes a strategy 
quite different from some current phenomenologically-rooted critiques arguing that the 
embrace of digital technologies has happened at the cost of sensuous experience.17 While such 
claims may (or may not) be true, a critique of the digital age must, I believe, expose not simply 
the latter’s shortcomings but rather the aporia that lie at its heart. My own concern is how the 
aporia inherent to present-day regimes of digital production contribute to economic exploitation 
and injustice. 
Concerning questions of justice, the present work owes a great debt to the methods and 
concerns of various scholars already mentioned such as Balibar and Buck-Morss, as well as to 
Jacques Derrida whose deconstructionist theories have been informative to my own methods, 




that semiotic thought was built from the fundamental structure of binary oppositions. In this 
respect Reinhold Martin’s Organizational Complex has also been influential to this dissertation, 
as it is one of the few architectural histories to date that details a kinship between, on the one 
hand, the organic or “humanist” and, on the other hand, the corporatist order of late twentieth-
century capitalism, thereby striking at one of the most significant mythical binaries of the 
modern era. My work is further beholden to several other historians within the field of 
architecture, including Felicity Scott, Arindam Dutta, Ijlal Muzaffar, and Anthony Vidler. Scott 
has continuously introduced into the ambit of twentieth-century architectural history 
protagonists who had been relegated to its margins despite the intrinsic importance of their 
work. This includes analyses of figures and institutions important to my own work, such as 
Bernard Rudofsky (whom I mention only briefly but whose exhibition Architecture without 
Architects was most influential to the architects I examine in Chapter Two) and the MIT Media 
Lab. Dutta’s book The Bureaucracy of Beauty: The Work of Art in the Age of Its Global 
Reproducibility is deeply informative to my study of how the discipline of design was 
established and codified beginning in the late nineteenth century. Dutta’s work focuses on the 
relationship between “crafts” in British-ruled India and the concomitant Department of Science 
and Art in London, a relationship that is not so dissimilar from the one I have identified 
between the Savage Mind and modernist Euro-American design, albeit in the former case the 
British were often developing methods of copying actual products (e.g., Indian textiles) made 
by actual people, whereas the Savage Mind’s methods were much more an invented figment. A 
propos of the “savage”, Vidler’s classic work, Writing of the Walls: Architectural Theory of the 
Late Enlightenment, provides a valuable reading of Laugier’s primitive hut and, more 




Muzaffar’s work on the intentionally “incomplete modernization” strategy enacted in 
twentieth-century colonies and post-colonies has been instructive to my reading of Team Ten 
architecture and the MIT Media Lab. Apart from these architectural histories, I have drawn on 
recent scholarship on semiotics and psychiatry, such as Lydia Liu’s Freudian Robot, which 
outlines some connections between psychoanalytic theory and cybernetics.18 However, my 
understanding of semiotics is most deeply indebted to coursework in anthropology with Paul 
Kockelman that has helped broaden the scope of what I deem might be interpreted as a semiotic 
system, indeed showing me the imbrications between economic and semiotic systems. 
Relatedly, another key influence on this work is Karl Marx whose analysis of labor still 
remains relevant to present-day scholarship even if requiring ongoing amendment. On the other 
hand, the most famous of twentieth-century Marxist architectural historians, Manfredo Tafuri, 
goes virtually unmentioned in this dissertation, given our different approaches to Marxism: in 
his case, often reading architecture’s permutations as symptomatic expressions of dialectical 
development. While his analyses are keenly insightful, my own work reads architecture’s 
twentieth-century trajectories as arising from the persistent contradictions of intellectual 
property in the technologically reproducible work, a theme not really treated by Marx—much 
less by Tafuri— however much my critique is motivated by Marxist theory.  More influential to 
my work than Tafuri are Marxian thinkers such as Balibar, Jacques Rancière, Gayatri Spivak, 
and Slavoj Zizek whose interest in how the fictional figure of the proletariat affects the actual 
question of class struggle has proven useful to my understanding of how a much wilder 
fiction—that of Savage Thought—has aided the persistence of class inequalities. Regarding the 




a slightly different strategy for considering the persistence of seemingly non-capitalist or non-
bourgeois practices within the hegemony of world capitalism by showing how technologies, in 
tandem with epistemic and semiotic apartheids, were developed toward maintaining difference 
within a universalizing framework of production.19 Such apartheids were promulgated within 
the global north as well as between north and south, even if to differing degrees. Moreover, the 
magical thought on which capitalist technologies and design techniques depended shows that 
the bourgeoisie was never actually bourgeois; that is, it never really adhered to Enlightenment 
precepts of rationality.20 Still, if “class” is something of a figment (insofar as it suggests a kind 
of homogenous culture), it nonetheless remains an indispensable category, one that I hope can 
be better understood through the concept of epistemic and semiotic apartheids. 
Finally, one interlocutor that appears only in my final chapter is Fredric Jameson whose 
Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism presents a rich and complex analysis 
of the semiotics—and Marxist underpinnings—of postmodern culture. Postmodernity might be 
said to form a latent theme of this dissertation, and it is my hope that the history of modernist 
designers’ semiotic engagements might offer a different reading of postmodernity’s presumed 
semiotic turn, described in the concluding remarks to my final chapter. Contrary to the legacy 
of Charles Jenck’s The Language of Post-Modern Architecture, this dissertation argues that 
twentieth-century architects had long prior been engaged in efforts to render architecture into 
semiotic code, and that Postmodernist architecture might be understood as a natural—if clearly 
unintended— outgrowth of Team Ten’s efforts. More importantly though, this work points 
toward a different understanding of the relationship between capitalism and postmodernism 




Jameson calls schizophrenia) said to characterize it. Rather than seeing the delirium of global 
capital represented in an equally delirious pastiche of artistic works, my own account of the 
postmodern period dispenses not only with inquiries into base-superstructure causation but also 
with understanding capital itself as driven by an internal logic rather than by continual efforts 
to flee the aporetic discourse that surrounds it. By understanding the aporia of intellectual 
property to pertain equally to interpretations of subjectivity and labor (class difference being 
coded as epistemic difference and vice-versa), the following work charts a different path 
towards postmodernity’s Babel. In other words, Babel must be read not only as a figure of 
polyglot confusion, but as a figure of the global division of labor. The apartheids pertaining to 
that division did not produce semiotic delirium; rather they produced the means of overcoming 
while still maintaining putative semiotic difference. Therein lies the culture of late capitalism. 
Under “late capitalism”, semiotic apartheids increasingly exert their influence in respect to 
labor and education. While this dissertation deals with past events and discourses, it is also 
intended to gesture toward certain issues of the present. One of the most evident of these issues 
is that of intellectual property itself and how it has become the focus of legal debates related to 
reproductive technologies, such as in cases of “piracy” usually understood as illicit copying in 
the global south of the technological products of the north. Secondly, in the area of 
architectural practice and discourse, the rising interest in “informal settlement” echoes themes I 
examine here, namely the positing of two modes of intellectual production, that of the 
unconsciously creative bricoleur and of the consciously designing architect who translates the 
bricoleur’s methods. A corresponding literature in other disciplines debates the relative virtues 




dissertation takes a slightly different approach to these difficult questions by situating the 
indigent’s agency not only in how one determines his or her material conditions and means of 
production but also in how one’s intellectual subjectivity is construed vis-à-vis the status “slum 
dweller”. Obviously, such putative subjectivity, while discursively formulated, is grounded in 
the politics of education, and here too my dissertation points toward some present-day 
concerns. Several of the following chapters deal with the hierarchical distinction granted to the 
humanities (and to people with access to a “humanist” education). In light of current 
developments in secondary and higher education, tending towards the marginalization of the 
humanities as schools re-orient curricula and expenditures towards the most lucrative 
professions and disciplines, it is incumbent to ask how the increasing inaccessibility of 
humanities training (i.e., accessible only to a small elite) bears upon epistemic apartheids and 
the global division of labor. Although it is not within the scope of this dissertation to explore 
such questions, my hope is that, by pointing to epistemic apartheids as an instrument of 
economic domination, this dissertation might open up ways to reconsider how the more 
estimable ideals held by some of this dissertation’s protagonists—I speak specifically of 
Leland’s interest in a universal education comprising both vocational and humanities training—








CHAPTER ONE: The Industrial Arts 
 
The “Architecture Machine” As Dreamed in the Nineteenth-Century 
Henceforth will be found… that Man can by a peculiar process based on his vital power 
and mechanical aid, actually decompose certain forms of matter or reduce them to an 
impalpable state as of dust or a vapour and then draw them together to a hard 
substance…  The result was that from earth or sand and air he [an inventor] made with 
great rapidity large masses of a kind of stone, in any shape required, and what was most 
remarkable he found it perfectly easy to put every block in place as formed… [O]ne 
morning the people living near a hill by Springfield, Massachusetts, were astonished to 
behold on its summit a stone tower fifty feet high which had not been there the night 
before, on the summit of which sat the builder. From this dated a new method of building 
which spread all over the world. 
By means of it, it became as easy for a traveler in the wilderness to build a stone cottage 
as to pitch a tent, and any man who had a bit of ground could erect on it in a short time a 
manor. Forthwith castles, towers and magnificent walls and arches began to arise on all 
the mountains, cliffs and headlands of the world. As the method once acquired was 
inexpensive and easy, the poorest people, and even boys erected at will houses or huts as 
they pleased for all kinds of purposes... The results… in public buildings and cities was 
colossal, one being the perfect restoration of the pyramids of Egypt, and of well nigh all 
the old cathedrals and palaces of which plans had been preserved, including the 
rebuilding of Babylon… 
Charles Godfrey Leland, “1936” from Prophesies for the Twentieth Century (1899)22 
The pyramids of Egypt would be rebuilt without slaves. The Tower of Babel would be finally 
completed despite the world’s diversity of tongues: Babylon’s restoration prefigured by a stone 
tower materializing as if by magic one morning in Massachusetts.23 With the aid of this 
imagined architecture-machine, children and “the very poor” would, according to Charles 
Godfrey Leland, scatter huts across the earth almost as if these grew organically from the earth, 
having sprung from rustic imaginations—imaginations uncorrupted, that is, by any 
cosmopolitan knowledge of architecture. In a subsequent speculation from his Prophesies for 
the Twentieth Century, Leland foretold that in 1974 this automatic architecture machine would 




used for mural decorations”. People could thereby decorate their dwellings according to 
Nature’s own patterns. “Moved by pity for the poor”, they would use their machines for 
“covering ugly old dwellings with all the elaborate splendor of Gothic or Arabesque 
Architecture.”24  Finally, with this machine, Leland tells us, “Nature will be really reproduced 
by Nature.”25 
What could it mean for a machine to enable Nature to reproduce itself? Does Nature not 
already reproduce itself, isn’t this one of its most defining features? And why should the 
concrete excretions of a sophisticated architecture-making machine be thought natural? Perhaps 
the answer is simple: The machine could be said to produce nature—or really, to allow nature 
to reproduce itself—because it would enable architecture to emerge directly from the untrained 
mind, uncontaminated by any consciousness of architecture’s historic developments and global 
permutations. The machine would operate according to organic principles that conjoined 
physical and psychic mechanisms. Because Nature and Mind were both deemed to be governed 
by the same scientific laws, it was conceivable that a machine might finally merge the 
creativity of Nature with that of the human mind. 
What deviated from Nature, Leland implied in his earlier writings on industrial arts education, 
was not machines but rather human labor, which was at once too machinic and not machinic 
enough: too much, that is, like a dumb, repetitive machine and too little like a magical, creative 
machine. Leland thus rewrites one of the nineteenth-century’s most familiar critiques of 
machine-made art: According to Leland, the machine does not denature and destroy the human 
artistry of pre-modern craft techniques; rather the machine enables the re-naturalization of art 




All humans could be assisted by personal machines that would replace the complex division of 
labor with spontaneous, demiurgic acts of creativity. In thus liberating workers from the highly 
specialized labor of architectural construction, Leland’s machine would render moot the 
confusion of tongues that had once disrupted Babel’s construction. Labor, as aided by creative 
machines, would become non-coercively self-organizing. Work would be a form of magic.  
Babel recurs as a theme for Leland, as it does for other designers and authors included in this 
history; for as will be seen, not only would subsequent projects to invent architecture machines 
depend on the capabilities of universal programming languages, but such inventions would 
likewise endeavor to eradicate the unruliness of labor arising through the long process whereby 
an original design—conceived purely and abstractly in the mind—is laboriously and 
collectively translated through the hands of countless workers. To eliminate the wayward 
tendencies of labor, one would have to make the execution of design a more seamless, 
unmediated process, a feat that would be tantamount to civilizing mind and nature in tandem. 
When the architecture machine, as imagined by Leland, had sputtered out the crowning stones 
that would complete the City of Babel, not only would world architecture but also World 
History thereby attain the ultimate dream of a peaceful global order. The machine would enable 
a post-historic reclamation of a prelapsarian state of freedom from toil. Machines would finally 
merge humans with the Nature from which they had been expelled so long ago. Leland’s 
architecture machine would help bring to pass the kind of redemption that had once been the 
special purview of divine eschatology but had, by the nineteenth century, been subsumed by 




History, in Leland’s writings, becomes indistinguishable from what I will call “machine 
eschatology”. 
Leland’s own work was polymathic in nature; yet a certain consistency cut across his diverse 
endeavors—namely, a disregard for conventional boundaries that delimited science from 
magic. Born to a wealthy Philadelphia family in 1824, Leland traveled extensively, published 
magazine articles, wrote fiction, translated the poetry of Heinrich Heine, edited a literary 
magazine and, later, an Abolitionist paper, The Continental Monthly. In the mid-nineteenth 
century, when the discipline of ethnography was still in its infancy, Leland learned the 
language of the Passamaquoddy and, during his travels in Europe, the language of the Roma. 
He subsequently published volumes on their folklore, and later engaged in similar work on 
African-American legends, voodoo, and Etruscan magic. Finally, inspired by craft techniques 
observed in his ethnological fieldwork, as well as by his brief involvement with institutional 
efforts to reform craft production in England, Leland developed his own theory of what he 
called the “practical” or “industrial” arts. Around 1880 he opened his own extracurricular 
program as part of Philadelphia’s new public school system, which became the Public 
Industrial Arts School of Philadelphia, an institution whose influence appears to have extended 
as far as the Bauhaus.27 Although his leadership of this school has led scholarship to link him to 
the Arts and Crafts movement (which did certainly influence him), Leland distinctly embraced 
new technological forms of production, albeit with an amendment: that these forms of 
production need not replace the work of the creative mind; nor—as Frank Lloyd Wright would 
later claim—that machines might inspire new formal innovations; rather, the encounter 




Studious analysis of the human imagination could render apparent the precise processes 
according to which beauty and novelty were conceptualized and materialized. The imagination 
could be improved through rigorous systemization of its methods. Consequently, the creative 
mind might operate more like a machine; or, conversely, machines might learn to operate more 
like creative minds. 
This Taylorism of the mind had implications beyond promoting new methods of industrial arts. 
Drawing from burgeoning conceptions of the human unconscious, Leland’s theory that the 
methods of the unconscious mind needed to be consciously harnessed towards productive ends 
provokes a reconsideration of the legacy of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. Motivated in part by 
Susan Buck-Morss’s demonstration of how actual events in Haiti may have likely influenced 
Hegel’s conception of the mind’s progressive self-liberation, this article proposes to investigate 
how a particular version of the master-slave dialectic became embedded within ideologies and 
technologies of creative production. Leland’s thinking was symptomatic of an increasing 
tendency to consider creative production—in the age of its technological reproducibility—as 
consisting of a dialectic between conscious and unconscious modes of thought. These two 
epistemic models, which could be schematized as that of the analytic or techno-scientific mind 
(associated with consciousness) and that of the intuitive, magical mind (associated with 
unconsciousness) mapped onto another master-slave binary, one that itself was informed not so 
much by any one specific historical relationship (e.g., Haitian slaves and French plantation 
owners) but rather by the more ubiquitous hierarchies that distinguished a putatively modern 
subjectivity from allegedly less enlightened, less rational ones.29 According to Buck-Morss, 




banners under which colonial powers assert their superiority over the colonized and enslaved. 
Similarly to this perversion, the presumed unconsciousness of “primitive” peoples (whether 
belonging to children, slaves, peasants, Native Americans, or European Roma) served Leland 
as the basis upon which to build a modern science of creative production that he used to claim 
the superiority of Anglo-American society. 
It should be noted that Leland was not the sole author of Prophesies for the Twentieth Century. 
Rather, he had based its year-by-year forecasts of political and techno-scientific developments 
on the divinatory work of Maddelena, a Tuscan witch who was one of his principle informants 
and collaborators during his years of ethnological research on Etruscan culture and magic. 
Leland believed that Tuscan peasants still preserved more or less intact the basic lineaments of 
primitive Etruscan culture, now cloaked in the guise of Roman and Christian mythologies. 
Leland had likely learned of these modifications to ancient Etruscan rites from James Frazer’s 
The Golden Bough (a book that would, incidentally, become a major source for Sigmund 
Freud’s understanding of the unconscious psyche’s “primitive” tendencies.)30  The peculiar 
hybridity of the Prophesies’ provenance—co-authored by a peasant practitioner of ancient 
magic and a bourgeois dabbler in the sciences—did not, apparently, give Leland pause. That 
peasant witchcraft had composed the timeline for the United States’ gradual ushering-in of a 
technologically-enabled state of perpetual peace was in no way inimical to Leland’s theories 
and life work. His contributions to the development of Euro-American industrial arts pedagogy 
as well as his theories of psychological self-training were informed by his ethnological work on 
“primitive” societies. According to Leland, England and the United Sates were to 




democratic self-governance. Yet Leland’s own proposed strategies for intellectual development 
recurrently drew from the very people who, supposedly, most urgently required intellectual 
development. Perhaps this was, in fact, the nature of World Historical progress. And perhaps 
too, the versions World History that Leland had inherited from his reading of Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx also bore the seeds of this contradiction concerning the linearity 
of historical progression, especially in regards to the supposed advance of something called 
consciousness.31 
Weltgeist as Wildegeist 
In The Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel describes the mind’s incremental transformation and 
assimilation of objects of knowledge into the mind’s own modes of cognition, as cognition 
distills and abstracts the object in question. Within this system whereby consciousness 
gradually gains self-awareness, the master-slave relationship serves the purpose of liberating 
consciousness from the bondage of dependency—specifically, dependency on another’s 
consciousness of oneself. 32  Prior to Hegel’s work, Enlightenment writers had entertained 
diverse theories on the nature of consciousness, language, and learning, often based upon 
speculative philosophical or ethnographic conceptions of what I will term (after Lévi-Strauss) 
“savage thought”. The workings of Savage Thought, because primitive, were likewise deemed 
apodictic, thereby exemplifying an epistemic ideal much sought after by Enlightenment 
philosophers. By dint of analyzing this externalized “Mind”, Europeans could become 
conscious of the processes of consciousness itself, stripped of its culturally acquired 
accretions.33 No doubt influenced by such Enlightenment thought experiments, Hegel’s master-




of the ideals espoused by Toussaint l’Ouverture, but also to be rooted in an Enlightenment 
tradition according to which consciousness of consciousness (or self-consciousness, per Hegel) 
was to be gleaned from encounters with savage peoples. 
Whereas for Hegel, the historical progression of consciousness was more or less an end in 
itself, being tantamount to political and cultural enlightenment, for Leland (who had clearly 
read Hegel and often referred to a “World Spirit” [Weltgeist]), the progression of consciousness 
was linked to material progress, to the advance of technological means of production. In his 
writings, the figure of Savage Thought was both mythical—resembling Enlightenment thought 
experiments—and, at the same time, literal, insofar as the “primitive” person demonstrated a 
facility for creative production that had been long since lost to bourgeois society. In contrast to 
the “primitivism” often posited by art historians in reference to the noble, “savage” themes 
depicted by twentieth-century avant-garde painters, the relationship between Leland’s 
ethnological studies and his theories of industrial arts production were epistemic in nature. That 
is to say, Leland had no interest in having artwork express some primitive quality. Instead, the 
intellectual processes of a putative Savage Mind were to be analyzed and transformed into 
technologies of creative production. Hegel’s master-slave dialectic became a literal dialectic 
between unconscious (i.e., savage) thought and the new modes of artistic production. 
I want to build upon Buck-Morss’s account by returning to the political shift she observes 
between early and later Hegel (i.e., between what she interprets as the radical egalitarianism of 
the master-slave dialectic versus the racism of World History).34 While deeply indebted to her 
arguments, I would still suggest that the master-slave dialectic was not unequivocally 




system of World History.35  The “slave” of the master-slave dialectic, far from being purely a 
revolutionary figure, was already enormously over-determined by, on the one hand, a vast 
Enlightenment literature on the savage and, on the other hand, changing regimes of labor, not 
only modern slavery but also the contemporaneous advent of wage-labor. (Hegel’s vacillation 
between the terms bondsman [knecht] and slave [sklav] attest this over-determination.) Perhaps 
in order to account for the discrepancy between Europe’s (and Haiti’s) seeming promise of 
universal enlightenment versus the increasing degradation of wage labor, Hegel’s philosophy 
effectively cast the degraded worker in the role of the soon-to-become-conscious mind who 
attains consciousness through laborious manipulation of the material world (indeed, through his 
craftsmanship). But how then to account for the inversion I am describing in this dissertation, 
whereby the non-bourgeois classes—whether enslaved or “free”—became recast as 
unconscious of their own productions, while the class of intellectual laborers assume 
consciousness—and thereby a kind of ownership— of these productive processes? 
In the histories described in this chapter, artists and intellectuals seem to mimic a sort of 
master-slave dialectic, by positing the existence of an unconscious mind internal but latent in 
themselves whose operations can only be glimpsed through recourse to the truly unconscious 
mind—that of savages and children. Thus, designers could gain consciousness of the nature of 
their own un-consciousness. Henceforth, Hegel’s “slave” would cease to be the real protagonist 
of the master-slave dialectic. As anticipated by Hegel’s later formulation of great “world 
historical men”, the Weltgeist would advance by a change of consciousness on the part of 
“masters”, not “slaves”, indeed by a kind of trans-historical haunting of the former by the latter. 




the evolution of the Weltgeist—when adopted by design theorists, instigated a “conscious” 
recuperation of the “unconscious” intellectual operations of an imagined Savage Mind. I will 
show that, just as Weltgeist was believed to advance History by taking spiritual possession of 
great historical men, avant-garde designers sought to become spiritually possessed by the 
Wildegeist [Savage Mind] so as to gain awareness of universal aesthetic principles and primal 
techniques of creativity that would undergird their techno-aesthetic innovations. During the 
period of Euro-American industrialization being examined in this chapter—the late nineteenth 
through early twentieth centuries—artists’ efforts to adapt and advance new means of 
technological production initiated a reconsideration of the role of “design” in relation to factory 
production and, concomitantly, a re-evaluation of the relations between intellectual, physical, 
and mechanical work, as would be particularly evident during the early years of the Bauhaus, 
Europe’s pre-eminent—if short-lived—school of design. 
In order to make sense of how the contradictions of a Hegelian and, subsequently, a Marxist 
construct of World History were enacted through burgeoning practices of design, I will draw 
upon a meaningful ambivalence noted by Etienne Balibar in his analysis of C. B. 
Machpherson’s concept of “possessive individualism”. Balibar remarks on the double meaning 
of “property” (propriété) suggested in modern European philosophies of economic ownership 
and exchange. Property denotes that which is “proper” to—or inseparable from—one’s 
selfhood and, at the same time, that which is expropriable or alienable from one’s self, 
including one’s saleable labor. The questions Balibar raises concerning property’s paradoxical 
alienability might be further elucidated in relation to the processes of material and intellectual 




concept of alienation). The discursive overlaps between “possessive individualism”, with its 
peculiarly alienable “properties”, and Hegel’s dialectic (also suggesting a fluid alienability of 
“properties” between master and slave) begs the exploration of another term—possession—
whose multi-valence may have been instrumental to the machinery of World History and 
technological progress. In this chapter I will explore how “possession” designated both a mode 
of stable intellectual ownership in perpetuity and a fluid mode of intellectual [geistig] exchange 
often taking the form of a kind of spiritual possession.36 Towards a critique of the modern 
construct of intellectual property, I will interrogate some of the ideological, legal, and technical 
means through which designers became complicit with the increasing division between the 
categories of intellectual versus material property (and labor), as they promoted “magical” 
techniques and theories of intellectual-spiritual possession, often claiming recourse to a more 
primitive intelligence. Indeed, the very notion of a general rubric of “Design” forming the 
educational framework for new institutions of art and architecture (as distinct from teaching 
particular crafts) seemingly helped to safeguard artists and artisans from the depredations of 
wage-labor by instead securing their place within the privileged sphere of intellectual work. 
Although Savage Thought was often defined by the lack of a complex division of labor, the 
Savage Mind was constructed by designers as a model for further articulating the division 
between intellectual and physical labor within the context of artworks’ increasing technological 
reproducibility. Their efforts brought to light the aporia that lay at the heart of World History: 
namely, that the Zeitgeist or the dominant mode of production (if a Marxist framework was 
preferred) that characterized European modernity constituted, at least at the level of design, a 




Universal Education and the Art of the Unconscious 
It was during a visit to the school of Miss Whatley in Cairo, and in Egypt, that it suddenly 
occurred to me that very young children could… profitably and pleasantly master the 
decorative arts. I there saw little Copht and Arab girls and boys… executing such works 
in embroidery as I had hitherto associated only with the efforts of accomplished adults. 
The next day in the bazaars I found even more striking illustrations of the discovery. I 
saw very small children, with a single frame between them, working both sides alike of 
beautiful, highly elaborate designs in silk, without a pattern before them. I saw in the 
jeweller's bazaar mere boys, with tools as rude as those of an English tinker, making 
jewellery… that kind which, while it lacks the machinery finish of Western work, excels it 
in originality and character…. I also found, and this was the most important discovery of 
all, that in all these countries these children did not by any means merely follow the 
designs furnished by artists. In most cases they, like the grown-up workmen around 
them, had no patterns at all, but worked like birds or bees by sympathy with the rest, 
modifying or varying it according to the aim of the work. 37 
Charles Godfrey Leland, Practical Education. 
For the fact that ants with incredible skill and forethought anticipate and adapt a 
thousand circumstances, not running in mere grooves of thought or mental action, but 
showing a varied genius which surpasses that of man in Architecture, renders absolutely 
absurd the belief of Descartes which still generally prevails, that animals follow in all 
things only ‘a blind instinct or mechanical impulse communicated through their external 
organs.’ 38 
Charles Godfrey Leland, “The Inner Life in Nature”. 
According to the Hegelian art historian, Heinrich Wölfflin, the Zeitgeist manifests itself in the 
artistic realm through a stylistic unity linking together the disparate fine- and decorative-arts. In 
The Principles of Art History, Wölfflin describes how characteristic ways of rendering lines or 
shading volumes change from one era to the next albeit consistently across the variety of 
artistic media.39 The decorative arts are not only thereby given a place within art history 
hitherto reserved for the fine arts; they are even given the more privileged place, for as the 
supposedly less self-conscious arts, the decorative arts seem to be identified as the more likely 
locus for art-historical change. Wölfflin does not really offer an explanation of how the change 
from one era to another is to transpire, except for in a very brief and rather surprising passage 




speculates how the perpetually repeated production of an ornamental motive would inevitably 
lead to its transformation, almost as if a craftsman, by some slip of the hand, would alter 
forever the character of that basic motive form and, thereby, the entire artistic Zeitgeist of the 
ensuing period.40 Published in 1915 and developed from some of the ideas set forth in his 
dissertation, Prolegomena to a Psychology of Architecture, the Principles is surely indebted 
enough to burgeoning psychoanalytic theory that the craftsman’s slippage should not be 
understood as purely random but rather unconsciously motivated.41 If Wölfflin thus ascribes the 
evolution of the Zeitgeist to the humble craftsman rather than to the great art-historical men 
(i.e., fine artists), it is surely because the dialectical movement of history requires an 
unconscious operation of adaptation. Or rather, the dialectic is not between two antithetical 
concepts but between two proposed different forms of consciousness, one of which gives rise to 
unintentional innovation. Even without recourse to Freudian theory, Wölfflin’s emphasis on 
role of the putatively unconscious arts might have been indebted to burgeoning practices within 
the new discipline of industrial-art education. For this discipline—devoid of “great masters” 
and of content, which dominated the fine arts—was free to draw from more unlikely models of 
creative production. Such was the case with Leland’s Public Industrial Arts School of 
Philadelphia [PIASP], founded around the year 1881.42 
An ardent believer in World Historical progress (he alluded frequently to a “World Spirit”), 
Leland incorporated Materialist and Idealist versions of World History by designating 
industrial-art education as way of training pupils to materialize  and thereby advance the 
Mind/Spirit through technics.43 Accordingly, students would not be taught skills requisite to a 




so as to more readily adopt any future method of production and perhaps even become an 
innovator of such methods, thereby entering into the process of History. Given his interest in 
developing human capacities rather than conferring vocation-specific skills, Leland anticipated 
a later discourse on “human development” that would coalesce more distinctly in the mid-
twentieth century. This discourse effectively merged “World History” with economic strategies 
of production. 
“Human development” suggested the attainment of a certain mentality whereby the laboring 
members of a society could become willing agents of technological-economic developments, 
merging their intellectual processes with regimes of production: this by virtue of the 
purportedly natural correspondences between their own minds and the new technologies they 
used. Leland’s combined interest in human education and creative machines anticipates human-
developmental discourse though still couched firmly in the language of World History. It can be 
deduced from the various proposals found in Leland’s pedagogical theories and his political 
essays and pamphlets that the poor would become possessed by Weltgeist through enacting new 
forms of work that were not simply rote labor but that mediated between methods of industry 
on the one hand and methods of art and science on the other. Responding to a pervasive 
concern (articulated by Hegel and reiterated by Marx) that repetitive, mindless forms of labor 
would split mind from body and prevent the organic development of the “whole human”, 
Leland’s system for industrial arts education would instead transform industry into a creative 
activity of mind-body correlation.44 As will be seen, this strategy would come to undergird 
theories and practices at the Bauhaus in Germany where, decades later some of Leland’s 




on Leland’s methods that was later translated into German, in addition to the fact that the two 
men gave lectures in Germany on their experiences at PIASP, so it is likely that Bauhaus 
instructors indirectly came into contact with Leland’s methods.45 At the Bauhaus, even more 
than at Leland’s industrial arts school, human creativity and machine production would be 
made to converge [Fig. 1.1, 1.2, 1.3]. 
Leland’s proposal to make industrial arts education a standard component of childhood 
education answered to various debates regarding the role of universal education within a 
society organized according to a complex division of labor. The question of whether to make 
primary-school education mandatory and cost-free arose in the late nineteenth-century United 
States in conjunction with child labor reform acts. Massachusetts was the first state to 
implement compulsory education for children in 1852, while Philadelphia instated a similar 
city-wide policy. Although the provision of free education to all children seemed requisite to 
American meritocratic claims, the realities of an agricultural and, increasingly, industrial 
economy arguably rendered years of formal schooling superfluous to the larger population. 
According to Leland, however, industrial arts education did not lead only to the acquisition of 
artistic skills but also to general psychic techniques of mastering the mind, the will, and the 
body and as such might benefit anyone. The educational system he founded at the PIASP was 
bound up with his systems of intellectual-spiritual exercises, since the spirit was understood as 
exercisable—that is, as working according to scientifically discoverable principles that a human 
might manage through mental-bodily techniques. Leland insisted always on the perfect 
compatibility of mysticism and science, seemingly because the spirit, like mind and body, was 




Leland had spent the late 1870’s in Ireland and England where he became one of the founders, 
along with Eglantyne Jebbs and Walter Besant, of the Cottage Arts Association that aimed to 
train rural peasants in the industrial arts without having to relocate them to city factories.47 
Leland returned home to Philadelphia in 1880 and began immediately to lecture on the 
advantages of industrial arts education as a means of not only instilling practical skills but also 
of honing general intellectual capacities. Following the work of Walter Smith from the South 
Kensington School who promoted artistic training within Massachusetts’ new system of 
compulsory education, Leland insisted that PIASP instructors should simply be ordinary school 
teachers not in possession of special artistic qualifications.48  He had visited a children’s school 
in Egypt led by the British missionary, Mary Louisa Whatley, which included crafts training in 
the children’s curriculum so that they might sell their wares.49 Leland seemed conscious of the 
need to negotiate between two arguably irreconcilable requirements of universal education: 
firstly, that it be practical—i.e., that it orient a child towards eventual economic productivity; 
and secondly, that the curriculum be nonetheless general, not tailored to any particular 
occupation, nor privileging the needs of future professionals over those of future laborers and 
farmers.50 
Leland was aware of the pedagogical methods of an earlier generation of European 
kindergarten teachers—he names Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi and Friedrich Fröbel, all of 
whom, in the spirit of Bildung, argued for educating “the whole human” rather than training the 
child for a particular trade.51 Towards this end, Fröbel’s methods emphasized training the hand 
from an early age, as well as encouraging latent intellectual capacities for learning and 




as proof of the ultimately practical tendencies of cultivating the human intellect rather than 
imparting vocation-specific knowledge. According to Fröbel, “the youngest child can be taught 
the beginning of hand-work of many kinds. It can learn to observe, its quickness of perception 
can be stimulated, it can be taught to draw and model in clay, and in short ‘begin to prepare’ for 
serious work. No one would think of training it then to make a living, but its mind may be 
diverted into a channel tending in that direction.”52  Within the framework of a democratic 
universal education, the mind is to be diverted in certain proto-productive channels, not in fact 
trained to a specific occupation based upon the child’s social class.53 
In the 1880’s Leland was active publishing treatises and lecturing in Philadelphia and Boston in 
support of mandatory arts instruction for all children. The methods he was then developing 
within Philadelphia’s public school system leant themselves easily, he argued, to replication 
across the country. Various artistic professions in Europe and the United States had long been 
guarded by certain exclusionary barriers—in the case of the craft-guilds, long and sometimes 
costly apprenticeships; in the case of nineteenth-century fine-arts or architecture, the customary 
enrolment in an elite academy. So the notion of teaching the foundations of artistic practice in 
public schools suggested a kind of democratization of artistic practice. Rather than requiring a 
long and specialized training, Design would consist of pared-down methods that could be 
taught universally through a free public school system, just like reading and arithmetic. If 
Design was based upon memorizable visual alphabets and imitable gestures rather than on 
specialized talent, then any schoolteacher could impart basic artistic competency without the 
need for professional artistic masters. Leland insisted that no special talent was required to 




Leland offered proof that design skills were universally attainable from his ethnological work 
on non-European peoples. For example, in an unpublished manuscript entitled, “Profitable 
Work for Poor People”, he spoke of the fact that the Passamaquoddy were all highly skilled in 
variety of crafts although none of them specialized in craft production. He recounted the plight 
of “a young sad Indian girl who believed that she was the least able to design of any of her 
tribe. And to prove it, in a merry mood, she scraped on birch bark with the half of an old pocket 
knife a series of designs.... They were all inspired with beautiful conventional motives.”54 Later, 
conceding that “[r]ed Indians do indeed have a greater aptitude than whites,” he ascribed this 
artistic superiority to their familiarity from infancy onward with various craft productions and 
to the fact that the Passamaquoddy possessed a system of design as demonstrated by 
“conventional motives” that could be applied to different materials and art forms. A 
conventional motif was not to be confused with pattern-work which Leland disparaged as a 
form of mechanical reproduction. Rather (as cited above), the architectural abilities of birds and 
bees to work “in sympathy” with the rest—without language—and to vary their designs 
indicated, for Leland, the existence of an instinctive, flexible architectural language that could 
be adapted to different conditions. In contrast to Marx’s claim that the distinction between bees 
and architects hinged on the latter’s ability to conceptualize the entire design in advance of its 
construction, Leland understood design to depend on an instinctive, a priori set of operations, 
thus blurring the line between bees and architects.55 Like birds and bees, the Passamaquoddy 
worked from a reconfigurable repertoire of established geometrical forms. In Leland’s book, 
Practical Education, he observed “that the best decoration consists of simple ornaments 
arranged at intervals, and that in doing this the mere savage often surpasses the civilised artist. 




English schoolboy.”56 Indeed, Leland tells us, “the child corresponds to primitive man.”57  If all 
savages could make beautiful art, this proved that all his students needed was an agreed 
conventional system of Design. 
The idea of establishing a pedagogy of general Design, in contradistinction to craft 
apprenticeships or Beaux-Arts academic-training, was seemingly seized on by Leland as an 
alternative to more vocationally-specific forms of education. In “Profitable Work for Poor 
People”, Leland wrote of the “Minor Arts” that they “all form in reality but one single Art, 
which is Design”.58  What this implied was that all branches of art could be thought of as a 
system: Mastery over a given material and the techniques specific to that material no longer 
formed the objective of arts education. Rather, the entire array of materials, tools, and bodily 
techniques known to produce artistic products were to be constituted as a single techno-organic 
apparatus whose mechanisms would be mastered for the sake of perfecting the apparatus itself. 
Tadd, Leland’s successor at PIASP, described the approach he had acquired from his mentor: “I 
have no sympathy with the manual training methods that make the use of tools… the main end. 
The pupils become simply machines, thoughtless mechanisms. The first tools to be used and 
trained are the mind, the eyes and the hands—the instrumentalities of the organism….”59   
In 1880 Leland was provided with modest funds and facilities to try out his method of design 
education as an extracurricular experiment within Philadelphia’s public school system that 
would become the PIASP. Two hundred students were selected (supposedly without regard to 
any demonstrated talent) to receive instruction two afternoons a week. Leland reported that, 
against initial fears that his students would subsequently fall behind in their required course of 




quickness of intellectual perception or intelligence, so that literary studies are also more easily 
mastered.”60 Leland concluded that his emphasis on exercising students’ faculties of visual 
observation and visual memory naturally affected intellectual competency in general.61 Decades 
later, Tadd noted that the hand-eye coordination exercises were excellent training not just for 
the arts but also for the medical professions.62 
Much of Leland’s work had sought methods of harnessing the intellectual capacities of the 
subconscious, as outlined most particularly in his book, Have You a Strong Will? How to 
Develop and Strengthen Will Power, Memory, or Any Other Faculty or Attribute of the Mind by 
the Easy Process of Auto-Suggestion. Moreover, an unpublished manuscript entitled “The Inner 
Life of Nature” explicates in great detail the architectural and intellectual feats of certain 
animal species, feats Leland ascribes not wholly to instinct but also to intelligence, the latter’s 
existence supposedly demonstrated by these animals’ propensity to make mistakes and correct 
them and also to adapt their architectures to the particularities of a site.63 This delicate balance 
between an animal’s unconscious instincts and its conscious adjustments seemed to indicate 
possibilities for new strategies of artistic production. The animals’ artistry was not beholden so 
much instinct as to something mediating between instinct and conscious problem-solving. The 
subconscious, which featured in Leland’s treatises on improving intelligence and artistic 
facility, appeared to operate in the fissures between a universally-shared unconscious instinct 
and a culturally-trained conscious intelligence.64 If conscious and unconscious thought could 
more effectively influence each other in the processes of making art and architecture, as 
appeared to be the case with the ingenious mound ants, then design education should ideally 




Training the unconscious would involve mediating between verbal articulation and non-verbal 
processes. According to Leland, the “marvellous” phenomenon of animal architecture, above 
all, indicated the necessity of reconsidering the imbrications of scientific and magical thought. 
He proposed that the recent discernment of sophisticated thought in other species indicated a 
growing tendency whereby “the study of Science in any branch whatever becomes… literally 
that of Magic.”66 
During the first few years of his directorship of PIASP, Leland wrote prolifically on a number 
of scientific and, arguably, supernatural topics, such techniques of perception, memory, and 
imagination. These included a number of essays describing future art-making devices, 
technologies of mind, and scientific discoveries that would produce organic matter from 
inorganic.67  Between his ethnographic studies and his diverse essays, he often conflated 
Savage tricks of the human intellect (including magic and hypnotism) with scientific practices 
of engineering and invention, so that proposals for developing human methods of intellectual 
and artistic mastery are echoed in proposal for machine methods of the same. Clearly many of 
his proposed inventions for artistic machinery overlapped with his pedagogical theories on 
human “machinery” for artistic production. In a lecture delivered at the Franklin Institute in 
1880 called: Eye-Memory, Leland argues that a person can improve the faculty of visual 
recollection to the extent that a quick glance should suffice to commit the contours of an object 
to memory so perfectly and indelibly that the mind might later conjure that image at will and 
reproduce it perfectly through drawing. Referring to this “volitional vision” as “a basis… to 
every branch of intellectual education and of art”, he draws anecdotal evidence of its extant 




intellectual and perceptual quickness of Gypsies, and from psychological and scientific 
discoveries about perception.68  Decades later, when Leland proposed the future likelihood of a 
machine that could project visions from a person’s mind onto a sheet of paper, he is evidently 
conflating his ideas for human technologies of mind with non-human ones. Convinced that his 
system for arts education cultivated artistic aptitude equally within all children, Leland seemed 
to maintain a belief in the essential mechanical sameness of all human thought. If those 
perceptual and mnemonic mechanisms could be systematically trained to operate more 
productively, then why shouldn’t a machine be able to likewise master such capabilities? 
If it was customary to regard the complexity of human consciousness as proof of the 
inimitability of human intellect, then the human unconscious provided apparent counter-proof 
of such inimitability. Indeed—a point I will return to—we could regard the imitable creative 
capacities of the unconscious as challenge to the conception of intellectual work as being truly 
“proper” to an individual. In his treatise, The Mystic Will: Or, How to Develop and Strengthen 
Will Power, Memory, or Any Other Faculty or Attribute of the Mind, by an Easy Process, 
Leland advocates for the uses of hypnotism and for the instrumentalization of dreaming as 
methods for captivating the latent productivities of the unconscious imagination. Drawing a 
parallel between the productive pursuit of unconscious instinct and the imitation of any long-
established artistic tradition, Leland suggests that the latter operates similarly to the 
phenomenon of hypnosis. 
For the man who built a Romanesque Cathedral worked by the suggestiveness of minds 
which went before him, or Tradition. He was truly, as it were, in a kind of slumber; 





… Instinct in its earlier or simpler form is the following laws of Nature which are 
themselves formed by motive laws… 
…We do not sufficiently reflect on the fact that Natura naturans, or the action of Nature 
(or simply following Tradition), may, as is the case of Transition Architecture [i.e., 
Romanesque], involve the creation of marvelously ingenious and beautiful works, and 
the great enjoyment of them by Instinct alone. It is not possible for ordinary man to even 
understand this now in all its fullness… But a time will come when he will perceive that 
his best work has been done unconsciously, or under influences of which he was 
ignorant.69 
Leland proposes that the evolution of consciousness would involve unleashing an unconscious 
mechanistic principle for organic change. This introduction of the unconscious as a vehicle for 
world transformation might appear as a curious amendment to Hegel’s scheme for the gradual 
unfolding of consciousness described by World History, although, arguably, this is implicitly 
indicated in Hegel’s writings. For Leland, the World Historical trajectory is a flexible and 
thereby demiurgic structure of perpetual creative permutation: 
… For men cannot conceive of creation as separate from a predetermined plan or end, 
and all because they cannot understand that creative innate force, potentia, must have 
some result, or that the simplest Law, once set agoing, awakens, acquires strength in 
going, and develops great Laws, which, with an all-susceptible or capable material to 
work on, may, or must, create infinite ingenuities, so that in time there may be an organic 
principle with sentiency, and yet no Will… or working to end or aim, ever tending to 
further unfolding… ever onwards into Eternity, in which there may be a million times 
more perfect ‘mind’ than we can now grasp.70 
Judging from Leland’s larger oeuvre, the abovementioned organic mechanisms of “sentiency” 
(leading in Hegelian fashion to a “more perfect ‘mind’”) would surely be deduced to a great 
extent from Savage techniques of magic, hypnotic trances, and creative thought. Leland’s 
understanding of the Savage Mind was drawn from all manner of sources—psychology, 
zoology, child pedagogy, and magic tricks—but I’d like to focus attention on his ethnologies of 
Savage Thought, given that the societies Leland studied were each proof of the disingenuous 




European Romany, and African-Americans) were survivors of Euro-American slavery, 
genocide, and persecution, while the Tuscan peasantry would soon find their habits and 
economy usurped by an industrializing national economy. Leland’s and Maddelena’s 
Prophesies at one point seems to concede these contradictions. Their forecast for 1937, after 
claiming subsequent improvements to the architecture machine, predicts that erstwhile efforts 
to “ameliorate the condition of the masses in the Aryan races” would now be redirected 
towards the “African and Mongolian, and lower or more savage orders of humanity. Most of 
these will perish, the most philanthropic and wisest measures to sustain them will only aid in 
their extinction.”  Despite this dark twist to Leland’s utopian narrative of Anglo-American 
colonialism and human development, Leland concludes optimistically: As people slough off 
their old racist bigotries, “[p]ro-universalism will be realized as it never was before, and the 
rising generation will take great pride in cosmopolitanism.” I would submit that Leland’s 
optimism in the face of genocide was enabled by his belief that industrial arts would assist a 
global indigent’s coming-into-consciousness, thereby gradually eliminating world poverty and 
discrimination. Leland’s methods set out to furnish both the laboring and bourgeois classes 
with a common means of gaining consciousness over allegedly unconscious means of 
production. Yet for his pedagogical heirs at the Bauhaus, the analogy between the binary 
conscious-unconscious would take on a different hue in regards to class as well as race. 
 
The “Useless Machine”: Toward a New Design Pedagogy 
In 1922, in a statement issued to the teachers of the Bauhaus school in Weimar, Germany, the 




Bauhaus choose between two pedagogical directions: On the one hand, much of the school’s 
instruction aimed to cultivate personal style befitting a fine artist, as was exemplified by many 
of the painting instructors, including Johannes Itten, Paul Klee, Oskar Schlemmer, Lyonel 
Feininger, and Wassily Kandinsky. On the other hand, training in the craft workshops (which 
were the intended pedagogic focus of the curriculum) stressed the skills requisite to both craft 
production and technologically-reproducible arts. This dialectic of Bauhaus pedagogy has been 
treated by art historians more as an insuperable contradiction than as indicative of two mutually 
reinforcing tendencies.71 Yet Gropius did not see a conflict between these emphases on 
expressive versus practical arts, notwithstanding the former’s association with the traditional 
art-making techniques removed from the realities of industrial production. “To come right out 
with it,” Gropius declared, “I look for unity in the fusion of these forms of life, not in their 
separation…  The Bauhaus has quite consciously aimed to replace the principle of the division 
of labour by returning to collaborative work.”72 
The teacher whose provocation Gropius was replying to in this Memorandum was Itten, 
instructor of the Primary Course [Vorkurs],73 which was intended to instill the basic foundations 
of design competency and creativity prior to a student’s entry into one of the specialized 
workshops where he or she would receive training in a particular craft.74  Many of Itten’s 
methods at the Bauhaus replicated those Leland had developed at his industrial art school in 
Philadelphia several decades earlier (again, likely an indirect influence due to the circulation of 
Leland’s theories in Germany), while also reflecting Itten’s experience as a kindergarten 
teacher, his artistic training under the abstract painter Adolf Hölzel, and his involvement in a 




In keeping with Mazdaznan ritual, Itten had his Vorkurs students regularly perform yoga-like 
breathing, chanting, and movement exercises as part of a warm-up routine. The drawing, 
painting, and sculpting exercises he assigned—often using Leland’s mind-eye coordination 
techniques—aimed at fine-tuning mind, eye, and body, as well as stimulating creative 
inventiveness [Fig. 1.4, 1.5]. 
Although initially a supporter of Itten’s Vorkurs, Gropius began to suspect that its emphasis on 
spiritual and personal expression led many students to pursue the fine arts rather than working 
in the craft workshops which were the Bauhaus’ intended pedagogical focus. He observed that 
the student, 
after completing the Vorkurs and overburdened with a ferment of ideas and thus with a 
lack of self-discipline, enters a Workshop where a quite different kind of hard, manual 
work is expected of him for which he is not equipped. The result is that he is perplexed 
and unable to work with his hands in a simple, continuous and ordered way. Every blow 
of the hammer is turned into a philosophy.76 
The stakes posed by Itten’s ultimatum to Gropius were quite high considering the Bauhaus’ 
idealistic statements about combatting a capitalist division of labor through a “medieval” model 
of freely-collaborative craft. Bauhäuslers were generally critical of the increasing 
proletarization of craft production, and yet it appears they were unsure which emphasis—fine-
arts or the industrial arts—offered a better alternative to capitalism’s degradation of crafts and 
alienation of the laboring classes. On the one hand, the fine-arts, by virtue of the autonomy 
fine-artists had to freely follow their own creative impulses, offered an escape from stultifying 
routines of mass-production. On the other hand, the “collaborative” aspect of industrial 
production (i.e., the division of labor) might be represented a kind of community of workers, at 




Arbeitsrat für Kunst. Yet, certainly neither of the options suggested in Itten’s “ultimatum” 
precluded a capitalist system of labor, since industrial design and the fine arts alike both 
constituted specialized, non-proletarian vocations. However, proponents of the industrial arts 
could make use of the designation “industrial” to pretend that those Bauhäuslers who designed, 
for example, tubular steel chairs belonged to the same social class as the factory workers who 
would actually produce those chairs.77 
In his 1922 memorandum, Gropius identified a strategy of avoiding conflict between the 
personal creativity emphasized by Bauhaus’s painting Masters and the technical training 
emphasized by the workshop Masters. He proposed that “proficiency in a craft is essential to 
every artist. Therein lies the prime source of creative imagination.”78  If material-technical 
explorations could be key to re-inventing the basic operations of artistic production, the 
dilemma between the individual creativity encouraged by the fine arts and the technical 
expertise required by the practical arts might be resolved. This move amounted to recasting 
technical training as technical experimentation and thereby bridging the rift between craft 
virtuosity and creative improvisation (a logic that has continued to inform architecture 
pedagogy up through the present day). Bauhaus instructor, Lazlo Moholy-Nagy, who inherited 
Itten’s Vorkurs, asserted that in his Preliminary Course “no copying of any kind is employed in 
this workshop, nor is the student asked to deliver premature, practical results.”79  Gropius cited 
as an example of this reconciliation between free experimentation and technical prerogatives 
the pedagogical device of a “useless machine”: 
Master Itten recently asked us to decide either to make individual, single pieces of work 
in complete contrast to the economically-oriented world outside or to seek contact with 




not in their separation…  [Y]oung artists have begun to concern themselves with the 
phenomenon of industry and the machine. They start with the design of what I would 
like to call the ‘useless’ machine—both creative approaches are therefore already 
converging! 
The machine would not replace either artistry or craftsmanship but would rather stimulate these 
both to evolve, recalling a similar argument elaborated in Wright’s 1901 speech, alluded to 
earlier in the chapter, “The Art and Craft of the Machine” wherein the machine forms the 
impetus to craft innovation.80 However, it was not simply that the machine could help artists re-
imagine art, but that art reciprocally would help re-imagine the machine. 
The “useless machine” at the Bauhaus—similar to many of Leland’s pedagogical strategies—
exemplifies one of the key tendencies that characterize the formation of the various disciplines 
of twentieth-century design: namely, the emphasis on structural processes—both human and 
technological—common to all creative production, usurping a product-oriented approach to 
arts pedagogy. The Bauhaus’s vaunted promotion of “a new unity” between art and technics 
would therefore redirect design away from the craft of the object itself toward crafting the 
human organism—its perceptory faculties, creative capacities, and other mechanisms of 
thought towards better inventing designed goods. Flexible design skills would comprise a 
rubric of foundational and codifiable techniques which could deployed in in the absence of a 
pre-conceived goal. Objects would likewise be designed according to psychologically-derived 
principles of human perception. At the Bauhaus, creativity, freed from routines of copying Old 
Masters’ works as well as from the limitations of purely object-oriented design, was to be 
grounded instead in a science of aesthetic and psychological technique.81 Where this differed 
from Leland’s approach is in the far greater emphasis the Bauhaus placed on cultivating the 




notion of universally attainable education (this despite Itten’s echo of Leland’s insistence that 
all people were creative). This not to say though that a claim to universal validity was thereby 
dropped. The structuralist bent was tacitly universalist in its logic. Many Bauhaus masters 
conceptualized design as comprising a natural semiotic system, linked to the nature of the mind 
and perception although often with the suggestion of having been divinely derived. This, 
combined with the concomitant—though patently contradictory—emphasis on personal 
creativity and innovation, required a student to master general rules in a particular way and, 
relatedly, required evidence of the student’s consciousness over his or her techniques. Indeed, 
an effort to represent pure consciousness itself directed several Bauhaus masters and their 
students towards theories of abstract composition believed to correspond to the workings of the 
mind itself. 
Apart from Itten’s Vorkurs exercises, a constellation of Bauhaus instructors—most notably 
Itten, Gertrud Grünow, and Kandinsky—co-operated in formulating a shared semiotic system 
of shapes and colors. Grünow, was not a Bauhaus master but was hired by Gropius to work in 
conjunction with the Vorkurs.82 She had established a system linking particular bodily 
movements to corresponding colors and musical tones, work which she would later develop 
further in conjunction with the developmental psychologist Heinz Werner.83 She led the 
students in choreographic exercises intended to help them understand their vocational leanings 
towards a particular workshop. Several of the Bauhaus instructors followed Grünow’s interest 
in the synaesthetic unconscious (most explicitly, Kandinsky, and Itten). Implicitly, Grünow’s 
claim was to be decoding the apparent chaos of sensory perception by establishing a system of 




experiences conveyed by each of the senses there were common structures allowing a 
translation between the senses. These common structures pointed to the existence of an 
apodictic semiotics of perception and, therefore, of design. Although not directly citing the 
work of Empathy Theory, Grünow, Kandinsky, and Itten believed their systems of aesthetic 
correspondence to be psychically or spiritually determined, and often cited examples of global 
arts to demonstrate the validity of these proposed aesthetic codes. Itten’s pedagogical 
notebooks, which he later published as the Tagebuch, explored connections between ancient 
hieroglyphics and basic shapes and linear forms so as to develop a basic formal alphabet [Fig. 
1.6, 1.7]. Grünow’s and Itten’s Vorkurs exercises were directed towards opening up the site 
where these aesthetic codes supposedly lay dormant, namely the psychic unconscious. 
The notion of an unconscious which operated according to knowable mechanisms would not 
only enable the possibility of natural, universal sign-systems—sign-systems which, unlike 
spoken or written language, involved no rupture between sign and signified—but also seemed 
to open up new ways of considering the relationship between design and technological 
reproduction. In keeping with the concept of the “useless machine”, Itten’s pedagogical system 
of design not only treated the body and mind as a kind of creatively spiritual machine but, in so 
doing, anticipated the logic of digital—rather than analog mechanical—reproduction. His two- 
and three-dimensional exercises aimed to break artistic practice down into component 
structures. Itten, following his own painting teacher, Adolf Hölzel, emphasized “contrast 
studies”.84 He had his students re-create Old Master’s paintings in black ink, reducing the colors 
of the paintings to stark, black-white compositions.85 What such studies did was translate an 




elaborate artworks as reducible to a simple, visual system, an operation that a half century later 
would be reproducible by digital machines, due to the simple calculability of this mode of 
translation (i.e., that any color darker than a given value be designated black).86 Shading 
exercises in which students produced a gradation of values from light to dark, distributed into 
discreet units, again converted what might be represented “analogically” (i.e., painted as a 
continuous spectrum) into a “digital” system. That is, students translated the infinitely variable 
spectrum of shadow and tone into “greyscale” increments of finite, monochromatic blocks [Fig. 
1.8] Itten taught his students to sense the abundance of the perceptual world through systems of 
binary oppositions. “Everything we see, hear, smell, taste, touch, feel,” he wrote in his 
pedagogical notebook, “is put in relation to a second factor which is opposed to the first…”87 
Anticipating imminent discourses on computer intelligence, the assumption underlying Itten’s 
systems of binary elements was that aesthetic representation and production could be based on 
clearly articulable and easily reproducible—because simplified—codes. However, similar to 
Lévi-Strauss’s later conception of the binary structures of Savage Thought, Itten understood 
these binaries not only as enabling a system of analysis, abstraction, and, hence, reproduction, 
but as rooted in the nature of things: in the nature of the mind and the spirit. 
Because of the mysticism he brought to the classroom in the form of Mazdaznan exercises, 
Itten has been treated by historians of the Bauhaus as an eccentric deviation from the school’s 
agenda to advance technological expertise in the industrial arts, a deviation that one would 
imagine to have then disappeared with Itten’s departure from the school in 1922. However, 
Itten’s successors, such as Lazlo Moholy-Nagy, relied on many of his educational exercises 




processes [Fig. 1.10, 1.11]. Whereas for many decades Bauhaus historiography largely 
excluded reference to the mystical enterprises of its teachers and students (following the 
scientific conceit of Gropius’s and Herbert Bayer’s 1938 Bauhaus exhibit at New York’s 
Museum of Modern Art [MoMA]), this mystical dimension to the Bauhaus has been more 
frequently addressed in recent literature.88 Nonetheless, the reigning narrative, as exemplified 
by the 2008 exhibition at the MoMA and its attendant catalog, is that an initial propensity 
toward Expressionism in the first few years of the Weimar Bauhaus had been eclipsed by 
techno-rationalisn by the time it moved to Dessau.89 No literature treats the mystical aspect of 
the Bauahus—often understood as simply pertaining to the Expressionist movement of the 
1910’s—as utterly complicit with its technological aims. Moreover, the pat recourse to the 
explanan of Expressionism interprets Bauhaus mysticism as a stylistic or thematic 
preoccupation—i.e., an emotively evocative representation of “primitive” themes—rather than 
as a method of production. Marcel Breuer’s “African chair”, to be superseded by his famous 
mass-produced tubular steel chair, thus becomes exemplary of the Bauhaus trajectory from 
idiosyncratic primitivism to techno-scientificity.90 My contention is that the more mystical of 
the Bauhaus masters, such as Itten and Kandinsky, were not trying to “express” emotional and 
spiritual content so much as they were positing a scientific system to explain the workings of 
the soul because the soul was more or less synonymous with the unconscious.91  It is telling that 
Itten himself refuted the designation Expressionist, claiming that Vorkurs exercises had 
“nothing to do with usual Expressionism” but rather with “the foundational principles of the 
fine arts.”92 Such principles, he maintained, were “scientific” (wissenschaftliches). Nor was he 
even oriented especially toward canvas painting as relevant monographs would suggest. 




decades following his departure from the Bauhaus focused mostly on weaving and pattern-
making (two of the three schools he opened were textile schools). Moreover, in 1955, he taught 
color theory for a year at the Hochschule für Gestaltung at Ulm, a school known at the time for 
its explicit techno-scientific agenda. Paul Klee, who taught painting at the Bauhaus and was 
fascinated by Itten’s methods, was one of the few to explicitly describe the technological bent 
of Itten’s mysticism, noting that the latter’s Mazdanan-derived bodily exercises acted as “a kind 
of body massage to train the body machine to function sensitively.”93 
Itten’s concern for his students’ spirituality (he succeeded in recruiting roughly half of them to 
extracurricular Mazdaznan rituals), owed to his understanding of the soul as an almost 
technological construction. Having been educated and employed as an elementary school 
teacher prior to studying the fine arts with Hölzel, Itten’s own training was deeply indebted to 
the nineteenth-century kindergarten movement led by Pestalozzi, Montessori, and Fröbel, some 
of the first promoters of universal childhood education. Following the precepts of Bildung, their 
methods aimed to encourage students’ innate potentials by tapping into the hidden mechanics 
of geistig (intellectual-spiritual) development, albeit through secular and systematic means. The 
most mysterious of innate human “technologies” were best demonstrated children’s capacity to 
effortlessly acquire language and to semi-autonomously build up refined aptitudes from more 
basic foundations.94 Itten, with his Fröbelian rhetoric, clearly brought to the Bauhaus his 
understanding of children as innately creative machines, capable of a kind of automated 
development when inculcated with some basic techniques of coordination and representation.  
Indeed, the foundations of modern education lay precariously poised between what was 




For ideological as well as practical reasons, Bauhaus instructors navigated this murky space 
between the spiritual and technological. The soul was a useful locus of educability for budding 
designers in that it permitted the technologically reproducible design to be ascribed to a faculty 
not possessed by the industrial labor of reproduction. As distinct from mere “craft”, the creative 
labor of the soul was not imitable by others. Itten’s teachings therefore had to contend with the 
paradox of how to teach what was by definition unteachable: namely, originality, one of the 
fundamental criterion of intellectual property. This paradox lay at the heart of a glaring 
curricular omission that has perplexed Bauhaus scholars for decades, the fact that an ostensible 
school of architecture failed to offer courses in architecture for the first eight years of Gropius’ 
nine-year directorship. Architecture [Bau] lay at the focal point of the famous curricular 
diagram drawn up by Gropius in the first few years at the Bauhaus [Fig 1.12]. While various 
possible reasons have been suggested for architecture’s absence from the course offerings, it 
seems plausible that one contributing factor would have been a sense that an original 
architectural design involved instinctual processes (given that animals and savages could do it, 
as we learned from Leland), but, relatedly, that a modernist architecture should develop not 
from unconscious instinct alone but rather from a systematic understanding and manipulation 
of internal human mechanisms: i.e., a consciousness of the unconscious. To put this another 
way: The universalist claims of modernism could only be met by invoking scientificity, while 
the avant-garde’s claims to originality could only be met by invoking individual genius, often 
assuming the form of spirituality. In response to these conflicting criteria of universalism and 
particularity, Itten’s own approach was to develop universally reproducible methods for 
guiding the unconscious soul. I would submit that this method was the Bauhaus answer to 




by the construct of intellectual property. That is, the extent to which Itten’s, Grünow’s, and 
Kandinsky’s teachings were magical in nature mirrored the magical requirement of intellectual 
property to be both universal and uniquely original. 
Design teachers’ turn towards magical pedagogies and equally magical semiotic systems laid 
the groundwork for an educational approach that could replace the proscribed system of craft 
guilds and apprenticeships that had for so many centuries managed the development and 
transfer of artistic and technical knowledge.95  At the Bauhaus, as at the PIASP, this movement 
away from craft was evident in the beginnings of a three-pronged system for thinking and 
inventing along the lines of technological media: Firstly, humans would be taught a rubric of 
design techniques divorced from any association with a particular artistic product; secondly, 
techniques would be translated into technics, as codified design- and production-methods 
rendered plausible the idea of designing-machines; thirdly, psychologically- and 
anthropologically-derived theories of human perception and aesthetics would inform how 
technological media would operate in relation to users.96  I would propose that this three-
pronged system, occurring at the intersections of psychological, magical, and technological 
theories, was foundational to the concept of Design and, subsequently, to the eventual concept 
of media. Although, arguably, there have always been media, the materials and modes of 
design we’ve come to characterize as media would not be designated as such until the crafts of 
the world had been broken apart and refolded into an over-arching system of design education. 
What I endeavor to show in the following history is that “media”, as distinct from crafts, 
gradually came into being through a discursive and material framework intent on establishing 




mechanisms of creative productivity. One could thus invert the famed formula of the Bauhaus 
“machine aesthetic” by speaking instead of Bauhaus pedagogy as constituting an aesthetic 
machine.97 
In designating the useless machine as a proof of how “proficiency in craft” might serve as “the 
prime source of creative imagination”, Gropius was really attesting to the dissolution of craft, 
to its historic transformation into media. The useless machine was exemplary of a growing 
tendency within arts education to rethink techniques and materials as comprising not a 
particular craft but rather the apparatuses of technical invention. Previously, the practitioners of 
a given craft were probably less apt to understand its techniques as interchangeable with those 
of other crafts, or at least to understand such interchangeable-ness as the fundamental basis for 
artistic training. Itten’s Vorkurs then stands in stark contrast to the guild’s treatment of a craft 
as a corpus of techniques requisite to the production of a particular material or product. Rather, 
students’ exercises involved a perpetual translation of techniques conventionally associated 
with one material into those of another material, focusing almost fetishistically on the two- and 
three-dimensional representation of diverse tactile qualities [Fig. 1.10, 1.11]. Works of art were 
broken down into component elements, not so as to aid in imitating a particular work of art, but 
rather so as to reuse its “parts” (or really its putative structures), to understand the work of art 
as a construction following patterns and rules, which could be endlessly reconfigured. 
Yet, as I have suggested, for ideological reasons the Bauhaus emphasis on pattern had to be 
counterposed with an emphasis on individuality (often in the form of spirituality). The political 
climate prevailing at the Bauhaus leaned towards socialist—sometimes even revolutionary—




status ascribed to design as intellectual work. Bauhaus rhetoric thus tended to simultaneously 
support and condemn the distinction between the designer and the craftsman or worker. 
Borrowing the nineteenth-century English designation, “Raphaels”, to refer to those Academy-
trained painters who meticulously copied the techniques of Old Renaissance Masters (in 
contradistinction to the supposedly more primitive and intuitive methods of medieval artists), 
Gropius wrote in his 1922 Memorandum: 
The Bauhaus has begun to break with the previous conventional kind of academic 
training which taught students how to become little Raphaels and pattern-designers. It 
has begun to return to the people those creative talents who had fled from a life of 
creative labour to their own and the people’s detriment. The Bauhaus has quite 
consciously aimed to replace the principle of the division of labour by returning to 
collaborative work in which the creative process is perceived to be an indivisible whole… 
For Gropius, creativity was a corrective to the division of labor and to the related degradation 
of artists into petty “pattern designers”. For many of the Bauhaus masters, creativity arose from 
the spirit, from the non-machinic and thus inexplicable part of the human, and it was therefore a 
weapon of resistance against capitalist exploitation which was seen to alienate one’s spirit from 
one’s work.98 This was indeed the general thrust of the socialist oriented art collective, 
Arbeitsrat für Kunst, to which Gropius belonged at the time of his founding the Bauhaus. The 
fact that creativity did not need to be wielded in direct service of a workers’ revolution, but 
could rather operate from within existing systems of industrial-art production was underscored 
by Gropius’ invocation of the useless machine, an object which functioned both for and against 
capitalist methods of production. In his 1922 Memorandum, he cited the useless machine so as 
to circumvent Itten’s ultimatum that he choose between a pedagogic emphasis on personal 
creativity or on industrially-oriented techniques:  The useless machine was at once purely 




yet machinic and therefore aligned to proletarian production. Forgetting that alienation was not 
a condition suffered by designers so much as by the proletariat, many Bauhaus masters forged 
an ideological justification for working within a capitalist economy through recourse to 
Romantic conceptions of artistic work as creative and therefore politically-liberating (i.e., the 
freedom of the imagination being conflated with freedom from political or economic 
servitude). It was as if the workers’ revolution could be indefinitely forestalled by resolving the 
problem of alienation far away from the factory floor and city streets, and instead from within 
the artists’ studio, indeed, within the artist’s organism.99 
The trick then would be to train students’ organisms and thereby transcend the alienating 
“Raphaelite” pedagogy of fine-arts Academicism that allegedly turned young artists into 
copying-machines. Students would be taught, rather, to manage their inner, personal creativity, 
to coordinate the workings of the soul with those of the eye and hand. Spirituality thus led full-
circle to a mechanization of the soul, which was to be scientifically analyzed and then trained 
to operate more productively.100 This contradiction brought on its heels another—specifically, 
the entanglement of modernist technological rhetoric with invocations of Gothic craft. Before 
Raphael—before, that is, the Renaissance and the modernity that followed from it—the soul, 
according to neo-Gothic critique, worked naturally in tandem with hand and eye. The Bauhaus 
was therefore founded upon the annunciatory image of the Gothic cathedral, a throwback to 
Ruskinian rhetoric of a natural, pre-capitalist system of craft in which the soul guided bodily 
skill. Rather than imitate the Gothic style, however, as was more or less the case with the 
nineteenth-century Gothic Revival, the self-consciously modernist Bauhäuslers would invoke a 




order to counter capitalist alienation (i.e., between intellect and mateiral, as theorized by 
Hegel). Claims to mind-body harmony were substantiated through allusions to the modern 
science of Empathy Theory and modern religions like Mazdaznan which claimed to recuperate 
ancient knowledge and ritual through systematic understanding of the effects of such ritual on 
bodily-spiritual function. By understanding how the soul operated and how it could thus be 
better integrated into processes of design work, the alienation resulting from machine-like work 
processes would be healed. Artists would not be copy-machines but creative machines. And if 
this seemed to overlook the enforced alienation of the real proletariat from intellectual labor, 
the Bauhaus interest in the new, industry-tailored style, such as described by the Neue 
Sachlichkeit, seemed to make a conciliatory gesture towards inscribing within the aesthetics of 
the commodity the industrial processes that had made it, thereby supposedly minimizing the 
alienation between the workers and the things they produced. The tacit implication was that “a 
new unity of art and technics”—by reinstating a spiritual bodily connection within processes of 
intellectual labor—could render the need for Marxist revolution null and void. 
Let the Living Unbury their Dead: Marxism and the Problem of Prehistory 
The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot take its poetry from the past but 
only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped away all 
superstition about the past. The former revolutions required recollections of past world 
history in order to smother their own content. The revolution of the nineteenth century 
must let the dead bury their dead in order to arrive at its own content.101 
Karl Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852) 
 [T]he complete and perfect comprehension of Man as he is, and may be in the future, 
depends very much upon… a knowledge of him as he was in early ages… it being by no 
means approved of that the dead Past should bury its dead and be forgotten.102 




When Marx exhorted the living to let the dead bury their dead, he was arguing for a revolution 
that would not revert to past models; arguing, that is, for a revolution which, unlike 1848, 
would not pretend to resuscitate Ancient Rome or 1789 but would rather create a new poetry 
utterly of the future.103 In 1848 Leland was just twenty-three years old and living in the Latin 
Quarter of Paris. At the outbreak of the revolution he took charge of constructing and 
commanding one of the barricades, a feat he boasted of in later writings. Marx disparaged 
trans-historical exchanges such as Leland’s revolutionary recuperation of 1789 because these 
did not conform to a materialist historical model whereby ideas and culture emerged directly 
from contemporaneous modes of production. In Specters of Marx, Jacques Derrida attributes 
Marx’s scathing denunciation of historical ghosts and spirits to the ways that Hegelian World 
History persistently haunts Marx’s own work despite his fundamental argument with Hegel and 
the neo-Hegelians. Following Derrida’s study of the “ghosts” that haunt Marx’s work, and 
using Leland’s methods as evidence, I will show how the Hegelian-Marxist concept of 
alienation, by assuming a divisibility between conscious and unconscious production, opens the 
door to all manner of other disjunctures, such as the haunting of one era by the intelligence or 
“spirit” associated with another.  
According to Marx and Engels, prior to the advent of the historical process—lying at the 
shadowy boundaries separating pre-history from history—was a state of human consciousness 
that was “mere herd consciousness”. At this point “man is only distinguished from sheep by the 
fact that with him consciousness takes the place of instinct, or that his instinct is a conscious 
one” .104 The surmounting of this “sheep-like or tribal consciousness”, the evolution of the latter 




Engels go on to explain that the division of labor is what also enables an illusory split between 
material production and consciousness. They write: 
Division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material 
and mental labour appears… From this moment onwards consciousness really can flatter 
itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice… from now on 
consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the 
formation of “pure” theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc. But even if this theory, 
theology, philosophy, ethics, etc. comes into contradiction with the existing relations, this 
can only occur because existing social relations have come into contradiction with 
existing forces of production; this, moreover, can occur in a particular national sphere of 
relations through the appearance of the contradiction… between this national 
consciousness and the practice of other nations.105 
What begets the illusory appearance of  a split between thought and material production is a 
division between intellectual and manual labor—occurring concomitantly with a society’s 
progressive distance from its earlier “sheep-like or tribal consciousness”. But what begets an 
actual split between material production and thought is a nation’s encounter with the different 
material practices of other nations, presumably through encountering new, more highly 
technological means of production. Yet, in light of the practices I have described at the PIASP 
and Bauhaus, it is incumbent to ask whether a willed encounter with a less technologically 
advanced society (and its presumed consciousness) might entail a similar contradiction. Indeed, 
a national economy organized according to a highly differentiated division of labor might need 
recourse to a model of undivided labor specifically in order to advance the techniques of 
technological production. Whereas Marx is wont to see trans-historical or transnational 
contaminations as exceptions to the trajectory of materialist World History, it may be more 
accurate to understand them as one of the most basic mechanisms of change. Modernist 
designers seemed to have intuited the potential fruitfulness of making forays into putative 




of production. Needing to be haunted by a prehistoric ghost (a spirit redolent of a time before 
the division of labor), modern innovators in the domain of industrial design drew methodically 
from supposed contradictions between the world’s disparate forms of consciousness. 
To briefly set such trans-historical hauntings in relief against the more well-known 
“primitivist” experiments of avant-garde figurative painters and sculptors (e.g., Picasso, the 
Fauves, German Expressionists, etc…), my hope is that the former might cast a new light on 
what has hitherto been understood as primitivist art. In the artwork normally described as such, 
the use of colors and patterns evocative of African or aboriginal arts, or the depiction of masks, 
dancing nudes, and the like, is understood as mimicry and representation of “primitive” art or 
“primitive” ways of life, essentially a version of emulating the noble savage. Yet, such 
primitivism was surely nothing more than a hackneyed version of a much more instrumental 
conceptualization Savage Thought that did not seek to evoke savagery but rather to systematize 
the techniques of Savage Thought towards forming a techno-psychological science of creative 
production. To stress the relations between the avant-gardes’ primitivist evocations and 
contemporaneous colonial contexts is certainly not incorrect, but in light of present-day non-
colonial forms of hegemony, such accounts allow ongoing forms of epistemic apartheid to 
remain invisible. Apartheid—literally meaning “separate development”—was not exceptional 
or incidental to nineteenth- and twentieth-century means of governance. Reordering the 
productive techniques of a subaltern to render them more suitable to an industrial world 
economy required a modification to subaltern consciousness while nonetheless maintaining a 
difference between the consciousness of, say, the industrialized peasant and the bourgeoisie. 




In Leland’s Prophesies for the Twentieth Century, amid forecasts of sundry technological 
marvels, he notes “that the complete and perfect comprehension of Man as he is, and may be in 
the future, depends very much upon… a knowledge of him as he was in early ages… it being 
by no means approved of that the dead Past should bury its dead and be forgotten.”106  Leland 
goes on to describe a great future “resuscitation” of dead literature as well as an enormous 
exhumation of “skulls and bones”.107 In the context of this particular manuscript—one whose 
prophesies describe all manner of technological marvels enmeshed with political-economic 
developments—the exhortation to not let the dead bury their dead conveys a sense of the dead’s 
instrumentality for constructing Leland’s vision of future global unification. In this case, 
nostalgia is not, as is commonly assumed, a longing for that which modernity has recently lost. 
Rather, nostalgia serves as an instrument for constructing differentials of consciousness, for 
advancing technological means of production through a process of distancing oneself from the 
mind’s naturally productive techniques so as to better view, distill, reconstitute, and, ultimately, 
“grasp” its mechanisms according to the terms of one’s own experiential or epistemological 
context, echoing to some extent Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind and also the “objectivity” of 
scientific praxis.108 The object of nostalgia is not an object lost and remembered so much as it is 
an object—imagined or otherwise—that must be set apart. What I refer to as “epistemic 
apartheid” (the positing of different intellectual trajectories of development pertinent to 
different classes of society) requires nostalgia to progressively advance differentiations 
between the forms of consciousness ascribed to respective forms of labor. 
In his unpublished treatise, “The Coming Race: or, the New Man of Cromagnon”, Leland took 




new and superior race; however, this was not a purely hereditary process but rather one that 
would need to be assisted through intellectual training. Just as Cro-Magnon had usurped other 
prehistoric humans, argued Leland, so would the “new Cromagnon” come to replace modern 
humans. Leland’s nostalgia for Cro-Magnon was not wistful as much as it was optimistically 
pragmatic, as was his nostalgia for Etruscan magic and African-American voodoo. These things 
were not so much lost as they were recontextualizable as systematic technique. Forecasting the 
twentieth century’s progress over all the centuries preceding it, Leland wrote that the latter 
“will be as the mere alphabet of a language as compared to a grandly developed literature and 
oratory.”109  The alphabetic metaphor should not be interpreted as purely incidental to the 
matter at hand:  Modern research would parse “the past” (read: “the primitive”), attempting to 
arrange the plenitude of its arts and techniques into an alphabet out of which one might 
construct the more “grandly developed” systems of the future.  
Leland’s involvement in founding Britain’s Cottage Arts Association (CAA) in the late 1870’s 
gives some notion of the ways in which a concept of prehistory became instrumental to new 
forms of artistic production.110 The CCA and its later version, the Home Arts and Industries 
Association (HAIA) sought to institute programs of craft training for children in rural schools, 
along with institutionalizing new practices of domicile-based industry. With their focus on 
Gothic ornamental motives, the CCA and HAIA demonstrate how easily John Ruskin’s Gothic 
“spirit” could be slipped into the cogs and wheels of an industrial economy. Wishing to provide 
a disenfranchised peasantry or, really, an agricultural quasi-proletariat with useful skills, Jebb 
envisioned these pedagogic programs as contributing to the spread of cottage industries, 




while claiming to economically empower women (a familiar strategy of twentieth-century 
human development).111  Freed up from childcare duties by the opening of new cottage schools, 
the wife of an agricultural laborer could perform paid piecework for an urban capitalist 
operation without having to leave the rural site of her domestic responsibilities, thereby 
dissolving economic boundaries between rural savagery and urban cosmopolitanism.   
Making use of words like “cottage” and “craft”, and emphasizing the stylistic motifs of 
medieval European arts, HAIA profited from the presumed antithesis between the self-
employed, medieval craftsman and the proletarian wage-slave, while promulgating an industrial 
system of “medieval craft”. For Leland, the figure of the medieval craftsman functioned as a 
Savage Mind of industrial productivity, whose virtuosic works offered proof of the artistic 
potentials of simpler peoples, to be brought out through education. In his 1882 pamphlet, 
“Industrial Art in Schools”, he had noted that the brain of the typical medieval European was in 
fact the same size as that of the average twelve-year-old boy in modern times.112 Subsequently, 
in his 1883 article titled “An Opening for the Unemployed in Ireland”, Leland argued that 
although the Irish were known for their uncultured ways, this characteristic arose only in recent 
centuries.113 During the “Dark Ages” when the arts languished throughout Europe, Irish arts 
alone had flourished. Against more typical nineteenth-century claims of the Gothic’s French, 
Moorish, or German origins, Leland proposed that Ireland’s “wild and strange” ornamental 
motives derived from its prehistoric arts and subsequently formed a basis for the Gothic style 
that eventually spread throughout continental Europe. One can thus trace the great arts and 
architecture of medieval Europe back to Ireland’s “sculptured stones of prehistoric times” in 




All this augured well for Ireland’s unemployed. “What I would examine,” Leland resumes, “is 
the industrial capacity of the Irish peasant.”115  It is not incidental to HAIA and the CAA’s 
mission—which were especially promoted in Ireland— that the Irish peasant (and Irish-
American immigrant) was one of the Savages par-excellence of the nineteenth-century Anglo-
American social order. The Irish peasant’s suitability for industrial employment could be 
deduced from his savage progenitors’ artistic genius. As the Irish peasant presumably still bears 
within herself that savagery in which civilization’s beauty gestated, surely she might hammer 
out some ornamental trinkets. This work would not be a form of wage-slavery but would rather 
belong to her own nature, evolving organically from her prehistoric ancestry. 
That Leland should have likewise adduced from the Passamaquoddy proof of the educability of 
all peoples may have owed something to the fact that in the United States the education of 
Native Americans formed a particular concern. Although Leland cites examples of British 
missionary schools in Egypt, closer to home missionary schools were employing similar 
strategies to inculcate American Indians with industrial techniques and habits.116  Within a few 
decades, children in Philadelphia public schools would be trained in art and manual 
coordination by imitating (pseudo)-American-Indian crafts.117  The purposes of institutions like 
PIASP, CAA, and HAIA were not so much to root-out Savagery from civilization so much as 
to transform both Savagery and industry in relation to one another. No longer functioning as the 
soulless blight of art and culture, as Ruskin had proclaimed, industrial production might erupt 
spontaneously from the quaint rustic cottages. Reciprocally, the peasantry would be 
transformed by industry. The peasant woman would divide her time—as if by choice—between 




figure of a pre-historic/post-historic state. By converting her cottage into a one-person factory 
she could coordinate her anachronistic and unproductive savagery with the workings of the 
modern design while simultaneously serving as an imagined model for pre-modern productive 
means. 
Just as Leland envisions a techno-industrial future of paradisiacal and savage freedom from 
hard labor, so Marx and Engels’ vision of a future condition of non-divided labor harkened 
back unwittingly to the past. They seek to deny this: Thanks to the modern mind’s advance far 
beyond animal or pre-historic consciousness, non-divided labor in the future would function 
entirely differently from that of the past; it would be permissive of individualistic choice and 
would be more cosmopolitan and leisurely—presumably through the help of machines—than 
any prehistoric state of non-divided labor.118  But if forms of consciousness should always 
correspond to forms of material production (particularly in a post-proletarian society), then 
wouldn’t a state of non-divided labor correspond necessarily to the almost animal 
consciousness that had characterized such a state in the past?  Far from letting the dead bury 
their dead, Marx and Engels seem to exhume corpses who can speak to them of a time before 
the division of labor. These corpses say that in the future people might live as they did, dividing 
the day, according to whim, into the disparate activities such as fishing, hunting, herding, and 
theorizing.119 
Yet, living exemplars of non-divided, “prehistoric” labor flourished throughout the world, as 
Marx and Engels well knew. Leland points to such examples in his own observation that art 




than most crafts produced in the United States. This evident encounter, or “contradiction”, 
between Leland’s own “national consciousness and the practice of other nations” should not be 
seen as an accidental exception to historicist unity; rather, it constituted a strategic method of 
Leland’s futurist proposals and reforms. His thinking exemplifies how the economic paradigm 
of perpetual invention and social-economic reorganization drew methodically from supposed 
“contradictions” between different societies’ forms of material production and from the related 
disjunctions of consciousness. Indeed, historicism in its various forms required these ahistorical 
contradictions through its insistence on purifying “European” consciousness of all that seemed 
exterior to it—i.e., all that was unscientific and mystical—thereby creating a differential space 
between the ideal construction of a Modern Mind and the fabulous figure of a Savage Mind that 
contained not only Euro-America’s other forms of consciousness but also—perhaps 
unsurprisingly—its other forms of material production. Just as Hegel’s Weltgeist transcends 
any given historical moment because it is that which moves history itself, so likewise the 
“consciousness” arising from modern-savage encounters can never be consistent with 
historicist categories.  Prehistoric man—in the form of present-day Savagery—does not stand 
at a moment just prior to History; rather, invented by modernity, he persists stubbornly within 
the present, hovering forever at the limits of History, destabilizing its dreams of historical 
coherence and clear historical progress. 
 
Spiritual Possession / Material Possession: An Exchange of “Properties” 
The poor will be saved from labor. The poor will be saved by labor. These antinomic theologies 




eschatology, are bound up with the nineteenth-century telos of World Historical liberation. 
People must work with machines in order that machines might (eventually) save them from 
work. The machine functions then as a sacrificial figure who “saves time” or “saves work” for 
people without itself ever attaining salvation. So is the machine messianic, being offered in 
sacrifice to save the poor? If so—and certainly, Leland and Bauhäuslers furtively imparted to 
machines a messianic function—one would have to reconfigure accordingly the very premise 
of justice, since this premise invokes an ideal of equitable exchange that would be incalculable 
in the context of the machine’s “gift”. The machine disrupts the calculability of just exchange. 
Seemingly, one takes from the machine the fruits of its labor without any obligation to give 
back to it its due equity. Marcel Mauss’s thesis that all gifts tacitly demand reimbursement 
would need to be rethought in relation to the machine: The machine is said to give its gifts but 
yet expects nothing in return. Of course, the contrary might equally be construed: that machines 
disturb all equations of justice simply so that the poor might save others from work. In true 
eschatological fashion, exchange and justice are infinitely deferred. The indigent sacrifice 
themselves now so that some future society will be saved from indigence and labor alike by 
machines. 
Machines rearrange normal customs of ownership and exchange—we know this from Marx. 
But these rearrangements had to entail a concomitant rearrangement: a vexed reordering of the 
logic of exchange that—while partly indebted to economic traditions of protection and 
patronage between classes—also introduced a new eschato-logic based on the machine’s 
prophesied deliverance of humanity from its travails. The relationship between machine-




calculus of justice resulting from this relationship in fact seems to lie at the heart of Bauhaus 
debates, indeed at the heart of design qua intellectual property. The aporetic equation is this: 
that the machine gives while receiving nothing in return, and yet the laborer who works in step 
with the machine is not enriched but seemingly impoverished by this gift. Clearly, we have 
recourse to Marx to help demystify this state of affairs (essentially through the inequality 
between the hours laborers work versus the hours for which the capitalist remunerate them 
for).120 However, further explanation would be needed to understand the role of designers vis-à-
vis this strange logic of exchange, as they struggled to clarify their own relationship to machine 
production. In the interest of reading histories both with and against their grains, I want to 
examine seriously the mysticism of modern design pedagogy. Read in conjunction with the 
mysticism of World Historical Geist and with Marxian and Capitalist machine messianism, the 
imbrications between machine and spirit that have perplexed scholars of the Bauhaus might 
seem less surprising. Given that the Marxist leanings of so many Bauhäuslers were at odds with 
their self-interest in preserving the professional status of design, the question of how to value 
the design of an object relative to its machine-reproductions was, as I’ve already argued, crucial 
to these designers’ ideological interests. This hinged on the question of how to value 
intellectual property, which, in turn, hinged on the existence of design’s essential 
incalculability: an attribute owing, I argue, to its suffusion with “spirit” or Geist. 
Arguably, the exclusion of intellectual labor from Marxist analysis has had the unintended 
effect of reinforcing the alienation between mental and bodily labor already effected by 
capitalism. In focusing on the mystical composition of abstract labor, Marx does not analyze 




intellectual property, Marx ignores one of the enabling myths of capital, namely that 
intellectual ingenuity might ultimately “cheat” nature’s entropic principle of requiring perpetual 
work to reproduce life processes. The messianic promise of machines—of which the worker 
would someday take conscious possession—was echoed in the domain of intellectual labor, 
namely by Design’s own messianic promise, that it was to operate as a magically anti-entropic 
device in the creation of value. Design, as imagined at PIASP and the Bauhaus, was crucial to 
recalculating the balance sheet between inputs of labor and outputs of value. Granted, there is 
nothing particularly novel about designers’ dreams of thus cheating entropy. Magic practices 
have long sought to recalibrate the scale that balances human inputs of labor with proportional 
outputs of goods, hoping to cheat the system of exchange.121 Indeed, if one were to explain the 
apparent discrepancy between Savage design competence and Modern design incompetence, it 
would make sense to seek an answer in what Leland referred to as magic, given that magical 
thought was, after all, what was believed to distinguish moderns from savages.122 
In Mystic Will: How to Develop and Strengthen Will Power, Memory, or Any Other Faculty or 
Attribute of the Mind by an Easy Process, Leland outlines some exercises whereby one’s 
conscious desires might begin to govern and improve one’s latent, primal, and unconscious 
talents: Hypnosis, “auto-suggestion,” and guided dreaming could all be used as methods of 
problem-solving, creativity, intellectual acuity, artistic skill, and invention. He credits 
Paracelsus with the invention of two “souls” [Leland notes the original: “Geists”] that seem to 
function like what we would now call the conscious and unconscious mind, being at once 
complementary to and  distinct from each other. Paracelsus describes techniques for improving 




mind can be disciplined towards greater productivity. While possessed by the unconscious 
mind during sleep, for example, those dreaming faculties could be trained to work, perhaps 
inventing technological marvels. Upon waking, one would then re-possess those creative 
visions with one’s conscious capacities for analysis and organization.123 If all this reads as an 
excursus from the economic questions at hand, I would argue, rather, that the nineteenth-
century cleavage of the intellect into the conscious and unconscious minds was instrumental to 
economic philosophies of labor, exchange, and appropriation. 
In re-evaluating how MacPherson’s proposed category of “possessive individualism” was 
treated by Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Marx, and Derrida, respectively, Balibar asks: How 
can an individual possess one’s own self, one’s own labor, as the most fundamentally 
constitutive property of legitimate selfhood and yet have that same labor expropriated, sold for 
wages? Simply put, how can one exchange one’s self while still retaining one’s self?  
According to “possessive individualism”, a person is defined as an individual (and thus a 
citizen) by virtue of possessing property, with the stipulation that if a person does not own 
material property, he or she owns at the very least the capacity to labor: Labor is proper to 
one’s propriété  (Balibar puns on both “property” and “self”). This self-property is the 
minimum requirement for one’s status as a free—i.e., self-owning—individual. The reason a 
slave does not possess his labor (or his self), according to Locke, is that he cannot consciously 
“represent” the nature and process of that work to himself. I will return shortly to the slave’s 
exemption from “possessive individualism”. For now though, I propose adding to Balibar’s 
characterizations of “property” a third facet, namely, intellectual property, a term which in its 




royalties existed before the nineteenth century, but the legal terms “geistiges Eigentums” and 
“intellectual property” do not gain currency until the nineteenth century.125 The equivocal 
translatability of “geistig” as either “intellectual” or “spiritual” (to say nothing of “ghostly”) is 
of some importance here, as I hope to show by explicating how the mystical processes of 
production developed by industrial arts teachers were used towards negotiating the aporetic 
tears within what was, ultimately, a magical logic of material-spiritual exchange. 
To explain how a worker alienates his labor from his self, and to understand how this 
expropriation can be considered within an equation of exchange, Marx invokes the mechanism 
of metabolism and energy whereby one’s self can be converted into labor and thus exchange 
value.126 A human can be dis-possessed of her labor because there is a common medium of 
exchange between the laboring self and labored material: namely, the medium of energy which 
is converted into commodities and then extracted back from them in the form of food 
commodities. Marx’s explanation seems reasonable, although indeed only applicable to the 
category of physical labor. But adhering to his reasoning, how could one then explain the 
Mazdaznan fasts and purges encouraged by Itten at the Bauhaus, encouraged precisely as ways 
to induce a form of spiritual-intellectual [geistig] possession, to seize the student in a “frenzy of 
creativity”?127 Work is produced precisely by purging material that would be converted into 
physical energy. The mental-bodily transformation presumably effected by these rites thus 
pertain more to an alchemical than a metabolic exchange of properties, whereby alchemy’s 
admission of “spirit” into an equation of exchange allows non-valuable material to be 
transformed into valuable material, seemingly without an input of labor. In the context of the 




unconscious to take control over consciousness and to perform in a kind of psychic 
automatism. (Itten later wrote an article entitled “Creative Automatism” [“Schöpferische 
Automatismus”].)128 Intended to induce creativity, Vorkurs fasts and purges also seemingly 
served an ideological function: These performances demonstrated creative labor to be so 
dissociated from the category of physical work as to be anti-metabolic in nature, requiring the 
ritual elimination, rather than intake, of nourishment. However, if Vorkurs exercises generally 
succeeded in distinguishing the processes of a creative avant-garde from those of physically-
laboring craftsmen and industrial laborers, they simultaneously obfuscated the distinction 
between modern intellectual processes of design and Savage intellectual processes of magical 
possession. 
While the Bauhaus’s creative vanguard were well situated to represent themselves as 
intellectual proprietors (since “innovation” had to be proven to legally establish intellectual 
property), the ways in which Vorkurs practices invoked Savage Thought could also be said to 
unwittingly undermine the understanding of design work as being proper to one’s own 
intellect. The legal-philosophical concept of intellectual property differs from that of material 
property insofar as it permits a person to retain intact all of his or her own propriété (selfhood) 
throughout the economic course of technologically reproducing an initial design. That is to say, 
following the initial output of intellectual labor, a designer need not sacrifice any additional 
labor when claiming repeated pecuniary property in the form of royalties for subsequent 
reproductions made by the labor of other humans and machines. Each subsequent reproduction 
of the designed object thus has reified within it not only the cumulative value of labor expended 




exchange-value (i.e., the labor-time invested in it) in order to cover royalty fees for the 
designer’s one-time intellectual contribution. In other words, there is no way to precisely 
calculate the value intellectual property or, therefore, of the resulting commodity. The quantity 
of intellectual labor invested in each reproduction is absolutely indeterminate, as one does not 
know how many reproductions will ultimately be manufactured. Every subsequent 
reproduction increases the value of the intellectual property held in the original design. Indeed, 
we might wonder whether Marx allowed intellectual labor to drop out of his equations not 
because of some categorically necessary split between intellectual and manual labor, but rather 
because the sheer incalculability of intellectual property would render mathematically 
irresolvable the equation of value requisite to establishing a just framework for exchange. 
Much has been written on the anxieties caused in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by the 
growing use of paper money and its “unnatural” and “floating” values. Strangely, less attention 
has been paid to the quantitative indeterminacy of of intellectual property value, despite its 
centrality to economic exchange. 
If never stated explicitly, Bauhäuslers surely understood the lucrativeness of intellectual 
property’s undefined (and potentially infinite) value, as there were examples of Bauhäuslers 
suing for intellectual property rights.129  Gropius wanted very much to place Bauhaus design 
practices within the category of “labor”, however apparent it must have been that design work 
differed fundamentally from proletarian labor, insofar as designers’ inputs of time did not have 
a direct calculable relationship vis-à-vis the value derived therefrom. Itten, unlike Gropius, did 
not speak of Arbeit (translatable as labor) but instead of Werk, more evocative of intellectual 




from similar impulses to reconcile or justify the logical absurdity and incalculability of 
intellectual property. And perhaps Itten’s mysticism—his anti-metabolic alchemy whereby 
spiritual propriété became material property—can be understood through this struggle to 
account for intellectual labor’s ambiguous relationship to value. If one translated geistiges 
Eigentums as spiritual rather than intellectual property, this might help explain how 
intellectual/spiritual property could function as a cipher within those legal, economic, and 
aesthetic equations stating that intellectual property can grow in value, can bring value back to 
itself, without any further input of labor offered in exchange for royalties garnered in 
perpetuity. The eternal perpetuity of “Spirit”, along with its limitless, incalculable dimensions, 
might prove applicable to the problem of possessive individualism in relation to intellectual 
property. Like the “breath” that bears the same name as “spirit” in its Latin derivatives, Spirit 
partakes in the organic nature of each individual—temporarily possessing them—without 
belonging to any individual. 
Itten believed in two fundamental techniques that must be mastered for all branches of design: 
breathing and drawing, which worked in cooperation with each other. He wrote short essays on 
breathing theory (Atemlehre), which explain how spirit and organism merge through the 
respiratory process. One drew out (lüften) Geist with breath and pencil alike. When drawing 
anything, it was necessary, according to Itten, to first conceive the generalized essence of that 
thing, to de-materialize its particularity so that it was not a material, sensuous thing, but was 
rather rarified into that common, basic essence of the thing (recalling Hegel’s description of the 
gradual, essentializing abstraction of the object until it conformed to the abstractness of 




drawing it out with pencil and breath. But how did one get to the essence or eidos of a material, 
concrete thing? Two operations are mentioned by students of Itten. To draw a lemon, one must 
first, literally, taste the lemon.131 There is thus a sensuous experience of the object that is then 
transcended by representing it to a different sense, requiring an intellectual (or spiritual) 
translation (following a model of Hegelian transcendence from the material into the spiritual). 
The properties of an object, when distilled through various techniques of assimilation and 
translation, were thereby converted into intellectual properties, transferring values or properties 
of the object into “values” of the human intellect belonging to the designer. 
Itten’s efforts at intimate sensuous familiarity with the world of things, followed by a supposed 
transcendence over their material particularity, happens to correspond with the evolution out of 
what the neo-Hegelian, Max Stirner, called both the “negroid” stage of historical development 
and the childhood stage of personal development, cited by Marx in the The German Ideology. 
Marx takes issue with Stirner’s use of this “negroid form” [negrehafte] owing to its temporal 
instability: This “negro form” supposedly persists throughout different historical epochs and up 
through the present according to Marx (since, he writes, “primitive man” still exists). Itten, 
however, had his own interpretation of Hegelian historical development in relation to the arts. 
In an essay, “Racial Theory and Development of the Arts” (Rassenlehre und 
Kunstentwicklung), Itten argues, following Mazdaznan philosophy, that the arts of all peoples 
and all eras are to be combined, harmonized, and balanced by the “white race” who will make 
the ultimate Art and who, in Itten’s words, will finally “realize the creative-drive”.132  Itten 
designated for each of four putative “races” a typical method and form of representation. For 




paintings in Spain and Africa, both of which supposedly demonstrate the “unconscious 
striving” of “negroid” art to represent immediate, sensuous, material objects. The responsibility 
for realizing the final telos of World History lies with “white” man who is to compress and 
transcend all prior processes of art-making through conscious realization of their unconscious 
tendencies.133 But what does this say of intellectual labor and, consequently, intellectual 
property?  How propre can intellectual propriété be when it is drawn from the intellects of 
others?  I would submit that although a mystic, racist ideology of World-Historic fulfillment 
(whereby the “white race” gathered and condensed the intellectual practices of other “races”) 
should have invalidated any concept of intellectual propriety, that, on the contrary, such 
mysticism effected a displacement of property from “unconsciously conscious” non-whites to 
their allegedly conscious and scientific white counterparts. 
It should be quite obvious that the category of intellectual property is a dismally unstable one, 
insofar as an idea is never proper to any single person; nor, subsequently, can a design really be 
the wholly intact property of an individual. This argument—that ideas cannot be property 
because they are indistinguishably mixed with other people’s ideas—should seemingly render 
intellectual property an impossible legal construct; whereas in fact such obstacles have entailed 
further mystifications to justify the logic of expropriation. European science has claimed the 
special prerogative of distilling nature and also human practices down into their essential 
components and essences, a process that claims not to imitate those things or those practices, 
but rather to extract from them some hitherto unknown principle or mechanism. In the case of 
Itten’s “Racial Theory”, the “white race” would henceforth combine the arts of all the other 




History. (And surely, this final stage is eschatological in nature.) Itten’s repeated insistence that 
his students reclaim the naïve creative faculty of childhood was seemingly intended to render a 
“white” artist temporarily or partly “negroid” (as with Stiner’s conflation of child and 
“negorid” naïveté): a form of unconscious possession by one’s own otherness which was then 
sublimated immediately into an adult e (read: “white”) knowledge and conscious manipulation 
of the unconscious habits of a Savage Mind.134 
Bauhäuslers thus did not imitate the creative processes of other “races”; rather, they became 
temporarily possessed by those races and, in turn, took intellectual possession of whatever 
resulted from these mystical performances. The “white” artist appropriated the geistig 
Eigentums of an imagined Ur-Mensch (often associated with “Africans”), borrowing the 
putative Savage’s own techniques of spiritual possession and transcendence, and then 
translating its unconscious, originary knowledge into scientific knowledge. One did not owe 
this Wildegeist anything in exchange for its intellectual contribution—for how could one 
possibly reimburse a historically-indeterminate ghostly intelligence? Rather, the fact that 
intellectual property could inflate or accrue value infinitely was perhaps premised upon the 
similarly unquantifiable and eternal transformations of Geist itself. An incalculable input of 
intellectual labor—comprising the intellectual techniques from all times past—undergirded the 
processes of design. Any resulting intellectual property possessed the residues of this geistig 
phenomenology, bore the traces of its priceless value. How could one put a price on spirit, on 
breath, on all the pseudo-historical history of Ur-Mensch, of “the negroid form”? Instead, a 
designer inhaled the “spirit” or Weltgeist of history, allowed this spirit to possess her and then, 




and finally exhaled it as pure essence, as a design of infinitely expandable, infinitely diffuse 
value. Designers’ intellectual property was thus, quite simply, priceless. 
 
“Africa”, Machine Eschatology, World History 
Here we have the negative unity, already seen earlier as man, now appearing as the 
“actual Caucasian”, i.e., not Negroid, not Mongolian, but as the Caucasian Caucasian. This 
latter, therefore, as a concept, as essence, is here separated from the actual Caucasians, is 
counterposed to them as the “ideal of the Caucasian”, as a “vocation” in which they should 
“find themselves”, as a “destiny”, a “task”, as “the holy”, as “the holy” Caucasian, “the 
perfect” Caucasian, “who indeed” is the Caucasian “in heaven — God”. 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The Possessed (Impure History of the Spirit)” in The 
German Ideology (c. 1846) 
Leland’s industrial arts movement was formulated during the decades immediately following 
the United States’ abolition of slavery. An active Abolitionist himself, Leland accepted 
African-American students at PIASP and also hired an African-American teacher whose later 
expulsion, occurring while Leland was living in Europe, infuriated him to the point that he 
almost disengaged entirely with the school. His fervid opposition to slavery notwithstanding, 
Leland’s work must be understood as an unintended formulation of less coercive forms of 
exploitative labor. Attempting to negotiate between human mastery of the machine and mastery 
by the machine, Leland promoted a system of the industrial arts that seemed calculated to allow 
humans to retain their own propriété precisely by becoming more like machines: creative 
machines that were human by virtue of their creativity and yet machinic by nature of utilizing 
pared-down and easily reproducible system of techniques.135 In so doing, however, he also 
suggested that machines might take over such creative processes from humans, such as in case 
of the Architecture Machine, thereby implying a shift in the attribution of intellectual mastery 




invention—i.e., the intellectual property—that has gone into the machine’s making renders it 
intellectually inaccessible to the workers who labor according to its devices. Balibar explains 
how Locke’s insistence that a worker’s labor can not be subject to expropriation rests upon the 
assumption that, in laboring, one remains one’s own self. Locke stipulates that this retention of 
self depends upon two conditions, which Balibar summarizes succinctly: 
1) that all the actions of the laboring body are accompanied with a conscious 
representation, or a representation of their meaning and their ends in consciousness—
the ultimate site of personal identity; and 2) that this body forms an indestructible 
whole, that it is not split or broken but expresses a proper life in the continuity and 
diversity of the actions of what Locke metonymously called ‘its hand and its gifts.136 
Balibar notes that Marx takes issue with Locke for his refusal to acknowledge that the breaking 
apart of the working human body was precisely what was being effected through capitalist 
modes of production.137 The deus-ex-machina that would rescue avant-garde design culture 
from this impossible contradiction consisted in supplementing disciplinarity with a notion of 
vocation While the discipline of design would be construed in so that designers would appear 
to have consciously systematized the unprincipled creativity of Savage Thought, the vocation 
of design would construe design as a holistic practice, uniting a person’s entire mind and body. 
The Bauhäuslers, who were obsessed with the fragmentation of the working person—into 
disjointed body parts split off from spirit and brain—struggled to find ways of representing 
their intellectual mastery over the entire intellectual-material ontology of their work. The 
nineteenth-century concept of vocation, aligned to Bildung, suggested that an individual’s 
unique, teleologically-determined development should lead naturally to a particular occupation, 
intrinsic to his or her entire person.138 Grünow, who was trained in music, was hired by Gropius 




musical tones and bodily movement could be applied towards determining a student’s inner 
vocational bent, thereby deciding which of the Bauhaus workshops she or he should enter into. 
Borrowing perhaps from Grünow’s system of color-personality relationships, Itten also 
developed a Vorkurs exercise in which students developed their own palettes, which was meant 
to reveal much about the student’s inner vocation.139 Combined with a rhetoric and with related 
exercises of “unifying” the whole person or the whole artist, the emphasis on personal vocation 
seemed directed both against the fragmentation of the person and against possible alienation 
from one’s work. In keeping with the spirit of Bildung, work was formulated as “vocation” in 
contradistinction to proletarian labor which entailed a lack of consciousness in relation to the 
overall work being accomplished. 
Moholy-Nagy later took up these themes in a diagram depicting “sectors of human 
development” showing the division of labor and the relative historical durations for certain 
professions [Fig. 1.13]. “Primitive man” stands in the middle, undivided into professional 
occupations. Radiating from that epicenter are various, supposedly defunct (or soon-to-be 
defunct) occupations, superseded only by “scientist” and “technician”.  Not coincidentally, the 
central and originary position occupied by “primitive man” corresponds with the place 
occupied by architecture (Bau) in Gropius’ curricular diagram. There too, the center served as 
the place where all the occupations were united through a form of collaboration that supposedly 
healed divisions of labor. Insisting that designers should envision their work as technical 
science, Moholy-Nagy implied that this science essentially consisted in understanding the 
“biological functions” of the human “organism”. His own work and pedagogy focused on 




produced materials. But this “craft”—which involved a perpetual exploration of machines and 
new ways to manipulate them—was, as he stated himself, less concerned with “usual artistic 
expression” than with “the ABC of expression itself”.140 The designer was to perpetually 
represent himself and his work in relation to these new structural and technological 
apparatuses. Responding to Lewis Mumford’s statement that “the machine cannot be used as a 
short cut to escape the necessity for organic experience,” Moholy-Nagy wrote that “in the 
Bauhaus, on the technically simple level of handwork, still possible to grasp as a whole, the 
student can watch the product grow from beginning to end. His glance is directed to the organic 
whole.”141  
To redress the rampant criticism that machine-production disjointed human labor and alienated 
a worker from his or her own work, Moholy-Nagy did not refuse a model of industrial 
production but rather found ways to represent human-machine productivity as a 
comprehendible and natural system. As such, he transposed Itten’s mystical practices into the 
idiom of techno-organicism, thereby rendering those practices more properly disciplinary. 
Designer-technicians would de-fragmentize or de-alienate humans living in an industrial 
society by using machine-produced arts to represent machine production as integral with 
human organicism. Yet, contrary to giving back to industrial laborers a unifying conception of 
their work, such representations of machine production in fact reasserted the primacy of the 
designer as intellectual proprietor who designed and represented machine systems, without in 
fact doing anything to counter the alienation resulting from an expropriation of laborers’ labor-
time. In the early twentieth century, abstract art and technologically-reproducible art both strive 




on a shared knowledge of Savagery whereby intellectual and manual work is stripped down to 
its component devices: devices that Moholy-Nagy can call “organic” because of their shared 
human-machine reliance on metabolic circulations of energy. 
According to materialist history, a lack of consciousness about one’s means of production is 
tantamount to a lack of historical consciousness. Thus, the worker must become historically 
conscious, by becoming conscious of the processes of production (and of the class inequalities 
these processes draw on) in order to render these processes his intellectual—and thereby 
material—property. But this revolutionary ideal is based upon an insurmountable contradiction 
in reference to the principles of technologically-reproducible design: Laborers cannot become 
conscious of their means of production because those means are always-already the intellectual 
property/ propriété of others. And laborers cannot ever become properly “historical” (or 
historically conscious) because this same lack of intellectual property amounts to a lack of 
historical consciousness. Within the scheme of World History, laborers are placed in a double-
bind. 
Balibar mentions that Locke had likely formulated his “exception” to the principle of self-
ownership so as to justify Europe’s growing dependence on African slavery. African 
enslavement serves as an ideal model of expropriation because of the double, tautological 
disenfranchisement it entails: By divesting slaves of their right to possess their own labor, 
slave-owning societies can also subsume slaves’ intellectual property (their actual and invented 
material techniques and knowledge) within a generalized category of Savage Thought (or Ur-
Mensch or Negerhaften), which can not belong to them precisely because they are slaves. Thus, 




productive techniques. Africans’ exclusion from World History renders impossible the 
liberation promised by the master-slave dialectic: The slave would be hard-pressed to surmount 
enslavement if the historical consciousness that liberates was precisely what was categorically 
denied to all slaves. Susan Buck-Morss’s thesis that Hegel expunged Toussaint l’Ouverture and 
the Haitian Revolution from his master-slave dialectic by effectively crossing-out Africa from 
World History underscores this predicament. But I would add this minor variation: That the 
African slave—even the slave that asserts his or her own propriété through self-
emancipation—must be removed from World History not simply to perpetuate the institution of 
African slavery (which is Buck-Morss’s central claim), but also, in the long run, to enable the 
entire conception of World History, whose Geist, I argue, rests upon an apartheid of 
consciousness, one that follows the figurative model of a master-slave dialectic. Africans 
(figurative and literal Africans) move World History by their removal from World History. 
This removal effects their transformation into the Ur-Mensch (or Negerhaften or Savage Mind) 
whose techniques are used for designing technological systems. 
Leland, in the years following Abolition, proposed Design as an alternative to the 
proletarization of the poor. His theory of Design—not so differently from Moholy-Nagy’s—
aimed to instill humans with the sort of efficiencies belonging to machines, albeit with more 
flexibility and creativity. Through the attainment of industrial-art skills, working-class 
designers would own their own means of production. However, Leland surely realized that the 
conception of Design also challenged the model of craft guilds according to which a person 
retained full ownership of his or her own labor by virtue of owning the entire commodity 




technophilic rhetoric, the ownership of personal machines is made to recompense for the 
worker’s loss of ownership of the intellectual component of his or her own labor. Or further, in 
the case of the architecture machine, it is implied that the machine’s intellectual labor merges 
with that of “the very poor” when they wield the machine. Leland does not explain how the 
architecture machine really works: Must every person who wields it have mastered the highly 
complex arts of stereotomy and masonry and then somehow convey these to the machine so 
that it may imitate all the intricate architectural stone techniques of the world?  More likely, 
these sophisticated stone-architectural crafts would have to first be reduced to structuralist 
components reproducible and reconfigurable by the machine (in which case a designer would 
have first had to distill all architectural craft into that reproducible alphabet of techniques). 
Presumably the designer, in turn, would own the intellectual structures imparted to the 
machine, thereby holding intellectual property in the styles and motifs of diverse global 
architectures. Conveniently those architectures had been designated by Hegel as having been 
long ago left behind by World History, which is to say that their techniques were up for grabs. 
As such, an inheritance of human techniques from all ages could merge with machine technics.  
I would like to think that the old story of Babel was meant to address the problem of the 
division between intellectual and manual labor: that the lack of a common language only 
became a hindrance because of a prior, implicit division of labor that required a person’s 
intellect (an architect’s intellect) to speak to and thereby coordinate multiple hands. The city 
was doomed to be unfinished because this need to dominate through language implied master-
slave relations. The Architecture Machine, however, would rebuild Babel and the pyramids 




system operating just below the level of conscious, verbalized thought, in other words, a kind 
of Savage Thought. The split between consciousness and production would be resolved through 
a cyborgian merging of human and machine, mind and body. And thus the machine would save 
people from work. At least, it would transform some aspects of work—the work of 
architecture— into something alchemical and magical. In thus saving people, the machine 
would put us all eternally in its debt. Or, if this is seems an impractical state of affairs, perhaps 
it would just put certain people in its debt. Perhaps those who could claim to own the Machine 








 CHAPTER TWO: Architecture 
 
The Primitive Hut: An Architecture of the Savage Mind 
In the 1930s, the Dutch modernist architect Herman Haan had a spherical aluminum cage 
constructed. It was designed to lift him up in the air, high over the escarpments of Bandiagara, 
Mali, and from there lower him into the abandoned cliff dwellings of the extinct Tellem, a 
people that had been wiped out many centuries before by the Dogon. [Fig. 2.1] Documentary 
footage shows Haan ensconced in this small celestial orb, suspended high above the cliffs, 
snapping photographs, as the orb swings like an eyeball unmoored from its body. In contrast to 
Haan’s rather primitive technology, Dogon architecture was to serve far more diffuse and 
complex technological aims for Modernist architects who sought to apply its logic to their 
project of rendering universal techniques applicable to local situations around the world. As a 
putative artefact of unconscious processes of production, Dogon architecture was regarded as a 
technological analog to the mind’s functions. For the architect Aldo Van Eyck, who later 
followed Haan to Bandiagara, the houses and granaries of the Tellem and Dogon comprised a 
kind of Rosetta stone that, with proper decoding, would hopefully reveal long-lost processes of 
translation that allowed natural human thought to be reified into a natural architecture.142 [Fig. 
2.2] Perhaps then it would be more fitting to see this object of the architects’ curiosity—the 
“primitive hut”—more as an epistemological instrument than as an object of knowledge, a 
mode that was to be decoded and recuperated in order to develop a natural system for the global 




In the previous chapter it was shown that the construct of intellectual property often operated, 
despite its aporetic basis, by virtue of a corollary construct, “World History”. Certain narratives 
of the (uneven) World-Historical development of consciousness allowed anonymous or 
“Savage” intellectual techniques to be cast as intellectually proper to (i.e., the intellectual 
property of) European authorship. Advancing this thesis, while shifting its discursive field, this 
chapter questions how intellectual property as a category of personal subjectivity operated in 
relation to various claims to global knowledge. Specifically, I will examine a complex 
configuration of theories and practices concerned with translating between non-European local 
“vernaculars” and presumed global “lingua francas” within post-War and neo-colonial projects 
of urban development. While translation theory, structuralism, and cybernetics posited the 
existence of universal semiotic processes, various post-War architects likewise sought to 
determine modes of thought capable of producing meaningfulness within a plurality of 
contexts. 
As regards architects’ encounter with structuralist linguistics, I would argue that the primitive 
hut—which resurrected an eighteenth-century figure—was imagined in the shadow of a much 
larger architectural figure, that of the mythic tower of Babel, which emblemized modernist 
anxieties about practicing architecture within international and colonial fields where no single 
architectural “language” could be assumed as universally relevant. In the wake of the Second 
World War, many architects had begun to react strongly against the prevailing tendencies of 
modernist design, claiming that its forms were reproduced in a standardized fashion without 
regard for local traditions.143 However, in turning more explicitly towards such local traditions, 




unacceptable paradigm, one best exemplified by the “Beaux-arts” model that an earlier 
generation of Modernists had disparaged: a method of design that drew from disparate 
historical motifs and that, according to Modernist critics, pressed these into a meaningless 
cacophony, without regard for native or national-historic specificity. In other words, these two 
paradigms at play within twentieth-century Euro-American architecture— Modernism and 
Beaux-Arts—both seemed to foreclose the possibility of architectural meaning: on the one 
hand, because of a presumed lack of signs (the pared-down Modernist style supposedly 
divesting itself of signifying features); on the other hand, because Beaux-Arts’ eclectic stylistic 
pastiches were thought to tend towards illegibility; and in both cases, a disregard for a 
building’s particular historic-geographic context, a context upon which the possibility for 
meaning apparently depended (for, as we will see in the next chapter, meaning was increasingly 
understood as an exchange between an organism and its environmental context). The confusion 
of tongues that was said to have disrupted the construction of Babel was thought to be echoed 
in the inarticulateness of modern architectural languages that bore no meaning within the 
specific cultural and environmental contexts where they were implemented. However, to 
simply replicate a society’s existing architectural forms was not a solution that post-War 
modernist architects considered, not only because of architecture’s technocratic and urbanizing 
functions but also, ostensibly, because architects were not prepared to relinquish Modernists’ 
claims to apply universally processes of thought. As had been the case with designers at the 
Bauhaus, the right to intellectual ownership could be asserted over the technologically 
reproducible architectural assemblage through claims to some intellectual division between the 
consciousness of the architect and that of the builders who either provided past precedents to be 




To retain modernism’s universalist approaches to architecture and urbanism while, at the same 
time, adapting these methods to particular social and geographic contexts formed the basic 
mission of the late modernist group, Team Ten, that splintered off from the Congrès 
Internationale d’Architecture Moderne (C.I.A.M.) around 1953 after finding fault with 
C.I.A.M.’s inattentiveness to local particularities and to “the scale of the individual”. Team 
Ten’s founding organizers included the British architects Alison and Peter Smithson along with 
the Dutch architect Jaap Bakema. Van Eyck was one of the core members of Team Ten, 
whereas other architects who appear in this chapter such as Haan, Yona Friedman, Giancarlo de 
Carlo, and Christopher Alexander were occasional participants.144 Whether they were central or 
peripheral to Team Ten, these architects, along with many others, shared a common concern 
with translating what they referred to as “vernacular” architectures into a modern architectural 
system.145 The lingua franca of a revised modernism would translate and subsume the world’s 
vernaculars, preserving some trace of them in abstract or rarified form—what could be called a 
pure language. Team Ten’s assumption that architecture constituted a language, one that could 
be translated as well as broken down into grammatical parts, presumably drew from the 
widespread currency of structuralism as a model for studying semiotic systems. I propose then 
to parse the theories and practices of several architects involved with Team Ten, in order to 
understand how their preoccupations with contemporary anthropological and linguistic 
discourses operated vis-à-vis late-colonial and post-colonial urban development during the 
Cold War, particularly during the 1950’s and 1960’s. 
Given Team Ten’s tendencies to borrow the terminologies of structuralist anthropology and 




identifying Team Ten’s work as exemplary of how Claude Lévi-Strauss’ pensée sauvage 
[savage thought]—for him, a cybernetic proposal—did in fact operate as a technological 
apparatus, just as cybernetic theorists were interested in primal psychic mechanisms.146  That is 
to say, in the twentieth century the study of “the primitive” was always-already a technological 
engagement, insofar as an imagined savage intelligence was deeply imbricated with fantasies of 
artificial intelligence and of new aesthetic media. For many Team Ten architects, there seemed 
to exist a useful slippage between two contemporaneous tendencies: Firstly, Modernist design 
was understood as a system of codifiable thought processes (a codifiability that might thereby 
enable processes of machine replication, as demonstrated by the architects Yona Friedman and 
Christopher Alexander) while, concomitantly, architectural systems that lay outside a Western 
canon, were studied as evidence of thought processes that modern designers had long since 
forgotten. Simply put, the primitive hut was an instantiation of a primitive brain whose basic 
intellectual structures could naturally convert habits of life and thought into architectural 
conglomerations. The Dogons’ granary, for example, did not constitute for Van Eyck an 
architecture to be reproduced but rather a “mind” to be decoded such that the semiotic 
mechanisms which produced it might be reapplied towards producing Modernist architecture. 
Savage machines such as Haan’s swinging aluminum eyeball—employed towards observing 
and decoding an imagined Savage Mind—were thus symptomatic of a broader tendency 
whereby the presumed object of “savagery”, an object to be studied with supposed scientific 
detachment, in fact did not constitute the object so much as the method of inquiry.147 That is to 
say, the aim of studying savagery was really to invent the instruments proper to savagery, to 




this tendency was theatricalized by the wild antics and trappings with which he performed his 
fieldwork.148  But we might also turn to Lévi-Strauss who, when invoking pensée sauvage as a 
device for cybernetic analysis, failed to consider that cybernetics was thereby contributing to 
the invention of savagery.149 I argue that the near-invisibility of the historic relationship 
between technological systems and savagery has produced a semblance of natural unity 
between these two. I will show in this chapter that a feedback loop develops whereby 
cybernetic principles which drew on theories of a so-called Savage Mind were then 
implemented towards managing global “savagery”: which is to say, a global indigent. Because 
cybernetic-inspired systems were like savage minds, it was only natural for “savages”—in this 
case, the poor— to be organized bio-politically within such systems.150 The structuralist 
approach to savagery—although its practitioners distanced themselves from their more racist 
disciplinary antecedents—was crucial within the ideological shift from World History to a 
paradigm of human development. Rather than understanding Europe’s nineteenth-century 
historical or diachronic approach to world cultures to have been largely replaced in the 
twentieth century by synchronic methods of the social sciences, I suggest that the two of 
these—the synchronic and diachronic—had been entwined from the Enlightenment onward, 
even if never clearly articulated as such, and that this imbrication is exemplified by the concept 
of human development. In the previous chapter my substitution of “Wildgeist” [Savage Mind] 
for Hegel’s Weltgeist [World Spirit/Mind] was intended to stress how the structuralist 
epistemological paradigm of synchronic studies—Lévi-Strauss’s “savage mind”—operated 
within a Hegelian nineteenth-century paradigm of diachronic World History. Lévi-Strauss 
himself understood the workings of the Savage Mind as “structures of transformation”, and 




eternally the same (thus, incidentally, resembling Weltgeist). In the argument to follow, I will 
draw from examples of the social sciences to demonstrate how synchronic, comparative studies 
of human intellect—demonstrated in architectural discourse through the “primitive hut”—
contributed to technologies and ideologies of a new version of World History—that of human 
development. 
The structure of this present chapter is necessarily complicated insofar as it aims to produce a 
triangulation between discourses concerned with semiotic translation and decoding: 
structuralist anthropology, structuralist linguistics, and structuralist-influenced architecture 
(e.g., Team Ten), extending into the related discourses of cybernetics and Information Theory, 
and also translation theories developed in literary studies. Yet, I believe this triangulation—
which must treat each of its three components in a broad fashion—is useful as a way to 
elucidate the historical dimensions of linguistic and anthropological structuralism. I argue that 
these latter contributed to the development of aesthetic and techno-semiotic systems for 
intellectual exchange within a framework—both ideological and technological—of Cold War 
global development. In this chapter I want to propose that “pensée moderne” must be 
understood through its invention of “pensée sauvage”, and for this reason I stress the 
imbrication of savagery and science as a relationship that, although conceived within the 
Enlightenment, continued to be productive throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as 
a way of imagining, constructing, and justifying new technological systems. 
In many regards this is not a new story: Team Ten’s efforts to deduce modernist urban design 
strategies from more “primitive” architectural precedents can be understood within the long 




“primitive hut”. [Fig. 2.3] His Essai sur l’architecture extrapolates modern-architectural 
theories from an allegory of how the first primitive hut was built out of tree branches by a 
single man attempting to shelter himself from the weather. In contradistinction to earlier art-
historical invocations of primitive huts, however, Laugier’s essay can be read as a guideline for 
modern modes of translation.151 That is to say, the essay’s canonical status as the seminal text of 
modern architectural theory likely derives not so much from its literal contention that ancient 
Greek architecture (and its neo-Classical derivatives) demonstrated a perfect re-instantiation of 
a more primitive, natural architecture. Rather, by allegorizing the primitive hut as a reification 
of savage or natural intellectual processes, Laugier provided an exposition of how to think 
about thought in its originary condition, upon its first encounter with its environment, at which 
point it transposes itself (as if magically) into architecture.152  Simply put, Laugier’s essay 
demonstrated how to translate primal thought into a construction that mediated between nature 
and human technology. 
What we would now call “the environment”—Laugier speaks of climatic conditions as well as 
available building materials—emerged as the medium through which thought manifested itself 
within the world, the thing that instigated thought while simultaneously being shaped by 
thought. Enlightenment “Nature” in fact referred largely to this seamless merging of human 
intellectual processes with environmental circumstances. Laugier’s Cartesian affectation to be 
building up first principles from an abyss of total doubt only calls the reader’s attention more 
acutely to the fact that his savage operates not within a dark abyss where he would, like 
Descartes, distrust sensory knowledge, but rather within a particular climatic-vegetative 




architectural thought. Thus, Laugier does not derive his principles through any real effort at 
syllogistic reasoning, but through recourse to a fabled hypothetical circumstance whereby a 
person, in direct contact with the primordial conditions of Nature, might build a copy in the 
absence of a prior original. These “fabulous” foundations of a purportedly apodictic exposition, 
far from having been relegated to the remote annals of early modern architectural theory, have 
in fact been adopted by some of the great fabulists of twentieth-century Modernism who 
implicitly invoked this mythical copy-that-lacked-an-original as the underlying rationale of 
architectural modernism’s world missionary activities.153 
In the post-War period, Team Ten architects sought to conceptualize their work as a complex 
negotiation between “originals” and “translations” that did not entail copying qua copying. The 
mystifying question of how such copying-without-copying was actually to occur thoroughly 
pervaded (and often vexed) Team Ten meetings. Peter Smithson, recalling Van Eyck’s 
contribution to Team Ten thinking, emphasized that diverse architectural languages were not to 
be copied but rather should suffuse the mind, informing its processes: 
When [Van Eyck] talks about all previous language, all previous sensibilities, which run 
through you, this opens my mind to the fact that academic historic knowledge, and 
knowledge of earlier sensibilities could run through you without having to use the form 
of these historical styles. [Smithson Archives, Netherlands Architecture Institute]154 
Although Peter Smithson seems to suggest here a kind of historical haunting whereby the 
architect could inhale the past and then exhale it as architecture (not dissimilar from the 
Bauhaus practices of “possession” noted in Chapter One), Team Ten members more typically 
strove to identify underlying patterns and structures that were manifest not only within pre-




dubbed the casbah organisé, was featured in a particular 1959 issue of the magazine Forum—
edited by Van Eyck—which he dedicated to examples of “vernacular” architectures. Van Eyck 
attempted to illustrate how the North African casbah provided a structural system of organic 
growth, one natural to North African intellectual and cultural habits.156 Christopher Alexander, 
an occasional participant in Team Ten meetings who had lived and worked in India, 
distinguished between the “un-self-conscious” architectures of a global indigene and the “self-
conscious” architectures produced by professional architects. Claiming that the former 
contingent replicated a single architecture within a given context, whereas the latter applied a 
plethora of diverse architectural types, Alexander argued that a diversity of types rendered it 
exponentially more difficult to identify an appropriate solution to an architectural problem. (As 
a computer programmer, he used an example drawn from computer science to demonstrate this 
point.) He wrote that the coexistence of strong tradition with an ability for immediate 
adaptation creates a controllable model of architectural improvement. As such, the global 
indigene provided an experimental arena from which to explore the transformation of simple 
architectural types, leading to the possibility of developing an architectural grammar.157 The 
Savage Mind thus provided the basic structures of what could become an architectural lingua 
franca. 
Within Team Ten’s discourse, the invention of a Savage Mind was crucial on three counts: it 
posited the “original” as a common inheritance, mythical and general rather than specific and 
historical, and thus not only universally applicable but also universally appropriable; secondly, 
Team Ten sought to render moot the problem of Babel, of a confusion of tongues, or, really, of 




that might transpose itself directly into architecture, in contrast to processes of thought that had 
to be stretched and pummeled into the outmoded constraints of historically-derived 
architectural techniques and styles; thirdly, an architectural design process conceived by 
Modernist experts and yet derived from Savage Thought might be deployed for the 
management of the world’s “savagery” as if it were a native system of urban self-governance.158 
Within the complex historic genealogies and geopolitical relations of urban-architectural 
production, the Savage Mind helped architects to elide the disparities between different or even 
incommensurable systems of thought, of signification, of habitation, and—I will argue—of 
justice. 
The Structure of Babel 
At the 1962 Team Ten meeting in Royaumont, a heated argument broke out between the 
Smithsons and Van Eyck. Two years had passed since Van Eyck’s return from his Dogon 
fieldwork, and, hard-pressed to transpose into modernist design the intellectual structures he’d 
supposedly gleaned from the Dogon, Van Eyck had brought instead to his colleagues some 
design work done by a student of his, a certain Piet Blom. Blom was trained as an artist and 
thus seems to have been regarded by the meeting attendees as a bit of a naïve savage himself in 
respect to architecture.159  His project, called “Noah’s Ark”, proposed a city of one-million 
inhabitants, built on an imagined tabula rasa site with a symmetric arrangement of large, 
repetitive block-buildings. It was presented by Van Eyck to his colleagues as a demonstration 
of Dogon metonymic modes of thought, the form of its architectural parts being reflected in the 
form of the whole scheme.160 Van Eyck alluded to an article he had authored, inspired by the 




as a tree and vice-versa.161  The Smithsons took issue with such nonsensical mystifications. And 
besides, Blom’s scheme was dismal: a woven mat of monolithic blocks homogenously 
distributed over a vast plot. It looked “fascist”, they claimed, precisely the sort of thing to 
which Team Ten members had objected a decade earlier when they had urged the dissolution of 
C.I.A.M. Van Eyck countered: “this diagram is a process of mind, not a city.”162  As the 
argument grew bitter, Peter Smithson demanded: “Why should we struggle with this guy’s 
[Blom’s] brain?”163 
 Why indeed?  Apparently, only by positing a direct relationship between thought and 
architecture could a “natural” architecture be realized. The mental diagram sought by architects 
was not so much one of neural networks but of the magical thought that could render such 
networks apparent: the kind of thinking capable of forging intricate relationships between all 
manner of disparate things and practices, and transforming these into a dense semiotic 
cosmography. Savage Thought, when confronted with contextual or environmental 
circumstances, transposes itself (magically) into architecture; this is what the primitive hut tells 
us repeatedly over the course of two centuries. I write “magically” in parentheses because 
neither Laugier nor Team Ten architects mentioned magic as they attempted to develop rational 
systems for deriving modern architectures from prior or primitive constructs. They did not 
understand these processes as magical but rather as “natural” or “organic”. But then why look 
towards an allegorical Savage or to Dogon granaries, given that any architecture is surely born 
from human thought processes and must thus be both “natural” and “organic”?  Why imagine 
some originary moment when a hut suddenly springs out of the brain as if it were a perfectly 




how do we relate this “magic” to the actual history of Team Ten’s work within contexts of late- 
and neo-colonial urban development? 
It is useful to reframe these queries more generally as questions of how the two-way relations 
or entanglements of indebtedness between originals and their translations bore upon actual 
relationships of debt-creation within the burgeoning post-War constructs of First and Third 
Worlds. Jacques Derrida, in his essay “Des tours de Babel”, proposes that Walter Benjamin’s 
“Task of the Translator” reverses the presumed indebtedness of a translation to its original:  
According to this reading, the original stands indebted to the translation, not only because the 
original survives through the translation but also, I would add, because the latter realizes more 
fully the poem’s “primitive” struggle to express thought through language. 164 Translation, 
according to Benjamin, manages to approach a “pure language” [reine Sprache]—a language 
that reveals its own language-ness—more closely than would be otherwise possible because it 
expresses the ontology of language itself. 
To project Benjamin’s language-based discourse onto an architectural discourse will inevitably 
stir up inconsistencies and imperfect analogies, and my justification for persisting in this 
method of comparison is the fact that architects, from the early years of modern architectural 
theory during the Enlightenment and up through to the present, have repeatedly insisted upon 
the analogy of “language” with its attendant tropes of grammar, translation, vernaculars, 
poetics, communication, etc.165  Rather than dismissing such tropes as evidence of architects’ 
merely spurious emulation of fashionable discourses, I propose that to regard architects’ 
interdisciplinary transpositions with some earnestness might shed light not only on the history 




worldly usefulness of originating the structuralist notion of a Savage Mind. When read 
together, “Task of the Translator” and the practices of Team Ten reveal an important ambiguity 
about the applications of structuralism in the world, as a bridge between cybernetic intentions 
and a magical poetics, or between universal systems of governmentality and imaginative 
translations of local cultures. 
One unsettling aspect of Benjamin’s “Task of the Translator” is the way it seems to 
proleptically refute some of the most basic tenets of Information Theory and machine 
translation developed by the likes of Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, while, at the same 
time, overlapping with those theories as regards their proposed methods of translation.166 On the 
one hand, Benjamin absolutely denies the importance of the “message” conveyed by a poetic 
work (whereas the message, codified into information, was conceptually crucial to information 
theorists). On the other hand, in light of the sign’s arbitrary relationship to its signified—a 
relationship that supposedly gives rise to the world’s “confusion of tongues” and the attendant 
difficulties of translation—Benjamin calls for a literal word-for-word translation. The 
transference of legible meaning is to be neglected in favor of an almost nonsensical 
transposition of one word into another, much in the way a translating machine would operate. 
Relatedly, both Benjamin and Information Theorists bracket aside “meaning” in order to treat 
the original according to its pared-down structural components. 
So the translator-poet would produce something similar to what the translating machine would 
produce, albeit towards different ends: For Benjamin, poetic translation effects a kind of tear 
within the otherwise seamless fabric of language, a rip that opens onto the originary chasm 




thought renders itself into language. By contrast, information theorists were concerned with 
decoding messages for purposes of espionage and other computational possibilities. These two 
concerns—of literary theory and Information Theory, respectively—may seem to have nothing 
more to say to one another; but it seems, in turning to Team Ten, that the search for a reine 
Sprache (carried on because and despite the acknowledged arbitrariness between sign and 
signified) undergirded the projects of both early Information Theory and what we might call 
poetic or artistic translation as described by Benjamin and as enacted to a large degree by 
modern architects. Indeed, although reine Sprache would seem to refute outright the 
arbitrariness linking sign to signified, I contend that structuralism in fact opened up ways for 
thinking about the creation of a “pure language”, a transparent, natural language that would 
render moot the confusion of tongues and make Babel’s Tower buildable again. Against a 
perception that structuralism entailed a dispassionate acceptance of the arbitrary relation 
between signs and their referents, I believe that structuralism’s application within an expanded 
field lent itself to the opposite: to efforts to re-naturalize semiotic modes, a reconciliation 
between signs and signifieds to be accomplished by erasing the strict distinction between them. 
Towards these ends, one would need to circumvent language or at least distort language to 
make it present thought more intuitively and directly, as was sometimes accomplished by 
architecture. For architects, this meant that Babel would be built by recuperating the semiotic 
magic of the primitive hut: the primitive hut serving as evidence of how pre-linguistic thought 
might be translated directly and naturally into architecture.  
Benjamin writes that the value of translation lies in its ability to represent the “central 




intensive form.” The translation’s “representation of hidden significance through an embryonic 
attempt at making it visible,” he continues, “is of so singular a nature that it is rarely met with 
in the sphere of nonlinguistic life.” 167  We could contrast the privileged place given here to 
linguistic translation with the importance Lévi-Strauss ascribes to translation between different 
semiotic forms (what Jakobson called “inter-semiotic translation”).168 Lévi-Strauss uses the 
example of how a set- and costume-designed must develop a visual translation of an opera 
score.169  If we take Benjamin’s theory of translation to its logical extreme, this would 
presumably lead—Benjamin’s caveats notwithstanding—straight to Lévi-Strauss’s interest in 
the “central reciprocal relations” between non-linguistic “languages”. For what could render 
“hidden significance” more “intensely” than its transposition into a different semiotic system?  
All those meanings that were latently, structurally at work but only silently so within the opera 
score, for example, could emerge through the set-designer’s struggle to identify aspects of the 
music that were not exclusively musical but were rather prior to music, prior to thought’s 
translation into form: Those extra-musical aspects, arguably, would approach more closely to a 
kind of primitive state of thought when not-yet-musical ideas struggle to convert themselves 
into music.170 Again, we are speaking of a reine Sprache: of a fleeting moment at which 
inchoate thought, freed from constraining systems of formal language and sense-making, 
begins to press itself into the more apodictic and universal communicative systems of the 
world. 
Because of the Savage Mind’s alleged reliance on myth as a magical system for structuring 
knowledge of the world, savage society was said to be always engaged in the process of 




Dogons’ ethnographer, Marcel Griaule, marveled at the overlaps of metaphoric figures between 
different Dogon semiotic forms, such as architecture, myth, dance, and domestic objects.172 The 
ways in which these arts played off each other were indicative to Van Eyck of structuring 
mechanisms with which one could make other artistic practices resonate with the culture of a 
given society. The Savage Mind’s presumed ability to forge reciprocities between different 
modes of meaning is ascribed by Lévi-Strauss to the reducibility of all these modes to a binary 
code comprised of difference, of “on-off” or “one-zero”, a theory Van Eyck echoed.173 Lévi-
Strauss took his cue from computer scientists’ projects to render diverse forms of sensory 
communication into a common language conveyable through binary code. Reciprocally, 
cybernetic theorists invited anthropologists of “primitive cultures” (most notably, Margaret 
Mead) to the Macy Conferences, hoping to learn from them the basic intellectual mechanisms 
that could be reproduced by thinking machines.174 
The question I struggle with is how to possibly understand such constructions of the Savage 
Mind as indebted to the actual intellectual practices of various small-scale societies, 
notwithstanding Europe’s invention of “savage thought”. Seemingly, the Savage Mind served 
as an “intellectual commons”, allowing intellectual techniques particular to a given society to 
be conflated with universal human tendencies. Such universalism permitted Savage Thought to 
be subsumed in the category of science, a move that served well for bracketing out magical 
thought from scientific thought, while still keeping the former at hand. Science could not 
acknowledge contamination from myth and magic. The fact that science needed magical 
thought in order to advance its perpetual re-ordering of things (in the interest of technical 




magical structures that could be hermetically analyzed and translated by Science rather than 
operating within Science. Science could sublimate the impurities of Savagery, through analytic 
translation, into the pure language of structural relations. These magical semiotic processes 
once systematized and redeployed by the Sciences, would be used to indebt the Savagery of the 
world’s indigent to European Science. The scientific translation of “local cultures”—such as 
proposed by Team Ten architects— would constitute a supposed gift to those same localities, a 
gift that rendered originals forever indebted to their translations.  
Alchemy, Translation, Debt 
A Dutch newspaper in the 1950’s announced that Haan had brought to the Dogon the Dutch 
“gift” of water in the form of a reservoir project he had undertaken for the Dogon.175 
Presumably, the Dogon had enjoyed the aqueous element long prior to building Haan’s 
reservoir. Indeed, Griaule’s book on Dogon knowledge was titled Dieu d’eau: Entretiens avec 
Ogotemmêli [God of Water: Conversations with Ogotemmêli], and the ethnopsychiatrist, Paul 
Parin, in an article published by Van Eyck in Forum, stressed that water and its scarcity 
“defined [Dogon] ‘being and consciousness’”.176 Certainly, Rotterdam had an excess of water, 
so this apposite cultural exchange between two unlike environments—the drained swamps of 
the Netherlands and the arid stretch of the Sahel—fit well within a burgeoning environmental 
discourse according to which the unequal distribution of natural resources mandated their 
exchange on a global market and hence their global, rather than local, management. Yet the 
provision of Haan’s technical knowledge could not necessarily constitute a “gift”, given that 
Haan had long been the recipient of gifts of Dogon knowledge, having transferred these into the 




for the receipt of Dogon knowledge would be considered a gift, we must assume that the 
knowledge Haan gave to the Dogon outweighed the knowledge he had received, an assumption 
that founders upon the difficulty—indeed, the impossibility—of quantifying the value of 
knowledge.178 
Given that Team Ten architects were concerned precisely with cross-cultural translation of 
knowledge and with promoting their own international expertise, the question of the value of 
the local knowledge that was being translated should be submitted to consideration. This 
question speaks to a long history of capital-rich nations and institutions conferring to capital-
poor nations the latter’s own natural resources in the form of gifts, by grace of the former’s 
technologies for resource extraction and management.179 Although in many such cases, the gifts 
are obviously proffered in the interest of sustaining the human labor required by industrial 
capital, if we bracket aside such tendencies, there still remain the sorts of cases exemplified by 
Team Ten, cases in which architects did not stand to gain material capital so much as 
intellectual capital from societies in relation to whom they were considered experts. The 
architect Yona Friedman, for example, based a life-long avant-garde practice on developing 
techniques for organizing the creative capacities of a recently de-colonized peasantry. In 
contradistinction to the more pragmatic approach adopted by many advocates for “self-help” 
architecture, Friedman stressed what he often called the “myth-making”, imaginative 
capabilities of a global indigent. An art project he conceived with the artist Jean-Pierre 
Giovanelli rendered quite literally the new model of exchange that was coming to characterize 
neo-colonial economic relations.180  For “Une intervention sur le dechet” [“An Intervention on 




Accumulation”, scrap parts from “our sophisticated technologies” would be amassed. In the 
“Phase of Transformation” these scraps would be distributed among “artisanal populations” in 
Africa where they would be subject to a process of “free transformation”. The “Phase of 
Recuperation” would deliver the newly transformed detritus back to Europe where, during the 
“Phase of Reinjection” these “African art objects” would be sold, the resulting proceeds being 
then remitted to Africa.181 
I will discuss later Friedman’s long involvement with UNESCO’s projects of Third-World 
development, his museological adventures in India, and his interest in the playful, creative 
instincts of children. For the moment though I would simply call attention to a new paradigm of 
economic exchange, described by Friedman’s work, that did not entail—as has been often 
said—a global division of labor according to which “the North” comprised the creative and 
analytic brain and “the South” comprised the laboring body. Rather, the brain itself was being 
divided into Southern and Northern “hemispheres” along an axis delimiting avant-garde global-
consciousness (tied to “our sophisticated technologies”) from the naïve playfulness of locally-
minded artisans. The fact that a capitalist apparatus for technological invention lacked the 
means to accommodate its own excess detritus drove Europe towards this alchemical 
arrangement whereby its dross would be reconverted into precious material by those eternal 
magicians, African Savages, whose non-mechanical techniques of production were competent 
to deal with Europe’s real one-off’s: their idiosyncratic technological scraps. Africans would 
presumably be grateful for this magical exchange: namely, the conversion of their strange 
“useless machines”—cobbled together from technological waste—into monetary remittances 




Savage to magically heal a pervasive anxiety about capitalist excess, pollution, and poverty, 
and to thus confer value to these ritual objects of “transformation”. If conceived in alchemical 
terms, pollution and poverty could be simultaneously treated: Europe’s pollution would become 
Africa’s raw material (while Africa’s actual raw materials were siphoned off, later to become 
European pollution). Although Africans were transforming waste into artwork, this process did 
not attribute to Africans the prerogative of “translation”, as they presumably need not analyze 
or understand the original technological scraps that they worked on. Indeed, Europe’s unique 
prerogative to uncover the “pure language” underlying Savage thought and all its 
productions—was required in order to comprehend the transformed detritus as art objects. As 
with Surrealists’ found objects, each transformed scrap constituted a banal “original” that 
Friedman and Giovanelli would translate through the very concept of selling these as artworks. 
Like Marcel Duchamp’s urinal, the real value being offered was conceptual: in this case, an 
alchemical economic exchange. 
If we extend Derrida’s reading of “Task of the Translator” to the problem at hand, we might 
note that just as an original poem is said to stand indebted to its translation (rather than the 
other way around), so, likewise, a Western translation of foreign knowledge has often appeared 
to incur a debit rather than a debt vis-à-vis its “original”. I would argue that Team Ten’s 
endless discussions on how to extrapolate the knowledge embodied by “original” architectures 
without simply cribbing those models was motivated to a large extent by the nagging awareness 
that the only possible justification for Modernist expertise hinged on its claim to be conferring 
value rather than extracting value from the (often colonized) societies it both studied and built 




analyze, distill—and thus to translate—more native modes of architectural organization would 
exceed the value of the original models. The balancing act was a delicate one between two 
extremes: By straying too far from or simply disregarding native architectures, one would 
merely carry on C.I.A.M. urban strategies of neglecting local patterns of life, thereby making 
architecture an imposition rather than a gift; on the other hand, if one remained too faithful to 
existing or native models, one could not really claim to be contributing or modernizing 
anything.182 The trick then was to create an architectural “language” more natively meaningful 
to a society than its own native architecture. Just as the translator of a poem would realize the 
reine Sprache underlying the original poem’s formation—or at least come closer to realizing 
that more basic, originary language—so too would architects supersede the native model by 
uncovering the “pure” language beneath or just prior to the actual vernacular. Translation was 
to be based on a new model of the gift—not the Maussian gift that demands commensurate 
reciprocity—rather, a gift premised on an incommensurability that rendered one party eternally 
indebted, as if indebted by nature. 
The surplus value of the translation vis-à-vis its original had already been suggested by 
Enlightenment aesthetics, including theories put forth by the architectural Encyclopedist, 
Antoine-Chrysostome Quatremère de Quincy, Secretary of the Académie des Beaux-Arts in the 
early nineteenth century.183 Indeed, an Enlightenment concept of World Historical progress 
(tied also to aesthetic progress) relied on such a reversal of debt. Effectively, the World 
Historical model implies that Europe’s continual improvement on the past as it leads the world 
towards a state of perpetual peace, renders the (savage) past indebted to the (civilized) future. 




civilized translation of a primitive model into an ideal, reproducible archetype: the mythic, 
primitive origin must be rendered more purely legible precisely by being used out of context in 
almost nonsensical fashion. As hinted in the previous chapter, World History can only claim 
progress through perpetual recourse to myth: that is, through translating an unconsciously-
construed mythic ideal found latent within an “original”. To borrow and translate these 
artefacts, modernity must presumably indebt itself to the knowledge of the people who created 
them. Yet, the construct of the Savage Mind suggests otherwise. Savagery indebts itself to 
translators who will distill its crude and unconscious techniques into the refined, self-
consciously grammatical lingua franca of Modernism. Only conscious knowledge can be 
ascribed value (how can one reimburse the unconscious?), and the Savage Mind—like 
vernacular architecture—was surely ingenious but only unconsciously so. 
Quatremère’s work on primitive “types” was cited centuries later by the architect Bernard 
Rudofsky in his 1964 exhibition at New York’s Museum of Modern Art, “Architecture without 
Architects,” in which several Team Ten architects showcased their own studies of so-called 
vernacular architectures.184 A common purpose united Team Ten’s work with Quatremère’s 
theories: namely, to translate primitive archetypes without actually copying them. Quatremère 
thus distinguished between a “type” to be translated and a “model” to be slavishly mimicked.185 
Rudofsky had used Quatremère’s illustration of how primitive or vernacular architectures were 
translated into present-day forms. Whereas Laugier had not attempted to give any historical or 
geographical context to his fabled primitive hut, implying its purely mythical status, 
Quatremère, who was an archaeologist as well as an architectural theorist, proposed three world 




modes supposedly predominating in a particular region of the world. According to this formula, 
South- and Southeast-Asian carved stone temples were modeled after fishermen’s caves, East-
Asian pagoda roofs referred to the tents of nomadic herdsmen, and Greek post-and-beam stone 
temples were translations of agrarian wooden huts. Against critiques of Ancient Greeks’ 
transformation of structural wood elements into stone ornament, Quatremère argued that this 
translation—although nonsensical from a practical viewpoint—was what made Greek 
architecture and its modern derivatives superior to all other architectures around the world. 186 
The conversion of structural wooden rafters into the purely decorative band of stone triglyphs, 
the transformation of the hut’s gabled roof into a false pediment masking a flat roof, and the 
translation of a light, flexible wooden frame into massive, brittle stone beams did not, for 
Quatremère, impute any corruption of the wooden original.187 Foreshadowing Benjamin’s 
theory of translation, Quatremère argued against the value of sensical translation in favor of 
revealing the pure (pre-sensical) language of architecture. 
By rendering the original’s logical, functional structure into superfluous structure and 
ornament, stone temples supposedly brought into relief the fundamental architectural eidos of 
the primitive wooden hut upon which it was modeled. What was formerly pragmatic had 
become, through translation, a rarefied and transcendent idea, disburdened of crude function.188 
Like Marx’s commodity, the Greek temple now led a double, enchanted life as something at 
once concretely sensuous—a temple—and abstract, referring not exactly to abstract labor but 
rather to some prior, primitive model it had transformed into an ideal archetype (to borrow one 
of Peter Smithson’s favorite terms). The Greek temple operated as a sign of the primitive hut 




wooden hut, it called attention to the irremediable split between sign and signified. By 
consciously invoking this split, Ancient Greek architecture indebts the primitive hut’s 
vernacular to its own translation of that vernacular. Without the translation, the primitive 
original would never transcend the naïve, illusory unity of sign-and-signified (its elements 
being all structurally necessary rather than alluding, ornamentally, to another architectural 
logic). And yet, Quatremère’s insistence that architecture operate as a referential sign meant 
that architecture had to exist as a kind of disjuncture from its own self, always quoting a foreign 
language.189 
Quatremère suggests that it is the translation of the archetype rather than the archetypal model 
itself that holds aesthetic value. The value of the translation derives from its association with 
the original, but the ultimate attribution of value falls entirely to the process of association, to 
translation itself as a mode of thought, a mode of associating things via some structural or 
essential resemblance, and thereby bringing into relief their hidden “type”. What distinguishes 
Quatremère’s position from that of later, mid-twentieth-century architects, ethnographers, and 
ethnopsychiatrists is that the latter often understood such processes of association—of forging 
resemblances—as the special purview of savages. For example, both Van Eyck and Lévi-
Strauss looked to so-called savages to discover the structuring mechanisms of association 
through which objects were implicated within a system of abstract ideas. Architects, in seeking 
from the processes of Savage Thought methods for designing more natural urban systems, 
seemed to follow Lévi-Strauss’s theory that the Savage Mind’s structures comprised a flexible 
infrastructure for transformation. The intellectual mechanisms that were known to weave such 




Team Ten architects spoke incessantly of. The Savage Mind’s intellectual structures, if 
properly decoded, could serve almost as kits for the construction of natural semiotic-
architectural infrastructures. All this was based upon an anthropological corollary to that of 
Ferdinand Saussure’s “discovery” that signs bore an arbitrary relation to their signifieds: 
essentially, that savages remained unaware of this discovery, and that they derived the 
capability of magical thought from this ignorance.190  However, in the following section, I will 
argue that magical thought was not actually premised on an ignorance of the distinction 
between sign and signified any more than it was symptomatic of delusional thought. Rather, the 
magical manipulation of signs—a magic performed necessarily by all semiotic systems—often 
took precisely the form of a negotiation of the sign’s inherent inadequacies and instabilities vis-
à-vis its referent and the world at large. 
Architecture and Words 
According to the Dogon elder, Ogotemmêli, the heavenly spirits descended to earth upon a 
granary.191  Steps were cut into each of its sides, so that the hut formed a steep ziggurat, and 
upon these steps all the living species of the world were arranged in taxonomic order. When 
asked how all these specimens could fit upon the walls of the granary, Ogotemmêli explained 
firstly that only a single representative of a particular species within a larger genre would be 
visible (e.g., a red antelope would stand in front of all other antelope species), and, secondly, 
that these were not actual plants and animals but rather the “symbols” for them, “the words of 
this lower, earthly world”.192 It would appear then that the Dogon, who were supposed to reveal 
how the Savage Mind unconsciously circumvented the arbitrary relationship between signs and 




be integral to the arrangement of an epistemological world-system. There was no “pure 
language” through which truth about the world might pass directly into human awareness. 
Rather, Ogotemmêli suggests, a divinely ordained world-order appears on earth through the 
translation of things into their debased, earthly words: Normal rather than “pure” language 
mediates between particular objects and the abstract ideas (resemblances and generalizations) 
needed to order objects into a taxonomic system. 
Van Eyck had gone to Bandiagara to discover how Dogon architecture functioned semiotically 
in relation to Dogon beliefs and practices. Through Griaule he was certainly familiar with 
Ogotemmêli’s explanations of how the things of the world had descended from heaven upon a 
granary and how they were arranged as symbols on the steps of the granary walls.193 In seeking 
a relationship between architecture and meaning, Van Eyck surely couldn’t have hoped to 
discover a more perfect semiotic role than this: architecture as the spatial scaffold upon which 
things were distributed into the taxonomic relations that rendered meaning possible. Curiously 
though, Van Eyck never mentions this aspect of the Dogon granary. He dedicated an issue of 
Forum magazine to the Dogon, comprised of his own writings and those of Griaule and 
ethnopsychiatrists, and yet the only hint of the granary’s role in the world’s origin is a brief 
allusion made in Griaule’s article, mentioning how the granary descended from heaven along a 
rainbow. Van Eyck, by contrast, focuses on the account by Ogotemmêli (transcribed by Griaule 
in Dieu d’eau) of the Dogons’ anthropomorphic arrangement of architectural space and the 
signification created thereby. It would seem that this more blatant use of architecture as a kind 
of non-arbitrary sign (non-arbitrary because formally mimetic) was much more compelling to 




taxonomic scaffold. After all, the Savage Mind was supposed to lead modernity back to the lost 
magical processes of developing non-arbitrary sign systems, rather than reinforcing the split 
between the divine ideational origin of things and the arbitrary earthly symbols of them. And 
contrary to the presumed limitations of the Savage Mind, the Dogon viewed their world-system 
as having been arranged according to a contingent, spatial logic, not dissimilar from what 
Michel Foucault has described as one of the hallmark epistemic models of early European 
modernity—the neutral organizational grid that supersedes the privileged relationship of sign-
to-signified with the importance of sign-to-sign relations. In the Dogon’s ordering system too, 
signifierss and signifieds—far from remaining locked in some mystic unity with one another—
participated in various exchanges and substitutions in the interest of forming a taxonomic 
system.194 
Later in Dieu d’eau, Ogotemmêli further demonstrates the flexibility between signs and 
referents, in regard to the act of commodity exchange.195 His explanation sheds light on the 
problem of objects’ translation into each other through trade. Raising the same philosophical 
problem that Marx accuses Aristotle of neglecting—namely the question of how two unlike 
objects can be traded for each other as if they somehow equaled each other—Ogotemmêli 
explains that not only do twins symbolize the process of trade but, moreover, trade must always 
be accompanied by words.196 Words are spoken by commodities, albeit channeled through the 
mouths of the owners who trade them. “To have cowries,” Ogotemmêli declared, “is to have 
words.”197  Due to a reciprocal life-force between an object and the person who manufactures or 
owns it, the object represents its owner, in contradistinction to the alienation incurred by 




process of possession (de-possession and re-possession): Ogotemmêli suggests that the object’s 
spirit returns to its maker so that he or she might then transfer that spirit via the medium of 
speech to its new owner. 
What enables trade between two unlike objects is that they share the common denominator of 
human intellect-spirit, demonstrated through the owners’ ventrilocution of the objects. The 
traders’ twin-ness testifies to the equality of the people who trade, to their equally-valid voices 
(hence, their products speak and negotiate), and to the essential commensurability of human 
skills, knowledge, and technics. I don’t think it would be a stretch then to say that, for the 
Dogon, objects can be translated into each other by virtue of the equality between humans and 
the subsequent commensurability of the knowledge embodied in their wares. Haan’s gift, by 
contrast, constitutes itself as un-translatable, un-reproducible, and un-reimbursable in the hands 
of its recipients because its knowledge is incommensurate with their knowledge. (How could 
hydrology be traded for “folk myths”?) Against prevailing economic theories that posited either 
labor time or “demand” as the common denominator allowing the ontological possibility of 
exchange between unlike objects, the Dogon propose for this purpose the common medium of 
consensus and intellectual equality.199 
In Chapter Three, I will discuss the thesis forwarded by the ethnopsychatrist, J.C. Carothers, 
that what distinguished Africans from Europeans was the former’s inability to comprehend the 
arbitrary relation between sign and signified, thereby allowing delusions of “omnipotent 
thought”—what Sigmund Freud had described as the belief that one could magically exercise 
influence over things through “wish”.200  Because Africans purportedly regarded words as 




manipulations) in their efforts to control those object-referents. Carothers’ thesis must be 
considered in light of the relationships Ogotemmêli described between words and commodities. 
In the act of exchange, magical speech—ventrilocution—is not a delusional exercise of one’s 
will over inanimate objects, but rather is a ritual enunciation intended to mediate between an 
object’s concrete singularity (derived from the local knowledge and personal technique that 
produced it) and its generality (derived from an essential equality of human intellect), so that 
the singular object might be exchanged for a different object or for money, converting its 
singular value into a generalizable exchange value. Far from upholding the unity of sign and 
signified, it appears that Dogon “magical thought” (e.g., ventrilocution) articulates an 
intellectual and performative analog to the unstable relation between sign and signified. 
Specifically, the mandate to exchange words acknowledges the ontological aporia of exchange, 
and therefore of ownership. Signs—articulated through speech—create a semiotic bridge 
between unlike things, between different individuals, and between dissimilar cultures and 
dissimilar cultural knowledge, enabling an exchange that would otherwise leave open an 
ontological and social rupture. The intellectual transferal effected by words allows that which is 
categorically proper to oneself (one’s property) to become proper to another owner. The 
converse would be that something appropriated without the “magical” semiotic transition 
effected by speech, might be inadequately appropriated. It stands to reason that the 
incommensurability of knowledge implied by paradigms of European and African exchange 
would render such knowledge, once exchanged, into a form of “non-sense”—a form that was, 
incidentally one of the leitmotivs of twentieth-century art and architecture, being particularly 




Ogotemmêli explains that if words are not exchanged, the spirit of the commodity’s previous 
owner, still possessing that commodity, could malevolently haunt its new owner (similar to 
Mauss’s observations on the Maori’s hau, a spirit that compels reciprocity of gifts).201 If we 
extended Ogotemmêli’s explanation to comprehend much larger exchanges (say, of urban-
architectural knowledge), the malevolent haunting Ogotemmêli describes might be understood 
somewhat differently: as a semiotic rupture caused by the refusal of reciprocal translation 
between disparate forms of knowledge. This “haunting” would present itself as the uncanny 
intonations of nonsense. That is, nonsense might indicate the lingering and maladapted 
presence of an “original” whose thoughts had been wrongly appropriated. In the worst case, the 
gift of one-way, nonsensical translations exemplified a savage-pathological breakdown of the 
system through which consensual trade of knowledge and thus the semiotic integration of 
knowledge could be possible. The rather harmless nonsense of Ancient Greeks’ translation of a 
primitive wooden hut into a massive stone temple—although supposedly deriving its 
superiority from that very nonsense—points to the kind of semiotic disjunction that would be 
greatly amplified by Postmodernist pastiches. I will endeavor to show how the uncomfortable 
affinities between those pastiches and Team Ten’s obsessive cataloging of global architectures 
might have derived from a prior haunting—and a prior nonsense—of Team Ten modes of 
translation. 
The Work of Dreams: Architecture and the Private Subconscious  
How knowledge could be rationally transferred between societies that held different knowledge 
systems—that is, transferred without simply producing nonsense—was ultimately the question 




prior question of what purposes such translation served. Van Eyck, who had no interest in 
building in West Africa, simply believed that the Dogons retained a privileged method of 
integrating all things and practices into a unified semiotic system, and that this was a method to 
be studied and applied to his own European work. Although he premised his fieldwork on the 
assumption that Dogon thought could be somehow grafted onto modernist design processes—
and that Dogon epistemology was therefore globally transferable—at the same time, the precise 
appeal of Dogon culture was its supposed stability according to which the things and events of 
the world were firmly implanted within a clear constellation of relations to one another. For 
other Team Ten architects, however, a semiotic modification of indigenous architectures was 
intended to alter the knowledge system of that same indigene. In the projects there existed a 
tension between the desire to make architecture accommodate the habits of its users versus 
using such architectural translations to acclimate its users to the precepts of modernity.202 In 
either case, architects grappled with the problem of what was retained and what was lost within 
the process of translation, a problem similar to rendering two unlike goods commensurable so 
that they might be exchanged for each other: If some common denominator was shared by two 
unlike terms such that they could be translated for each other, what precisely was it that 
changed and to what purpose?  
During Team Ten’s Rotterdam meeting in 1974, the group revisited the unhappy incident of 
Van Eyck’s argument with the Smithsons over Blom’s “Noah’s Ark” scheme. Peter Smithson, 
trying to explain his prior refusal to recognize “Noah’s Ark” as a translation of Dogon thought, 
complained that he had expected Van Eyck’s efforts to reveal some irreducible constant term, 




have represented a permanent human characteristic, which was to have some sort of animal 
relationship, one with another…  I thought you were saying that these were all symbols of 
constancy.”203  Van Eyck protested: “Did I speak about constancy?  When I see a Bedouin tent I 
have an enormous feeling of permanence, even if they move somewhere else…”. The tent, 
taken as a pure elemental structure of habitation, remained intact even while being transposed 
into different contexts. Van Eyck’s colleagues, however, raising the question of the alterability 
of things according to contexts, seemed to recognize some instrumental potential for change in 
the sign’s inherent instability. Giancarlo De Carlo commented that the difference between a 
Bedouin tent and a modern tent is not just of technology but rather “difference of use.”  
Bakema offered an amendment: a Bedouin would still use a modern tent in the same way as the 
old tent but the different forms would communicate in a different way. De Carlo concurred that 
the modernization of the tent “affects the message.”  Bakema explained further that all new 
iterations of the tent would have “different messages”, and continued: “That is my hope, that, 
when [the Bedouin] sees a blow-up tent, that, immediately, his whole consciousness is relating 
to another way of use, to another way of living.”204 
Modernity’s translation of the Bedouin tent would have a consciousness-altering effect 
because, if we follow the general drift of Team Ten discourse, a tent—the primitive hut par 
excellence—is precisely a manifestation of the mind’s subconscious operations. The Bedouin 
mind would be partly modernized—some kernel of non-modernity would remain—just as the 
tent itself had been only partly modified and just as the new petroleum nations of the Middle 
East were asserting an economic sovereignty that was nonetheless still dependent on U.S. and 




tantamount to altering and clarifying the intellectual composition of the Bedouin who inhabited 
it, showing the Bedouin to be savagely nomadic and yet, at the same time, dependent on and 
thereby integrated with the modern knowledge that analyzes and translates savage thought. As 
Bakema and De Carlo declare, Team Ten’s efforts at translation also were intended as a way to 
communicate with building’s occupants. Whereas industrial societies had long proposed 
housing improvements as a way to inculcate the poor with genteel habits, many of Team Ten’s 
architects began to venture beyond this tactic: It was not about the civilizing effect of bright, 
orderly accommodation; rather, architecture could function as a sub-conscious language, a 
“pure language” that spoke to Bedouin minds directly, without mediation and in a language 
almost familiar to them. The instability of signs’ relations to things was thus useful for Team 
Ten architects so that they might subtly shift the “messages” of things. Curiously, this 
instability—enabled by the separable relation between sign and signified and, relatedly, by 
processes of translation—was required precisely in order to naturalize the relationship between 
signs and signifieds, to develop a more directly intuitive relationship between them and, 
therefore, between sign and mind. As will be seen in the following chapters, the circumvention 
of the arbitrary relation between sign and signified had everything to do with education and 
management of a global indigent. “Pure language” for architects was not related to divine 
revelation, as was the case for Benjamin; rather, it was about a science of revelation, a method 
of aesthetic translation that could get below the split between sign and signified, down to the 
site where things spoke im-mediately and pre-linguistically to the mind by virtue of being of 




To make a copy in the absence of a prior original is to copy the Savage Mind’s abilities to forge 
semiotic relations. It is to translate translation: to surreptitiously transfer the magical tools of 
translation into the rubric of science, the very tools that science officially excludes: magically- 
or poetically-construed interactions between things. A fundamental aporia was at play here. A 
science of design techniques would have to let itself be contaminated by the workings of 
magical thought in order to transgress the limitations of its own knowledge. However, in order 
to constitute their own expertise as superior to native architectures, Modernist architects would 
need to somehow conceptually segregate their own science from others’ magic. This 
segregation would be attempted through an analogous distinction between the magic of the 
private subconscious and the science of structuralist knowledge—a kind of global Ur-
consciousness. Although “distinct”, these two categories of private subconsciousness and 
global consciousness were overlapping and complicit. 
Peter Smithson expected Van Eyck to have identified among the Dogon some “permanent 
human characteristic” to bring to bear upon the design of modern housing, but the permanence 
he actually sought was only the enduring capacity to transform things, magically, semiotically, 
so that they spoke (non-nonsensically) to the contexts into which they were interjected. 
Claiming subsequently that the foundational ground for an authentic modern culture must 
reside “in the interior of the mind and no longer outside it,” Van Eyck retreated from Team 
Ten’s initial insistence that modernist architecture be derived from societies’ extant social-
semiotic systems.205 He had another proposal though, one that subsumed the Savage Mind 
within the framework of Surrealism. Van Eyck effectively proposed to put the dreamwork to 




“all things escape from the rigid meanings assigned to them, cross their own frontier, and are 
significantly reshuffled.”206  Far from designing architecture on the basis of existing social 
systems, Van Eyck suggested that unconscious mechanisms of the imagination could 
perpetually create new, individual, and ever-shifting semiotic webs. One could abandon all the 
abysmal efforts to translate local “vernaculars” into modern architecture by arguing instead for 
the mind’s magic ability to autochthonously integrate any architecture into a personally 
constructed cosmography. 
Van Eyck’s interest in the semiotic operations of dreaming may have received impetus not only 
from Surrealism, as he implied, but also from his reliance on the Freudian-trained 
ethnopsychiatrists Paul Parin and Fritz Morgenthaler who were conducting fieldwork around 
Bandiagara and who aided him with his own researches.207 Attempting to adapt Freudian 
models to better describe the circumstances of “non-European” psychic formation, Parin and 
Morgenthaler ignored a more basic theoretical problem: namely, that Freud’s seminal 
breakthroughs regarding the structure of the psyche had been based on a comparison between 
neurotics and “primitives”, who were both said to be enthralled by delusions of omnipotent-
thought. 208 However, the alleged equivalence between European pathology and “primitive” 
culture—based on their shared techniques of magical or omnipotent thought—elided a crucial 
distinction between attempting to manipulate the world simply by one’s thoughts or wishes (as 
was supposedly the case with neurotics), versus trying to influence some aspect of the world by 
manipulating signs that pertained to that aspect through some relation of resemblance or 
taxonomic proximity. Tellingly, this latter definition of magical thought is actually quite 




through various associative devices, based on resemblance and genealogical connection, creates 
a semiotic web within which to symbolically fulfill one’s waking desires. It is necessary, 
however, to point out a further distinction between the European dreamwork and the logic of 
magic: namely, the difference between a societally-formulated semiotic web through which 
magical thought can be exercised and, on the other hand, a semiotics based on private 
experience and relegated to dreaming and avant-garde art-making, relegated, that is, to the 
avant-garde production of non-sense. 
Van Eyck’s relationship to Freudianism was indirect. I mention it, firstly, because of the great 
influence of Freudian-based Surrealism on Van Eyck’s thought—he claims to have visited the 
Dogon after being inspired by Griaule’s photographs in the Surrealist-linked magazine, 
Minotaure—and because of his reliance on Freudian ethnopsychiatrists while in Africa.209 But 
there is also an important theoretical connection to be made: It could be argued that the 
Freudian “neurotic” is pathological not because he or she seeks to influence the external world 
through mere thought or fantasy, but rather because the magical semiotics of personal 
experience—as operative within the dreamwork’s manipulation of signs—do not speak the 
(generally unintelligible) lingua franca of the scientific epistemic order. Van Eyck’s surrealist 
methods of manipulating privately-construed symbols indicated the fundamentally aporetic 
project of trying to transpose the magic of semiotic-manipulation into a science of public 
architectural design. In the absence of a social semiotic framework, the psyche’s associative 





Van Eyck’s retreat from his initial endeavor to create culturally relevant architectures by 
wielding the techniques of Savage Thought was symptomatic of shifts within architectural 
discourse moving from the 1950’s into the 1970’s towards Modernists’ unabashedly Babelian 
“other”, Postmodernism. The games of Team Ten led increasingly to a Babelian double-bind: 
no proper edifice (proper to a society’s culture and habits) could be constructed in the absence 
of a shared semiotic framework undergirding its construction, and yet, the modernist mandate 
to render architectures universally legible—i.e., to confer the gifts of an expert translation—
refused the native framework that might have grounded a building semiotically. Team Ten 
architects wanted a non-nonsensical translation that nonetheless did not simply copy. A key to 
such an endeavor might have lain within the fact that the first Dogon granaries had most likely 
been copies themselves (a fact Van Eyck fails to mention). The “originals” for these copies had 
been built by the Tellem who had died off, by disease, violence, or famine when the Dogon 
migrated to Bandiagara in the fourteenth century. So the importance of the granary in the 
Dogons’ myths of the world’s origin is proof not of some unchanging semiotic system made of 
indissoluble relations between architecture and other practices. Rather, the Tellem granary’s 
full reappropriation by the Dogon points to a society’s ability to endlessly re-work its system of 
knowledge in order to integrate new techniques, objects, and events (a claim often made by 
Lévi-Strauss in The Savage Mind). 
After a Surrealist magazine had led Van Eyck to the Dogon, he could not discover how to make 
Modernist architecture speak to Dogon knowledge, and instead could merely seize upon 
Blom’s “brain”: that is, the city Blom’s brain had supposedly fashioned its own image. Thus, 




individually-constructed semiotic cosmographies. Surrealists’ “chance” juxtapositions of 
objects, arising from the arbitrary nature of dreamwork semiotics, rendered the iconography of 
the artwork incommunicable to anyone but the artist/dreamer.210 The uniquely private “pure 
language” of the subconscious discouraged an artist from trying to represent anything other 
than his or her own mind and dream-world.211 While Van Eyck’s career became similarly 
dedicated to designing buildings rich with finely nuanced “meanings” which, he claimed, its 
users often failed to understand, his colleague Friedman took advantage of geo-political 
circumstances: The imaginations to harness were those of the poor themselves who still 
supposedly were attuned to architecture’s natural semiotic capabilities. The urban poor could 
imagine their own private primitive huts within an established organizational framework and 
sub-structure provided by architects and technocrats. The rift between the individual’s “free” 
imagination and any socially-mandated semiotic-aesthetic system released the architect from 
public obligation to make culturally-relevant (i.e., non-nonsensical) architecture, leaving this 
task instead to the slum-dweller’s own imagination. 
Megastructures and Bricolage: The Dialectic of Conscious and Unconscious Architectures 
Decades of Team Ten meetings rendered evident the logical impossibility of the task the group 
had implicitly set for themselves: to develop processes of design that would, on the one hand, 
retain all of Modernism’s claims to universal applicability and, on the other hand, address some 
unique and contextually-specific attributes of the society intended to use this architecture. This 
contradiction was revealed most undisguisedly in the work of Friedman who, rather than trying 
to resolve this paradox through sophisticated abstractions of local “patterns of life”, simply 




disjointed components within his architectural designs. At the inaugural Team Ten meeting of 
1956 in Dubrovnik, Friedman presented his new concept of an architecture mobile, which he 
would further develop in the years to come as the Ville Spatiale. Flouting CIAM’s mandate for 
the separation of urban functions (i.e., habitation, work, recreation, and circulation) and 
decrying the “atomization” of urban life into discrete activities, Friedman proposed a more 
flexible integration of urban programs, as had many of his Team Ten colleagues. For his Ville 
Spatiale, first formulated around 1959, Friedman designed a massive structural skeleton 
intended to span over existing cities, reaching into their outskirts and serving as a supportive 
frame into which inhabitants could insert their own self-built dwellings. Friedman, who had 
been born and raised in Hungary, had fled to Israel-Palestine after the Second World War 
where, for a decade, he worked on the design and construction of kibbutzim and other Jewish 
settlements. After he had migrated back to Europe in 1957 his work retained not only the 
utopian idealism of kibbutz culture but also the strategies associated with the swift settlement 
of disputed territory. It was the architecture par excellence of rapid colonization, mobilizing 
citizens into a brigade of willing settlers while, at the same time, laying claim to land through 
the implementation of infrastructure.212  
Back in Europe, Friedman first sketched his idea of the Ville Spatiale—a concept that he said 
could be deployed anywhere in the world—as an intervention into the metropolitan area in and 
around Paris (where he had made his new home). Thus removed from the Palestinian context of 
Jewish settlement, the design nonetheless employed an idea first explored in his architecture 
mobile, splitting architecture into the two components of rigid technical structure and the 




technicians, allowing all other aspects of design to be determined and built by small 
autonomous groups of inhabitants.213 [Fig. 2.5, 2.6, 2.7] This strategy, a more literal 
instantiation of that undertaken by the Israeli state and its citizens, conferred to citizens the 
putative role of independent agents pursuing their chosen ways of life in small, unobtrusive 
ways, while conferring to the state a similarly pared-down and thus allegedly neutral role of 
assisting settlement. (Indeed, in the context of Israel-Palestine the seeming neutrality of the 
structural skeleton and the haphazardness of its infill give the false impression that it could 
serve as a platform equally for Israeli settlers or Palestinian refugees.) If Friedman’s Team Ten 
colleagues had endeavored to help sustain certain extant modes of life within the framework of 
architectural modernization (such as with the hypothetical Bedouin tent), Friedman had, on the 
contrary, identified a way to make change itself a permanent fixture within a static modern 
infrastructure, as presaged by Le Corbusier’s proposed Obus plan for Algiers.214 Thus altering 
the conventionally understood relationship linking modernization to change and, 
concomitantly, the indigene to tradition, Friedman conferred to the state the role of enduring 
stability and to the indigene the creative adaptiveness of Savage Thought. 
Most of Friedman’s professional employment was in the global south, much of it through 
UNESCO, demonstrating the applicability of his ideas to diverse contexts, though his ideas 
proved particularly useful at encouraging an impoverished peasantry to utilize their own 
knowledge and resources (both intellectual and material) toward self-sustenance. Drawing from 
his years of work in India, Friedman presented to a UNESCO reporter the case of a certain Raj 
Kumar whose mud and thatch house had been destroyed by monsoon floods.215 Whereas the 




himself could rebuild his own house using native techniques for a mere 55 U.S. dollars. 
Adducing such thrift as evidence for why the government should relinquish efforts to provide 
decent housing and instead focus on “environmental improvement for the shanty-towns”, the 
article advocates for the burgeoning “self-help” housing movement in which Friedman played a 
leading role. Unlike many of his colleague who wanted to replace the bidonvilles with more 
permanent, modern housing (as with one of the seminal Team Ten projects, ATBAT-Afrique’s 
Nid d’Abeille housing project in Casablanca), Friedman referred to bidonvilles themselves as a 
permanent fixture of the future, one for which architects could provide fixed organizational 
platforms.216 
Modernity would now be the thing that remained unchanged, the enduring infrastructural 
backdrop to the constant migrations and resettlements of so-called non-modern peoples in 
contexts of wars, famines, natural disasters and poverty. We should be clear about the 
significance of the Ville Spatiale’s infrastructural component: The “primitive hut” in 
Friedman’s work consisted less in the cheap, rustic homes that inhabitants of the Ville Spatiale 
would cobble together than in the relationship between those homes and the sophisticated 
structure provided by the architect-technician. Both the skeletal infrastructure and the rustic 
infill were instantiations of the primitive hut, albeit differently so. Friedman, having like 
Laugier reduced all of architecture to its apodictic, primary structures, could now posit 
technical architecture as the conscious science of Savage Thought, which is to say, the 
conscious science of the pared-down structures from which all cultural variation was to be 
composed. Whether or not Friedman had read Lévi-Strauss (he moved to Paris shortly after 




acclaim), his work corresponded closely to Lévi-Strauss’s precepts. Unlike his Team Ten 
colleagues who attempted to translate some unique characteristic of a given society into a 
modernist idiom in such a way that this characteristic would still remain legible, Friedman’s 
work suggested that all architecture was ultimately translatable—or reducible—to simple 
primary structures that would allow culturally specific fabrications. However, relative to the 
architect’s infrastructural frame, the complementary component of the Ville Spatiale—the 
infill—did not constitute architecture (insofar as architecture was the conscious design of 
buildings). The originary architectural model—the global indigent’s creative technics qua 
primitive infill—functioned in Friedman’s scheme as the untranslated original while the 
architect’s infrastructural frame translated that original into the lingua franca of modernism. In 
other words, the Ville Spatiale diagrammed the modern dialectical conception of unconscious 
and conscious thought. According to this mythical dialectic, the architect’s infrastructure 
translated originary thought into a clarified, universally communicable analog by converting 
particular examples of putatively unconscious creativity (in the form of indigenous housing) 
into the form of a simple unifying grid that would help govern an ethnically-diverse and often 
migratory class of workers and peasants. 
Twentieth-century governance of the poor (often across different languages) was constituted by 
this precise—though often tacit—claim to translate the eclectic creative processes of a global 
indigent into a single orchestrated system of production. Increasingly into the twenty-first 
century the creativity of the indigent was touted as a form of sustenance supplementary to wage 
labor. As such, the indigents’ own imaginative methods were to be encouraged on the margins 




Migrants’ housing was at once integrated and conceptually segregated from the older city 
fabric: segregated by virtue even of the migrant’s imaginative productions. Friedman’s use of 
the term bricoleur indicates that he may indeed have been familiar with Lévi-Strauss’s usage of 
bricolage to describe the operations of Savage Thought. The Savage Mind arranges whatever 
happens to be at hand into a meaningful and thereby useful order, whether in the form of myth, 
taxonomy, or other organizational systems. [Fig. 2.8] The bricoleur, according to Friedman, 
literally cobbles together a house from whatever detritus can be found. Peasants, Friedman 
says, have always been able to fashion their own dwellings out of the surrounding material of 
their environments. Therefore, peasants who have relocated to cities should do likewise. Just as 
the bricoleur’s mechanisms of thought are flexible, so the life of a migrant indigent was 
represented as flexible, or in Friedman’s words, “élastique”. The Savage Mind’s nimble 
assimilation of its environmental circumstances was not, in Lévi-Strauss’s writings, a reason to 
assume that so-called primitive societies were therefore well-suited to continuous upheaval or 
displacement. But in Friedman’s work a global indigent figures as different from its bourgeois 
counterparts in its special imaginative abilities to produce housing ex-nihilo. Nonetheless, it is 
precisely what the architect-technician and the migrant-indigent share in common—that their 
constructions plainly draw from the primary structural elements of intelligence—that render the 
Ville Spatiale conceivable. This stands in contrast to the story of the Tower of Babel: 
Difference in this case (between class, epistemic status, and often language) does not render 
impossible an integrated urban model of production. The Ville is meant to succeed where Babel 
failed because a shared semiotic-architectural system underlies all the different classes and 
nationalities that the city holds. Institutions like the Grameen Bank which were founded 




(and equally well-intentioned) to the Ville Spatiale as instruments that integrated a peasantry 
(or an urban ex-peasantry) more fully into a global economic system while still maintaining 
class-based differences in relation to global capital.217 
In montage after montage illustrating the Ville Spatiale, Friedman shows grids spanning over 
the old buildings of venerable capital cities, the outskirts of these cities filled with the bricolage 
of the city’s new migrants, and, beneath this sublime, infinitely-sprawling machinery, the 
whimsical renderings of noble savages intermingling with lions and flowers: This is how we 
should picture the twentieth century’s Tower of Babel, to be completed this time despite the 
city’s multiplicity of tongues. [Fig. 2.9] Just as Babel was more than a mere city—it was 
intended as a structure for a new world order—so Friedman speaks of the production of a 
“world model”, a semiotic or epistemic cosmography. Whereas each individual, he writes, has 
its own particular world model, science can extract a universal model from all the individual 
ones: 
Since the main endeavor of science is the unification of all these personal universes, 
scientists search for the commonality in all of these images. The goal is to discover those 
elements of the ‘private’ images that are ‘communicable’. That is the first criterion for a 
scientific statement—that it be communicable. 
… A subject becomes communicable only if it refers, in some way, to that which we all 
know, i.e., if it fits into all these personal world models… 
Friedman’s work would lead him to collaborate in the 1960’s with researchers at MIT to render 
the bricoluer’s process of architectural design into a computer program called Flatwriter. The 
communicability Friedman sought in his efforts to produce a universally valid world model are 
best understood through this venture into computational design. By laying at the hands of the 




universally communicable language with which any person might then compose his or her own 
unique dwelling. The vast physical infrastructure of the Ville Spatiale is more aptly realized as 
computational program, the latter serving as a manifestation of Savage Thought—that is, of the 
primary structures of intelligence. But Friedman’s work, whether computational or physical, 
still begs the question: Why translate diverse world architectures into their shared component 
structures only to have people then retranslate these structures back into diverse architectures? 
What was effected by such an operation, I believe, was a subtle redistribution of intellectual 
property. 
Friedman’s endeavors reveal the sleight-of-hand enabled by the term “communication”, so 
rampantly employed by him and his Team Ten colleagues at this time. Communication renders 
things en commun but in this case merely in order to then apportion and redistribute according 
to hierarchical categories. The architect-technician’s infrastructure remains inexorably of a 
different and higher order than the unconsciously creative bricolage of the Ville Spatiale’s 
inhabitants (or of Flatwriter’s users). Whereas the architectural infrastructure comprehends (in 
both senses of the term) the inhabitants’ bricolage-infill, the inverse can not be said to be true. 
This distinction is maintained as an epistemic hierarchy. Friedman, in describing his efforts to 
invent a new universally-valid “world model” explains that mathematics is in many ways a 
natural choice as the structural basis of such a project, given that it is the “most evident” of 
epistemic forms. Nonetheless, he writes, 
I am trying to find a language of reference more familiar than mathematics. We would 
expect this language to represent the complexity of our personal images of the universe 
better than mathematics does. 
…At the same time, it is important that an image of the universe built on these principles 




The construct of a non-mathematical cosmography that is subsumed within a mathematically-
based one—that fills in the gaps without contradicting a mathematical language—is inherently 
hierarchical, with the non-mathematic language serving as complement—as decorative 
embellishment, really—to a form of reasoning that is always-already universal in nature. If 
mathematics falls short of representing the “complexity of our personal images”, it nonetheless 
must, according to Friedman, underlie that same complexity. Friedman’s Ville Spatiale is 
nothing but an urban-architectural instantiation of this relationship whereby the universal-
mathematical framework subsumes the uniquely-whimsical “vernaculars” (or patois) associated 
respectively with scientific versus savage thought. The piecemeal insertion of the vernacular 
into the framework of the lingua franca does not obviate their stark difference and, to some 
extent, segregation. 
At Last, the Banality of Babel 
In Des tours de Babel, Derrida writes that the Biblical passage on Babel mandates the duty to 
translate even while maintaining that translation is impossible. This impossibility is marked by 
the punishment of the Sons of Sem (who attempt to build the tower). They are thwarted “for 
having thus wanted to assure themselves, by themselves, a unique and universal genealogy”. 
Uniqueness and universality are forever at odds and yet forever entwined in the task of 
translation… as they are, likewise, in the tactics of modernist architecture. Hence, the 
simultaneous duty and impossibility of translation, as exemplified by the problem of proper and 
common nouns: “And people no longer understand one another when there is only some proper 
name, and people no longer understand one another when there are no longer proper names.” In 




without signs that mark the particularity—and thus untranslatability—of a given referent, no 
exchange of human thought is possible. This is because any such exchange necessarily involves 
both the integration and differentiation of things, such that sense can emerge. 
In architecture, the absence of referents precludes translation as such, but architecture does 
nonetheless offer chains of association between times, places, and styles, revealing both 
commonalities and differences between various architectures of the world and thus demanding 
both integration and differentiation among its sources. Consequently, an architecture emerging 
from the encounter between two societies or at the juncture of urban and economic change—
whether due to colonial violence or not—might likewise carry the injunction to, if not translate, 
then at least to seek out certain architectural reciprocities. Pursuing the linguistic analogy, we 
might call architectures’ universally common features—e.g., roofs, floors, apertures—
“common nouns” while “proper nouns” could correspond to architectural stylistic distinctions. 
Yet, the post-war architects featured in this chapter often failed to perceive their own designs as 
dependent on “proper nouns”—i.e., on style—while likewise failing to understand the designs 
of other societies as emerging from any conscious manipulation of “common nouns”—i.e., 
from the categorization or generalization of different architectural features. Translation, which 
involves a conservation of proper nouns in the original language amidst a rendition of common 
nouns into the language of the translator, is therefore eschewed in these architects’ attribution 
of the proper and common to the respective categories of unconscious savagery and conscious 
modernity. This bears implication beyond that of producing Babelian confusion: For 
modernists to detect what is common between architectures (architectures which allegedly 




of arch-propietorship over the architectural “commons”, indeed over architecture itself. For 
architecture is only construed as truly architectural (as opposed to unconscious or “without 
architects” per Rudofsky) when it involves the grouping of particulars into general classes such 
that—depending on one’s school of thought—one can either recombine these parts into a 
specific configuration or else deduce the common denominator underlying all the particulars 
and present therefrom a pure essence of the thing in question. Architecture thus defined 
constitutes a subtle form of ownership, for if a global indigene can own nothing beyond—
perhaps—its own “traditional” productions, an architect can claim a far greater degree of 
intellectual ownership by extrapolating putative structural principles from a global commons in 
order to formulate particular variations proper to his or her own authorship. In other words, 
unlike linguistic translation, the proper is not conserved in its transposition into a translation; 
rather, the proper is taken as common and translated—that is, rendered into a newly proper and 
even proprietary composition. Although Friedman was content to allow “proper nouns” (in the 
form of the bricoleur’s habitations) to persist untranslated within the architect’s megastructure, 
this merely underscores Derrida’s observation that there is no understanding when there are 
only proper nouns, these habitations forming only disjointed, polyglot insertions within the 
otherwise mute infrastructural frame. 
Derrida reminds his readers of Benjamin’s stipulations concerning what constitutes a true 
translation, and here we detect another possible difference between this conception of 
translation versus the claims of modernist architecture. A translation, like a proper original, 
does not, Benjamin insists, aim to communicate. However, post-war modernists repeatedly 




is built, whom it houses, how it is used, etc.... If Quatremère de Quincy envisaged something 
more subtle than this—a rendering of sense into non-sense in order to express some hidden 
essence—most Team Ten architects understood their goal quite differently. They sought to rid 
the original of its excesses, of that which was uniquely proper to it, of that which remained 
after all else had been reduced to the common denominators that constituted modernist 
vocabulary. This was so that modernist “translations” might appear to eschew idiosyncratic 
language in favor of the non-language of organization. To put this another way: A language 
purged of proper nouns would be not pure language so much as it would be pure structure 
communicating merely its organizational aims and strategies. To whatever extent it could be 
said to be semiotic, it would be tautological, just as Friedman’s megastructural frame conveyed 
nothing beyond the function of organization, his claims to communication notwithstanding. 
The intentions of most Team Ten architects were to transpose from the original an altered but 
still functional and recognizable element, rendering the new, modernist version meaningfully 
communicative, indeed communicating to all what Ijlal Muzaffar has referred to as 
intentionally incomplete modernization: the persistence of certain archaic habits despite the 
inhabitants’ integration into an urban economy.218 This incomplete modernization was, 
moreover, a way of establishing the hierarchical binary between the architect’s (and the state’s 
or NGO’s) intellectual possession of technics and the inhabitants’ unconscious insertion into a 
technical apparatus. As the next two chapters will further show, the key to maintaining class 
apartheids amidst increasing global economic integration involved subtle rhetorical and visual 
devices for producing difference within unification. Friedman, rendered this paradox absolutely 




produced was polyglot pieces floating within a monolithic unifying frame: Babel completed 
despite the diversity of “tongues”. Other Team Ten members, such as the Smithsons and 
Candilis, Josic, Woods endeavored more earnestly to translate an indigene’s architecture such 
that the lingua franca of modernism would be deduced from indigenous architectures, 
subsuming these in less literal ways than Friedman had proposed. It would lie within different 
sub-disciplines of design—those of media and environmental design—to formulate new 
discourses for enfolding rural subjects into a unified “global village” while maintaining these 
subjects’ status as villagers. What architects’ efforts point to ultimately was the banality of the 
Babelian enterprise, their repeated attempts to rarify architectural and social difference into 
pure essential elements—e.g., courtyards, streets-in-the-sky, and such—showing that the lingua 
franca led always inexorably to a kind of computational logic, turning architecture into the 




CHAPTER THREE: The Environment 
 
 
Mind of Brightness / Heart of Darkness 
Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness opens with an account of something glowing whitely 
against a twilit haze. That thing of brightness—the River Thames—described here as a “gauzy 
and radiant fabric,” is strangely evocative of a thing we would now call media: a glowing 
channel which, as Conrad says of the Thames, not only conveys exchanges between remote 
peoples but also retain the memory of things and dreams that have traversed them in days gone 
by. Yet, however lucid the River Thames appears to Conrad’s narrator, the ensuing tale 
suggests that this watery medium—dark beneath its mirrored surface—masks secrets that can 
only be unmasked by journeying to another river, the Congo. In contrast to the Thames, this 
latter river figures as a muddied and maundering interface between Europe’s “emissaries of 
pity and science and progress” and the “howling savages” encountered in pages to follow. In 
the absence of telecommunications, the Congo River is negotiated as a communicative 
channel—by turns, blindingly bright and treacherously dark; deafeningly loud and hauntingly 
silent—through which Europeans access the psychiatric secrets of a supposedly primal 
intellect, a mind said to be blinded and muted by the jungle that presses upon it. Taken as 
metaphoric figures, these rivers comprise two halves—one Savage, the other technological—of 
a single semiotic model born of colonial governance. 
It is not customary, of course, to read the Heart of Darkness as a novel about media. But the 
relentless attention Conrad pays to the varying sensory texture of the Congo, and to the ways its 




discourse on media and the environment. Indeed, historians and theorists of media have long 
remained silent on Media Studies’ roots within the fantastic science of ethnopsychiatry, the 
latter formed in a racist effort to map out the psychic-environmental system it dubbed “the 
African mind.” I use Conrad’s fiction then merely as a launching point into a non-fictional 
history of how “Africa”—and, more generally, the burgeoning construct of “the Third 
World”—was re-invented as a psychological model for developing semiotic technologies 
pertaining to post-War global relations. 
The previous chapters examined  how conceptions of a Savage Mind were instrumentalized 
toward developing, firstly, techniques of creative productivity at the scale of the individual 
designer and, secondly, techniques of translating between semiotic forms towards producing 
urban schemes and architecture. This chapter subsequently explores how two very disparate 
scales—that of the individual’s psyche and that of the terrestrial planet—were folded into a 
single system by virtue of a new epistemological category: “the environment”, closely aligned 
to the expansion of electronic media. In contrast to Team Ten’s search for universal underlying 
structures that might produce urban-architectural patterns specific to a particular culture, the 
environmental discourse I am about to map drew a broad binary schema consisting of First and 
Third Worlds, ascribing to them psychological attributes based on their respective climatic 
milieus. For example, the Tropical Architecture movement was linked, I argue, to a 
contemporaneous construction of a “tropical mind”. Just as the Savage Mind has figured in 
previous chapters as a shifting, transposable category, the tropical mind, although supposedly 
associated with a specific climatic sensorium, was really not tied to climate so much as to 




were those of the so-called pre-industrial world, construed contemporaneously with the 
complementary neologism of the “post-industrial”. As such, the category of the environment, 
although it ostensibly designated a planetary system of material interactions, was not deemed a 
universally applicable framework so far as forms of economic-political subjectivity were 
concerned. Indeed, two different semiotic, epistemological frameworks were conceived in 
relation to each other, both supposedly global, yet each associated respectively with the pre- 
and post-industrial “minds”. These frameworks were those of “the environment” and 
“humanism”. Together, they helped organize new paradigms of intellectual and material 
exchange as the world moved from colonial to post- and neo-colonial relations. 
Humanism in the Primeval Forest: The Hospital at Lambaréné 
Students of Heart of Darkness will often tell you that Conrad is concerned not so much 
with Africa as with the deterioration of one European mind caused by solitude and 
sickness… that Africa is merely a setting for the disintegration of the mind of Mr. Kurtz. 
… Can nobody see the preposterous and perverse arrogance in thus reducing Africa to 
the role of props for the break-up of one petty European mind? 
—Chinua Achebe, “An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness” (1975) 
Chinua Achebe, at a university lecture delivered in Massachusetts in 1975, elicited a good deal 
of rancor from the audience when he drew a comparison between the racism of Conrad’s Kurtz 
and the racism of another “great humanist”, the (non-fictional) European missionary doctor, 
Albert Schweitzer, who for several decades directed a missionary hospital in the small village 
of Lambaréné in French Equatorial Africa. According to Achebe: 
The kind of liberalism espoused here by Marlow/Conrad touched all the best minds of 
the age in England, Europe and America… but almost always managed to sidestep the 
ultimate question of equality between white people and black people. That extraordinary 
missionary, Albert Schweitzer, who sacrificed brilliant careers in music and theology in 
Europe for a life of service to Africans in much the same area as Conrad writes about, 




“The African is indeed my brother but my junior brother.”…Naturally he became a 
sensation in Europe and America. Pilgrims flocked, and I believe still flock even after he 
has passed on, to witness the prodigious miracle in Lambaréné, on the edge of the 
primeval forest.219 
In this last sentence, Achebe was referring to Schweitzer’s book, On the Edge of the Primeval 
Forest (1921), in which he described his experiences at the hospital he founded in French 
Equatorial Africa in 1912. The “primeval forest” might appear as an eccentric theme within an 
oeuvre that Schweitzer had thus far devoted to the music of J.S. Bach, the psychology of Jesus 
Christ, and the progress of European civilization. But this incongruity is merely superficial, 
belied by the actual conceptual importance of the primeval forest within Euro-American 
humanist discourse and “the kind of liberalism” decried, above, by Achebe. That liberalism—
Achebe was speaking in the year 1975—was situated amidst a gradual reorientation in global 
policies of “human development” as promoted, for example, by Robert McNamara’s policies at 
the World Bank, tied to new educational and developmental strategies in the Third World.220 
This movement would, in turn, be reflected in the distinction between post- and pre-industrial 
landscapes, the latter foreshadowed by the primeval forest Schweitzer described. The forest of 
French-Equatorial Africa—decades later to become the site of intense industrial 
deforestation—could be contrasted then with a post-industrial one: the sparse, fledgling forests 
that were starting to creep back over the ravages of defunct mines and abandoned factory-towns 
in many parts of Western Europe and the United States. In 1949, at one such ghost-town, 
Schweitzer delivered a speech celebrating that arch-paragon of humanism, Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe. Such humanism was bound up, I will argue, with the prerogatives of a shifting 




Humanism in the Post-Industrial Forest: The Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies 
The 1949 bicentennial of Goethe’s birthday was celebrated in a somewhat unlikely location, 
particularly considering the recentness of the U.S. war with Germany. A week-long festival 
was hosted in the Rocky Mountains, in an abandoned mining town to which the railroad had 
long since ceased to run.221 There was no real access to Aspen, Colorado except by car or 
private airplane from Denver, a circumstance that did not prevent an international elite from 
descending in droves to participate in the Bicentennial that marked the inauguration of the 
Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies. Journalists covering the event concluded that the vast 
majority of Americans had never heard of Goethe, much less read his work.222 The choice to 
use his two hundredth birthday then to mark the opening of the Aspen Institute arose from 
factors that outweighed Goethe’s seeming insignificance within American culture. Apart from 
the co-incidence of the bicentennial date and Goethe’s aptness as a polymath of humanistic 
studies, the theme was meant to mark America’s rapprochement with Germany and to establish 
the seeming continuity of Euro-American liberal culture against the disruptions of communist 
and nationalist liberation movements.223 
The Aspen Institute was founded by the German-American industrialist Walter Paepcke, owner 
of the Container Corporation of America [CCA] in Chicago, who, along with his wife Elizabeth 
Paepcke, was a great patron of U.S. cultural ambitions following World War II.224 After 
purchasing the town of Aspen with the initial idea of turning it to profitable use as some kind of 
leisure outpost, Paepcke, needing to draw people and investors to the town, arrived at the idea 
of the Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies (AIHS), which he imagined as a non-degree-




supporting the private leisure resort he was developing, the Paepcke sought funding for the 
AIHS from organizations like the Ford Foundation. The concept for the AIHS as a center of 
humanism stemmed from Paepcke’s involvement with the University of Chicago’s recent Great 
Books program under the presidency of Robert Hutchins, a close friend of Paepcke’s whom he 
then appointed as the chair of the Goethe festival.225  In the years to follow, the AIHS would 
expand from the specific mission of providing American businessmen with a humanist 
education as the Institute grew into an interdisciplinary center for promoting scientific, 
technological, and social-scientific studies in relation to liberal U.S. conceptions of global 
governance. Nevertheless, the logic underlying Paepcke’s interest in the Great Books 
programs—namely, that literacy in the Western classics was prerequisite to U.S. management 
of international business and geo-politics—evolved into an ethos linking Western humanism to 
control of “the environment” as the latter term gained currency. 
Apart from supporting a Western renaissance of literacy, the Paepckes were also advocates of 
modernist design and employed a group of ex-Bauhaus immigrants, most notably Walter 
Gropius, Lazlo Moholy-Nagy, and Herbert Bayer. While Paepcke’s interest in modernist design 
owed largely to his faith in the persuasive powers of advertising, his support of Bauhaus 
immigrants has also been interpreted as a material-aesthetic complement to his advocacy of 
humanism and literacy.226 I’d like to suggest, however, that the design strategies of Moholy-
Nagy and Bayer ran quite counter to the spread of proficiency in the verbal arts. Indeed, the 
program of the AIHS, read in conjunction with design discourse at Aspen, exposes two 
opposing but complementary semiotic models that were crucial to U.S. neo-colonialist 




verbal sign, was regarded as the special purview of the newly-formulated “First World”. The 
other semiotic model (we can think of Marshall McLuhan) regarded the Third-World’s alleged 
illiteracy as kind of a laboratory condition from which to theorize and develop new, non-literate 
or “environmental” means of communication: means that were magically subliminal, not 
comprised of signs-and-referents, and yet not eluding structuralist or computational 
reproduction, insofar as they would be formed by underlying patterns and codes. 
Bayer’s earthworks for the AIHS, which preceded by many years similar works produced by 
the Land Art movement, serve as an example of this magical semiotics. His land works marked 
the earth with a kind of primal, non-denotative “alphabet” of basic forms, suggesting the earth 
itself as a proper medium of primitive communication. [Fig. 3.2] An Austrian-born artist whose 
talents included typographic design, architecture, painting, exhibition design, and 
photomontage, Bayer had initially been hired by Paepcke to do advertising and product design 
for the CCA, and was subsequently appointed director of design at the AIHS, where he 
produced graphics, designed the headquarter building, and devised land art constructions, while 
also heading the board of directors for the yearly International Design Conferences in Aspen 
(IDCA), beginning in 1951 and ending in 1965 when the designer Eliot Noyes took over. I will 
turn later to the 1962 and 1970 IDCA’s, which were themed explicitly on the Environment;  at 
this point, I would simply underscore that “the environment” was a construct which helped link 
various branches of design, as exemplified by Bayer’s multi-media practice, and was 
particularly useful in bridging the domains of the mind and the globe. During this pre-history to 
the environmental movement—during, that is, the 1940’s through the early 1960’s—the 




and semiotic ones, as I will explain through the course of this chapter. Relatedly, the discourse 
on the environment became increasingly imbricated at this time with a growing interest in 
theories and uses of media. 
For historiographic purposes then, I am identifying the AIHS as a key nexus for certain 
discursive overlaps during the first decade of the Cold-War, a site where we can chart 
itineraries between humanistic studies and the burgeoning constructs of “media” and “the 
environment”, all of these being implicated in the United States’ bid for control of the world’s 
intellectual and material resources. In referring to this discursive site, I will map a related 
dispersal of various trajectories connecting the remote, derelict mining town of Aspen to a few 
hospitals and schools scattered across colonial Africa. This site then provides a particular view 
onto the mythic constructions of the “post-industrial” and “pre-industrial”, a binary that was 
essential to the making of the post-War globe and to the correlate binary of two distinct types 
of psycho-semiotic “minds”: the tropical and the temperate. 
While the historic content of this chapter includes certain contributions of architects—the 
IDCA’s were organized mostly by architects or scholars of architecture—I am tracing a 
constellation, several of whose points lie at some remove from a history of  architecture per se. 
Instead of focusing on something we would now refer to as sustainable design, the concern of 
this chapter is to question what was even meant by “the environment” during the decades when 
this term began to gain increasing currency as a cosmological, geopolitical, and economic 
category. Whereas there had previously existed environments—signifying the immediate 
surrounds or environs of a particular locus—the environment referred to a non-bounded and 




reformulate U.S. neo-colonial practices as the management of the global environment rather 
than as incursions into the domestic affairs of other nations. That being said, I am not by any 
means attempting to present a genealogy of the concept of the environment, whose branches 
would be vastly complex. I am merely presenting a few representative nodes within that 
genealogy as a way to begin to break-down the meta-cipher of this term. One of the historic 
conditions I focus on is how “the environment” emerged out of wartime technologies of 
representation, recycling, and resource development, and was invoked to help translate 
techniques of war into techniques of cold war. For example, Paepcke’s own CCA flourished 
during the war thanks to its innovations in paper recycling. After wartime shortages were 
succeeded in the U.S. by an era of plentiful production and consumption, paper recycling 
would be reconceptualized as part of a battle for saving the environment. 
Within the historic frame identified here—the 1940’s up to around 1970 in the United States 
and Africa—I focus on two particular theoretical iterations of the environment that might 
appear somewhat at odds with each other: on the one hand, “the environment” was a synonym 
for material exchanges and transformations occurring on a global scale; while, on the other 
hand, “the environment” referred to the immediate perceptory milieu of a person and its effects 
upon his or her intellectual mechanisms. Both these concepts would later be integrated within 
different architectural discourses in the 1970’s: For example, the sustainability movement 
sought new techniques for managing scarce global resources, while architects involved in the 
new discipline, Environmental Psychology, studied how various sensory effects of space and 
surface affected the mind and behaviors of people.228 I submit that these two scales of “the 




human brain—were imbricated and even conflated in ways that made the invention of the 
psychological environment inseparable from the invention of the global environment. The 
forced elision between the incommensurable scales of the planetary and the cerebral was 
related, I argue, to the transition from colonial to neo-colonial governance (that is, both the 
means and justification thereof) and the latter’s related semiotic apartheids.229 
What I intend to demonstrate though discursive itineraries linking the AIHS and African 
colonial medicine is that the conceptualization of the global environment as a unified entity 
(despite concomitant geo-political segregations—i.e., the invention of the First and Third 
Worlds) depended on the tacit assumptions of two different kinds of environment, the tropical 
and the temperate, which would undergird late- and neo-colonial paradigms of economic 
exchange. There exist myriad ways in which environmental—and hence intellectual—
difference was used as ideological justification for neo-colonialist practices. However, rather 
than focusing on ideology alone, I will examine how the most basic of presumed 
environmental-psychological differences, corresponding to the split between temperate and 
tropical zones (and hence temperate and tropical minds), was exploited for developing modes 
of communication within the context of a global division of labor. According to colonial 
doctors and North America media theorists, the alleged intellectual difference between the 
temperate and tropical mind manifested itself as a semiotic discrepancy in how sign-systems 
emerged from particular environmental conditions, and how these systems affected the brain. 
Hence, environmental unification on a global scale was contradicted by a concomitant division 




were linked to cerebral hemispheric difference and, subsequently, to different forms of human 
productivity. 
Aphasia: “He who lives in Africa… can give no message to the world….” 
In June, 1949, amid much fanfare and curiosity, Schweitzer arrived in the United States for the 
Goethe Bicentennial after traveling by ship across the Atlantic from his missionary hospital in 
Lambaréné. Asked by reporters in New York to speak about the prospects for world peace in 
light of nuclear proliferation, Schweitzer demurred: “No, he who lives in Africa can’t speak 
about the outer world… can give no message to the world—just as those who come to us can 
give us no message.”  This response was widely circulated as the sort of aphorism befitting a 
humanist sage. No one apparently thought to ask what caused this alleged semiotic impasse 
between those living in Africa and those living in “the outer world” that should prevent the 
exchange of messages. (Nor did they remark that the speaker from Africa who claimed the 
incapacity to speak had just been paid a six-thousand dollar honorarium to come lecture on the 
theme of Western humanism.) Granted, this purported aphasia between Africans and non-
Africans had long formed a motif within European colonial discourse, a motif that was rivaled, 
however, by colonial reports of the deafening cacophony of African speech. The semiotic 
impasse then was obviously not owing to silence; nor to linguistic difference, given that so 
many Africans spoke European languages; nor even to alleged racial difference, given that a 
white colonist like Schweitzer claimed the inability to bring messages to non-Africa. Rather, I 
will argue that this perceived chasm between Africa and non-Africa had been dreamed-up as a 
circumstance of the environment: of the irremediably different environments of the First and 




pertained to the schema propounded by communication theorists. Schweitzer described the 
aphasia between Africa and non-Africa as resulting not from a mutual lack of comprehension, 
but rather from a break-down in the transmission of messages, a disruption in the semiotic 
system that communication theorists might have ascribed to “noise”. 
Before turning to the ways that designers and media theorists at Aspen articulated various 
dimensions of “the environment”, I would note one exception to what Schweitzer imagined to 
be the communicative rift between Africa and non-Africa. As a musician and an expert on 
Bach, Schweitzer commissioned a piano with an organ-pedal to be specially made for the 
jungle’s climate and brought to Lambaréné. He noted subsequently how well the piano 
resonated with the sounds of the jungle.230 Schweitzer considered the jungle an especially 
enriching environment not only for playing Bach but also for elaborating his own theoretical 
arguments about Bach’s music.231  While working in “the primeval forest,” he observed that 
there were “many of J.S. Bach’s organ pieces into the meaning of which I can now enter with 
greater ease and deeper appreciation than ever before.”232  Bach could, apparently, “give a 
message” from “the outer world” to Africa (and vice-versa), although this musical message 
remained within the incantatory realm of non-language. In considering why Bach could 
“speak” to Africa, whereas people “who come to us [in Africa]” were rendered effectively 
speechless, it is useful to understand how Schweitzer regarded Bach’s music as a non-linguistic 
semiotic form. In his two-volume book on Bach, first published in 1905, Schweitzer advanced 
the controversial theory that the composer’s work was less purely abstract than it was 
pictorial.233  Although it was true, explained Schweitzer, that mathematical patterns underlay 




convey imagistic impressions that verged on narrative. This, then, was a form of evocative 
communication that did not depend on coded language or even on signs per se. 
Speech, it should be remembered, was understood, according to early twentieth-century 
linguistic structuralism, to be characterized by the arbitrary relationship between sign and 
referent. And, as I will elaborate later, ethnopsychiatrists believed the “African Mind” to be 
impervious to any awareness of this arbitrariness. Africans allegedly believed that phonemes 
were naturally joined to their referents, thereby allowing magical control to be exercised over 
objects through rituals or spells that invoked those objects’ signs. Europeans’ belief in 
Africans’ and non-Africans’ mutual aphasia toward each seemingly owed then to the 
fundamentally different status of the sign within African and European usages. It was to be 
deduced that whereas twentieth-century Europeans were conscious of communicating in code, 
twentieth-century Africans conjured with incantations. Yet, the fact that Bach’s music relied on 
“natural” mathematical patterns (e.g., the ratio of the golden section) to conjure pictures of 
things without denoting them through arbitrary phonetic signs suggests an amendment to 
received accounts regarding the centrality of structuralist precepts in twentieth-century Europe. 
Schweitzer’s Bach exemplifies how Europeans used “Africa” (that is, Africans’ supposed 
inability to recognize the sign qua sign) in their own efforts to dispense with signs as such, as 
they sought more natural, subliminal, or magical forms of communication. Bach spoke to 
Africa because his compositions were intoned as numinous incantations whose flowing 
imagery could not be decomposed or decoded into discrete, arbitrary signs. 
Not surprisingly then, Schweitzer’s experience of playing music in the jungle contrasted with 




bear to look at. The printed string of words… seems here, where time is, so to say, standing 
still, positively grotesque.”234  Well in advance of Marshall McLuhan’s famous critique of how 
Western print culture had foreclosed various forms of thought and experience that remained 
open to the “tribal world”, Schweitzer speculated that Africans preserved certain modes of 
knowledge by virtue of their supposed ignorance of writing, avowing that “the negroes are 
deeper than we are… because they don’t read newspapers”. And yet, such illiteracy appears to 
have been greatly exaggerated, given that Schweitzer also mentions hiding newspapers during 
World War I, “lest” he says, “the boys, who can read, should absorb both text and pictures”.235 
While Schweitzer’s impulse to conceal the war from Africans was consistent with his desire to 
preserve Europe’s image as a bastion of humanist civilization, his words testify, furthermore, to 
a prevalent European belief in Africans’ greater susceptibility or enthrallment to the potency of 
signs. Whereas the European Mind safely filtered words and pictures through the sieve of 
analysis, the African Mind simply absorbed multi-media as a direct, magical experience, in a 
kind of gestaltic and mystical whole. 
The “Basic Alfabet” and The World Geo-Graphic Atlas 
Again, from the current example of Africa we can observe how very much visual 
processing of the human psyche by alphabetic means will be needed before any 
appreciable degree of homogenized social organization is possible. Much of this visual 
processing was done in the ancient world by nonliterate technologies, as in Assyria. The 
phonetic alphabet has no rival, however, as a translator of man out of the closed, tribal 
echo-chamber into the neutral visual world of lineal organization. 





“reine gebrauchs-graphik“ from Herbert Bayer’s monograph, herbert bayer: Visuelle Kommunikation, Architektur, Malerei 
Schweitzer’s categories of what did and what did not speak to Africa anticipated one of the 
preoccupations of media designers in the mid-twentieth century as they strove to identify 
universal semiotic systems in contradistinction to the arbitrary linguistic codes of the world. 
Bayer, for example, had long been engaged with the problem of developing graphic and 
typographic systems that would be universally intuitive or psychologically “natural”—i.e., that 
would be based on the inherent structures of cognition and perception. In the 1920’s, while still 
at the Bauhaus, Bayer had worked with Moholy-Nagy on developing a new typography and 
orthography as part of a “pure essential graphics” [reine Gebrauchs-Graphik]. The resulting 
“basic alfabet” would be purged of all idiosyncratic elements, such as capital letters, aberrant 
spellings, or phonetically superfluous letters, so as to render the German (and subsequently 
English) language more intuitively legible, and to make all the languages of the world more 
consistently transcribable into the Roman alphabet.237 If the arbitrary relationship between 
phoneme and referent were an unavoidable evil (one exacerbated by the arbitrariness between 
alphabetic sign and phoneme) then, at the very least, these sign systems could be made more 
natural by rendering them internally consistent and legible. But Bayer’s ambitions went further. 
In a later lecture delivered on the theme of “Design and Industry”, Bayer speculated that in the 
future “we will write and read less and less, and the book will perhaps entirely disappear. 




instead absorb and convey information not through eyes, mouth, and ears but rather through 
supernatural means”.238 
Bayer’s dream of a magical semiotics that would obviate the need for literacy oddly coincided 
with the incipient use of literacy as an index of comparison when measuring a nation’s level of 
“human development”.239 Bayer was no stranger to the new norms of human development, as 
he had been commissioned by Paepcke in 1949 to design a grand catalog of bio-political 
comparative data called the World Geo-Graphic Atlas: A Composite of Man’s Environment. 
The book was published in 1953 by the CCA for private distribution only. Paepcke sent copies 
to influential acquaintances as means of garnering support for the newly founded AIHS. Using 
various indices for comparing the relative wealth, population, industry, material resources, and 
racial make-up of nations and colonies, the Atlas can be read as a map of many things: as a 
cosmography of a burgeoning conception of “the environment”; as ideological propaganda for 
the Cold War; as a neo-colonial construction of global difference that bifurcated the globe into 
First and Third Worlds (with the Communist “Second World” being largely a foil for this more 
crucial distinction); finally, the Atlas was a virtuosic exercise in graphic communication, 
bypassing language as such in favor of mimetic icons and swaths of color that segregated the 
world into clear hierarchical strata of development. 
Marking a bio-political shift from an Enlightenment construct of “Nature” to a neo-colonial 
construct of “the Environment”, The World Geo-Graphic Atlas was symptomatic of a 
disingenuous semiotic fabrication of the earth. Bayer’s Atlas violently fractures the earth into 
First and Third Worlds, using a vast apparatus of data and media to represent this vivisection as 




and referent for the other, as the one was defined only in terms of its developmental difference 
vis-à-vis the other. In light of this fracture, a necessary corollary to the fabrication of First and 
Third Worlds was the concept of the Environment, whose transcendent unity—like all magical 
conjurations—bridged the rift between these two signs that were locked in a relationship of 
irremediable difference from each other. “The environment” then permitted one to transcend 
this mise-en-abîme of signs, without actually dispensing with the First-World/Third-World 
binary. In contradistinction to most signs, which name identifiable referents, this super-natural 
sign, “the environment”, had no real referent as such—for how could one possibly define and 
delimit the environment?  It served more as a meta-sign that glossed over the disjuncture 
between the binary signs which split the world in half. The recent scholarly preoccupation with 
architectural-environmental histories often neglect this more preliminary link between design 
and the environment: namely, that architecture and design would be required to invent and 
render plausible an aporetic entity called “the Environment” by grace of designers’ virtuosic 
techniques of spatial and iconic constructions. Environmental design—before broaching 
strategies of sustainability—first needed to aid in the semiotic fabrication of the Environment 
as ideo-theology of the global. 
Ethnopsychiatry and the Environment 
In 1953, the same year as The World Geo-Graphic Atlas was published, another book was 
printed that happened to forward a noteworthy theory on “the environment”. This book had 
been written at a hospital in Africa, not Schweitzer’s missionary hospital, but a British clinical 
hospital in Nairobi. The hospital’s director, John Carothers, had been sent to Nairobi to assess 




colonial Mau Mau movement.240 Under Carother’s direction, various anthropometric 
experiments had been performed over the course of years—weighing brains and measuring 
skulls with calipers—in order to establish some empirical basis for the presumed difference 
between the cerebral capacities of Africans and Europeans. While the results of these 
anthropometric experiments failed to provide much convincing proof of difference, Carothers’ 
subsequent theory that the African environment must render the African mind different from 
and inferior to the European mind would have far-reaching effects upon the future field of 
media theory. McLuhan’s media theory, for example, was indebted to his reading of Carothers’ 
substitution of “environment” for “race”.241 
Perhaps responding to Franz Boas’s contention that there was no innate physiological 
explanation to intellectual traits that appeared to inhere to different races—that differences 
between societies could be explained on the basis of cultural and environmental factors—
Carothers countered with an insidious interpretation of the relationship between race and 
environment.242 Carothers’ thesis was grounded in a conviction that the environmental milieu of 
a society gave rise to racially distinct thought-mechanisms. Invoking the jungle as that familiar 
Heart of Darkness, Carothers argued that this densely vegetated environment had formed the 
African psyche by obscuring visual information, thereby compelling greater attentiveness to 
sounds, and ultimately encouraging oral versus written means of communication. Claiming that 
speech links word to object in an immediate and present way, Carothers suggested that non-
literate societies thereby remained ignorant of the true arbitrary relation between sign-and-
signified.243 Carothers argued that Africans’ sense of an unmediated unity between words and 




“omnipotence-of-thought”, blind submission to authority, and a subsequent inaptitude for 
problem-solving, all of these culminating in Africans’ psychological resistance to industrial 
urbanization. Given twentieth-century accounts of how European modernity had sprung from 
this crevice between sign and signified, Carothers effectively set the environmental-
epistemological basis of modernity at an insurmountable remove from the shadows of the 
jungle—shadows which, apparently, stretched long over the savannahs and deserts of Africa 
and even across the Atlantic, as Carothers also used experiments on African-Americans to 
prove his arguments.244 
Although Carothers’ and Schweitzer’s hospitals followed two distinct models—laboratory and 
missionary, respectively—these models were complicit with each other, insofar as they both 
promulgated techniques of converting Africans to those same norms. The norm that Africans 
supposedly deviated from—according to both Schweitzer and Carothers—consisted in their 
inexplicable dislike for hard, repetitive, menial labor, and their obdurate determination to thus 
remain pre-industrial.245  The challenge of harnessing African labor toward European ends 
obsessed Schweitzer as well, who frequently punctuated his writings on Africa with complaints 
of African laziness and with accounts of his strategies to trick or otherwise induce Africans into 
realizing his own grand schemes of “improvement”.246  Carothers did not consider African 
resistance to the dictates of European labor to be a manifestation against colonial rule and 
exploitation, despite the fact that he had been sent to Nairobi specifically to assess the 
psychological pathology responsible for the Mau Mau insurgency. Rather, he ascribed 
Africans’ resistance to European labor to their intense obsequiousness toward authority, a 




Africans and their subsequent enthrallment to the magical powers of vocal speech rendered 
Africans unable to think independently and creatively. They believed that magic could do the 
work of labor. And they thus remained obedient in respect to the seeming magical abilities of 
others, including European authority and technology. Therefore, reasoned Carothers, not only 
did Africans lack the intellectual ability to organize their own productive capacities; their 
proletarization by Europeans posed certain psychiatric challenges. Another Englishman sent to 
Nairobi was F.D. Corfield who had been commissioned in the 1950’s to make a historical 
survey of the causes of the Mau Mau rebellion. He concluded that, apart from air-raids, the 
form of warfare best suited to the suppression of nationalist uprisings was psychological 
intervention.247 
The ways that the environment was said to dictate semiotic-psychiatric tendencies also 
suggested new means of converting Africans to desired semiotic-psychiatric norms. At 
Lambaréné one of the most grueling tasks assigned to local inhabitants was the continual 
clearance of dense forest, which was prerequisite to constructing, maintaining, and improving 
the medical facilities [Fig. 3.3.]. On the Edge of the Primeval Forest sketches some instances of 
Schweitzer’s difficulties in directing his laborers to work in an orderly and efficient manner. 
One day, after much exasperation in the workers’ periodic lapses into discussion, Schweitzer 
finally perceived a kind of symphonic scheme to the day’s work of clearing the jungle, 
realizing that, so long as nothing interrupts the organizing rhythms of their labors, these 
Africans will unflaggingly persevere at the task he has laid before them. However, any acoustic 
interruption—birds, thunder, speech—would break the rhythmic spell, leading to disruptive 




mythic Tower of Babel, noise—that which interrupts the intended “message”—would 
disintegrate the coordination of labor. Happily then for Schweitzer, the “symphony” of work 
precluded long discussions about techniques of work. By obviating the need for language, the 
captivating rhythms of labor circumvented the cumbersome split between sign and signified: a 
split from which could erupt distracting intellectual debates that would undermine the hierarchy 
between European intellectual work and African rote labor. 
Aptly, the jungle—that dim and densely auditory environment which supposedly produced 
Africans’ psychically-innate idleness—was cleared symbolically and literally through the 
musical circumlocution around language. Work’s transmutation into symphonic form—
Schweitzer literally broke the day’s work into four distinct “movements”, each with their 
respective rhythms and sounds—hence resolved the problem of Africans’ alleged resistance to 
rote labor. The symphonic innovation replaced verbal language with more magical semiotic 
means for organizing industrious bodies. The task of making Africans submit to European 
forms of labor would thus require a kind of suturing of sign and referent, so that the sign as 
such would disintegrate into more flowing, mesmeric forms of communication. 
Cybernetics and the Jungle: The Problem of “Noise” 
Language as the technology of human extension… may have been the “Tower of Babel” 
by which men sought to scale the highest heavens. Today computers hold out the 
promise of a means of instant translation of any code or language into any other code or 
language. The computer, in short, promises by technology a Pentecostal condition of 
universal understanding. The next logical step would seem to be, not to translate, but to 
by-pass language in favor of a general cosmic consciousness which might be very like the 
collective unconscious… The condition of “weightlessness”, that biologists say promises a 
physical immortality, may be paralleled by the condition of speechlessness that could 
confer a perpetuity of collective harmony and peace. 




The structuralist literary theorist, Roman Jakobson, noted that one common form of aphasia 
involved a person’s inability to distinguish noise from phonemes—or rather, to understand 
phonemes as referent-bearing components of speech instead of perceiving them merely as 
noise.249  Around the time that Jakobson wrote his essay on aphasia, the problem of noise 
formed one of the central concerns of communications scientists; most notably, Warren 
Weaver, whose research into “noise” (the electronic degradation of “messages”) would become 
an important foundation for the interdisciplinary project of cybernetics.250  Cybernetic theorists, 
in fact, shared many concerns in common with European doctors and psychiatrists living in 
Africa, such as the problem of organizing production; problems of communication and 
translation; and, related to these latter, the problem of how noise disrupted the transmission of 
coded language. Noise was the counter-productive and entropic error within semiotic 
technologies.  
According to Jakobson, aphasia derived from a malfunctioning of the basic operations of 
encoding or decoding signs. My proposition then is that the African Mind served as an 
imaginary exemplar of how communication presumably transpired with minimal interpretation 
or decoding. The African Mind’s alleged belief in the unity of sign and signified pointed 
toward magical communicative strategies that could circumvent the coding and decoding 
necessitated by language. The cybernetic proposition to render a semiotic system globally 
operative—independent of cultural and linguistic differences—presumed an intellectual ability 
to operate within semiotic systems without in fact grasping what mechanisms enabled those 
systems, even to the point of suggesting the mind’s ability to project meaning upon a 




theorists’ and cybernetics’ preoccupation with noise—effectively suggesting that the mind 
could actually make sense (its own sense) of noise—lay hold of the African Mind’s presumed 
ability to “absorb” coded messages without in fact decoding them. 
In Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, Marshall McLuhan, recounted one 
ethnopsychiatrist’s anecdote of how a certain African acquaintance zealously listened each 
week to a particular British radio talk-show, enraptured by its sounds even though he allegedly 
understood not a word of English.251  This binding medium of sound which drew the colonized 
into the fold of colonial communications thus operated on two levels: as intelligible speech for 
those who knew English and as a mesmerizing incantation for those who did not. That is: For 
those whose psycho-environmental formation was believed to keep them ignorant of the 
arbitrary relationship between sign and referent, the broadcast operated as McLuhan claimed 
that media really should operate, erasing any “message” that was separable from its medium 
and simply absorbing listeners in its irreducible, textural streams. McLuhan frequently cited the 
work of African ethnopsychiatry—particularly Carothers’ African Mind—to bolster his 
argument that “the medium was the message”. He alluded to various psychiatric attributes of 
what he called “the tribal world” as a way of imagining users of new media technologies whose 
senses would be so directly engaged with those media as to merge senses, media, and messages 
into an indistinguishable unity. 
As guest editor for the fourth issue of Aspen Magazine (a publication that had spun off from the 
IDCA’s, McLuhan opened the issue with the assertion that: “[A]ny understanding of social and 
cultural change is impossible without a knowledge of the way media work as environments.”  




media and environment. McLuhan’s frequent citations of African ethnopsychiatry likely did not 
derive only from a shared interest in the relations between environment, semiotics, and 
psychology; McLuhan was, furthermore, interested in how these factors would bridge First and 
Third Worlds, specifically by “re-tribalizing” the Western world through the use of magical 
semiotic technologies. His introductory essay to Aspen Magazine proposes that: “Electric 
circuitry is Orientalizing the West. The contained, the distinct, the separate—our Western 
legacy—are being replaced by the flowing, the unified, the fused.”252  That is to say, Euro-
American technologies were replacing that presumed hallmark of Euro-American modernity—
the structuralist sign—with ineffable non-signs.253 
McLuhan’s strict distinction between the literate European mind versus non-literate African 
mind was formulated at a time when one of the two central policy issues behind the incipient 
U.S. civil rights movement was the continuing use of literacy tests to bar African-Americans 
from voting (a practice also employed in Canada, McLuhan’s home country). As such, the 
celebration of African illiteracy was particularly insidious. The anecdotes he gleaned from 
ethnopsychiatry were intended as indications of how media might operate in the First World as 
much as in the Third. His insistence that new multi-sensory media be used to “re-tribalize” the 
“de-tribalized” world implied that Euro-Americans’ psychic adaptation to such technologies 
could take as an ideal model that same African Mind that had been invented by 
ethnopsychiatry. What the jungle had purportedly accomplished toward shaping the African 
Mind’s methods of magical thought could be accomplished on a global scale (in the absence of 
jungle) through multi-sensory media. McLuhan hoped that such media would undermine a 




non-linguistic semiotic systems. However, it seems unlikely that this professor of English 
Literature was really advocating universal illiteracy. Because the very development of 
electronic media depended on this same disenchantment (insofar as machine coding drew from 
the Saussurean theory of the sign), Euro-America had to maintain its canny manipulation of the 
sign’s inherent instability vis-à-vis its referent. What was needed then was an ideological 
technique for upholding Euro-America’s governance of the structuralist sign while still 
allowing for the de-structuralization of that sign—i.e., its dissipation into effulgently streaming 
semiotic forms. As stated earlier, a belief that the sign possessed a different status within Africa 
versus non-Africa mirrored another semiotic difference—namely, the First-and-Third-Worlds 
as mutually cross-referential signs for each other. The cleavage between First and Third Worlds 
was to be bridged through a binding and enchanting conception of the Environment. The latter, 
as McLuhan explained, was a construction of media. 
The Environmental Sphere: Unfolded, Everted, Refolded 
The sphere, as image-form of a system, denotes an ambit, suggesting boundaries of inclusion 
and exclusion and, relatedly, boundaries circumscribing the knowable. In the mid-twentieth 
century, the definition of “environment” quickly expanded its circumference to designate not 
only a person’s more or less immediate perceptory milieu, but in fact the entire terrestrial 
globe. I say that the definition expanded, not shifted, because a persistent association with the 
earlier definition produced an elision between these two unlike constructs: The original term, 
environment, suggested an organism’s sensorium but also—I will explain this momentarily—a 
semiotic sphere of intelligibility. The global environment, by contrast, was too vast and 




of the global-environmental concept depended on its ability to represent itself to humans’ 
psychological environment. To represent this magical globe as being in fact a perceptible 
entity—i.e., as being environmental—would require some rather ingenious strategies of 
representation. 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, “the environment” may have become synonymous 
with “global system”, but its thicker sedimentation of meanings implicitly linked that globality 
to the more minute perceptory and significatory world of each human subject. I don’t mean to 
suggest that this elision in scale could have been accomplished merely through etymological 
accretion; rather, spanning between these two disparately scaled environments also required 
spatial, graphic, and semiotic constructions. The planetary sphere and the organism’s sensorium 
would need to be articulated in commensurable, exchangeable terms. For example, the 
prevalent modeling of the organism’s environmental interactions as a feedback loop, rendered 
the immediate environment in terms akin to those in which global systems were being 
articulated, namely as feedback loops and as cycles. Conversely, the terrestrial globe itself 
would be modeled as a perceptory milieu that could be unfolded and refolded to situate itself 
vis-à-vis the perception and knowledge of a human subject. 
In 1943, several years prior to his involvement with the AIHS, Bayer had designed with the 
curator Monroe Wheeler a wartime exhibition at New York’s Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) 
entitled Airways to Peace: An Exhibition of Geography for the Future, a show that informed 
many of his later designs for the 1953 World Geo-Graphic Atlas. Taking the title of the show 
literally, I’d stress Wheeler’s and Bayer’s interest in transitioning from wartime to peacetime 




developed for aeronautic warfare. As had been noted by the architects Maxwell Fry and Jane 
Drew, who launched the post-War Tropical Architecture movement from their work in British 
West Africa and, airplane routes and landing strips that had been built in Africa for World War 
II now permitted new inroads for urban-architectural and economic development.254 During the 
planning phase of Airways to Peace, Wheeler accumulated clippings from various newspapers 
and magazines, all of them denouncing the out-datedness of the Mercator map—developed by 
the Dutch in the sixteenth century—in this new era of air travel. The Mercator map produced 
the greatest spatial distortion around the North and South poles (these regions having been less 
relevant to seafarers), and yet, as Bayer and Wheeler stressed, “the most populous nations of 
the world are clustered about the North Pole, within easy flying distance of each other.”  In 
1943, the state of New York mandated that the standard Mercator maps in classrooms be 
replaced with maps using the North Pole as the central point. Many of the globes and maps 
included in Airways to Peace emphasized the strategic importance of this focal shift, yet failed 
to address the resulting problem: increasing spatial distortion toward the equator, with the 
southern hemisphere being omitted altogether, or else depicted on a separate map. This new 
global bifurcation, inherited from the wartime mapping of air-routes, graphically foregrounds 
the possibilities for rethinking global politics in terms of north-south divisions. 
When designing Airways to Peace and later the World Geo-Graphic Atlas, Bayer referred to 
Richard Buckminster Fuller’s techniques of cartographic arrangement. Fuller, having designed 
the Dymaxion map while serving on the Board of Economic Warfare, claimed that the map 
eliminated the Mercator’s conventional orientation in order to present different strategic 




existed recent antecedents, most notably the maps of William Diller Matthew, the English 
evolutionary paleontologist whose reasons for reorienting the relationships between the earth’s 
land-masses were not dissimilar from Fuller’s, insofar as both wished to show certain 
proximities radiating from a central focal point. In fact, both men produced these contiguities to 
demonstrate theories of racial evolution. Matthew, foreshadowing the geopolitics of 
Lebensraum, placed northern Eurasia in the center of the map and showed the “races” of the 
world emanating from it in southerly directions (quite contrary to mounting evidence of 
modern humans’ shared African evolution).255 [Fig. 3.5] The version of Fuller’s Dymaxion map 
published in Life Magazine in 1943, however, situated the North Pole in the middle of the map. 
From that point concentric bands of the northern temperate zone radiated, circumscribed by the 
southern tropical zones, which were thereby subject to the greatest distortion. This is the map 
that the United Nations would use on its logo shortly thereafter. The accompanying text to 
Fuller’s map explained that this arrangement was meant to “line up the same temperature 
zones, or isotherms, and clarify their role in human geography.”  [Fig. 3.6] Distinct from zones 
bounded solely by latitude lines, Fuller’s so-called isotherms banded together swaths of land 
according to their shared seasonal temperature ranges, thereby allowing almost all of the United 
States and Europe, along with Japan, Korea, and northern China, to be banded together, while 
much of the Soviet Union and what is now called the global south were relegated to non-
temperate isotherms, polar and tropical respectively. Because the temperate isotherm was 
deemed “the optimum temperature zone for the well-being and efficiency of human beings,” its 
nations, according to Fuller,  had succeeded in controlling “84% of the world’s mechanical 
horse-power and, in consequence, dominating the territories and people outside [that zone]”. 




peoples less industrious than their European counterparts, Fuller invoked the temperate 
climates as the natural locus of industrial innovation. Both ethnopsychiatrist and engineer 
instrumentalized their formulations of the tropics’ non-industrial character as a mandate for 
particular forms of Euro-American intervention in those regions: respectively, through psycho-
semiotic influence and through techno-scientific management of human and material resources. 
Bayer was especially adept at bringing these two mandates of Euro-American global 
governance into mutually supporting relationship with each other, as his graphic and spatial 
constructions suggested the globe as both a psycho-semiotic sphere and an (unevenly) 
distributed arrangement of material and technological resources. Whereas Carothers—and later 
his follower, McLuhan—argued that the climatic environment produced certain psycho-
semiotic modes of thought, Bayer’s move was to represent the globe as being itself an 
environmental medium for communicative systems. In parallel with the cybernetic-related 
discourse of biosemiotics, which construed the organism’s environment as an extension of its 
own being, and anticipating McLuhan’s concept of media as “extensions of man”, Bayer 
depicted the earth as a vast geocentric envelope of interaction within which the actual terrestrial 
orb was merely a small nucleus. In a series of five small drawings collectively titled “The 
Nature of Air”, Bayer chose to show “the earth as a ball of atmosphere with a solid center” 
instead of as “a solid surrounded by a layer of atmosphere”. [Fig. 3.7] In so refiguring the earth 
as atmosphere, Bayer translated the terrestrial globe into a medium of communication—in this 
case, for the communicative trajectories of airplanes but also as a medium of electronic 
telecommunications. The first of his drawings for “The Nature of Air” series, titled a “Cross-
Section of the Atmosphere”, in fact treated the terrestrial-atmospheric strata as media-specific 




captions, called “the radio-roof because radio-waves bounce back from it. The Stratosphere is a 
layer of air too thin for human life but navigable and sensitive to radio-electric 
communication…. The Troposphere is the air we breathe, the layer in which we live…”256 If the 
composition of the troposphere was conducive to the functions of material existence and to 
immediate communication within a local milieu, then the strato- and ionospheres allowed the 
earth to be converted into a unified communicative environment, resembling, at blown-up 
scale, the perceptory sphere of a single organism. In the introductory caption to the drawings, 
Bayer and Wheeler claimed that meteorology was the new paradigmatic science of the air age. 
It was to be inferred from Bayer’s drawings, however, that the centrality of meteorology is 
argued not solely on the basis of its usefulness for aeronautic operations; instead, 
“meteorology” appeared to have been a more all-encompassing construction, evoking a science 
of ambient transmissions and exchanges, as important to semiotic technologies than to flight 
paths. 
Here, I would draw on the biosemiotic terminologies and models advanced by the twentieth-
century biologist, Jakob von Uexküll, who described any given organism as being “captured” 
in its environment. Uexküll models the environment as a feedback loop between an organism’s 
inner and outer environment (Innenwelt and Umwelt). Semiotic signals are received by the 
organism, and the organism subsequently acts upon the environment, actions also construed as 
signals. The organism is “captured”, according to Uexküll, because of the ways its particular 
perceptory faculties, specifically attuned to its own biological needs, constrain which aspects of 
that world are thus available to perception. Environment thus does not describe a spatial area. 




different environments.) The environment, rather, describes a particular semiotic sphere whose 
ambit is delimited less by spatial scope than by the perceptory possibilities available to a given 
organism. I invoke Uexküll’s theories because, in contrast to many who would take up the new 
idiom of “the environment”, he defined and theorized the semiotic turn that was subsequently 
implied by the post-War usage of the term. If Bayer’s “Nature of the Air” drawings could 
redefine the earth as “a ball of gaseous fluid with a solid center”, this is because the earth qua 
environment could be understood as a semiotic universe, rather than as a physically geographic 
system. “Atmosphere”, in contrast to “land” conveyed this ambient field of communication. 
The human subject would be “captured” in this spatially vast, super-terrestrial field as surely as 
Uexküll’s tick (the small animal into whose world Uexküll first leads us) is captured in a 
semiotic system consisting of the few crude environmental signals to which it is attuned. [Fig. 
3.9]  The “captivity” is due to the ways the semiotic system structures what is perceivable and 
thus knowable. 
In contrast to broader theoretical models like episteme, paradigm, or habitus, which have been 
invoked to help explicate either a history of knowledge or modes of knowledge acquisition, the 
global sphere was not precisely an underlying, ordering mechanism of knowledge formation. 
Instead, it offered a perceptible image or representation of a new form of knowing and its 
correlate forms of political subjectivity. What it permitted conceptually was a translation 
between an abstract “sphere” of global communication technologies and a slightly less abstract 
sphere of individual perception, thought, discourse, and action. This was not exactly a 
synechdochal relationship; for, despite the movement between scales, I don’t think a part was 




exchange of one scale for that of another: Exponentially, and in a single leap, the boundaries of 
one’s immediate environment could be substituted for that of the globe. The resemblance 
between the perceptual-communicative sphere of the organism and the spatial sphere of the 
terrestrial globe permitted the circumference of the latter to operate as if it were the 
circumference of the former. New conceptions of globality were suggestive of forms of 
political subjectivity, producing relations between semiotic modes and geographical domains. 
Yet, there were, in fact, two different models of global manipulation at play in Airways to 
Peace, one that represented the earth as an atmospheric semiotic medium and one that 
represented it as a solid architectural surface. These forms corresponded to two distinct forms 
of global subjectivity. In one of the main showpieces of the exhibition, the “Outside-In Globe”, 
Bayer treated the earth as a surface to be unfolded and refolded around the viewer. [Fig. 3.10] 
The earth is turned into a sheltering nest, allowing its geographical entirety to be grasped in a 
single glance, like a map but without a map’s spatial distortions. Wendell Willkie, the 
proponent of “one world” for purposes of “free trade”, who authored the exhibition catalog, 
claimed that the Outside-In Globe demonstrated how “the most populous nations of the world 
are clustered about the North Pole, within easy flying distance of each other”. While the viewer 
of this globe was certainly captured within its sphere, he or she also, simultaneously, viewed 
the globe from the privileged perspective of omniscience. The everted globe thus amended 
Renaissance techniques of representing scenes as if from the vantage point of a single 
stationary viewer. Bayer’s sphere took what could not in reality be seen from any viewpoint 
and rendered it within a single frame of vision. The terrestrial sphere was thus captured by the 




issue of Aspen Magazine, McLuhan contrasted the effects of Renaissance perspective painting 
to the effects of electronic media: Whereas the former situated the world “outside the frame of 
experience”, the latter “involves all of us… No detachment or frame is possible.”  The everted 
globe, however, attempted to transcend the inside-outside distinction. While, on the one hand, 
the world/environment was rendered quite literally as bounding “the frame of experience”, it 
also could be modeled, objectified, and comprehended as being, in turn, bounded by perception 
itself, an orb to be turned about and viewed from all sides. It was structuring, but, like Fuller’s 
geodesic domes, it was not only structure, also comprising surface and object. And against the 
dichotomy drawn by McLuhan, the subject of the Outside-In Globe was at once detached and 
involved, framing and enframed. The ability to stand outside one’s own captivity within a 
global sphere and view it as though comprehending it, pointed toward a paradoxical form of 
hegemonic subjectivity: An environment that increasingly captured subjects in a semiotic-
technological sphere could also be objectified in relation to them in order to illustrate those 
same subjects’ own environmental and geopolitical agency vis-à-vis the world. 
Airways to Peace endeavored to construct a “Geography for the Future”, but it could also be 
seen as contributing toward an architecture for the future, one that was widely mobilized during 
the decades to follow. The architectonic form of the sphere—often a geodesic dome—would 
figure largely in both types of environment—semiotic and geopolitical. Architecture historian, 
Beatriz Colomina, has coined the phrase “enclosed by images” to describe Charles and Ray 
Eames’ propagandistic multi-media constructions featured in Cold War-era international 
exhibitions.257  The lack of orthogonal surfaces in many exhibition spaces from this era 




Within the twilit interiors contained in these shells, the architectural surround retreated to 
invisibility, allowing the projective media themselves to become the atmospheric architecture 
of enclosure. In 1961 Fuller conceived of the World Game, which he argued should, in lieu of 
classic literature form the new core curriculum for universities. Converting computer-simulated 
war games into “peace games”, Fuller proposed projected a terrestrial map onto a giant 
overhead dome, so that the roof’s arc would become the sphere of the world. 258 The proposed 
World Game thus reproduced the forced homology between the semiotic sphere of media 
communication and the larger global sphere of resource exchange. 
Later, during the Environmental movement in the U.S., circa 1968, geodesic domes became the 
preferred architecture of the drop-out culture, promoted in the do-it-yourself manuals of 
Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Catalogs. As Felicity Scott has pointed out, the drop-cities and 
tent-cities were highly engaged—despite the imperative to “drop-out”—with technologically-
reproducible forms of media, such as film and audio and print transmission.259  In the previous 
chapter I showed how the primitive hut had long been understood by European architects as a 
model of the “primitive mind”. In the U.S. countercultural movement, something similar was at 
play, except that the mind was understood at this point as a semiotic sphere suffused with forms 
of media.  At the 1970 International Design Conference at Aspen, a professor from Berkeley’s 
College of Environmental Design, Sim van der Ryn, in trying to arrive at the archetypal form 
for an environmental architecture of the future, explained that: 
The metaphor for the tribal form is the circle. In tribal times people lived in a condition 
we now call mythic unity. It is a state of total participation between self and 
surroundings. The boundary between man’s interior ecology inside his skin and the 




…The current mystique about domes that is growing up among many young people, I 
think, is related to their attempt to get back to the unity and simplicity of the tribal form. 
One way to understand the geodesic dome is as the archetypical “primitive hut” of the 
environmental era, similar to how the primitive hut functioned as an epistemological model for 
Enlightenment and late modernist architects in Europe. Whereas Team Ten architects had 
viewed the structure of the primitive hut as analogous to the mind’s processes of associative 
construction (operative in language, myth, or other cultural formations), the geodesic dome 
demonstrated the mind’s resemblance to a sphere of media. The non-planar and often irregular 
forms produced by the triangulated structural system abolished walls as such, creating instead 
organic, cellular spaces whose architecture figured as a natural extension of its inhabitants’ 
psychic world: its remoteness and confining scope rendered tolerable by its occupants’ 
participation in a much larger sphere of electronic and print communications. There was, 
furthermore, the geodesic dome’s association with Fuller’s Dymaxion Globe and World Game, 
thereby linking the dome-huts homologously to the global sphere. The settlers of these short-
lived communities instantiated a particular form of subjectivity, even amidst their staged 
protest, that had been implied already by Bayer’s Outside-In Globe: Captivated within a 
techno-media sphere, the drop-outs were, at the same time, operators of those same media 
technologies. [Fig. 3.11] Like the occupants of the Outside-In Globe, who were made to feel 
conscious or even omniscient about the global sphere that entrapped them, the builders of 
geodesic dome-huts unfolded and refolded the structural-surface apparatus of the sphere to 
better accommodate their new, globally-conscious lifestyles. 
Various publications contemporaneous with the Airways to Peace exhibition, such as Life 




importance for Americans in the imminent post-war era to learn geography, particularly the 
strategic proximities of industrial cities around the northern pole. [Fig. 3.12] While post-war 
Americans were to thus regard themselves in relation to this re-foldable geopolitical surface, 
there remained nonetheless Bayer’s very different model of the earth as communicative 
atmosphere, subjecting people to an invisible milieu of communications. By contrast, the 
icosahedron or geodesic globe could be objectified, manipulated, and studied. These models 
corresponded respectively to two forms of subjectivity pertaining to the incipient categories of 
the post- and pre-industrial worlds. The aphasia between Africa and non-Africa arose not in the 
distances stretching across the Atlantic, Mediterranean, or Indian Ocean, but within the 
stratoposphere engulfing the tropics in a semiotic haze which rendered signs indistinguishable 
from signifieds. Africans were subjects of the environment. If Americans were likewise 
environmental subjects, “Airways to Peace” suggests that they could nonetheless objectify that 
same environment, physically transcending the stratosphere—literally, in the case of air travel, 
or symbolically through the manipulation of it as a structural surface. Bayer’s everted globe 
stood for the actual production of a global-inside and a global-outside that could be flipped, as 
circumstances dictated, in relation to the post-industrial, humanist subject. The exterior-interior 
relation could not, however, be flipped for the captured pre-industrial, environmental subject, 
for whom, in McLuhan’s words, “no detachment or frame is possible.” 
I don’t mean to suggest that these two forms of subjectivity described the actual relationships 
between humans and the world-systems (both semiotic and political) they inhabited. The 
activity of stepping outside the captivity of one’s psycho-semiotic sphere was more often an 




Indeed, if magical thought was at play—we could think of Freud’s formulation of magical 
thought as belief in the omnipotence of one’s own thoughts and wishes—it would consist in 
this construction of a cosmography that enfolded the human subject and which could be, 
nonetheless, unfold and refolded by that same captured subject. Yet, while Bayer dreamt of a 
not-so-distant day when humans would “absorb and convey information… through 
supernatural means”, the prevailing notion of literacy as the special purview of the industrial 
Global North endowed the latter’s subjects with an ability to step outside the supernatural 
ambience of electronic communications and into a different sphere: that of humanist and 
hermeneutic literary traditions. 
Liberal Arts vs. Environmental Arts 
If leisure and political power are a reason for liberal education, then everybody in 
America now has this reason, and everybody where democracy and industrialization 
penetrate will ultimately have it…. If the people are not capable of acquiring this 
education, they should be deprived of political power and probably of leisure… If the 
people are incapable of achieving the education that responsible democratic citizenship 
demands, then democracy is doomed [and] Aristotle rightly condemned the mass of 
mankind to natural slavery… 
On the other hand, the conclusion that everybody should have the chance to have that 
education which will fit him for responsible democratic citizenship and which will 
develop his human powers to the fullest degree does not require the immediate adoption 
in any given country of universal liberal education. This conclusion states the ideal 
toward which the society should strive… 
The poverty of a country may seem to prevent it from rapid approximation of its 
educational ideal. In the past the education of the few rested on the labor of the many. 
Robert Hutchins, The Great Conversation (1956)260 
For the 1956 International Design Conference in Aspen (IDCA), themed on “Future of Man 
and Design”, the conference organizer, architectural historian Robin Middleton, invited 
Mortimer Adler as one of the speakers. Adler had received a doctorate in psychology from 




development of the “Great Books of the Western World” courses, which became the basis for a 
host of programs and publications, such as Columbia’s core curriculum, the University of 
Chicago’s curriculum, the Great Books of Western Civilization series, Hutchins’ Great Books 
for Business Men course, and, stemming from this last, Paepcke’s initial conception for the 
AIHS. For the 1956 IDCA, Adler delivered a talk on “Some Philosophical Questions about 
Design” which focused on the question of whether design fell solely into the category of what 
he called—in preference to “vocational” or “technical” arts—the “servile arts”, or whether it 
might, in some of its “higher” forms be counted among the liberal arts. The distinction between 
servile and liberal arts depended upon whether a given occupation tended toward serving 
“biological” needs, or whether it was aligned purely with leisure, the latter term not being used 
by Adler with any pejorative intent. Architecture, he avowed, was first and foremost a servile 
art insofar as it served the biological need for shelter, but the question remained whether, to 
some degree, it attained to the liberal arts, given that it also adorned and beautified. Ultimately 
though, the question, Adler stated, was not about beauty per se but about a certain 
communicative intelligibility: 
But, and here is the question, do works of predominantly servile art ever have anything at 
all to say?  The question is not whether they have something important or profound to 
say. It is simply whether they have any message at all, any truth to communicate, any 
instruction for the human mind.261 
Architecture apparently inhabited a position oddly similar to that occupied by “Africa” in 
Schweitzer’s recent formulation: Architecture’s alleged aphasia would be taken as proof of its 
inherent servility (Adler having gone on to answer the above questions in the negative, i.e., 
architecture had no “message” or “instruction for the human mind”). Architecture’s exclusion 




meaningfulness—and thus the aptness—of their productions; yet, the fact that architecture, as a 
non-sign-based aesthetic system, could not be translated, had also held out the possibility that it 
could be meaningful without requiring translation, much like, say, Schweitzer’s Bach in 
Lambaréné, another quasi-semiotic system: that is, a semiotics without signs-and-signifieds. In 
the previous chapter I showed how Team Ten architects sought to establish architecture as a 
quasi-semiotic system. Without using signs as such, architects’ various techniques of 
“translating” indigenous architectures were understood as manipulating non-sign-based systems 
of meaning. That manipulation was key to the profession’s aspirations to the status of 
theoretical, communicative, and globally-adaptable art. 
Adler noted that the distinction between the liberal and servile arts dated back to Greek 
antiquity, although he omitted to mention that it referred then to the categories of knowledge 
befitting citizens and slaves, respectively. Hutchins, Adler’s collaborator in the Great Books 
project, explained the priority of the liberal arts somewhat differently than his colleague, 
echoing claims by John Locke and Adam Smith described in my first chapter that a man’s self-
determination and political agency depended on his consciousness or intellectual mastery over 
the entire system of manufacture in which he participated.262 A lack of consciousness of one’s 
work led to a loss of selfhood and of the rights to political participation resulting therefrom. 
One might recall here Schweitzer’s description of his employees hacking down the forest in a 
trance-like state. 
By way of explicating the Great Books concept, in 1954 Hutchins had published a long essay 
titled The Great Conversation which argued against the prejudice that a liberal arts education 




element [of Western civilization] is the Logos,” Hutchins claimed that in the West, therefore, 
“[e]verybody is to speak his mind…. The exchange of ideas is held to be the path to the 
realization of the potentialities of the race.”263 In recent history, machines universally conferred 
to men the leisure time to pursue liberal arts education, freeing up more and more people to the 
pursuit of intellectual endeavors, so that (at least in the United States, it was implied) universal 
training in the Great Books was possible. Hutchins did not mention a key event that would have 
helped support his claim regarding the accessibility of education, namely the racial 
desegregation of schools mandated two years earlier by the verdict of Brown versus Board of 
Education. Perhaps the recentness of this victory—indicative of de jure, if not de facto, social 
equalities now accruing to all Americans—still hinted too strongly at the fallacy of ascribing 
generous amounts of leisure time to all U.S. inhabitants. Indeed, by predicating the possibility 
of universal liberal-arts education upon Americans’ supposed liberation from menial labor, it is 
unclear whether Hutchins was simply distorting the real state of affairs in order to persuade his 
detractors, or whether he was effectively maintaining boundaries between two forms of 
political-economic subjecthood: the liberal and the servile. Regardless, he did let slip that 
“universal” was a category confined to members of the First World, as he conceded that a 
nation’s poverty might prevent it from the equitable distribution of leisure necessary to 
pursuing the liberal arts. Hutchins wrote: 
On the other hand, the conclusion that everybody should have the chance to have that 
education which will fit him for responsible democratic citizenship and which will 
develop his human powers to the fullest degree does not require the immediate adoption 
in any given country of universal liberal education. The conclusion states the ideal 
toward which the society should strive. Any number of practical reasons may prevent 
the society from moving rapidly toward this ideal. … 





Following contemporaneous developmental theory, such as that promoted by economist Walt 
Rostow, Hutchins insisted that the impoverished nations of the world must industrialize before 
they could approach the ideal of universal liberal-arts education. Further in the essay though he 
admits that the “mechanization which tends to reduce a man to a robot also supplies the 
economic base and the leisure that will enable him to get a liberal education and to become 
truly a man.” The industrial laborer must thus submit him or herself to a robotic, quasi-human 
condition in order to attain (eventually, circumstances permitting) to the liberal arts and the 
concomitant state of being fully human. This condition of full human-ness was only possible to 
an already industrialized society. Yet, according to Carothers’ African Mind, published a year 
prior, Africans innately, psycho-semiotically resisted industrialization. Hutchins would not 
have been likely to subscribe to Carothers’ unapologetic racism, and yet his program still 
pointed toward the production of two new idioms, that of the pre-industrial and post-industrial 
spheres. In light of a growing global division of labor, it could be argued that the latter’s leisure 
to pursue the liberal arts was premised on the former’s lack thereof. 
Hutchins argued that the necessity for “universal” liberal arts education stemmed from the fact 
of universal suffrage and from the tremendous international stakes set by the development of 
atomic weaponry. Like many participants at the AIHS, and particularly at the Goethe 
Bicentennial, Hutchins regarded a return to the humanities as remedy for the destructive 
excesses of the sciences. Philosophy, rhetoric, and classic literature were also seen as potential 
proof against a resurgence of fascism (despite the extent to which humanist education was a 
German tradition). Yet, at the same time as literacy was being thus promoted, governments 




communication technologies would necessarily render hermeneutics and textual analysis null 
and void, but that—recalling Bayer’s dream for “supernatural means” of conveying and 
absorbing information—these technologies, I argue, would have demanded a broadening of 
liberal arts curricula adequate to the critique of non-written forms of knowledge, and a 
concomitant commitment of making liberal arts education obtainable regardless of economic 
class. In an era of audio and visual media, parsing texts would have to be matched by the 
parsing of quasi-semiotic forms, if the liberal arts were to have any critical purchase on the 
world. 
The IDCA’s advisory committee—perhaps bearing in mind Adler’s censure of design’s 
servility and aphasia—formulated for their 1959 conference the theme “Communication: The 
Image Speaks”, and included in its roster of speakers Gyorgy Kepes, a protégé of the now-
deceased Moholy-Nagy. Kepes’ book, Language of Vision, had sought to establish a quasi-
semiotic system of psycho-perceptual techniques. Given that the first few IDCA’s had been 
themed on the relationship between corporate business and design, it is not surprising that 
many of the themes throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s dealt with design’s potential for 
psychological persuasiveness. That Adler should have failed to perceive how design did, in a 
sense, “speak”, albeit in a manner that could not be reduced to strictly textual analysis, testified 
to a certain obdurateness against engaging with the aesthetic, quasi-semiotic forms that were at 
that time being studied by designers and psychologists for their communicative potentials. 
Indeed, given the role played by film, architecture, radio, and spectacle toward the rise of 
fascism, to say nothing of the colonial powers’ continuing interest in developing media of 




communist revolutions, it is surprising that Adler and Hutchinson remained blind and deaf to 
the communicative powers of design. (A subsequent IDCA in 1963 was explicitly themed on 
the potentials of propaganda, titled “Design and the American Image Abroad”.) The IDCA’s, 
having been born of two quite disparate frameworks—those of the text-based liberal arts and of 
the propagandistic potentials of design (whether for governmental or corporate purposes)—was 
symptomatic of the split between the two modes of subjecthood that were being 
conceptualized, which I would call humanist versus environmental subjectivity. 
“Inner Environment / Outer Environment”: Aspen, 1962 
The first IDCA dedicated specifically to “Environment” was held in 1962 and brought together 
speakers from the same range of disciplines usually represented at the conferences, including 
theologians, philosophers, anthropologists, and scientists, in addition to architects and other 
designers. Due to the flexibility of the term “environment”—that is, the ambiguity of its 
referent—it was treated to mean different things by most speakers, several of them in fact 
declaring their intentions to use the term differently than the way others would be using it. Yet, 
despite the diverse disciplines represented by the conference participants, surprising similarities 
abounded in their formulations, most notably, in the pervasive tendency to refer to the dual 
existence of inner and outer environments (a distinction Uexküll had made long ago). 
The environment thus referred to both a material-empirical milieu as well as to a cognitive and 
thus behavioral framework, distinct for different societies or, according to some participants, 
for particular individuals. The anthropologist of Mexican lower-class communities, Oscar 
Lewis, delivered a talk on one particular “environment” that he regarded as structurally similar 




possessing “universal characteristics which transcend regional, rural-urban, and even national 
distinctions”.265 While it might seem strange to thus equate a “culture” to an “environment”—
and it is possible that Lewis did so simply to incorporate the conference’s theme—on the other 
hand, what he went on to identify as the common denominator shared by the vastly dispersed 
societies comprising the culture of poverty was their alleged illiteracy. He claimed, for 
example, that “the Jews of Eastern Europe… are a group, who, because of their cultural 
traditions and literacy, do not show many of the traits associated with the culture of poverty.” 
Among the peoples comprising this culture of poverty, the supposed lack of a “great native 
literature” comparable to the “outpouring of a universal literature” that had characterized 
nineteenth-century industrialization and urbanization mandated the intervention of the Euro-
American social sciences to assess the “psychology” of the poor. Lewis also excluded from the 
culture of poverty “primitive peoples whose backwardness is the result of their isolation and 
undeveloped technology and whose society, for the most part, is not class stratified.” In other 
words, the culture of poverty did not refer to societies that remained intact against colonial 
and/or industrializing practices. Instead, the culture of poverty seemed implicitly to refer to any 
impoverished peoples who participated in an incipient capitalist economy, often in a state of 
massive transition. Lewis mentioned specifically “the poorest workers, poorest peasants, 
poorest plantation laborers, and that large heterogeneous mass of small artisans and tradesmen 
sometimes referred to in the literature as the lumpen proletariat”. He further elaborated that this 
impoverished condition sometimes “results from imperial conquest in which the conquered 
maintain servile status…. It can also occur in the process of detribalization such as is now 
going on in Africa, where tribal cultures are developing what have been called ‘courtyard 




the conference speakers, the architect, Balkrishna Doshi, who was loosely associated with 
Team Ten, had given a presentation on the modernization of courtyard housing to 
accommodate cowherds near Ahmedabad. In a move recalling the schemes of Yona Friedman 
(described in Chapter Two), he had proposed the provision of basic services, in the form of 
plumbing and electricity within a kitchen area, while leaving the rest of the architecture to be 
built by its future occupants. In effect, this was a structural (or, indeed, mega-structural) 
solution to poverty, which dispensed with the question of cultural particularities, suggesting a 
more global solution. 
The “culture of poverty”, to which Lewis ascribed a “structure and a rationale”, identified a 
new, evolved form of savagery that compressed into a single genre a great mass of world’s 
population. By turning poverty into a question of cultural rather than material difference, Lewis 
could likewise formulate the solution to poverty as psychological, rather than economic-
political, transformation, a strategy that spoke loudly amidst the rumblings of Latin American 
communist movements and in the wake of the United States’ recent military failure in the Bay 
of Pigs. “It is conceivable,” Lewis declared, “that some countries can ameliorate the culture of 
poverty (at least in the early stages of their industrial revolution) without materially increasing 
standards of living for a while, but rather by changing the value systems and attitudes of the 
people…”.267 As distinct from the category of savagery that prevailed during centuries of 
colonialism and that was characterized primarily by its torpor within history’s evolution, the 
culture of poverty indicated a psychological-historical stratum of transition and malleability. 
The concept of “the pre-industrial”—or here, according to Lewis, a society “in the early stages 




fulfillment mandated the involvement of Western countries. Marxian and Maoist distinctions 
between a peasantry and urban proletariat—although linked to different forms of education and 
rates of literacy—were irrelevant within a culture of poverty, given that the poor were all 
understood as unstable components, to be relocated as the global economy should require and 
re-culturated to be made amenable to these needs. Like the incipient concept of the “pre-
industrial”, the “culture of poverty” was a category that erased distinct, existing forms of 
production (to say nothing of forms of culture), in order to conceive of these areas as awaiting 
economic and cultural development guided by the Global North. As can be gleaned from in 
other presentations at the 1962 IDCA, the presumed difference between North and South was 
related to different forms of consciousness. 
With seemingly little to unite some of these disciplines, a recurring motif was nonetheless 
apparent, namely, an interest in the relationship between what was referred to as man’s inner 
and outer environments. The theologian, Arthur Cohen, argued that “the signal marker of a less 
developed society” was the discrepancy between its material productions—however impressive 
these might appear—and its inner spirit, a split that he then named as a disjunction between its 
outer and inner environments.268  Others of the speakers, while also affirming this reflective 
relationship between inner and outer environments, nonetheless allowed for the ability to 
somehow step outside of one’s environment. The historian, Herbert Mueller (a recent signatory 
of the Second Humanist Manifesto), ranted against anthropologists’ preoccupation with how 
cultural biases conditioned their understanding of other cultures: “…[T]hese anthropologists 
were not strictly culture-bound…. [T]hey were trained observers, who had achieved at least a 




studying…. With such knowledge men are no longer slaves of custom, no longer mere 
creatures of the environment.”269  In respect to this objectivity, however, Mueller distinguished 
between the abilities of primitive versus advanced societies, claiming that the latter “has meant 
a more conscious, less purely tribal culture.”270 
The notion that consciousness, in contradistinction to unconscious or habit-based behavior, 
could interject a wedge between the otherwise perfectly imbricated systems of inner and outer 
environments implied a triangulation of this otherwise tightly bound dyad. The cybernetic 
physicist, Heinz von Forester, in his IDCA talk, “Logical Structure of the Environment and Its 
Internal Representation”, followed in the vein of Uexküll by describing “the totality” of the 
relationship “Environment-Environmentee” as one in which the neural-sensory system of an 
animal was formed in specific relation to its particular material needs. The environmentee’s 
environmental material was thereby translated into “symbols” that the environmentee’s brain 
could understand and respond to. The translation of environmental materiality into a semiotic 
system was of great interest to cyberneticists (and could be considered in relation to Bayer’s 
wish for a supernatural means of communication). Forester noted, however, that there always 
lurked the question of knowing whether the perceived environment might not in fact be “the 
sole product of the environmentee’s imagination… an illusion…”271  To distinguish between 
imagined versus objective environments, Uexküll had described the latter as “magical 
environments”, giving examples of animals that either projected an internally-generated image 
onto the external world, or, as in the case of migratory flight patterns, projected an internal 
geographic conception onto the actual external environment. Given that Uexküll’s model of a 




interjection of a non-environmental signal into the organism’s semiotic world, magic was 
invoked to explain the possibility of a non-sensory-based or non-environmental sign. This form 
of magical semiotics, however, was at odds with that ascribed to the so-called African Mind. 
The African Mind, with its belief in the inextricable unity of sign-signified, was captured in the 
environmental sensorium that engulfed it. The magical thought resulting thereof invoked signs 
so as to manipulate their material-environmental referents. In other words, magical thought 
owed to the thinker’s belief in the tight bond between environment and sign-systems. On the 
other hand, it was due to the cleavage sometimes appearing between environment and sign that 
Uexküll sought recourse in a concept of magic. Effectively then, magic was both that which 
bonded and that which separated the sign from the sensorium, the environmentee from the 
environment. 
Forester, however, resisted the possibility he had already broached regarding the environment’s 
possibly magical nature, explaining: 
that, for the establishment of the logical structure of the concept “environment”, there 
must be at least two elements observing the environment and they must be sufficiently 
alike in order to serve as mutual witnesses for any objective event…. Again, to put it 
differently, only knowledge that can be shared belongs to our environment. Thus, it turns 
out that the logical structure of the environment is that of a “triadic relationship”. 
Yet, the “two elements observing the environment” were not, in Forester’s estimation, two 
human beings. “Environment,” Forester continued, “can be called ‘together-knowledge’, which 
in English undoubtedly sounds awkward. However, in Latin there is a splendid expression for 
exactly this term, namely conscientia, from which, of course, our word ‘consciousness’ is 
derived.”  The triadic relationship that converts the environment into an objective, scientific 




between humans. The double witnessing of the environment that attests to its verifiable (i.e., 
non-magical) nature is essentially a dialogue or conversation within a single human. The idea 
of “conversation”—for example, Hutchins’ formulation of Western literature as “the great 
conversation”—was central to the claims of Humanism. According to Forester, the individual 
organism verified the objectivity of the environment through a conversation between multiple 
sensory perceptions: “In order that these senses may compare their various experiences, it is 
necessary that they translate these into the same language.” (The language was, of course, the 
binary code of the neural system’s on-or-off signals.)  There is a strange echo of the Bauhaus 
here: As I discuss in Chpater One, synesthesia provides the sensory-transcendent, natural 
language of the world, and yet synasethesia is completely sense-triggered, thus supposedly 
circumventing language as such. What Forester’s proposed inter-sensory form of 
communication allowed was paradoxical, as consciousness was thereby situated both internally 
and externally to the environment-environmentee bond. I argue that this ambiguous position of 
being both inside and outside the environment pertained to the burgeoning construction of the 
humanist, post-industrial subject. 
In the context of a conference that included a military intelligence expert, a virologist, a 
psychiatrist who invented “milieu therapy”, a cyberneticist, a racist theologian, and a 
propaganda designer (Bayer, who happened to have been a Nazi collaborator and later a U.S. 
war exhibition designer), it would not be unfounded to suggest that the conferees’ recurring 
motif of inner-/outer-environment touched closely upon questions of “environmental” 
(psychological) manipulation; and that, while all minds might be subject to environmental 




post-industrial subject—would safeguard people against the environment as such; would 
provide them with recourse to language-based debate (as Hutchins said), rather than leaving 
them in the aphasic thralls of quasi-semiotic languages, whether these took the form of 
symphonies, supernatural means of communication, or magical environmental projections. The 
environment as construed at the 1962 IDCA was the quasi-semiotic substrate of psychological-
material interaction, in which the balance between objective materiality and psychological 
projection could be tipped to either side of the scale, as needed. 
Yet, a political and cultural movement focused on physical—or material—ecology might also 
be said been inaugurated this same year with the publication in 1962 of Silent Spring. Rachel 
Carson opened the book with a description of a charming bucolic town “in the heart of 
America”, then proceeded to describe its condition of total blight some years later: swept by 
fires, devoid of wildlife, its children dying off from pollution. The town, Carson wrote, did not 
actually exist, but it easily could. While her vision was effectively compelling, the imaginary 
town was slightly misconstrued. Just a few years after 1962, city neighborhoods would indeed 
be set ablaze, first during the civil-rights riots of the mid-sixties, then following the increasing 
disinvestment in urban areas that had been already blighted by decades of redlining practices 
and massive infrastructure projects. These areas were certainly far more ravished by toxic 
pollutants and emissions than any quaint town of the sort Carson had depicted. The silence 
Carson described as prevailing in a world extinct of birds could have easily been described as 
the silence prevailing amid blocks of torched buildings. Without denying the great courage and 
value of Carson’s work, one can nonetheless question her pastoral-suburban bias, her blindness 




the environment itself, was something that the privileged could, by turns, step in and out of. 
Not so for the residents of the so-called “inner city” (which, tellingly, usually referred to the 
city outskirts: Bronx, Watts, Newark, Roxbury, etc...). Having dedicated Silent Spring to Albert 
Schweitzer, Carson quoted from him the passage: “Man has lost the capacity to foresee and to 
forestall. He will end by destroying the earth.”  One pictures Schweitzer decades earlier in the 
village of Lambaréné, musing about the great challenges and achievements of Western man, all 
the while overseeing the labors of his employees as they cleared the pre-industrial forest. 
Pre-Industrial / Post-Industrial Bridge: Aspen 1970 
“Environment,” says [Richard Buckminster Fuller], “is everything but me.” … I would say 
that a more workable way to think about this infinitely complex subject can be found if 
we turn the Fuller aphorism around…. [W]hy not describe it as the me in everything else? 
…I have often found it handy to consider environment anything that gets processed 
through those incomparable computers—the human mind, the heard, and the spirit…. As 
most of us flew or drove over the Front Range of the Rockies on our way here to Aspen, I 
think we transformed the natural world through our perception into environment.272 
William Houseman, Introductory Remarks to the International Design Conference at 
Aspen, 1970 
By 1970 when the IDCA conference “Environment by Design” took place, the environmental 
movement was well underway, and accordingly, the usage of “environment” had shifted more 
toward material ecology. However, I would argue that “the environment” as a psychological 
milieu was still implied, however subtly, within the new ecological connotation of the term. 
Since the last conference of 1962, various environmental programs related to design had begun 
to garner widespread recognition. Such was the case at the University of California at Berkeley, 
where in 1959, William Wurster, a former member of the group, Telesis, had administered the 
unification of the architecture, city planning, and landscape programs under the single umbrella 




Berkeley became known for its focus on environmental psychology. At the Graduate Center of 
the City University of New York, a program in Environmental Psychology was likewise 
founded in 1959, focused largely on the psychological effects of the physical environment at 
psychiatric hospitals. More recently, the architectural critic Reyner Banham, who, along with 
two professors from the CED, would also speak at the 1970 IDCA, had just been appointed 
head of the University College of London’s new Environmental Design School. 
As always, the intellectual interests and political orientations of the IDCA participants were 
rather heterogeneous, although, compared to past conferences, many of the speakers seemed to 
indicate a departure from conservative Cold-War politics, as well as an embrace of 
environmental activism. For all that, the nineteenth IDCA did not go precisely as planned. A 
group of protesters set up camp at the conference and launched their own counter-conference 
presentations and performances in a smaller satellite tent. Dissent was not limited to those non-
invited participants in the counter-camp. The “French Group”, led by Jean Baudrillard, had 
been invited to speak and concluded the week’s events with a brief but scathing denunciation of 
how the concept of the environment had been ideologically conjured and mobilized to mask 
social-economic conditions that were causing widespread civil unrest in France and the United 
States. 
The environment, invoked from the 1940’s onward to refer to a construct of co-operative global 
relations, was quickly revealing itself as conceptually contested territory even within the United 
States and Western Europe. Baudrillard was correct to point out how the environmentalist 
cause had generated a collective anxiety uniting political constituencies that were otherwise 




probably helped deflect civil unrest. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that the environment—
even as ideology—was not exactly a conspiratorial ruse invented by politicians and 
corporations to mask other social injustices. After all, its cipher-like structure also allowed it to 
be invoked against corporate and neo-colonial interests. Moreover, the problems broached at 
the IDCA, such as pollution, were certainly legitimate causes for concern, whether one 
categorized them as economic or environmental issues. The concept of the environment—far 
from being a mere ideological veil draped over the real and ongoing catastrophes of economic 
inequality, racism, and proxy wars—in fact helped configure and sustain those catastrophes. As 
a transcendental spatial and semiotic mechanism (rather than an ideological veil), “the 
environment” ascribed racial and economic difference to psycho-climatic causes, while, at the 
same time, couching various forms of neo-colonial governance as natural extensions of 
environmental stewardship. Environment and global governance had been imbricated from the 
beginnings of the post-War period. The environment was not ideology in the traditional 
Marxian sense; it was a flexible set of spatial and semiotic concepts that contributed toward the 
imagined binary of the pre- and post-industrial, whether in the form of the First and Third 
Worlds, the tribal and the detribalized, the illiterate and literate, the tropical and temperate, the 
agricultural and urban, or, finally, the ghetto and its affluent suburbs. 
Nonetheless, various tendencies differentiated the 1970 IDCA from its predecessors and, more 
particularly, from the 1962 IDCA on “The Environment”. To summarize briefly some of these 
differences: For one of the first times in IDCA history, no theologian-philosophers were invited 
to speak; the keynote speaker was an environmental journalist and activist; an African-




either a  woman or African-American in previous IDCA’s had involved a short poetry-reading 
by Gwendolyn Brooks); the theme of education, which had been so frequently invoked at past 
conferences, was even more pervasive but seemed to refer less to humanist, liberal-arts 
education than to the new field of environmental design; and, finally, the ghostly future vision 
of the post-industrial city was, for the first time, perhaps treated as an actual urban-architectural 
project. 
The conference chairman, William Houseman, though he did not present any of his own urban 
re-development work, was associated with the recently-coined neologism “post-industrial”. 
One of the participants he invited, Carl Koch, described his plan for redeveloping the 
warehouses of Boston’s Lewis Wharf into condominiums and leisure venues for the “creatively 
inclined”.273 A very early example of repurposing a defunct industrial site,—although not so 
early as Paepcke’s redevelopment of Aspen—Koch’s Wharf project posited the rightful 
subjects of post-industrialism as the creative-class: the humanists par excellence, whose 
urbanity and leisure tastes would render desirable the site’s immediate proximity to downtown 
Boston. Jutting into the expansive Boston Harbor, yet, directly adjacent to downtown, the 
wharf allowed its post-industrial residents the luxury of being at once both inside and outside of 
the city. 
The orientation of Houseman’s own work was, however, quite different than Koch’s. At the 
time of the conference, he was involved in organizing a community-design charrette for the 
development of the Harlem River Yards in the south Bronx, a long swath of land lying across 
the Bronx Kill creek from Harlem which had been cordoned-off from the rest of the Bronx by a 




Deegan Expressway, exacerbated the isolation of the Yards. Then, throughout the 1960’s and 
1970’s an epidemic of arsons, mostly the work of landlords for whom fire-insurance would 
provide better returns than the rents they were collecting from poor residents, swept across the 
South Bronx, leading to massive depopulation and social devastation. With the city of New 
York on the verge of bankruptcy throughout the 1970’s, city administrators began a campaign 
of redevelopment that involved different strategies of cultivating a tax-base, all of which are 
now well-known: attracting artists into downtown ethnic and industrial ghettoes by excusing 
them from the requirement to pay rent or property fees; transforming downtown business 
districts into centers for the investment of global finance; and, on the other end of things, 
seeking new industrial tenants for sites that, due to their locations, would be unable to attract 
other types of investors. 
The Harlem River Yards fell into this last category: Its waterfront situation at the conflux of 
massive infrastructures was a potential asset for factories, whereas its distance from downtown 
and proximity to violent urban blight made it unsuitable for other large-scaled, profit-
generating enterprises. Unlike those downtown areas targeted for gentrification, which had 
once included small-scale industrial manufacturies, the Harlem River Yards could be construed 
as pre-industrial insofar as the highways and railyards that segregated it from the surrounding 
city had left it unbuilt. The city’s Economic Development Commission had managed to attract 
the interest of an Italian real-estate developer who imagined that an industrial park at Harlem 
River Yards could draw tenants from Europe “escaping higher corporate taxes at home in favor 
of an acceptable cost of doing business in the South Bronx.”274 According to Houseman, “little 




community.”275  Consequently, the Wave Hill Center, an endowed estate located in a more 
suburban, affluent part of the Bronx, secured funding from the National Endowment of the Arts 
to investigate redevelopment strategies for the Yards, and recruited Houseman’s involvement 
with the project. 
Wave Hill Center assembled an appraisal committee of “experts”, including the director of the 
Environmental Psychology Program at the City University of New York, in addition to 
developers, planners, and architects. The experts seemed to view the site in terms similar to 
how the North-American frontier had been regarded in the nineteenth century, as the latter was 
progressively crisscrossed with railway and communications infrastructure. The Yards were 
treated simultaneously as a pre-industrial wilderness and a post-industrial wasteland, whose 
well-developed infrastructures nonetheless promised future, potential land-value. A 
representative from the British architecture firm, Llewelyn-Davies, declared that the Yards 
could “lie fallow for a period of time, until something major happens in the South Bronx.” 
Reminiscent of nineteenth-century efforts to transform valueless frontier into real estate, the 
architect suggested that, while the land remained fallow, a design charrette could in the 
meantime produce “the perception that something positive is going to happen—the creation of 
a plan, and making people believe that this plan is going to happen.”276  Presumably in 
recognition of the Yards’ indeterminate category as a pre- and post-industrial landscape, the 
Deputy Borough President of the Bronx proposed “bridging the Harlem River Yards… 
physically and psychologically,” suggesting the area might serve as a connector between the 




impressed upon the charrette teams that they should “consider the Harlem River Yards an 
environmental bridge to Randall’s Island.” 
For the sake of brevity, I will focus on just one of the design proposals for the Yards that was 
developed by a team of architects, planners, and representatives from the South Bronx 
community organization, and that best illustrates some of the contradictions of the pre-/post-
industrial bridge277. The two dominant features of the scheme were a “gymnasium bridge” and 
“checkerboard site plan”, intended, in combination with each other, “to signal hope and 
despair.” [Figs. 3.13, 3.14] Using the monumental formal simplicity and spare graphic 
language made popular by the postmodernist architect, Aldo Rossi, and also suggestive of 
Superstudio’s ironic, dystopian montages, the team proposed a gigantic pivoting building-
bridge they referred to as a “pay-roll gymnasium bridge”, thus named because its interior 
program would serve the double purpose of providing jobs to the underemployed residents of 
the South Bronx while also providing spaces for leisure and recreation. The second element 
was a vast checkerboard field in which other programmatic elements might be eventually 
distributed. Alternating with squares of newly planted grass, black squares were to be filled 
with ashes taken from the burnt-out buildings throughout the area. Given the vast scale of the 
pattern, the checkerboard would be “clearly visible from airplanes passing directly over the site 
as they come and go from the airport.”  Remnants of older infrastructures were to remain on the 
site, such as old boxcars from the railyard, which were to be “incorporated in a kind of railroad 
graveyard and recreation area.”  In one corner of the site, in the spirit of the pre-industrial/post-
industrial frontier land, hydroponic towers would grow “Manhattan tomatoes and exotic fruits 




The design proposal was notable for a certain heightened ambivalence, not simply between 
hope and despair, but also between legibility and muteness. The massively monolithic concrete 
bridge, sublime and cryptic in its function, loomed like a vast columbarium, and would seem to 
silence any resurgent activity on the site. Yet this silence was counterposed by the potent 
symbolism of the checkerboard whose legibility, however, was intended to speak to those who 
might fly above the “environmental bridge”: those who, unlike residents of the South Bronx, 
could come and go from the city as they pleased and observe along the way the ambiguous 
relationship between the post- and pre-industrial wilderness, between the devalued and 
revalued city. The environment could only be read from the stratosphere. For those who 
remained captured inside the environment, its strange, sublime forms might certainly 
communicate, but not with legibility. Rather, they communicated in a more haunting, 
melancholic, and supernatural fashion, one better suited to maintaining the imagined aphasia of 
the poor. 
The evocative images produced for the Harlem River Yards charrette (seemingly authored by 
Steven Holl) stand in contrast to another project, this one in Harlem, which the lawyer and 
community-organizer Cora Walker presented at the 1970 IDCA. The radical dissent that shook 
that conference has been retrospectively ascribed to the group of French theorists led by 
Baudrillard and to the young protesters outside the tent. However, while Walker’s denunciation 
of the IDCA’s environmental discourse was conveyed with less arrogance and hostility than 
Baudrillard’s diatribe, she nonetheless declared outright the incommensurability between 
Aspen and Harlem, perhaps thereby implying the inadequacy of “the environment” as a 




while those gathered at Aspen “live in another world…a dream world.” At an environmental 
conference funded by major aluminum and petroleum corporations (a fact that had never 
received any criticism from IDCA conferees), Walker pointed out that those sponsors were 
appropriating the nation’s resources while not “putting what they take out back into the ghetto 
communities”, and that, in light of such sponsorship, she was compelled to “question whether 
you are serious in this group as to your intention to make a contribution to change of the 
environment by design for all the citizens of this country.”279 Walker remarked that the kind of 
environmental movement suggested by the conferees would be unrecognizable to poor blacks, 
Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Indians, who, thanks to economic injustices, were still focused 
on the environment as it related to their day-to-day abilities to survive. An “environmental 
revolution”, she argued, must begin in the slums and then move outward from there. Walker’s 
proposed model of environmental movement indeed implied a different spatial configuration 
than that presented decades earlier at Airways to Peace: not a global sphere in and out of which 
the humanist subject could perceptually move, but rather a collection of distinct neighborhoods 
addressing their immediate (non-stratospheric) environments and, thereby, critically addressing 
whichever larger legal frameworks, institutions, and corporations with which that immediate 
environment was imbricated. 
Walker’s talk did not confine itself to negative critique, as she offered an alternative example of 
what an environmental movement might consist of, describing a project she’d helped organize 
in Harlem starting in 1967. Protesting against a proposed low-income high-rise project whose 
construction would exclude local labor, neighborhood residents organized their own housing 




oversaw the creation of a cooperative supermarket to redress Harlem residents’ lack of access 
to quality food. They also launched a housing development company which, by that time, had 
secured most of the funding to build hundreds of units, drawing largely on local labor skills. 
Walker’s community movements suggested a counter-example to the categories of pre- and 
post-industrial, terms that denoted strategies for capitalist intervention. The members of the 
Harlem housing council sought to intervene in what they understood not as a universal-
historical teleology of “pre-” and “post-” anything, but rather as a longstanding economic and 
political disenfranchisement of the “third world”, whether that world lay inside or outside the 
acknowledged boundaries of the First World. 
Later that day, when Eliot Noyes delivered a summary address of the conference’s events, he 
referred to various of the members’ contributions and to the dramatic commotion caused by the 
French Group’s presentation. No mention, however, was made of Walker’s talk, as if it had 
apparently provoked no real response in the audience, certainly nothing like the reaction to 
Baudriallard’s brief denunciation. Later, the conference papers were published with a preface 
consisting of Houseman’s pithy notes, which included brief quotations and summaries of the 
speakers’ most salient points. For Walker, however, Houseman chose a rather odd passage to 
cite, one that hardly conveyed her main arguments. Walker was quoted as saying: “I must agree 
that Aspen is a garden spot of the world. I was asked on my arrival here whether I had even 
been to Aspen before. I openly admit that I had never heard of it before [emphasis original].”280 
Although Houseman asserted that these few sentences “spoke volumes”, they seemed to speak, 
paradoxically, to an imagined mutual aphasia, indeed to the spectral phenomenon Schweitzer 




or between Harlem and Aspen, or “Africa” and “the world”—a breakdown in the transmission 
of messages between two purportedly distinct worlds. (Obviously, Harlem was not Africa, but 
this distinction would have meant little to many of this chapter’s protagonists.) If Harlem had 
never heard of Aspen, it was equally true that, until this nineteenth IDCA, Aspen hadn’t 
acknowledged the existence of African-America, despite Harlem’s long history of leadership in 
American intellectual and artistic culture. Even when Harlem spoke, its salient message was 
lost: Baudrillard went down in history as the radical dissenter of “Environment by Design”, 
while Houseman and present-day historians failed to take note that Walker had likewise offered 
a radically different interpretation of the environmental movement.281 Instead of summarizing 
Walker’s call to arms against the IDCA’s industrial-corporate sponsorship, Houseman chose 
instead to cite Walker’s own avowed communicative distance from the post-industrial “garden 
spot of the world”. 
If Walker’s message had fallen on deaf ears, for the majority of conferees “the environment” 
was, after all, something more abstract and stratospheric than the urban politics of inequality 
which rendered some lands liable to industrial degradation, while transforming other lands into 
arcadian preserves for a post-industrial elite. In this sense, Schweitzer’s proclamation of 
semiotic impasse between First and Third worlds had been realized, owing in part to the 
indeterminacy of this word, “environment”, which could refer equally to a global sphere of 
material and communicative exchange and to the more immediate physical circumstances in 
which citizens had to eke out their survival. Yet, the conferees, for all their interest in the scale 
of globality, were mostly architects, design educators, and city planners, whose daily work 




stratosphere would suggest. In this disjuncture between the scale of the globe and the scale of 
the immediate urban milieu, there existed, however, an “environmental bridge”: the psyche 
itself which, depending on its education and social-formation, might either remain enthralled in 
its immediate environment or else transcend to the level of the environment: the place from 
which one manipulated the quasi-semiotic technologies of a global sphere. 
Aspen 1970, Continued: “Environmental Operators” 
At the 1970 IDCA, an unprecedented number of talks focused on design education. Banham, 
having recently been appointed Director of the new undergraduate program of Environmental 
Design at the University College of London (UCL), delivered a charismatic talk, entitled “The 
Education of the Environmentalist”, which described how his school had departed radically 
from its eponymous predecessor, the College of Environmental Design at U.C. Berkeley (the 
latter derided by Banham as the “Great Berkeley Disaster”). Rather than simply reassembling 
the traditional design disciplines under the conceptual umbrella of “environmental” and 
assuming that they must thereby be environmentally-oriented (although this was hardly an 
adequate description of Berkeley’s program), the UCL, Banham boasted, did not offer a basic 
design curriculum, but rather a “degree in environmental studies, a general degree with no 
necessary linkage to any professional destination that a student might have in mind.”  The 
environmental design degree, according to Banham, should confer neither professional training, 
nor expertise in a particular craft (in an echo of Itten’s Primary Course). “If,” Banham 
proposed, “to quote Bucky again, everything is environment which is not me, then 
environmental education is the study of the whole damn universe.”  Far from training students 




revision of liberal arts curricula, preserving all the latter’s claims to universalism, albeit now 
with a stronger emphasis on crafting the world’s techno-politics. What the school would 
produce, claimed Banham, although he couldn’t be sure of precisely what this new occupation 
would entail, were “environmental operators”. 282 
Banham was generally vague concerning what the education of an environmental operator 
might consist of, although he mentioned that the broad options available to design students 
within the larger university might lead them to pursue courses as disparate as “Futures and 
Forecasting”, symbolic logic, and urban geography. Nonetheless, students were to become 
neither “environmental know-alls”, nor simple problem-solvers. To operate then presumably 
constituted a mediating activity between knowing and rote doing. To illustrate the difference 
between environmental operators and crude problem-solvers, Banham described the studio 
assignment given to first-year students to design a “portable photographic dark room that could 
be built and used by eight-year-old school children during their field trips”. When students and 
critics from the neighboring Architectural Association showed up to survey the results of the 
studio, a number of them snidely demanded whether UCL students had ever heard of the 
Polaroid. The question exemplified for Banham the mentality of mere problem-solving in 
contrast to the complexity and creativity demanded by the darkroom project. Indeed, what 
Banham was getting at lay close to the old Bauhaus pedagogical exercise of designing “useless 
machines”, which I described in Chapter One. The point of the studio was not to produce a 
device with any use-value (given that, yes, there exited Polaroids), but rather to inculcate 
students with the habits of technological thinking, so that mind and technics structurally 




engaged not questions of material ecology (much less those of ecological justice), but rather 
technologies of perception, representation, and reproduction. Moreover, it did so while 
addressing specifically those little savage minds for whom the construction drawings had to 
outline a set of discrete operations which assumed no architectural knowledge or skill beyond 
that possessed by a normal eight-year-old child. In some ways, the education of 
environmentalists was the education of education itself, and it is not accidental that the only 
UCL faculty Banham mentioned by name was Jane Abercrombie, a psychologist and zoologist 
to whose research on education, he claimed, the Environmental Design Program was deeply 
indebted. Taking this point a step further in a talk entitled “Energy of Communication: Tools of 
the Design Process”, the architect Paul Friedberg, who had recently designed a nursery school, 
claimed that the conference might have better addressed its environmental concerns had it 
actually been themed on education instead. 
However, the conferee who most insistently stressed the connection between the changing 
nature of education and the changing nature of the environment was Walter Orr Roberts who 
was not a design educator but rather an atmospheric physicist. Roberts’ talk began by 
predicting the imminent development of technologies for suppressing hail and deterring 
hurricanes from reaching land. He pointed, furthermore, to accidental “weather modification 
experiments” that might already be underway, and used the example of airplanes’ production of 
contrails, which turned into tropospheric clouds with the potential to affect weather patterns. 
But then Roberts seemed to disavow the significance of weather-changing technologies, 
claiming that in the future “[a]tmospheric systems are probably going to give us a general 




for cities in which the quality of life would be so improved as to reverse the ongoing exodus to 
the suburbs. In addition, there would be great improvements to waste recycling and general 
perfection of resource management. But what would, above all else, “characterize life in the 
revolutionary times of the year 2000” would be the computer. And the “educational uses of the 
computer”, Roberts mused, “are going to be the greatest part of this revolution of all.”283 
Roberts described education as being already the United States’ “biggest and probably most 
important business.”  By the year 2000, however: 
with the vast leisure that can be available, the largest number of hours of a student will 
be spent in a computer-based multi-media carrel talking with the computer… The use of 
the computer, moreover, will be highly individual… The wider use of computer is going 
to make it possible for our teachers to cease being machines and [instead to] be humans 
in interaction with people. 
Whereas nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century machine fantasies had promised the liberation 
of people from rote physical labor, the dream of the post-industrial age was, apparently, for 
machines to liberate people from various forms of intellectual labor as well; or, perhaps to re-
direct intellectual labor toward more financially profitable forms of work than that of education 
or (as we will see in the next chapter) of architecture. After all, the use-oriented nature of these 
professions rendered them mere “servile arts”. If, as Hutchinson had argued, machine-
production had enabled the possibility of universal liberal-arts education, on the other hand, the 
machine was now being said to usher in a new model of education, one in which the student, 
instead of interacting with a teacher, would be absorbed in a sphere of “multi-media.” The 
question was only whether one would remain inside the multi-media carrel—the “darkroom” of 
the twenty-first century—or if one would attain to the status of environmental operator and help 




If I have chosen to conclude with this somewhat abrupt move from environment to computers, 
it is because the environment had long been conceived in conjunction with computational 
developments, whether at the scale of global systems management as exemplified by R. 
Buckminster Fuller’s World Game, or at the scale of electronic media-environments, as most 
clearly articulated by McLuhan. The environment was precisely the construct that permitted 
new computational technologies to elide the disparate scales of the individual’s perceptual 
milieu and the global sphere. This elision would take on a new idiomatic charge in the decades 
to come with the idea of global interconnectivity via electronic media. In the following and 
final chapter, “Media Arts”, I look at the beginnings of the MIT Media Lab in the 1970’s and 
early 1980’s, when its researchers’ goal of developing creative, thinking machines to assist in 
Third-World development shifted gradually towards questions of the kinds of interfaces and 
operations through which human minds and machine minds might best engage with and 
improve each other. In this endeavor, a new “savage mind”—the child—became a key player in 
many of the Media Lab’s experiments with machine and human intelligence. The questions that 
remained consistent, however,  from the industrial arts (where we began) to the media arts had 
to do with the strange contradictions between a presumed magical, raw, and originary 
intelligence (whether the “Savage Mind”, the “African mind” or the mind of the child)and the 
technical expertise capable of instrumentalizing the apparent operations of that originary 
intelligence. In the decades to come, the First World/Third World split that had been both 
effected by and elided by the meta-cipher of the environment continued to assume a central 










The day when every society will have appropriated the personal computer and be 
connected via data-bank networks will be the end of imperalisms and neo-
colonialsims. On all continents. 
[Le jour où chaque population se sera approprié l’ordinateur individuel et sera 
branchée sur les réseaux et les banques de données, ce sera la fin des impérialismes 
et des néo-colonialismes. Sur tous les continents].284 
—Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, director of Centre Mondial Informatique 
 
You gentlemen [from the Centre Mondial Informatique] believe that computers are going 
to help the Third World and that computers are in fact going to move education in the 
Third World.  But have you thought about the difference between primitive man and 
illiterate people? 
—Ahmed Yamani, president of OPEC, as paraphrased by Nicholas Negroponte, 






Education, “the oil of the future” 
In 1982, Nicholas Negroponte, the founding director of the new Media Laboratory at MIT, 
stood before the audience assembled at the thirty-first International Design Conference at 
Aspen to deliver a lecture on “Micro-Electronics and Human Development”. He began with a 
bold pronouncement: 
Education, in the broadest sense is clearly, if you will, the oil of the future. And in fact, the 
entire future of mankind clearly rests on education, and by that I don’t just mean the 
education we know in schools, but the education that is appropriated personally, mostly 
through computation. My first encounter with this group interested in personal 
computation and education was in November at the OPEC meeting… to set the price of 
oil.285 
Negroponte’s formulation of education as the new petroleum followed the previous decade’s 
shifts in international power brought to light by the 1973 oil embargo. The United States’ 
dependency on petroleum imports had led to escalating tension with OPEC members, the recent 
revolution in Iran only further revealing the fragility of U.S.-British efforts to maintain 
political-economic sovereignty over oil-rich nations. However, despite its increasing 
dependency on petroleum imports, the United States held a clear international advantage in the 
domain of digital technologies, whether for purposes of weaponry, espionage, or commercial 
and manufacturing processes. To focus on this sector of production was therefore an obvious 
strategy for maintaining some form of dominance in international economic relations. 
Negroponte’s particular innovation was to regard education as the most lucrative area for 
technological exports. 
Negroponte, along with his MIT colleague Seymour Papert, had recently taken a leave of 
absence from their newly conceived Media Laboratory in order to work with the French 




Humaine (CMI) in Paris, an institution that sought to develop computer production and 
consumption within France, in tandem with spreading computer literacy (as well as French-
language literacy) throughout the global south. Servan-Schreiber had just published The World 
Challenge (Défi mondial), which traced a history of global economic shifts from the Second 
World War up through Japan’s recent transformation into a developer and exporter of digital 
technologies.286 The World Challenge took the United States and Europe to task for their 
repeated contempt of Third-World leaders’ demands for economic justice. In contrast, Servan-
Schreiber praised the OPEC nations, particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, for their expressed 
commitment to employ national wealth towards eradicating the human-developmental divide 
between First and Third Worlds. Servan-Schreiber also reminded his readers of a historic 
precedence, explaining that the Marshall Plan had not been conceived altruistically by the 
United States but rather as a way to ensure future markets for its own products. The Third 
World, Servan-Schreiber added, represented three-billion people with a potential purchasing 
power that might far exceed that of Europe in decades to come. To educate these masses in 
basic computer skills should thus form a priority of human-development initiatives. A corollary 
initiative would be to make France competitive with U.S. and Japanese high-tech industries. 
Servan-Schreiber recruited Negroponte and Papert from MIT, in addition to Raj Reddy from 
Carnegie Mellon, to help lead the CMI’s efforts to deploy micro-computer technologies in the 
Third World. The underlying “challenge” referred to in his book’s title —to transform Third-
World subjects into dependent consumers of French high-tech manufactures—appears not to 




Negroponte, however, interpreted Servan-Schreiber’s vision of a post-industrial knowledge 
economy for the West through the familiar idiom of an industrial fossil-fuel economy. That is 
to say that the exportation and consumption of education, as had been the case with oil, would 
be foundational or structural to all other economic development; but, unlike oil, education 
might prove a far more secure national resource than an exhaustible raw material like 
petroleum. That being said, education obviously did not constitute an extant natural resource 
simply awaiting extraction. In order for it to be considered an exportable material, several 
conditions would first have to be produced and maintained. Just as a natural disequilibrium 
between petroleum-poor and petroleum-rich nations had been a necessary condition for the 
international trade in oil, the establishment of a similarly natural imbalance in educational 
resources would be prerequisite to marketing education as a major world-export. Negroponte 
and Servan-Schreiber never mentioned the contradiction embedded in their economic proposal: 
For educational exports to sustain the kind of longevity worthy of major upfront investment, 
global inequalities in education would need to be perpetuated even while the purport of 
educational exports was to redress those same inequalities. As Servan-Schreiber had already 
intimated, his model was the Marshall Plan. What was implicit in the comparisons between 
education and the mid-century petroleum economy (petroleum also having been key to the 
Marshall Plan) was that the so-called post-industrial world would continue to perpetuate the 
trade and monetary imbalances inherent to the colonial world.287 
To avoid the same economic downfall that the U.S. had experienced in becoming a net 
importer of petroleum—to ensure, that is, that education remain a stable, long-term export—




educations, would be unable to educate others, at least not without perpetual importations of 
new U.S. technologies. (This logic was perhaps not so dissimilar from Monsanto’s 
contemporaneous development of terminal seeds.) Yet this implicit desire for a persistent 
developmental/educational lag between education importer- and exporter-nations ran counter to 
the intentions of Negroponte’s close colleague, Papert, as well as running afield of the 
teachings of Negroponte’s former mentor, Kevin Lynch. Papert’s and Lynch’s interests in 
education were linked to their mutual censure of the racial- and economic-segregation which 
characterized the U.S. school system, to say nothing of Papert’s experiences growing up in 
apartheid South Africa. Papert often insisted that the use of personal computers in the 
classroom could help overcome not only inequalities in access to education but also what he 
perceived as the stultifying authoritarianism inherent to classroom structure. By instituting 
personal computers in classrooms, learning could be tailored to the specific needs of individual 
students and would be oriented less toward memorizing facts and more towards playful 
processes of self-guided exploration. In order to direct computer-use towards the amelioration 
of entrenched economic inequalities, Papert argued, it would be necessary to ensure that 
personal computers not become mere supplements to conventional means of rote learning; 
instead, all children must learn to program. Programming in this case was understood as a form 
of autonomous creativity, leading school children toward independent thinking and thus to 
presumably independent means of production. It is this assumption that I wish to interrogate by 
framing a history of the early MIT Media Lab against the background of various endeavors on 
the part of the global south to gain economic-political sovereignty through access to the new 




Whereas Papert’s intention was to render the basic techniques of intellectual productivity 
accessible to all people, cutting across economic and racial distinctions, Negroponte’s 
comparison of educational technologies to petroleum exports implied that the expertise tied to 
wealth production should remain within the hands of an elite, thereby supporting the 
asymmetries of a global (and domestic) division of labor. Under the paradigm of petroleum, 
this asymmetry amounted to a tri-partite division between nations which lacked natural 
petroleum reserves, nations which possessed reserves but lacked the technological expertise 
required for extraction and processing, and nations like the U.S. and Great Britain which 
possessed both the requisite technological expertise and the military-economic influence to 
impose control over other nations’ oil reserves. Since there existed no natural reserves of 
computer technology comparable to oil reserves (excepting some rare metal deposits whose 
scarcity was not yet on the horizon) a somewhat different tri-partite division of labor began to 
emerge in the 1970’s in respect to digital technologies: There were nations that possessed the 
technological expertise for manufacturing micro-computers, namely the U.S. and Japan (with a 
few European nations trailing behind); there were nations that did not possess manufacturing 
expertise but boasted sufficient economic resources to purchase micro-computers and 
implement computer literacy among the general populace; and finally, there were those nations 
that lacked both the technological expertise and the economic means to purchase micro-
computers on a scale sufficient for implementing general computer literacy.288  The 
international division of labor was thereby beginning to alter its character, such that what had 
recently emerged as a key leveraging tool in negotiations between the global north and south—
OPEC’s control of the most crucial of raw commodities—was already threatened by its 




intellectual wealth would come to the fore in the international contestations throughout the 
1970’s and 1980’s over the terms of technology transfer. 
The following chapter explores how this new division of labor correlated with emerging 
epistemological- and class-based categories of subjectivity. Papert’s identification of computer 
illiteracy as a crucial obstacle to global class equality failed to take into account the more 
foundational problem of international imbalances in computer manufacturing capabilities, an 
imbalance which entailed not only economic but also military ramifications related to the 
uneven distribution of technologies of espionage and advanced weaponry.289 Moreover, the 
need for cross-compatibility and standardization in the computer industry portended the 
likelihood of corporate monopolization of micro-computer technologies, regardless of whether 
or not students learned to program computers themselves as Papert desired.  Papert’s focus on 
children’s unique intellectual adaptability as a key to understanding issues of computer-human 
communication drew implicit—and often explicit—connections between Savage thought and 
machine thought. Yet, more than in the histories examined in previous chapters, this present 
chapter shows how the figure of the Savage Mind—in this case, embodied by the child—came 
to function as both the idealized muse and the idealized user of new technologies of production, 
as seen in the MIT Media Lab’s pervasive research on child-computer interactions. While the 
child-savage’s presumed intellectual kinship to the personal computer seemed to demonstrate 
the feasibility of universal computer access (and, therefore, of the universal attainability of 
intellectual forms of labor), the homology between children, savages, and computers helped 
mask the ways in which computer technologies were instrumental in advancing forms of 




characterized by its state of dependency, the Media Lab’s and the CMI’s focus on children as 
assimilators of computer technology could be seen to preserve relations of international 
dependency . Ultimately, the equivocal status of the child-savage vis-à-vis international 
economic inequities allowed it to serve the role of cipher, lending itself to Papert’s and 
Negroponte’s respective and conflicting economic agendas—on the one hand, for total equality 
of access to computer education and, on the other hand, for computer education to become “the 
oil of the future”. Just as the contradictory figure of the child-savage proved viable despite (or 
because of) its contradictions, so likewise, Papert’s and Negroponte’s aims were mutually 
cooperative. 
Papert’s and Negroponte’s highly successful collaboration over the decades to follow was 
symptomatic of a long extant dialectic characterizing the development of new media 
technologies such as the printing press. On the one hand, new communication and publishing 
technologies have been heralded as tools to be wielded by a single individual towards creative 
production, thereby undermining more hegemonic forms of production and expression. On the 
other hand, those same technologies have been seen, time and again, help coalesce processes of 
production into increasingly centralized forms, owing to the ways that media multiply the 
channels of output relative to channels of creative input.290 To be certain, there are economic 
causes which favor the increasing monopolization of those tools of productivity. However, 
rather than positing a purely economic explanan, I argue here that the vexed entanglement 
between, on the one hand, the individual’s empowerment through personal computing 
technologies and, on the other hand, the monopolization of such technologies by a handful of 




set of international codes governing technology transfer between the global north and south. 
Essentially, the semiotic distinctions inhering to the relationship between machine-producers 
and machine-consumers resembled the master-slave relationships that had been operative in 
industrializing and colonizing nations. These relationships had long ago been characterized by 
European philosophers as either deriving or derived from two respective epistemic modes 
involved in processes of production: namely, being conscious or unconscious of the underlying 
logics of those processes.291 As described in the preceding chapter, by the late twentieth 
century, techniques of production increasingly relied on semiotic technologies which had 
emerged out of the invention of two distinct categories of semiotic thought—
magical/unconscious thought versus structuralist/conscious thought—categories ascribed 
respectively to savage and bourgeois minds. Whatever the political intentions of Media Lab’s 
founders, their research methods implicitly subscribed to this binary, often by mobilizing the 
figure of the child. 
The dialectic at play in the founding of the Media Lab—in this particular case, we could say 
between technology as “petroleum” and technology as a free resource—has, in various guises, 
formed a persistent motif throughout the histories described in this dissertation, insofar as 
intellectual ownership of means of production has been repeatedly redistributed and then 
reconsolidated following the development of new creative technologies. For example, at the 
PIASP and the Bauhaus the technologically-reproducible artwork was perceived as driving a 
wedge between the artist’s conscious ownership of methods of design and the rotely 
unconscious techniques (on the part of both machine and worker) of technological 




techniques of consciousness more machine-like, in effect trying to elide the difference between 
conscious versus unconscious or human versus technological methods of artistic production. In 
contrast to that earlier chapter on industrial-arts pedagogy, this current chapter deals with 
technologies of production whose increasing complexity challenge the feasibility of any 
designer’s full consciousness over their operative methods, so that new degrees of intellectual 
ownership emerge, often blurring the lines between menial and intellectual labor, or, between 
the work of programming and the work of creative, independent production. 
The development of the computer interface in particular was related to conceptions of 
consciousness and labor similar to those elaborated in previous chapters, and to the putative 
semiotic modes which had been ascribed to those forms of consciousness. Essentially, the 
computer interface mediated between two distinct forms of consciousness and language: that of 
the programmer qua operating system and that of the user. In the decades examined here, the 
increasing sophistication and elegance of computer interfaces touches on an aporia lying at the 
heart of modernity’s enduring techno-pentecostal search; its search, that is, for a lingua franca 
that might eliminate the arbitrariness between signifier and signified in order to communicate 
around language. “Graphic user interfaces”, by dint of the various ways they have come to 
mediate the mutual unintelligibilites between user and hardware, have effectively enabled the 
“Babel” of the actual computer operating system (babelian because of its inarticulateness to 
most computer users) to persist innocuously beneath the imagistic Esperanto of the interface. In 
other words, Babel and its antithesis—to keep the theological idiom consistent, I will call this 
antithesis not “Esperanto” but rather the “pentecostal”—were collaboratively entwined in 




between two antithetical figures was not unrelated to the collaboration between the two 
contradictory economic paradigms which formed the models for research agenda at the Media 
Lab, namely that of communalizing the digital instruments of production and, on the other 
hand, treating them as a resource similar to petroleum. Here, it would do well to bear in mind 
how the theological concept of the pentecostal described a magical intelligence (i.e., a “holy 
ghost”) which mediated between the topoi of Babel and what we could anachronistically refer 
to as Esperanto. According to the Christian scriptures’ account of the Pentecostal event, the 
universal intelligibility which transcended the attendant confusion of tongues was effected 
through the mystical mediation of holy spirit, which somehow converted disparate languages 
into common understanding. The arbitrariness between sign and signified was thus overcome—
even as it persisted—by virtue of the magical sublimation of signs into the pure substrate of 
thought (or of spirit, ghost, or—to collapse these concepts—Geist). I introduce this theological 
trope not simply to underscore the magical roots of the technologies that were finally made 
“real” in the twentieth century, but because, in both the theological and the recent historical 
moments the pentecostal miracle served as a proselytizing device, one that could reach across 
global and class divisions thanks to new semiotic means. 
In the twentieth century, the graphic-user interface performed the role of an epistemic deus-ex-
machina, enabling the global adaptability of technologies even while their underlying codes 
and technics remained the exclusive purview of a handful of multi-national corporations and 
research institutions. But this state of affairs hardly arose without contestation. On the contrary, 
microcomputer technology formed the focus of a series of embattled negotiations between the 




platforms, most crucially the Intergovernmental Bureau of Informatics (IBI), the global south 
struggled to obtain intellectual access to Japanese and U.S. technological expertise. The IBI’s 
campaign was vexed, however, by certain contradictions between the economic-political 
sovereignty its constituent nations sought and, on the other hand, the technological and 
financial transfers many of the nations demanded from the global north in order to break free of 
economic dependency. (In contrast to this approach, some nations called simply—and more 
radically—for the abolition of intellectual property altogether.) A national sovereignty that 
would rely on the transfer of expertise—indeed a kind of epistemic importation—from the 
global north was precisely the contradiction that institutions like Servan-Schreiber’s Centre 
Mondial Informatique and Negroponte’s Media Lab could exploit. Contemporaneously with 
the south’s struggle for global technological parity, the CMI and the Media Lab interjected two 
politically ambiguous constructs which would prove key to the success of their pentecostal 
projects: Firstly, both institutions drew on the figure of the child, whose innate savagery 
transcended geographic, racial, and gender distinctions and whose dependency was merely the 
dependency accorded to all children (as distinct from the forms of dependency imposed upon 
the global south). Secondly, the Media Lab’s founders honed in on the concept introduced by 
the Reagan administration of “flexible technologies”, which were as primitive, generative, and 
structurally essential as the intellectual operations of the child itself. Before, however, we turn 
to those persistent constructs of the primitive, it is useful to expound briefly on the Media Lab’s 





The Architecture Machine and the Jungle-as-City 
The pyramids of Egypt would be rebuilt without slaves. The Tower of Babel would finally be 
built unhindered by the confusion of tongues… or so suggested Charles Godfrey Leland in his 
fin-de-siècle prophesy of an architecture machine that was to be invented in the twentieth 
century. This machine, as recounted in Chapter One, would permit everyone to be an architect, 
while relegating no one to the hard work of construction. “As the method once acquired was 
inexpensive and easy,” wrote Leland, “the poorest people, and even boys erected at will houses 
or huts as they pleased for all kinds of purposes…”.292 That the “poorest people” and “even 
boys” should wield these machines lent a misleading nuance to Leland’s prophesy; for, as his 
earlier pedagogical theories made clear, it was precisely children (and especially poor children) 
who could best adapt themselves to new technologies of design and production. This was the 
lesson he had gained from his ethnological studies of “savages” and “gypsies” before having 
translated this lesson into the educational system of the Public Industrial Arts School of 
Philadelphia. It was not, therefore, even children who would wield the architecture machine; 
rather, the instantaneous transposition of inchoate creative impulses into refined material 
accretions would be effected precisely by dint of a secret intellectual kinship between the mind 
of the child and the workings of the machine. 
Negroponte started the Architecture Machine Group around 1969 when he was hired as faculty 
in MIT’s Architecture Department after having completed his undergraduate and graduate 
studies there. The stated purpose of the Architecture Machine Group was to develop a 
computer that could rescue slum residents from monolithic, top-down planning solutions, 




where Negroponte’s actual political sympathies may have lain, he was surely aware of where 
funding opportunities lay. In courting support from the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, 
Negroponte’s senior colleagues at MIT’s School of Architecture and Planning, and especially 
those involved with the Joint Center for Urban Studies, had learned that funding was most 
readily granted to projects that distinguished themselves according to their technological 
innovation and/or their efforts to combat communist sympathies.293 Perhaps not surprisingly 
then, Negroponte’s first book published on the Architecture Machine Group’s research, The 
Architecture Machine: Towards a More Human Environment (1970), refurbishes one of the 
key formulations of the early Cold War decades, namely the invocation of “the human” as the 
implicit subject of capitalist freedom and as distinct from the statistical units of population 
allegedly governed by communist regimes. If capitalist societies had hitherto failed to 
accommodate human needs—as exemplified by the bleak, undifferentiated forms of urbanism 
decried decades earlier by Team Ten—this glitch was correctable within the framework of 
capitalism which was often defined as a self-correcting system (to be contrasted with both the 
rigidity of Soviet planning and the economic and cultural sluggishness of the global south). It 
should be noted that this model of self-correcting logic had precedents in Lévi-Strauss’s and 
Yona Friedman’s respective conceptions of the Savage Mind and the slum-inhabitant as natural 
bricoleurs. That is to say, if capitalism’s wont was to naturally correct its own crises by 
perpetually tinkering with its techniques of wealth production, the bricoleur’s intellectual 
prerogative was likewise to perpetually invent and recalibrate, albeit with more rustic means. 
However, the Architecture Machine’s researchers were very interested in primitive means, 
given that, first of all, the Machine had to be conceived by analytically reducing the human 




“more human environments” that the Machine was intended to produce would be deemed such 
to the extent that they resembled their more primitive urban antecedents. 
Negroponte’s efforts at the Architecture Machine Group to produce a machine that could 
replace human architects would eventually lead him to discover, through Papert’s work, how 
children could aid his efforts to develop creatively intelligent machines. His Architecture 
Machine Group was distinct from many research endeavors in artificial intelligence in that it 
defined intelligence not only as the ability to learn from mistakes but, moreover, as a capacity 
for creative, heuristic, and gestaltic processes.294 As an undergraduate student in MIT’s 
Architecture Department in the late 1960’s, Negroponte had been an admirer of Friedman, who, 
as described in Chapter Two, had insisted on the special innate creativity and resourcefulness 
of the global south’s indigent and also of children. The indigent’s purportedly instinctive 
tendencies for bricolage could, according to Friedman, minimize what housing agencies and 
architects were expected to deliver to the poor, since these latter would always possess greater 
imaginative thrift than their bourgeois counterparts. The poor needed only be provided with 
structural frameworks and guidelines within which to exercise their own imaginative instincts 
for bricolage. This line of thinking led Friedman towards systems-thinking as a potential 
platform for integrating the Savage Mind’s creativity with technological processes of 
international bureaucratic architectural production. He would eventually collaborate with the 
Architecture Machine Group in developing the software, Flatwriter, a platform allowing people 
to design their own habitation.295 
Taking his cue from Friedman’s ideas, Negroponte’s design thesis, Systems of Urban Growth, 




twentieth and early twenty-first century, in response to which he proposed a megastructural 
housing skeleton of the sort Friedman had recently made famous296. Two years later, 
Negroponte’s master’s thesis, also undertaken at MIT, took up some of Lynch’s interests in 
vision and motion, exploring the technological possibilities of an environment-scanning 
machine.297 Both of these design theses initiated avenues of research that Negroponte would 
develop further in the decade to follow, related to machine perception and systematic solutions 
for housing the poor. However, the work he would undertake at the Architecture Machine 
Group needs to be further contextualized vis-à-vis larger planning projects being undertaken 
then by MIT faculty, many of which were engaged in combatting the spread of communism 
through non-violent means, particularly in Latin America. 
In the previous chapter, ethnopsychiatric theories held the jungle’s richly auditory sensorium 
responsible for a particular epistemic modality, according to which Africans’ supposed 
illiteracy and inability to recognize the arbitrary relation between sign and signified led to their 
pervasive enchantment with magical forms of communication. Proponents of such theories 
suggested that colonial obedience could be obtained by taking advantage of Africans’ 
enthrallment to immersive forms of communication. In this current chapter, something akin to 
the jungle also plays an epistemic role, albeit amidst different political circumstances and 
different technological means. For the protagonists of this chapter Africa and Latin America 
were seen as ideal loci for developing new technologies of mediation between human and 
machine intelligence, often related to neo-colonial agenda. Servan-Schreiber viewed France’s 
former African colonies as future markets for computers, markets that could be captured by 




imported from France would help a new generation of Africans to acquire French competency 
in the absence of a colonial presence. Negroponte, on the other hand, implied that computer 
technologies could serve as non-violent weapons in preventing the spread of Communism, 
particularly in Latin America. His “systems for urban growth” could be interpreted as 
implements for converting a rural indigent into land-renting wage-workers, as was suggested in 
his undergraduate thesis project and in his later description of the Architecture Machine 
Group’s research. “Implicit in technological revolutions,” wrote Negroponte in his prefatory 
remarks to Systems of Urban Growth, “is the necessity of a social revolution, the creation of a 
society which can assimilate a world controlled by remarkably advanced inventions.”298  It was 
through his work with Servan-Schreiber and Papert, however, that what had begun as a fairly 
mundane and paternalistic aim to inculcate the global south’s peasantry with modern habits of 
life eventually evolved into a somewhat more eccentric view, as Negroponte came to regard the 
rural population as more easily assimilable to computer technologies than their cosmopolitan 
counterparts.299  His observations, made several years prior to the 1976 advent of the Grameen 
Bank, anticipated what would soon become a much more widespread economic interest in the 
creative, entrepreneurial potentials of the world’s expanding urban slums. 
Not surprisingly, as colonial governance gave way to the international economic relations of 
the 1970’s and early 1980’s, we witness a prior interest in procuring obedience or productivity 
give way to a more complicated set of expectations and negotiations between the global north 
and south. The combined factors of post-colonial independence and Cold-War propaganda 
made it incumbent on NATO nations to couch their economic—and sometimes military—




in Latin American industrialization served the double interest of granting the United States 
access to Latin American labor and raw materials while providing the Latin American 
peasantry an apparent path to urban upward mobility. The jungle, which had been characterized 
in the preceding chapter by John Carothers, Albert Schweitzer, and Marshal McLuhan as 
producing an African or “tribal” subjectivity that could be manipulated through technological 
imitation of the jungle’s semiotic means (i.e., magically immersive and non-literate means), 
was in the 1970’s displaced to another locus and another logic, one still largely tropical if no 
longer strictly rural. The new characterization of the tropics followed the widespread 
migrations of the latter’s rural inhabitants to the urban outskirts where this climatological 
environment was tacitly conceptualized by developmental experts as an urban jungle requiring 
a new technological semiosis. Whereas the actual arboreal jungle had figured in colonial 
accounts as leading to the inevitable intellectual dependency of colonized on colonizer, this 
new tacit figuration of the urban-slum-as-jungle would highlight the agency of the global 
south’s indigents, while nonetheless circumscribing that same agency within frameworks of 
technological mediation. That is to say, if the jungle, as described in the preceding chapter, had 
previously provided African colonial powers with an ideal model for non-violent, 
communicative forms of subjugation, its new urban form was seen to lend itself to participatory 
technologies with which rural people could transform themselves into quasi-modern subjects. It 
was thus not given to the slum inhabitant to speak so much as to interact with electronic 
systems. 
Pentecostal technologies, intended to dispense with written language in favor of more 




the non-literate urban indigent whose entry into modernity could bypass education without, 
however, sacrificing education’s assimilative effects. Among the many aims of the Architecture 
Machine project, as described at length by Negroponte in two successive books, no intention 
was ever expressed to educate the Machine’s intended users about architecture’s social 
ramifications, its histories, or its constructive processes. Rather, the assumption seemed to be 
that the organic instincts of the urban indigent—still intact as instincts due to the slum 
inhabitants’ incomplete urbanization—could be translated by the Machine directly into urban 
forms. In other words, the pure, elemental savagery of the peasant intellect could remain intact 
as such despite that intellect’s sublimation (via the Machine) into modernist architecture. What 
Ijlal Muzaffar has described as the intentionally partial modernization of Third-World urban 
inhabitants in the decades following World War II, can be seen to take a slightly different turn 
in the subsequent digital age.300 Now, the slum inhabitant is poised at the forefront of 
technological use and consumption while being simultaneously relegated to conventionally rote 
forms of labor and archaic forms of subsistence. That is to say, the slum inhabitant is 
simultaneously behind and ahead of his or her metropolitan counterparts. With one foot thrust 
into the digital age and the other foot planted firmly in the mythic “jungle”, the slum inhabitant 
was to straddle over the historic-evolutionary stage occupied by literacy, formal education, and 
the critical forms of consciousness allegedly resulting therefrom. As such, a gesture of 
democratic consent could be performed by slum inhabitants through their participation in 
technological processes of urban planning without perturbing the reputedly rustic 
consciousness which had rendered machine intervention necessary in the first place. In the 




urban indigent—especially of the global south—would continue to figure in this dual role of 
technological vanguard and rural savage. 
The preface to The Architecture Machine opens with a series of images: First, a juxtaposition of 
two aerial photographs of La Paz, the first of which shows the affluent portion of the city 
whose Spanish colonial grid, according to the caption, was intended for infinite expansion 
regardless of context. By contrast, the second photograph shows a poor district creeping up the 
hillsides of La Paz, demonstrating how the latter’s “growth beyond the Spanish colonial plan 
has forced a ‘pebble-oriented architecture.”301  By “pebble-oriented,” Negroponte means that 
the individual unit expresses its uniqueness even amidst the mass urban conglomeration. In the 
facing page, he writes of the need to concentrate on the local, exceptional, and particular, for, as 
he cites from Brave New World, “particulars, as everyone knows, make for virtue and 
happiness; generalities are intellectually necessary evils.”302 Negroponte appears blind to the 
glaring irony of Huxley’s statement, uttered by the director of a human cloning hatchery. The 
director is admonishing his new medical interns to concern themselves only with the rote, 
specific tasks assigned to them and not with the larger scientific and social processes they are 
contributing to, since, he tells them, it is “not philosophers but fret-sawyers and stamp-
collectors” that “compose the backbone of society”.303 Negroponte’s misreading not only 
inverts a technologically-dystopian pronouncement into a utopian one, but also ignores 
Huxley’s linking of particularities to petty, piecemeal forms of labor and consciousness (i.e., 
the work of clones). Negroponte’s captioned photographs ascribe to the inhabitants of La Paz’s 




according to Huxley, with the rotely non-philosophical and non-scientific—even if Negroponte 
intends this as a favorable contrast to communist mass-housing. 
The book’s subsequent page offers four images: a photograph of newly constructed apartment 
towers in Brasilia; two photographs of medieval Mediterranean hill towns; and a computer-
generated linear diagram showing an ideal urban pattern.304 The image of Brasilia—whose 
design was heavily influenced by the communist-sympathizer, Oscar Niemeyer—was selected 
by Negroponte over myriad, equally bleak housing blocks around the world (including in the 
United States) to represent the anti-humanist, totalitarian solutions he deemed typical of 
modernist architecture. It was a peculiar moment to scapegoat Brasilia for totalitarian urbanism, 
given that the United States had recently helped sponsor a military coup to replace Brazil’s 
democratic republic with a repressive, anti-communist dictatorship. Why Brasilia should have 
been particularly singled out by Negroponte for characteristics which were in fact shared by 
modern housing throughout the world likely owed to Brasilia’s unique position as a planned, 
rational city situated amidst a vast, sparsely populated jungle. In other words, having both 
literally and figuratively razed the jungle, Brasilia’s construction can be seen as the direct 
inverse to the “organic” development of La Paz’s poor districts, a process of development 
which represented the ideal of the city-like-a-jungle rather than the-city-replacing-a-jungle.305 
The city-like-a-jungle was one that incorporated the alleged semiotics of the jungle into its own 
structural logic. It should be remembered that the jungle-semiotic as theorized by Carothers, 
was one that precluded the epistemological tendency towards generalizations, insofar as 
colonial subjects reportedly could not distinguish between the generality of a sign and the 




indissoluble from the words that named them, “the African Mind” understood utterances as 
magical tools for manipulating the particular things of the world, in lieu of applying 
generalized laws (as deduced by European sciences) towards manipulating them. Keeping this 
theoretical background in mind, the concept of the city-as-jungle can be understood to harness 
the same magical thought disparaged by Carothers, in that the particular is to be manipulated 
without being subsumed within the general. 
Concerning the particular, Negroponte goes on to praise the medieval Mediterranean hill towns 
whose images he’d borrowed from Bernard Rudofsky, claiming that their type was “in fact 
attainable in high-density urban life, now that the serial, repetitious, and generalized aspects of 
the industrial revolution can be superseded.”306 In reference to the accompanying image of a 
computer-drawn linear pattern, Negroponte discusses how its irregularly spaced intervals 
resembled the finely nuanced variation of the old hill towns. Whereas architects’ urban housing 
schemes could never mimic the minutely-scaled variation of homes conceived and built by 
“anonymous” inhabitants, the Architecture Machine could, in theory, reproduce the hill towns’ 
large-scale accretions of individuated units. In this respect, Negroponte does not completely 
dismiss the need for “the global”, which he perceived as co-operative with the particular in the 
case of the Mediterranean hill towns. Whereas Brasilia was solely “the result of the global and 
general”, the variation-within-repetition seen in the hillside town of Mojacar in Spain 
demonstrated a certain “unity, which results from more global causes, comes from the 
limitation of materials, resources, weather, and so on…”.307 Indeed, what the Architecture 




detection of pattern across variation, such that—we might surmise—a global unity would be 
able to congeal different particularities within a shared substrate. 
Of what would this global unity consist?  We know that the detection of pattern across 
difference has held a significant place in the epistemology of modern science.308 Most 
explicitly, it formed the working method of structuralist linguistics and anthropology. This 
method typically presumed a sharp divide between those who operated within a given language 
or social structure and the analytical scientist who detected structural commonalities between 
all languages and societies. Simply put, it was by virtue of an entirely different order of 
knowledge that the observing scientist could become privy to the concealed workings of the 
system, in contrast to the sort of knowledge mobilized by societies performing within the 
system. Such a split, however, was slightly less clear-cut in the thinking of Lévi-Strauss, 
insofar as he acknowledged that the Savage Mind’s tendency to categorize—often according to 
the identification of similarities which cut across difference—was precisely akin to the methods 
of European science. Yet the fact remained that the Savage Mind was deemed unaware aware 
of its own methods, and therein lay the difference. For Lévi-Strauss, la pensée sauvage is 
always already cybernetic thought, except that it is “raw” cybernetic thought, unconscious of its 
own methodology and thus unable to harness that methodology through technological means. 
In the case of the Architecture Machine, what rendered the Mediterranean hill town’s patterned 
production of particularity different from the patterns detectable to the Machine was that the 
“global unity” of the former derived from local environmental constraints (“the limitation of 
materials, resources, weather, and so on…”), whereas the global unity the Machine would 




architecture”, i.e., to architecture that appeared random but in fact, to the discerning Machine 
eye, was structured according to a concealed logic, mimicking the workings of the Savage 
unconscious. (We might recall from Chapter Two that Christopher Alexander in Pattern 
Language had proposed variegated pattern-making to be the special purview of what he called 
“unconscious” builders.)309 Because the Architecture Machine was intended to glean knowledge 
of slum inhabitants’ particular architectural desires and then construe these differences into an 
overall pattern, the Machine was in fact a quite literal technological instantiation of the human 
structuralist anthropologist of previous decades. The city that was supposed to emerge from 
thus applying structuralist analytic methods towards the realization of built form so as to 
translate indigenous habit into urban habitation. That is to say, the jungle would be transposed 
into the city, such that its inhabitants could enter the city’s industrial labor force while, at the 
same time, retaining all the instincts and habits pertinent to their rural antecedents. 
The city-as-jungle marks a clear departure from a Marxian concept of industrialization. The 
class consciousness said to emerge concomitantly with proletarization is circumvented by 
technological means that allow slum inhabitants to retain their “vernacular”, rural tendencies in 
contradistinction to the metropolitan lingua franca of class struggle.310 This can be seen quite 
clearly with one project undertaken by the Architecture Machine Group called URBAN5.  In 
describing the aims of this application, Negroponte alludes to a prior experiment conducted by 
the computer researcher, Richard Hesserdorfer, for a “machine conversationalist” that could 
take into account different local inflections of speech.311  According to Negroponte’s 
description, the “machine tries to build a model of the user’s English and through this model 




her own mode of consciousness in order to enter into technological forms of production; the 
task of adaptation lay with the computer. In the absence of requisite language technologies, 
Hesserdorfer brought a mere tele-typewriting device into Boston’s South End, “the ghetto 
area”, Negroponte explains. Led to believe that they were interacting with an intelligent 
machine, rather than simply transmitting their answers to a fellow-human, “three inhabitants 
from the neighborhood were asked to converse with this machine about their personal desires.” 
Negroponte asserts that the men felt at ease communicating with the machine in a way that they 
would not have felt in talking to an urban planner or architect: that is to say, someone 
supposedly employing different semiotic means. As evidence of the freedom thus granted to the 
South-Boston test subjects, Negroponte adduces a photograph documenting the experiment in 
which one of the men wears a button with the words “Tenant Power”. Another irony apparently 
lost on Negroponte is that this message would have gone undetected by the “machine 
conversationalist,” whereas it would have been clearly legible to a human planner, architect, 
politician, or community organizer. It seems highly doubtful that the man would have felt 
compelled to hide such a political message from human planners, as Negroponte implies. 
Indeed, the assumption of some insurmountable communicative rift between ghetto inhabitants 
and urban experts—to which Negroponte alludes at various points throughout The Architecture 
Machine—seems exaggerated in that it is presented as a result of inevitable semiotic differences 
rather than historically contingent differences in education. When class difference is thus 
rewritten as innate semiotic incompatibilities, i.e., between the presumed vernaculars of the 
poor and the technical languages of experts, such difference can be bridged through 
technologies of translation, rather than by situating problems of translation within a political 




Perhaps anticipating such criticisms, Negroponte assures his readers that what “will remove 
[URBAN5 or the machine conversationalist] from a ‘Brave New World’ is that they will be 
able to… search for the exception (in desire and need), the one in a million. In other words, 
when the generalization matches the local desire, our omnipresent machines will not be excited. 
It is when the particular varies from the group preference that our machine will react, not to 
thwart but to service it.”313  Yet the gratification of exceptional needs and desires is hardly 
tantamount to a commitment to seeking justice and equity as articulated by the abovementioned 
“Tenant Power” button. The latter’s expression of commitment to community politics and 
group organization sets in relief that politics is precisely what the Architecture Machine would 
dispense with. Indeed, the dystopia imagined in Brave New World was, contrary to 
Negroponte’s glib interpretations, one in which politics had been displaced by technologies for 
gratifying citizens’ personal desires (which, after all, proved not to vary so much from one 
individual to the next). The implication of the Architecture Machine project, mirroring the 
claims of the bourgeoisie, is that the accommodation of individual difference (or of cultural 
difference) alongside persistent class inequality renders the latter justifiable. 
The vision of the city suggested by The Architecture Machine, is indeed one whose opacity can 
only be penetrated by the Machine: Its pattern-making is dimly perceptible to—but not 
reproducible by—the urban subject. (After all, the human inability to grasp such complexity is, 
according to Negroponte, what mandates the invention of an Architecture Machine.) 
Interestingly, Negroponte’s thesis advisor, Kevin Lynch, had recently published an article 
calling for ways to render cities into didactic expositions of themselves.314 His interest in 




dimension. The work he was best known for—encouraging city inhabitants to map their own 
images of the city—sought to ameliorate problems of communication between experts and 
urban inhabitants. His work seemed to acknowledge that the alienation experienced by 
metropolitan denizens pertained to the alienation of their consciousness from the means of 
production, the city being effectively a vast concretization of those productive means. Lynch’s 
work can be seen to rest on the razor-edge of an indeterminate conceptualization of 
consciousness: On the one hand, his endeavors indicate a pedagogical intent to destabilize an 
existing apartheid of consciousness. On the other hand, his work in many instances lends itself 
to developing machine consciousness at the expense of human understanding, in ways that then 
guided Negroponte’s early research. For example, the book that Lynch co-authored with 
Donald Appleyard, View from the Road, imagines a U.S. highway system that could deliver a 
multi-media experience, educating motorists about the localities they are passing through.315 For 
Negroponte, the requisite technologies suggested by View from the Road would be taken up in 
his thesis work on Machine Vision and, later, in a seminal project by the Architecture Machine 
Group called the Aspen Movie Map, a technological precursor to Google Earth and related 
technologies of surveillance. Negroponte’s translation of Lynch’s speculative proposals into 
serious technological endeavors inverted the idealistic and even Marxian undercurrent latent in 
Lynch’s goal of rendering the workings of the metropolis more evident to its inhabitants. 
Instead, electronically mapping the city opened it up to strategies of remote governance while, 
at the same time, allowing citizens to more easily navigate the streets of vast cities subject to 
perpetual transformation without actually understanding the nature of those transformations. In 




between the city and its users, a city whose subsequent navigability rendered its deeper 
incomprehensibility a moot issue. 
It is already evident in The Architecture Machine that, behind the specific aim to develop a 
machine capable of designing urban housing, Negroponte has identified a more expansive area 
of research in the problem of the computer interface. While only his penultimate chapter is 
devoted to an explicit discussion of the machine interface, most of his book is implicitly about 
this topic insofar as it deals with a twofold problem of communication: firstly, between 
machine and user, and, secondly, between machine and the environment. Although Negroponte 
surveys contemporaneous efforts to teach computers to understand and communicate in natural 
language, he concludes that ultimately the computer must be able to bypass the user’s natural 
language in order to merge more seamlessly with the user’s mind. This problem is in some 
sense specific to the project of the Architecture Machine in that human architects, he reminds 
us, do not design with language but through intuitive sketches and the like.316 But apart from 
questions of the architectural design process, Negroponte advances a more general claim about 
the relations between user- and machine-consciousness based on a longstanding view of 
language as a poor facsimile to thought, one that cannot rival thought’s supposedly more direct 
relation to sensory perception (as input) or to graphic means of communication (as output).317 
His subsequent book, The Soft Architecture Machine narrates some of the experiments the 
Architecture Machine Group undertook in the early 1970’s following Negroponte’s assertions 
in his previous book that machines would need to learn to see so that they might bypass human 
linguistic input as their primary means of acquiring visual information about the 




was meant to transcend the over-simplistic means of human architect-planners (as evinced by 
box-like modernist design), was in fact reduced further to what the machine could hopefully 
comprehend. Even so, video input of uniformly sized cubes, painted matte white to avoid the 
confusing illuminations, and placed against a black velvet backdrop were still beyond the grasp 
of the machine to make spatial sense of. The feasibility of a machine interface that could 
bypass language as its means of input was still almost hopelessly remote. 
Yet, at this juncture the conceptual challenges faced by Negroponte and Papert could prove to 
be of mutual assistance to each other. As a former student of Jean Piaget, Papert believed that 
children learned less from being formally taught than from moving through stages of 
development in which new mental “structures” were progressively built upon previously 
acquired ones. One of the three developmental stages theorized by Piaget was the “concrete 
operational stage” during which children can logically reason, show a propensity for ordering 
things and making transitive inferences, and yet are still unable to think inductively or in 
abstract concepts.319 Negroponte’s and Papert’s research pursuits coalesced around the 
phenomenon whereby children (and thus potentially machines) could progress organically from 
incomprehension to comprehension through non-linguistic means. Their own “interfaces”—
which is to say their sensory apparatuses—supposedly provided their brains with adequate 
input for advancing incrementally from crude to more complex understandings. Furthermore, 
children acquired language without formal instruction, which, according to Papert’s Piagetian 
ideas of development, owed to the child’s endowment with primary intellectual structures that 
expanded into increasingly more complex structures over the course of achieving linguistic 




of a “universal grammar” which was said to prove that humans were born with inherent 
linguistic structures of thought.) Nonetheless, Artificial Intelligence research had thus far been 
unable to reproduce the deeply innate and seemingly magical nature of human acquisition of 
language and knowledge. In the continuation of such efforts, the categorization of intellectual 
difference between humans would be key—for example, between different developmental 
stages as researched by Piaget, or between the so-called African and European Minds, as 
theorized by colonial ethnopsychiatry, or between the city and jungle and the distinct 
subjectivities they supposedly produced. Only such identifications of difference could permit 
the subsequent detection of patterns underlying the apparent invisibility of mind’s mechanisms. 
 
“Humanistic Computer Studies”: or, LOGO vs. Logos 
The [Centre Mondial Informatique’s] work focused on the use of computers for primary 
education in developing nations. The first site was a school outside Dakar, Senegal. This 
small experiment was just terrific… Kids from the jungle learned faster than kids from 
the city.320 
Nicholas Negroponte, Wired, (1997) 
The Wild Child was human, yet he had lived apart from culture and language. He walked 
out of the woods to enter history and, what is perhaps more to the point, to enter 
modern mythology as someone with a secret to tell. As a human being who had lapsed 
back to the animal condition, he was thought to embody the “natural.” His way of 
thinking, if he could be taught to communicate, would testify to the condition of “man in 
nature.”321 
Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (1985) 
Human and computer means of thinking need not be estranged, need not be characterized by 
platitudes alleging the intellectually reductive, stultifying effects of human-computer 
interaction. Rather, human-computer interaction might be regarded as a constant provocation to 




Sherry Turkle, who taught in the Science, Technology, and Society Department at MIT and 
was a close associate of Papert’s during the early years of the Media Lab, contributing to the 
latter’s efforts to launch a program of Humanistic Computer Studies.322 Turkle’s interest in the 
psychological and epistemological relationships between humans and computers helped 
provide a theoretical scaffolding for the Media Lab’s early research endeavors. Rather than 
relegating human-computer interactions to the binary of “programming” versus “using,” 
interaction with computers at all levels could be regarded as a stimulus to epistemological 
reflection. In Papert’s words, “as more complex and varied uses of the computer are developed 
the distinction ‘programming vs. using’ will slip away into a complex of richly variable 
possible relationships between people and machines.”323 However, this variety of possible 
relationships casts doubt upon Papert’s initial proposal that all children must learn to be 
programmers in order to undo existing intellectual inequalities that resulted from social-
economic inequalities. Papert’s involvement in the 1970’s and 1980’s with developing the 
computer language, LOGO, largely responded to concerns of how humans and computers could 
interact more intuitively. Designed especially for children, LOGO used a cursor shaped like a 
small turtle, which children could make perform graphic operations through simple 
navigational commands.324 LOGO—which, despite its name, privileged geometric over 
logocentric reasoning—took a cue from ideas of magical thought, in which one’s wishes, when 
expressed in certain formulas, could exercise control over external beings. Indeed, Papert 
described the operations of LOGO programming as involving the use of “primitives”. Rather 
than expecting children to learn the complexities of translating their intentions into 
computational code, children were asked to do what came more naturally to them: to 




Tellingly, Turkle noted that explorations in computer intelligence recalled the story of the Wild 
Child—Victor d’Aveyron— the aphasic orphan captured in the French forests in the early 
nineteenth century whose education became the source of widespread philosophical speculation 
at that time.325 Turkle explained that the question of how language could be acquired by a wild, 
speechless adolescent corresponded to similar questions now being asked of computers. If, in 
recent decades, the Savage Mind had been construed as uniquely able to generate semiotic 
richness—that is, to construe meaningful relations between disparate things, words, and 
practices—Victor was intriguing, on the contrary, for his semiotic poverty. In the hands of the 
doctor, Jean-Marc Gaspard Itard, who had taken custody of Victor so as to teach him language 
and social comportment, Victor spent years in intense one-on-one lessons without, however, 
ever learning to speak more than a word or two (and these merely in a garbled fashion). 
Frustrated by his efforts to instill speech and literacy, Itard nonetheless found greater success in 
having Victor identify likenesses between household objects and simple chalk drawings of 
those objects. As Victor’s socialization progressed from a completely asocial state to one of 
expressive affection for Itard and the housekeeper, he learned certain routines to communicate 
his needs.326  For example, he would communicate his desire for milk by seizing his bowl and 
entreating the housekeeper with his gestures towards it. Relatedly (and based on his reading of 
Condillac), Itard tried to teach Victor words that designated the things the boy most needed or 
desired, although Victor, as just described, was usually able to communicate such desires 
through other means. Indeed, Victor’s semiotic means remained much more indexical than 
lexical and—to whatever extent they made use of visual or vocal signs— tended to focus on the 
sign-referent relation rather than on relations between multiple signs. In other words, he was 




The expansion of the Architecture Machine Group into the Media Lab during the late 1970’s 
and early 1980’s was largely premised on such a turn from the lexical to the indexical, on how 
to curtail the need for programming language in favor of a spatial, graphic environment 
composed of icons and pointing devices.327 In this sense, Turkle’s invocation of the “Wild 
Child” was highly apposite. Moreover, Victor’s formation might attest to certain theories of 
linguistic and psychic formation postulated in the late twentieth century. One could point, for 
example, to Jacques Lacan’s notion of schizophrenia insofar as Victor, unable to adapt to the 
symbolic order, relegated his use of signs to the almost immediate, indexical connection they 
bore to their signifieds. That is to say, the bowl meant to signify his desire to drink milk was 
the actual bowl from which he drank milk. Turkle did not draw this association between 
Victor’s aphasia and Lacan’s notion of schizophrenia despite the fact that her preceding book 
was an intellectual history of Lacan (granted, her allusion to Victor was only as a suggestive 
analogy, not a sustained analysis). However, both of these examples of abnormal 
consciousness—the computational and the feral-aphasic—could be dubbed “schizophrenic” in 
the Lacanian sense of the term, describing a semiotic inability to understand signs except for in 
their total imbrication with their referents. A point I will return to later is how this notion of 
schizophrenia was taken up by Fredric Jameson in his description of postmodern culture. 
It should be stressed that schizophrenia has been a fluid term throughout the twentieth century, 
as is recounted in Jonathan Metzl’s illuminating study of its diagnostic transformation during 
the U.S. civil rights movement. Whereas prior to this period, the diagnosis in the U.S. had 
mostly been applied to despondent bourgeois housewives, during the civil rights era it quickly 




behavior and magical thought.328  Cases of allegedly schizophrenic persons included accounts 
of black men who, incarcerated for violence against white policemen, or,  more often, for their 
participation in civil rights demonstrations, either spoke “gibberish” or else demonstrated a 
“refusal to accept the syntactical language of standard English…” instead, “…elaborating their 
ideas in the direction of African ideology with a decided ‘primitive’ accent.”329 Interpreting this 
pentecostal phenomenon as schizophrenic shows that the symptomatology of schizophrenia 
was already seen to have a semiotic dimension before Lacan specifically described it a s such. 
Granted, the semiotic anomaly theorized by Lacan was somewhat different in nature than what 
was suggested by the pentecostal utterings of incarcerated black men, although the difference 
might be less stark than it appears: Lacanian schizophrenia was marked by a difficulty in 
interpreting how signs interacted with each other, such that schizophrenics were said to focus 
myopically on how individual signs related inextricably to their referents. That is to say, signs 
were almost concrete entities due to an inseparable closeness to their referents, more than they 
were abstract elements that derived meaning from their combination with each other. While the 
American diagnosis of schizophrenia was not explicitly theorized from a semiotic angle, the 
symptomatology was largely of a linguistic nature, in contradistinction to the affective nature of 
many neuroses. Typical schizophrenic symptoms included hearing and speaking to imagined 
voices and—concerning the tendency towards paranoia—a general misinterpretation of events 
and words so that these seemed to point to a single, overarching cause. That is, for the 
paranoiac, signs did not only point to their apparent referents but also pertained to some secret 
code written by overly powerful, magical, or conspiratorial forces. Conversely, owing to their 
imagined knowledge of such hidden codes, schizophrenics often were prone to magical 




schizophrenics’ semiotic modes were held to be markedly different from the codes 
acknowledged by normative society. 
According to Lacan, the schizophrenic fails to perceive signs through the lens of symbolic 
displacement, resulting in a misconception of signs as being bound concretely to their particular 
referents.330 On the other hand, the U.S. diagnosis of schizophrenia that emerged with the civil 
rights movement identified a semiotic dysfunction tending in the opposite direction: Signs were 
determined less by their actual referents than by some overarching schema that pointed always 
towards the same conspiratorial source. In other words, the Lacanian schizophrenic did not 
allow enough symbolic displacement between sign and referent, whereas the U.S. 
schizophrenic submitted them to too great a symbolic displacement. These two tendencies, 
however, shared common ground insofar as they both stood in opposition to the structuralist 
treatment of the sign as primarily decodable through its relationships with other signs, rather 
than through a particular referent. 
Yet, if schizophrenics thus decoded through means very different from those taken up by the 
fields of information theory and cybernetics—in other words, different from the semiotic 
operations of computer scientists—schizophrenics’ interpretive means may have nonetheless 
resembled the communicative forms of human-machine interaction emergent with the advent of 
the personal computer. These means, employed by the user of simplified programming 
languages such as Papert’s LOGO, involved, on the one hand, reducing language’s 
communicative aims to what he called “primitives” which entailed the manipulation of simple 
shapes and, on the other hand, sublimating the concrete world into a highly abstract 




immediately seem to describe schizophrenics’ semiotic means, but in fact the schizophrenic 
and the computer user both relate to the sign on two striking registers: on the plane of the 
magical/iconic and on that of the abstract system.  
In the early 1980’s Papert and Turkle proposed that computer education might occasion a 
change in children’s cognitive developmental stages, such that abstract thinking, a key 
component to Piaget’s proposed “formal operational stage,” would now precede the child’s 
acquisition of concrete thinking or its “concrete operational stage.”331 What this meant is that 
children who learned computer programming would effectively leap directly from the stage of 
what Freud would have called magical thought (characteristic of savages and narcissists, he 
believed) into the highest stage of cognitive development, which involved hypothetical, 
complex thinking as well as the ability to consciously reflect on and correct one’s own 
processes of thought. This last stage of cognitive development was said by many followers of 
Piaget to be unavailable to less advanced societies, whereas the others stages of development 
were deemed more or less universal categories. Along with Turkle, Papert reasoned that the 
ways in which computer programming involved methodical, complex problem solving as well 
as epistemological considerations of how computers “thought,” encouraged all children to 
move into the formal operational stage much earlier than the adolescent period Piaget had 
designated as typical of this development. However, if Turkle and Papert were correct about 
this modification to the prescribed order of intellectual development, it must also be assumed 
that child programmers, in deferring the concrete operational stage, would thereby, at least in 
some respects, defer transitioning out of magical or “primitive” thought that was a hallmark of 




intellectual limitations characteristic of the pre-operational stage—such as difficulties with 
causal relations—would necessarily be overcome by any child who had advanced to the formal 
operational stage, other limitations may have persisted, such as the child’s tendency toward 
“egocentric” and “animistic” thought.  Thus, despite their advancement to sophisticated 
abstract reasoning, children might, at the same time, retain the basic lineaments of Savage 
Thought. Indeed, “egocentric thought” was more or less identical with the kind of primitive 
magical thinking described by Freud. It involved confusion between one’s own thoughts and 
objective reality, often manifested through the delusive notion that one’s desires could exercise 
control over the surrounding world.332 For Carothers, this delusion—endemic, he believed, to 
the African Mind—specifically presented itself as a misunderstanding of the relation of verbal 
signs to their signifieds, such that utterances were believed capable of transforming the material 
reality of the referents involved. By circumventing the stage of childhood development in 
which they were supposed to outgrow such magical or egotistical thought, and by moving 
straight into the most sophisticated possible stage of intellectual development, child 
programmers would effectively attain the ideal creative state that had been sought by the avant-
gardes since the nineteenth century, in which the semiotic fecundity of Savage Thought could 
be skillfully, technologically manipulated through abstract processes of experimental thinking. 
That is to say, for the first time since industrialization, it could become normal for a person’s 
consciousness over the technological means of production to coexist with the kinds of creative, 
magical thought associated with the unconscious mind. As was the case with schizophrenic 
diagnosis as described by Metzl, Papert implied that the leap from one Piagetian stage to 




epistemic rupture was desirable in order to combat racist politics inherent to childhood 
education.333 
Bearing in mind Papert’s censure of educational inequalities, this new prospect for reconciling 
Savage Thought with techno-scientific thought held out a certain promise, given that this 
epistemological binary had for centuries been mapped onto class- and race-based apartheids. 
Yet, before accepting at face-value the apparent dismantling of a longstanding epistemological 
binary, it is worth considering that a new form of consciousness and, along with it, a new 
epistemological binary might have been in the offing. This can be glimpsed in the different 
roles ascribed by Papert and Negroponte respectively to “the jungle.” Papert, in a grant 
proposal for a research center on computer pedagogy, alluded to the possible reversal in 
Piagetian stages of childhood development, stressing that: 
[T]he differences between the intellectual environments of the USA before and after the 
age of the personal computer are… very much bigger and more significant than the 
differences between the USA today and pre-urban jungle villages. Thus the observation 
of the effect of the computer presence on the intellectual growth of children will… 
constitute a giant and possibly very informative experiment in comparative cognitive 
psychology. At least it will serve this purpose if someone with the competence to see 
happens to be looking.334 
Here we are faced with the familiar identification of the jungle as an environment that stunts 
intellectual development. But how to square this analogy with Negroponte’s later reminiscence 
of his and Papert’s experiences with the CMI in Senegal, where he observed that “[k]ids from 
the jungle learned faster than kids from the city”?  How could “the jungle”, which figures in 
both cases as an intellectual environment, serve simultaneously as the epitome of intellectual 
backwardness and the epitome of intellectual adaptability? If I might be allowed some 




of both the anti-technic mind and the super-technic mind, might be linked to Papert’s belief in 
the imminent reversal of Piagetian states of development. Just as computer-educated children 
would indefinitely defer moving into the transitional stage of concrete operations, instead 
straddling simultaneously the immature stage of magical thought and the most sophisticated 
stage of abstract thinking, so too the “pre-urban jungle” would function for decades to come as 
the Media Lab’s magical site of human-computational adaptiveness. If it were asked what 
might possibly distinguish the children inhabiting a “village outside Dakar” from children 
living inside Dakar (or Boston’s ghettoes) that would give the former such a clear advantage in 
assimilating computer thought, it seems that the answer would likely consist in the respective 
levels of literacy accruing to village and city children, as well as the presumed persistence of 
magical practices. Quite simply, the child in the jungle village represented the naiveté, the 
malleability, the semiotic and epistemological backwardness, and the dependence that was said 
to characterize the global south, and these characteristics all made the south ripe for 
consumption of personal computing technologies. 
What goes missing from Negoponte’s, Papert’s, and Turkle’s discussions of children’s 
technological intelligence is an account of the adult intelligence responsible for both designing 
computers and observing the interactions between computer and child. In applying for grants to 
fund the proposed study center on “computers and people,” Papert acknowledges the need for a 
particular, elite form of adult intelligence: The study of computer pedagogy will only prove 
vastly informative, he writes, “if someone with the competence to see happens to be looking.”335  
The stipulation that someone must possess the “competence to see” would seem to exclude 




of intelligence, whereas the observers of child-computer learning must be able to think beyond 
such conventionalities. They must be intelligent about intelligence, understanding not what is 
produced by the pupils so much as what structures of intelligence are at play in these processes 
of growth, and—even more importantly—how such structures are manipulated and altered 
through computer interaction. In other words, the observer of these operations needed to 
possess a far deeper understanding of the processes of “production” than was typically 
possessed by a college-educated professional. 
Given Negroponte’s comparison of education to petroleum—declared a few years after 
Papert’s efforts to launch the center for computer and people—it is not off-base, I think, to 
interpret computer-human intelligence, even in the context of education, as a process of 
production—indeed as a paradigmatic process of production that would overtake the world 
economy in the years to come. If a former discrimination between intellectual owners and non-
owners had hinged upon conscious apprehension and manipulation of normally unconscious 
modes of creativity, this formulation was now further complicated by the advent of personal 
computers. The Media Lab’s founders—and also theorists like Turkle whom they leaned on—
tended to argue for the convergence of human and machine thought processes. Turkle and 
Papert also saw personal computers as prods to epistemological reflection (hence allowing 
children to overleap the concrete operational stage), encouraging thought about thought. At the 
same time, however, Papert, Turkle, and Negroponte regarded the means of computer usage as 
potentially so intuitive as to render them perfect companions of human thought. The writings 
authored respectively by these three called for an ever-greater convergence of human and 




the classroom and the jungle—was seen to invite consciousness over means of production; on 
the other hand, the computer was meant to be used almost unconsciously. Whereas in past 
chapters, it was seen how professional designers endeavored to gain conscious ownership over 
putatively unconscious means of creative production, associates of the early Media Lab tacitly 
suggest that computers would allow everyone to produce in ways that were at once unconscious 
and hyper-conscious. Echoing Leland’s fin-de-siècle prophesy that “the poor and even 
children” would wield architecture machines, Papert’s and Negroponte’s research on computer 
languages and interfaces seemed intent on having the most unselfconscious of producers—
children and alleged “primitives”—retain all their instinctive, unconscious techniques of 
thought while at the same time consciously wielding these techniques in order to instruct the 
computer. In other words, the distinction between conscious and unconscious producers was 
obfuscated. 
Apropos of relationships between human consciousness and computer use, it could be asked 
what Papert and Turkle may have meant by “humanistic” in the context of Papert’s 1977 
proposal for a new academic program of “Humanistic Computer Studies.”  We might recall 
from the previous chapter that architecture had been excluded from the liberal arts by Mortimer 
Adler, on the basis that it communicated nothing. In other words, it did not transmit to its 
beholders a message they might parse or speak back to. It did not operate at the level of 
consciousness (and here we might also bear in mind Walter Benjamin’s pronouncement that 
architecture was merely perceived in a state of distraction). The humanities (or liberal arts), 
thus defined by Adler, excluded any methods that strayed too far from clearly coded systems of 




supplements par excellence—of conscious thought, whereas images and spatial constructions 
were associated with unconscious, speechless forms of thought.336 If Adler’s conservative 
delimitations were not exactly representative of the humanities at the time of Papert’s and 
Turkle’s call for a program in humanistic computer studies, it was nonetheless true that one of 
the operative missions of the humanities seemed to consist in rendering conscious and legible 
that which was previously illegible. This continues to be one of the underpinnings of critique, 
but critique was not necessarily what Papert and Turkle had in mind for humanistic studies. 
Being tightly involved—whether directly or indirectly—with the development of computer 
technologies, they were interested less in applying the critical methods of the humanities 
towards an interrogation of the ideological and historical dimensions of computing culture than 
they were in better understanding the potentials of human-computer interaction. Much weight 
rested upon their shared conviction that the consciousness of consciousness which 
programming supposedly entailed would inevitably transform computer users into 
philosophers, as if philosophy consisted only of the epistemology of machine operations. 
Even one of the most glaring criticisms of computation technologies—its imbrications with 
warfare—was later glibly dismissed by Papert who implied that as long as children learned the 
same kinds of computational knowledge that underpinned technologies of warfare, then the 
Media Lab’s instrumentality in developing such technologies was a matter of no concern.337 
That is to say, consciousness over the means of war-production was in itself a weapon which 
rendered the tool of critique superfluous. Yet, the fact that the children were supposedly well-
armed with the intellectual weapons wielded by the most powerful military in the world in no 




sponsored them, or, even in thus deploying them, that they would be victorious. These were the 
kinds of issues that only the humanities disciplines—in contrast to engineering and 
mathematics—might have addressed through their application of the tools of criticism. But, to 
the extent that Turkle and Papert optimistically failed to recognize the need for disciplinary 
critique, they excluded the humanities’ most valuable tool from the domain of media studies, 
while at the same time tacitly subscribing to one of the humanities’ most conservative tenets: 
that the highest form of knowledge entailed mastery over the tools of production, such that 
literacy (in this case computational literacy) became an end in itself, rather than a tool of 
criticism. 
It was specious, however, to suggest that all computer users might become computer 
programmers, considering the directions of the Media Lab’s research, from its beginnings as 
the Architecture Machine Group up through its early work in the 1980’s, which was to render 
computer use easier for non-programmers, so that an understanding of computer languages 
would be unnecessary. The bad faith implicit to Papert’s optimism was clearly spelled out in 
Papert’s and Negroponte’s collaboration with Servan-Schreiber’s CMI, which was seminal to 
the directions later taken by the Media Lab. According to Servan-Schreiber, one advantage of 
computer education was that, although computers could certainly be used to promote literacy in 
the Third World, future computers did not necessarily require keyboard input. “Thus, a person 
who cannot read and write, can learn to operate a computer and, through it, have access to all 
the power of the electronic age.”338  Corroborating this position, Negroponte explained to his 
audience at the International Design Conference in Aspen how Ahmed Yamani, the oil minister 




with animosity towards the organization, but had been transformed by Yamani’s words to him, 
which he now paraphrased for his audience: 
You gentlemen, [said Yamani] believe that computers are going to help the Third 
World, and that computers are in fact going to move education in the Third World. 
Have you thought about the difference between primitive man and illiterate people?  
And clearly I hadn’t, and the question was incredibly good…. And, thank goodness, 
Yamani answered it himself: Well, primitive man is in fact a very literate man, and 
yet his literature and his culture is passed through media—through storytelling, 
through all sorts of channels—which you guys know nothing about. And that in fact 
this primitive man is a very literate person in a way that you don’t understand 
literacy; whereas an illiterate person, particularly in an industrialized society, has a 
problem of being in that industrialized society and not knowing very much, and if 
you are going to in fact apply computation to helping that person— Yamani goes on, 
these are his words and he doesn’t have speech writers—you know what you have to 
do first, you have to spend time pulling things out of their heads before you put the 
new stuff in. This is incredible! Here’s this bastard who’s raised the price of oil for all 
these years, and he’s so incredibly smart and understanding, and isn’t this [OPEC] a neat 
operation to get involved with.339 
Rather than taking to heart Yamani’s criticism of the neo-colonial manner in which the Media 
Lab or the CMI privileged Euro-American technological expertise over other forms of 
knowledge, Negroponte interpreted Yamani’s words as indicative of a new direction for the 
burgeoning Media Lab. According to Negroponte’s interpretation, the Media Lab might 
employ more “primitive” semiotic means to reach a wider consumer base, rather than presume 
literacy as a prerequisite for computer use. Knowledge of the humanities—with their promotion 
of criticism, philosophical reflection, and empathy—was no longer to be understood as a 
necessary precondition to operating the intellectual tools of production. Nor would it be 
necessary to understand those tools’ underlying mechanisms. Intellectual labor, therefore, need 




Negroponte’s initial hostility to Yamani needs to be understood in the larger context of what 
OPEC meant in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. It was not simply that the cartel wrested a 
portion of economic power away from the U.S. and Great Britain; this shift in power had also 
signaled to the other nations of the global south that they too might alter the fundamental terms 
of economic exchange which placed them in poverty and debt vis-à-vis the north.340 These 
terms of economic inequity largely pertained to intellectual property laws, which, especially 
with the advent of computer technologies, threatened to entrench global divisions of labor more 
deeply than ever. Papert had hoped that computer education might bring about the opposite 
effect, but he should have surely realized that a major reform of intellectual property laws 
would have to accompany pedagogical efforts if the latter were to accomplish anything more 
than turning a global indigent into a vast market of computer consumers. 
 
The “Properties” of Minds, Nations, and Corporations 
Several days ago four mini-computers were delivered [to Tardouant in Morocco]. Since 
then there has been tumult among the upper-year students. There are the enthusiasts 
(“It’s cooler than a motorcycle”), the skeptics (“Will the West really accept yielding its 
secrets of manufacture? Rather, we will have its gadgets.”), the worriers (“They condemn 
us to laziness: I’m told to press a button to get an answer, but I would like to know how 
this answer was elaborated.”) 
“… Seen from Africa, the diffusion of computers does not present itself with the 
simplicity close to the evidence that M. Jean-Jacques Schreiber demonstrated in October, 
1980 in his Défi mondial. 
 
[On a livré il y a quelques jours [à Taroudant, une ville Marocaine] quatre mini-
ordinateurs. Depuis, c’est l’effervescence parmi les élèves des grandes classes. Il y a les 
enthousiastes («C’est plus chouette qu’une moto»), les sceptiques («L’Occident 
acceptera-t-il vraiment de céder ses secrets de fabrication? On aura plutôt ses gadgets»), 
les inquiets («On nous condamne à la paresse: on me dit d’appuyer sur un bouton pour 




“Vue d'Afrique, la diffusion des ordinateurs ne se présente pas avec cette simplicité 
proche de l'évidence que démontra  M. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, en octobre 1980, 
dans son Défi mondial.]341 
—Pierre Drouin, « Le saut de la ‘puce’, » Le Monde, December 23, 1982  
In his 1982 piece, “Le saut de la ‘puce’,” Pierre Drouin, an editorialist for Le Monde, punned 
on the two meanings of puce—“flea” and “microchip”, implying that due to the small distance 
covered by a flea’s jump [saut de la puce], the latter formed a fitting idiom for how personal 
computers should affect the Third World. What worried Drouin—in the case of a larger jump 
for the Third World—was not the economic dependency that might result from an international 
transfer of technology, but that “grafting” computer technologies onto Third-World societies 
would lead to a “rejection”, as was sometimes the case in botany when grafted elements were 
too dissimilar.342 Contrasting the case of Morocco or Senegal with that of India or Brazil, 
Drouin noted that while the latter two countries had taken steps towards developing their own 
means of computer production, the former two countries—for reasons not stated—were 
incapable of such a smooth transition into “self-development.” For these African nations, “the 
‘jump’, the rupture with many habits” would be inevitable, he declared.343 Fortunately, 
however—and here Drouin cited Mahdi Elmandjra, a key member of the International Bureau 
of Informatics (IBI) who had helped organize this technological collaboration between 
Morocco and its former colonizer—“‘Piaget has certainly shown that the child does not learn in 
a linear manner, that ruptures are necessary. It is the same for the transition to new 
technologies.”344 That is to say, the imminent techno-cultural “rupture” in France’s former 
African colonies—though inevitable—could be elided (and thus in a sense avoided) thanks to 
this other rupture—a natural, psychic one—that was structurally integral to children’s 




consumption, computer dependency need not instigate any deep social, historical, or 
epistemological transformation. 
The Piagetian rupture that is here said to enable the African child to assimilate French 
technologies and thus to effect historical change bears a certain resemblance to Foucaultian 
epistemic ruptures, which were constitutive of historical change. Yet, unlike Foucaultian 
ruptures, which are deep-reaching in their social, cultural, and technological dimensions (as 
they underlie the very constitution of knowledge), Drouin’s Piagetian rupture indicated a way 
to effect technological change without causing too great a disturbance in existing modes of 
knowledge. It was important, Drouin cautioned, that in societies characterized by agrarian 
production, illiteracy, and “vivid” traditions, the computer not overhaul cultural identity 
completely.345 In other words, epistemological ruptures should be contained such that an 
epistemic continuity could endure in the midst of technological upheaval. Indeed, such an 
upheaval was notably different from a Euro-American understanding of technological progress 
as part and parcel of historical-cultural transformation (i.e., the Hegelian-Marxian inheritance). 
What Drouin was describing constituted technological change without significant intellectual or 
cultural change. Similar again to what Muzaffar has called out as the intentionally “incomplete 
modernization” of the south in the decades following World War II, by the 1980’s African 
digitalization entailed an even stranger contradiction, this time at the level of epistemology 
itself. This contradiction basically consisted in the argument that agrarian societies could be 
simultaneously illiterate and computer-literate, intellectually backward by modern standards 
and yet, at the same time, at the vanguard of computer consumption. Unlike Papert, Drouin did 




yields.346 Such a discourse did not aim at enlarging peasant’s vocational self-determination so 
much as regulating how computers might make small adjustments to improve—while still 
maintaining—Africa’s current agrarian base According to this notion of introducing computer 
technologies without really altering African society, Drouin advocated that France adapt its 
softwares to meet intrinsically different African needs: 
If poor countries depend on Western computer technologies [informatique], this is not so 
serious regarding their material and final use, whose mastery can be rapidly acquired on 
the spot. On the other hand, the possibility of conceiving and installing software adapted 
to the local needs is very important. Therein lies the knot of technological liberty. To 
achieve it, developing countries must be able to train highly competent national 
computer technicians [informaticiens]. 
Despite the economic lag and slow progress in literacy, Third-world countries can thus 
use the tool of computation. The most important thing is to know what demands will be 
made of the computer.347 
In other words, since it was easy enough to learn how to use computers—as opposed to 
programming or manufacturing them—French software engineers should custom tailor 
computers to the presumed needs of African users to ensure simple implementation even 
among the illiterate. This identification of local difference would tie the “knot of technological 
freedom” (an apt idiom for a kind of “freedom” which economically bound large parts of 
Africa to France). Technology transfer thus conceived did not entail sharing scientific 
knowledge so much as it entailed modifying Euro-American technologies to suit the 
supposedly indigenous modes of African thought and production. As was suggested in another 
Le Monde piece published a few months later on the training of computer technicians in Africa, 
a consideration of specific African modes of production would include a consideration of 
African modes of thought. The selection of programmers would have to be “primordial,” 




machine of this sort can constitute a formidable instrument of power.” 348 But most of the 
Africans cited in Drouin’s editorial seemed less concerned about their alleged mental and 
cultural unpreparedness for technology transfer than they were with the intellectual and 
economic terms of that transfer: Would the West really yield up its secrets of production? ... 
They condemn us to laziness: I’m told to press a button to get the answer, but I would like to 
know how this answer was elaborated.349 The import of these provocations, uttered by high 
school children—the little “jumping fleas” themselves—was not pursued by Drouin. Yet the 
students’ comments pointed to the fact that many nations of the global south were less 
interested in buying computers than in acquiring the technical knowledge requisite for 
producing them. Drouin had rejected this claim, declaring glibly that African dependence on 
Western computer technology was not a problem, and yet in 1982, when his editorial was 
published, heated international negotiations concerning just this issue had for years been 
underway. Most notably, the IBI had formed around 1974 under UNESCO (although over the 
years the latter regarded it with increasing suspicion).350 With the exception of France, Italy, 
and Spain, the IBI was comprised of nations from the global south who sought a greater role in 
determining how technologies would be globally implemented. Headed by the Argentinean 
statesman, Fermín Bernasconi, the organization added to UNESCO’s initial goal of directing 
technological education in the Third World questions of economic and technological parity. 
Influenced by dependency theory and Latin American structuralist economic theory that still 
prevailed in the years prior to the Latin American debt crisis, Bernasconi reminded IBI 
representatives that “political independence [in the Third World] has been achieved, but [these 
nations] do not have real economic independence.”351 IBI member-nations thus sought to 




regional and trans-regional cooperation for sharing technology and implementing networks. 
Questions of education were also paramount. Finally, a recurring theme involved the tension 
between promoting an open global exchange of data and technical knowledge and, on the other 
hand, preserving national sovereignty against the use of data for international espionage. 
While the tenor of IBI conferences tended to be optimistic, there also prevailed a recognition 
that extant models of economic dependency were at risk of worsening with increasing 
disequilibrium in technological access. Moreover, there existed an ambiguous dimension to 
informatics development. As noted by Marius Francisco, who directed the Informatics Office 
of Benin, “billions of dollars are going to be placed at our disposal to establish their banks for 
our data.”352 In other words, data—which helped “any industrialist in Europe” to “penetrate a 
market [in Africa]”—constituted a new kind of raw material to be extracted from Africa for 
enriching the nations of the global north. The technological facilities, infrastructure, and 
knowledge that these latter nations developed ran the risk—much like colonial transportation 
systems—of serving first and foremost as vehicles of wealth extraction. Indeed, the hierarchy 
of stages involved in data collection and analysis was described in much the same way that 
industrial processes were. At the IBI’s 1981 meeting on the International Environment of 
Transborder Data Flows, experts discussed how “raw data” was typically extracted from 
“developing countries” to be processed within the United States whence it was sold to “other 
developed countries” or else back to the “developing countries” themselves in the form of 
either processed information or technology and media products.353 In the worst scenario, data 
was extracted without contractual consent via remote sensing technologies such as satellite 




processed into products that were sold back to the south at higher prices than the raw material 
had commanded. To this day data continues to be described in terms inflected by industrial-
capitalism: data banks, data mining, and data processing. The French term for data, données 
(givens), even hinted at the longstanding relationship between Savage Thought and computer 
technologies: Much like the intellectual processes of the Savage Mind, data was assumed to be 
a raw, natural given, free for the taking, as well as apodictic in its epistemological status. 
However, in its processed—i.e., consciously analyzed—form it became the intellectual 
property of others.  
Accordingly, members of the IBI proposed access to existing databanks, control over national 
data, and the cooperative creation of their own shared data networks. To whatever extent the 
construction of computing facilities and infrastructure was to be an independent effort (many 
IBI nations, on the contrary, still demanded assistance from computer-exporting nations) state-
centralized import substitution provided a model that had been successful in many of Asian and 
Latin American countries during the past two or three decades. Import substitution in the area 
of computer manufacture was not easy, however, given the imbalance in research funding 
between the global north and south. Latin America’s efforts to unite regionally, as well as 
India’s successes in developing a large computer manufacturing sector, pointed to the necessity 
of a large funding base existing by virtue of a nation’s size and centralized economy or else by 
virtue of broad regional cooperation.354 Throughout the late 1960’s, tensions had escalated 
between the Indian government and the two foreign corporations it hosted that manufactured 
most of its computers, namely IBM and Great Britain’s International Computers Limited (ICL). 




Furthermore, they tended to recycle obsolete parts from the global north into refurbished 
models, so that a technological lag was maintained even within the context of technology 
transfer.355 In the late 1960’s as India issued stronger demands for equity and knowledge 
transfer, IBM began to withdraw its operations, finalizing its departure in 1973 when India 
passed the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, requiring foreign companies to cede majority 
control to Indian partners. As a result, by the early 1980’s almost all computer components and 
subsystems consumed in India were being fabricated by its own homegrown companies.356 An 
imbalance between India and the computer exporting nations still remained, however, in the 
relative lack diversity of the technological products India was able to furnish. Moreover, after 
enjoying a few years of tremendous growth in technical knowledge and production, India was 
compelled by the oil crisis of the 1970’s to allocate 40% of its import budget to petroleum, 
drastically reducing research expenditures and thereby paving the way for the liberalizing 
economic reforms that Indira Gandhi ushered in upon her return to power in 1980.357 The 
situation in Latin America was even more dire, given that the Latin American debt crisis had 
wrested away from many countries their leverage to resist encroachment by foreign 
corporations, especially as the International Monetary Fund began to stipulate economic 
liberalization policies as a precondition for extending credit. 
Between 1980 and 1984 the Diplomatic Conference for the Protection of Industrial Property 
was held largely in response to international pressure to reform the intellectual property laws 
that had been signed by just eleven nations (eight of which were European) at the 1883 Paris 
Convention and which had since become de facto international protocol. At the Diplomatic 




abuses and areas of possible reinterpretation stemming from the Paris Convention codes and its 
subsequent amendments.358 These specific textual and legal gray areas were distinct, however, 
from the more general differences in agenda between the Group of 77 and the technology-
exporting nations, especially as manifested by some of the more radical proposals being made 
contemporaneously at the IBI conferences. For example, “technology transfer” had been 
defined by some IBI members as the free (i.e., unremunerated) sharing of technical knowledge, 
whereas technology-exporting nations typically understood technology transfer as either the 
international sale of technological products or the establishment of overseas manufacturing 
facilities, according to which arrangement host countries were compelled to uphold the patents 
foreign corporations had secured in their home countries. Some voices at the IBI meetings 
called for the abolishment of intellectual property altogether, but for those Latin American 
nations whose call for freer technology transfer had been accompanied by strong leftist political 
movements, the debt crisis combined with U.S. military interventions began to undermine Latin 
America’s efforts to redefine technology transfer. Following the oil crisis of the 1970’s along 
with the end of Bretton Woods and the IMF’s increasing imposition of liberalization measures 
on the global south, the once vociferous demands for the free sharing technical knowledge gave 
way increasingly to the south’s willingness to accommodate foreign manufacturing enterprises 
on the latter’s own terms. As some IBI members had feared might become the case, new right-
wing regimes made use of computer technologies for means of domestic control and 
surveillance.359 
Negroponte’s comparison of education to oil had implied that a knowledge economy would 




giving way to a post-industrial utopia. But the persistence of petroleum politics still exerted an 
inexorable—if indirect—influence on the politics of knowledge transfer. The fundamental role 
played by petro-capital in fueling the Latin American debt crisis effectively stripped any 
negotiating power away from what had once been one of the largest organized blocs advocating 
for the reformation of intellectual property law. Largely due to the economic recessions of the 
1970’s, the Group of 77 did not succeed at the Diplomatic Conference in diminishing foreign 
corporations’ power to control intellectual property but, quite to the contrary, ended by yielding 
to such corporations even greater powers over intellectual property.360 OPEC, after having 
served throughout the 1970’s as a model for resisting neocolonialism, had by the end of that 
decade clearly embraced the international financial institutions that both profited from and 
exacerbated global economic inequalities. So long as much of the global south was entrapped 
in petroleum-debt, they remained unable to compete with the vast sums that the United States, 
Japan, Great Britain, and France poured into the research and development of new computer 
technologies, while also remaining economically powerless to dismantle the intellectual 
property laws that held a stranglehold on existing computer technologies. Heralded as offering 
an escape from the inequalities of fossil-fuel-based industrialism, personal computing 
technologies were in fact held hostage by the very powers associated with the twentieth-century 
petro-economy. That is to say that if computer-based education was indeed the “new oil,” as 
pronounced by Negroponte, this new oil was still utterly imbricated with the “old oil”, its status 
as property largely determined by the power hierarchies of the petro-economy. 
In 1980, following the United States’ recovery from recent recessions, the federal government 




property of any patented invention that had been funded by public research grants rather than—
as had previously been the case—ceding possession of that patent jointly to the inventor and 
the government. This proposal, which President Jimmy Carter had opposed for several years, 
was passed into legislation immediately following Ronald Reagan’s election to office.361 
Another policy pursued by the Reagan administration at that point—though not articulated 
through legislation—was to direct government research funds toward what they called “flexible 
technologies”, indicating inventions that might lend themselves to multiple applications, 
typically straddling both military and civilian uses. The real innovation that allowed the Media 
Lab to rise to such prominence during the last decades of the twentieth century was its unique 
funding structure devised to take utmost advantage of Reagan-era economics. The Media Lab, 
which evolved from the Architecture Machine Group the same year that Reagan came into 
office, was quick to devise strategies for benefitting, firstly, from the privatization of publicly-
funded research and, secondly, from the mixing of military and civilian technological research. 
Negroponte developed a system whereby separate laboratory groups within the Media Lab 
would offer two levels of sponsorship to corporations, one of which—the most popular—
granted corporations shared property in any research undertaken by a particular laboratory; the 
second of which allowed a corporation exclusive rights to a particular, directed research 
endeavor. Apart from this corporate sponsorship, the Media Lab continued to enjoy generous 
funding from government-related bodies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA). As a testament to the “flexibility” of the technologies being funded, not 
only did likely candidates such as military research agencies and major electronics and 
software corporations become chief sponsors of the Media Lab’s work but also petroleum 




Earlier, I referred to flexible technologies as “structuralist” in the sense that they were intended 
to serve as a common denominator generative of endless possible applications, much in the 
way that the sign-signified relationship per Saussure and the binary on-off relationship per 
Lévi-Strauss’s cybernetics were generative, respectively, of infinite possible linguistic 
expressions and epistemic forms. If the Reagan administration seems like an unlikely body to 
have unwittingly identified structuralism’s “Savage Mind” as a useful model of knowledge 
development, I propose that, on the contrary, the administration’s unconscious recourse to 
Savage Thought had been foregrounded by modern science’s long extant framing of knowledge 
as reducible to common mechanisms that were translatable across diverse contexts and diverse 
semiotic forms. In presuming the utter neutrality, translatability, or “flexibility” of semiotic 
structures—whether according to Bauhaus notions of reconfigurable elementary forms, Team 
Ten’s adaptation of “originary” cultural techniques, or McLuhan’s and Bayer’s fantasies of a 
globally shared communicative medium—modern art and science effectively repackaged and 
resold the supposed techniques of a primitive imagination to the twentieth century’s military-
industrial complex. Having posited human thought and imagination as relying on the 
deployment of flexible structures—a position suggested by artists as much as by scientists and 
social scientists—structuralist approaches lent themselves to a capitalist instrumentalization of 
knowledge. What a structuralist episteme helped enable was a dual semiotic model that served 
as both justification and instrument for advancing class apartheids related to a global division 
of labor. If techniques of thought and communication could be universal in one respect and, in 
another respect, differentiated by presumed degrees of consciousness over the deployment of 
those same techniques, then the Tower of Babel (a figure for the division of labor) could be 




could be enacted across the construction of difference. Global semiotic unity allowed semiotic 
exchange on a superficial level—through the use of personal computers rather than through 
semiotic coding and decoding—thereby making a coordination of labor possible. However, 
semiotic difference justified an otherwise unjust division of labor. Thus, the Tower of Babel 
could be built because and despite alleged epistemic difference.362 If the Enlightenment’s dream 
of a utopian Esperanto never materialized, the realization of a pentecostal fantasy had begun to 
succeed by virtue of the fact that although multiple languages might divide the world’s peoples, 
technics could unite even amidst difference. 
In the early 1980’s, following grim economic recessions in much of the world, AGORA devoted 
one of its semi-annual issues to advocating the dissemination of computer technologies among 
the rural population for purposes of assisting agricultural production. [Fig. 4.1] Attempting to 
address how the growing epidemic of food shortages could be mitigated through better 
agricultural methods, IBI members also thereby subscribed implicitly to a model according to 
which rural populations of the global south were to become increasingly integrated into a 
global economy. Computer data was to be employed by farmers to inform them of shifting 
supply-demand relationships for particular crops. While this might economically benefit some 
farmers, it also clearly pushed agricultural work into the mercurial swings of a global 
marketplace focused on monocultures and cash crops rather than more autonomous, 
community-sustaining forms of agriculture. However, this kind of economic integration was 
touted by IBI nations—as it was by their computer-exporting counterparts—as communication 
rather than as economic exchange. For nations like those belonging to the Andean Pact, 




involvement than the forms of economic liberalization promulgated by IMF measures. This 
may explain why leaders of southern nations seized upon the idiom of communication, 
essentially in order to veil the new techno-economic policies in euphemism. Quelling their 
demands for reforming intellectual property laws that governed technology transfer, southern 
nations that had formerly mounted radical critiques of north-south economic relations began to 
embrace the adage that personal computing technologies, by virtue of uniting geographically-
distant people, somehow created a fairer playing field, a sort of global democracy. 
In 1984 at the joint conference between the IBI and Cali on “Informatics and Sovereignty”, 
Colombian President Benatcur proclaimed of the advent of personal computing that “…we 
must… understand that it is necessary to educate society to this new phenomenon of life and to 
familiarize it with the new languages which, unlike the languages of the Tower of Babel, can 
create a sense of community at higher levels.”363 The computer’s ability to facilitate new sets of 
social relationships which cut across different languages and nations were often described 
through the McLuhanesque adage of a global village. Wider access to globally-shared 
platforms of communication gave rise to a new techno-pastoralist imaginary according to 
which the travails of agrarian and urban poverty might simultaneously be redressed by merging 
forms of rural and non-rural production. The founding director of the IBI, Fermin Bernasconi, 
said in his opening address at the 1982 SPIN conference in Torremolinos that the “socio-
cultural impact of Informatics must be reviewed in light of this new reality [of the microchip], 
which could permit a return to life in small communities, retaining all the advantages, without 
the disadvantages of the large urban conglomerations.”364 If the IBI debates throughout the 




knowledge, in the early 1980’s IBI discussions turned more to how nations might best integrate 
personal computation into their societies, and the group’s discussants often echoed ideas 
generated in computer-exporting nations about a new kind of cyber-peasantry to emerge 
through the use of pentecostal technologies. The pages of AGORA in the 1980’s were littered 
with illustrations showing electronic networks penetrating and merging with tropical jungle 
growth [Fig. 4.2]. 
The imaginary of global villages, electronic jungles, and peasant cyborgs existed by virtue of 
an elision. An intermediary process of knowledge had to be overleaped in order to forge a 
connective link between two mutually incommunicable modes of non-literate forms of labor 
and computer use. What was overleaped by administrators wishing to implement personal 
computers in rural villages was an intention to instill knowledge of programming code, a 
knowledge which distinguished the semiotics pertaining to computer production from those of 
computer consumption. Although personal computing technologies do not inevitably give rise 
to such segregation, intellectual property laws, in tandem with the move to create more user-
friendly interfaces, led inexorably to an apartheid—apartheid involving elision as much as 
separation—of non-compatible modes of thought. “Class consciousness” or consciousness over 
means of production could be indefinitely deferred provided that the technologies on which 
agricultural production depended were owned by corporate patents and copyrights. The gap of 
understanding lying between agricultural means of production and computational invention was 
elided, and thus made functional rather than dysfunctional, by virtue of interfaces that made 




The epistemic chasm intervening between forms of agricultural production and computer 
production was also instantiated in the form of a divide that was opened up by the French and 
U.S. focus on educating young children much more than adults in computer use. A 1983 article 
in AGORA reviewing the implementation of computer education in Morocco described how the 
importance of age hierarchies in the transmittal of knowledge was being destabilized by 
childhood computer education.365 Such generational gaps would surely have been less 
significant in societies where a large urban, professional class was procuring computer skills in 
the workplace in tandem with the younger generation’s schoolroom training. The introduction 
of personal computers into predominantly agricultural societies produced a disjunction that was 
simply a hyperbole of a similar situation being produced within the middle professional and 
working classes as well: a growing divide between the knowledge needed to operate tools of 
production and the far deeper knowledge needed to produce those same tools. In the 1983 
article alluded to above, the author articulates an unease concerning a break-down in the 
existing chains of knowledge transmission: that elders will no longer be able to serve as sources 
of knowledge, that teachers will be replaced by machines and, more generally, “the possibility 
that [informatics] can become a source of incommunicability among individuals”.366 Contrary 
to claims made at IBI’s Strategies and Policies on Informatics (SPIN) conference regarding the 
pentecostal effects of computer dissemination, this author seems to suggest that in actuality an 
epistemic and semiotic apartheid was in the offing.367 
The Media Lab did not abandon its interest in the global south once it became clear that 
intellectual property laws were rendering dreams of computational egalitarianism increasingly 




them intellectual ownership of its research findings, its showcase piece became the One-
Laptop-Per-Child (OLPC) project which aimed to produce a child-friendly laptop computer to 
be distributed to children in the global south at a price affordable to their national governments 
(one hundred U.S. dollars). [Fig. 4.3]368 If the laptop itself was relatively affordable at roughly 
209 U.S. dollars (sometimes partly subsidized by charitable campaigns in the global north),369 
governments were expected to buy them en masse to distribute to entire national populations of 
school children, leading some critics to decry the relative costs of purchasing laptops versus 
investing in libraries, teachers, shared computer labs, and school buildings.370 371 Criticisms of 
the generational divide being produced in partner nations were contested by Negroponte’s 
assertions that, although only children received the laptops, those children were then teaching 
their parents how to read and write.372 Whether or not parents of child laptop owners were really 
attaining literacy through the OLPC program (which seems dubious), his words attest to a 
proposed reversal in the order of knowledge transmission with all its attendant effects of social 
destabilization.373 Most unsettling though was the partnership that developed between OLPC 
and Microsoft to implement a Microsoft Windows environment on the machines. Against 
Papert’s conviction that knowledge of programming was a requisite aim of computer education, 
the laptop’s special interface, “Sugar”, was designed to render computer use as simplistic as 
possible, reducing the computer’s functions to a few child-friendly applications, denoted by 
conventionally European icons, such as musical notes and paint palettes [Fig. 4.4]. The “Help” 
page on the OLPC’s official website states that if any programmers are “interested in 
developing OLPC software at the system-level, the important backend stuff that the user 




implies is that even experienced software developers would need substantial written guidance 
to decode the invisible workings of the machine. 
In the early 2000’s the OLPC became a corporation independent of the Media Lab with 
Negroponte at its head. Negroponte has recently announced his new project of dropping laptops 
by airplane into remote villages.375 Devoid of user instructions, these laptops would thereby 
allow children to learn independently how to use them, thus proving Negroponte’s belief in a 
natural connection between machine and primitive childhood intelligence. This latest project 
recalls the 1980 film, The Gods Must Be Crazy, which satirizes the devastating social effects on 
a small aboriginal community when an empty Coca-Cola bottle, discarded haphazardly by an 
airplane pilot, lands in their midst as if from the gods. The bottle is used by the villagers as an 
implement for various purposes but, because its method of fabrication can not be replicated by 
them, wreaks havoc, instigating greed while also deskilling the aborigines in their conventional 
methods of labor. OLPC’s laptops appear likewise as an ambivalent gift from the gods, offered 
gratuitously and yet—if the machines are indeed popular among their recipients—likely to 
produce drastic shifts in technological and economic dependency. The irony of this gift is that it 
appears, on the one hand, as utterly cryptic to its child users, arriving from the sky, its 
provenance and its technological composition completely baffling to them. On the other hand, 
as histories of design and computation attest, this machine was made in these children’s image, 
the child (and especially peasant child) qua Savage Mind serving as the ideal model for 
replicating the mechanics of intelligence and, furthermore, for rendering complex 




gazing into the laptop screen might thus be said to gaze into a one-way mirror: seeing her own 
reflection precisely because she does not see what lies behind the screen. 
Postscript on Postmodernism: Or, the Techno-logic of Semiotic Architectures 
In Postmodernism: Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, just prior to his famous 
description of the reflective glass façade of the Bonaventura Hotel, Fredric Jameson draws 
another connection between reflectivity and postmodern culture. The reflective sheen of 
computer and television screens, he writes, denotes a shift in emphasis from modernist to 
postmodernist culture. Whereas we associate modernism with technologies of production, the 
postmodern is more bound up with technologies of reproduction, as epitomized by endless 
reflections bounding from glossy screens. For Jameson, reflexivity is, moreover, the hallmark 
of postmodern semiotics, whose self-referential aspect he describes as schizophrenic. Jameson 
thus rightly explains the exaggerated or distorted references to classical architectural elements 
(one might also say to programmatic elements) in postmodernist architectures as a kind of 
semiotic involution. However, we might recall from my second chapter that at the dawn of the 
nineteenth century Quatremère de Quincy had proposed precisely this kind of transcendence of 
architectural elements into signs of themselves. He argued that architecture’s transformation 
from useful material into pure self-signifiers was what rendered ancient European architectures 
superior to their primitive wooden antecedents. Indeed, the cleavage between signs and 
signifieds, which Jameson identifies as key to modernist culture, in fact always already situated 
the sign within a different semiotic register. The sign under modernism did not merely lie 
around idly for decades detached from its referent; rather, the structuralist cleavage has always 




is to say, that—whether we are talking about the methodical ways of representing, analyzing, 
and mechanically reproducing craft techniques (from the Encyclopédie to the Beaux-Arts to the 
Bauhaus), or about the structuralist parsing of languages and the subsequent rendition of the 
latter into computer code, or about the psycho-anthropological analysis of the Savage Mind 
such that its imaginative productions could be mimicked via audio-visual media—in all these 
cases, modernist and postmodernist alike, the integrated weave of the code is decomposed and 
then recomposed through other means. What makes the era Jameson describes different from 
all that came before it is not the fact that codes are decoded and recoded (often in self-
referential ways) but instead, I would argue, the ways in which the processes of decoding and 
recoding are differently owned among different classes of people. 
In his richly complex analysis of the relationships between capitalism and culture, Jameson is 
still somewhat hard-pressed to define how technology fits into this dense equation, despite the 
fact technology pervades the postmodernist artefacts he describes.  Jameson’s interpretation of 
reflective electronic screens as emblematic of a postmodern shift from technologies of 
production to reproduction points to a glitch, I believe, in his overall analysis. In fact, human 
forms of production have always been forms of reproduction: not only in that—as Marx says—
the reproduction of life is what drives all means of production, but also in that the forms of 
production are always coded in such a way that their repetition might be described as 
reproduction. For example, we could understand agriculture as having always been a sort of 
semiotic decoding of the world’s vegetative abundance and the reinscription of that natural 
abundance into reproducible knowledge, indeed reproducible knowledge of reproduction itself. 




Mesoamerican agricultural sophistication as evidence of the semiotic workings of Savage 
Thought). In the case of agriculture, what has changed over the millennia then is not a shift 
from production to reproduction but rather the peasant’s increasing dispossession of the 
reproductive technologies of the soil. Or, more generally, what has changed over time is how 
ownership of the means of production is divvied up. As Marx says, there has always been a 
division of labor, even if at first only between the sexes. Yet, the technological, cultural, and 
political means by which labor (and ownership) is divided—that is, the means by which such a 
division is enforced—have always been in flux. What may be distinct to late capitalism—
though even this distinction has been in the offing since at least the seventeenth century—is 
how the technologies of re-/production are made to inscribe different categories of social 
subjectivity so as to naturalize the apartheids of technological ownership. If these apartheids 
depend first and foremost on coercively enforced domestic and international laws, they equally 
depend on the production of epistemic and semiotic subjectivities which help determine who 
should have access to different levels of technical knowledge. This is to say that the division of 
labor under capitalism (late capitalism and its forerunners) is bound up with epistemic 
distinctions pertaining to class as much as under feudalism. In the present day, however, 
technical knowledge is guarded by patents, copyrights, and restricted access to education in 
ways that belie its conceptual indebtedness to the very peoples who are denied the right to it. 
The laboring classes are denied knowledge of their own means of production (that is, the 
broader schema and the underlying mechanisms of the productive processes in which the 
laborer partakes) even when the magical epistemic mode that disqualifies them from the 
privileged sphere of modern science is the same mode that has been decoded and recoded in the 




same epistemic and semiotic modality as computers themselves—that of magical thought—
non-literate (or less literate) classes are paradoxically denied ownership of the underlying 
technologies of computers. The schizophrenia Jameson speaks of (and he is astute to have 
grasped at such an early date the semiotic dimension to late capitalism) derives, I argue, from 
this paradox. Signs are deployed deliriously and uselessly because the magical semiotic model 
which governs how they function is a model that is actually repudiated by those who own 
control over semiotic technologies. In order to repudiate the magical thought they themselves 
use, intellectual owners of computer technologies externalize such thought, ascribing it to 
children and “non-modern” peoples instead of to themselves. Only upon such a split can a 
distinction between intellectual owners and non-owners be premised. Schizophrenia is thus a 
function of class apartheids. And class apartheids present themselves as semiotic apartheids. 
If all this seems to have strayed far away from architecture, I would suggest that, on the 
contrary, it has everything to do with architecture. But if Jameson was correct that architecture 
is the privileged cultural form of postmodernism, he was not aware that the paradigmatic 
architecture of this period may not really be John Portman’s Bonaventura, which is merely a 
spatialized image of what is in fact truly paradigmatic—namely, the Architecture Machine. The 
Architecture Machine was a machine for dividing owners and non-owners, for producing and 
reinforcing different classes of technological and epistemic subjectivity, for further entrenching 
the global south’s technological (and thus economic) indebtedness to the north, and for doing 
all this while seeming to abolish northern technocratic expertise from its dominion over the 
slums of the tropical world. The Architecture Machine of the twentieth century took a crucial, 




postindustrial economy of creative technologies. The Architecture Machine was a technology 
of elision—the first of many to be pursued by the MIT Media Lab and similar high-tech 
institutions—insofar as it was intended to unite impoverished illiterate societies with 
sophisticated technological means while nonetheless maintaining a clear divide between those 
who really owned the technologies and those who were subject to them. It also was thereby 
intended to help elide the gap between forms of rural and urban life that the slum dweller was 
supposed to straddle. The self-help architectures, such as those promoted by Friedman, and 
which inspired Negroponte, were the concrete forerunners to more sophisticated and automated 
forms of economic and epistemic elision that would constitute a crucial cultural innovation of 
the late twentieth century. One of the limitations to reading postmodernism through the lens of 
U.S. artistic production is that postmodernism’s actual privileged form might have consisted 
less in postmodernists’ architectural designs than in the quasi-architectural technologies of 
eliding rural-urban and south-north segregations. These elisions in all their manifold forms 
were essentially means to connect while still dividing those who use versus those who own the 
means of production. 
Papert believed that computer pedagogy for the poor could abolish this apartheid, and he 
endeavored therefore to institute computer education in local underprivileged schools. But what 
he failed to consider seriously was that, even if mastery of computer programming was 
universally attainable, the need for software and hardware compatibilities and the vast 
resources that corporate- and federally-funded institutions could pour into research and 
development encouraged the growth of high-tech monopolies and, concomitantly, the ubiquity 




extent they may have worked against military and corporate enterprise—remained the activities 
of an elite subculture, rarely posing any serious challenge to software and hardware monopolies 
and often joining forces with them in the long run. Papert must have surely seen that the 
business model pursued by the Media Lab could only further cement corporate ownership of 
digital knowledge. What he could not have likely seen was how his thesis that computer 
education would produce an epistemological elision between two non-consecutive stages of 
childhood development bore a disturbing resemblance to economic developmental models for 
converting the largely non-literate semi-urban poor into consumers of U.S. computer 
technologies. The double mission of the Media Lab—on the one hand, to make computers 
available to all classes and nations; and on the other hand, for computers to become the new 
petroleum—demanded that computer languages be translated into a medium—an interface— 
voided of most of its linguistic code. If the Tower of Babel of the world-wide economy was to 
be built through a division of labor without, however, being disrupted by an attendant 
confusion of tongues, pentecostal technologies would need to cater to difference. To achieve 
this, the structuralist split between sign and signified would have to be re-sutured to reduce the 
need for technological users to code and decode. The sign’s schizophrenic self-referentiality, as 
described by Jameson, had been long in the making as a way to communicate across a global 
division of labor and to ensure that classes who did not intellectually own their means of 
production could be nevertheless dependent on those technologies of production. This, I 
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Faculties of the Mind, through the Awakened Will, by a Simple, Scientific Process Possible to Any Person of 
Ordinary Intelligence, American ed. (New York,: Hero Press, 1972). 
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47 Paul Larmour, “The Art-Carving Schools in Ireland” in The GPA Irish Arts Review Yearbook, 
(1989/1990), pp. 151-157.  See also: Charles Godfrey Leland, Memoirs  (New York,: D. Appleton, 1893). 
48 Leland: Practical Education. 
49 Ibid: 11.  See also: Mary Louisa Whately, Among the Huts in Egypt  (London, Seeley, Jackson,: & 
Halliday, 1871). 
50 Massachusetts was the first state to instate mandatory childhood education.  In the State of Pennsylvania 
where PIASP was, compulsory education was not enacted until 1893. However, in the city of Philadelphia, 
experiments with free public education for children were implemented earlier, often in conjunction with 
vocational training. See: Andrew Dawson, “The Workshop and the Classroom: Philadelphia Engineering, 
Decline of Apprenticeship, and the Rise of Industrial Training” in History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 39, 
No. 2 (Summer, 1999), pp. 143-160. 
51 Leland, Practical Education. 
52 Ibid: 3. 
53 Decades later, John Dewey would similarly formulate the problem of reconciling the practical needs of 
vocational training with the diversity of student talents and interests represented. He would likewise conclude 
that structural commonalities between different disciplinary specializations could allow for a shared 
curriculum. John Dewey, Democracy and Education : An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, 
Cosimo Classics Philosophy (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2005). 
54 Charles Godfrey Leland, "Profitable Work for the Poor," in Charles Godfrey Leland Papers (Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania, unknown). 
55 Marx, Capital: A Critique of the Political Economy, Volume I: 283-284. 
56 Practical Education: 23. 
57 Ibid: 13. 
58 "Profitable Work for the Poor." 
59 J. Liberty Tadd, New Methods of Education: Art, Real Manual Training, Nature Study (New York: Orange 
Judd Company, 1899): 4. 
60 Charles Godfrey Leland, “Ought Elementary Instruction in Drawing to Be Made Part of the National 
Education?”, Manuscript, Charles Godfrey Leland Files, (Historical Society of Pennsylvania), collection 
363, Box 5). 
61 Leland, Practical Education: See esp. p. 109. 
62 Tadd, New Methods in Education: 14. 
63 Irene Cheng explains how the American ethnologist, Louis Henry Morgan, argued that the architecture of 
bees and beavers was not a mere product of instinct but rather of intelligent trial-and-error. Cheng, “The 




                                                                                                                                                           
 
64 Charles Godfrey Leland, Eye-Memory: A Lecture Delivered before the Franklin Institute March 29th, 
1880  (1880) in Charles Godfrey Leland Papers (unpublished: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, n.d.) 
Collection 363: Box 5.  Also: The Mystic Will; a Method of Developing and Strengthening the Faculties of 
the Mind, through the Awakened Will, by a Simple, Scientific Process Possible to Any Person of Ordinary 
Intelligence. 
65 Leland’s successor, Tadd, opines that: “Very little can be done in skilled hand training if the movements 
are made consciously. It is only by making them automatic… that skilled work can be done.” See p. 82. He 
describes one of the primary goals of his and Leland’s method to be: “the acquisition of their [the hand, eye, 
and brain’s] conscious control, to be followed by automatic control.” See: Tadd, New Methods in Education: 
4. 
66 While Bauhaus histories have tended to relegate Itten’s mystical practices to the margins of its history, 
figuring him as an eccentric driven out by the rationalist proponents of machine-based design, anyone 
acquainted with the writings of the early Bauhaus’ most influential teachers—notably, Kandinsky, Paul Klee, 
Oskar Schlemmer, and Itten’s technophilic successor, Lazlo Moholy-Nagy—can see that magical thought 
formed thea common foundation underlying modernist aesthetics and modern machines. 
67 “The Photograph of Helioeidolon of the Future” and “The Folding Mirror or Pocket Kaleidoscope and Its 
Use in Art” Charles Godfrey Leland Papers (Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Boxes 5 and 7). 
68 Leland claims that acquired criminal skills of snooping and memorizing “become hereditary, and may then 
be honorably applied.  I have had such experience of Gypsies, and have observed among them a great 
development of this faculty.” Leland, Eye-Memory: A Lecture Delivered before the Franklin Institute March 
29th, 1880. Also: “Not only are gypsy boys clever and artful in many ways, but also any other boys brought 
up with them. In fact there is not one child in a hundred who would not, under the pressure of necessity as a 
gypsy or street arab, would not develop a quickness of observation in certain directions which would seem 
miraculous in a well-bred nursery child.” Leland, Practical Education: 170. 
69 The Mystic Will; a Method of Developing and Strengthening the Faculties of the Mind, through the 
Awakened Will, by a Simple, Scientific Process Possible to Any Person of Ordinary Intelligence: 72-73. 
70 Ibid. 
71 For example, see Alan Colquhoun, “Weimar, Germany: The Dialectic of the Modern, 1929-1933” in Alan 
Colquhoun, Modern Architecture, Oxford History of Art (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002).  See also: Kathleen James-Chakraborty, “Henry van de Velde and Walter Gropius: Between 
Avoidance and Imitation” in Kathleen James, Bauhaus Culture : From Weimar to the Cold War  
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006). 
72 Walter Gropius, “Statement about the differences of opinion at the Bauhaus, Feb.3, 1922,” compiled in The 
Bauhaus: Masters and Students by Themselves, ed. Frank Whitford (London: Conran Octopus Ltd., 1992). 
73 The Vorkurs is customarily translated as the “Basic Course” (as in the English translation of Itten’s Mein 
Vorkurs am Bauhaus ) or else as the “Preliminary Course”. I am opting instead for the translation “Primary 
Course” to stress Itten’s aims to instill primary—indeed primitive—means of creative production. 
74 Prior to opening the school, upon review of student portfolios, Itten was dismayed by the lack of creativity 
and originality of student work despite evidence of their prior training and virtuosity of skill.  He suggested 
the institution of the Vorkurs to Gropius specifically in order to cultivate creativity and originality of 
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expression. See: Marcel Franciscono, Walter Gropius and the Creation of the Bauhaus in Weimar: The 
Ideals and Artistic Theories of Its Founding Years  (Urbana,: University of Illinois Press, 1971). 
75 Leland and his appointed PIASP successor, J. Liberty Tadd, gave lectures throughout Germany on the 
PIASP’s pedagogical methods.  In 1899, Tadd published a book on these methods entitled New Methods in 
Education that was translated into German and published in Leipzig in 1903 (c.f. 14).  Itten never discusses 
the provenance for his teaching methods, except for those taken from his painting teacher, Adolf Hölzel. It is 
likely that Leland’s methods had been taken up by various other instructors and that Itten, who was trained to 
teach elementary school, encountered these through such channels rather than through Leland’s and Tadd’s 
books or lectures, given that he belonged to a younger generation. See: Tadd, New Methods in Education. 
See also: Akos Moravanszky, "Educated Evolution". 
Concerning Itten’s involvement with Mazdaznan, he describes it retrospectively as an interest in “Persian 
Zoroastrianism” and “early Christianity”. See: Itten, Design and Form: The Basic Course at the Bauhaus, 
Revised ed. (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975): 9. 
76 Walter Gropius “Memorandum to the Masters of Form, 13 March 1923, ed. Frank Whitford and Julia 
Engelhardt, The Bauhaus : Masters & Students by Themselves  (Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook Press, 1993). 
77 Marcel Breuer’s tubular steel chair was one of the first designs made in the Bauhaus workshops which 
received an industrial patent.  See: Otakar Máčel, "Avant-Garde Design and the Law: Litigation over the 
Cantilever Chair," Journal of Design History 3, no. 2/3 (1990). 
78 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
79 Moholy-Nagy and Hoffmann, The New Vision, 1928, 3d Rev. Ed., 1946. And, Abstract of an Artist: 21.  
80 Frank Lloyd Wright argues that because the machine provides new ways for making things, it inspires the 
innovation of craft (through machine techniques) rather than the replacement of craft by machine. "The Art 
and Craft of the Machine," ed. Henry-Russell Hitchcock ([Chicago]: Chicago Architectural Club, 1901). 
81 For an examination of the early twentieth-century connections between the psychology of perception and 
architecture (in the context of the Soviet Union), see: Alla Vronskaya, “The Productive Unconscious: 
Architecture, Experimental Psychology and Techniques of Subjectivity in Soviet Russia, 1919-1935” (Ph.D. 
diss. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014). Also, the work in progress: James Graham, “The 
Psychotechnical Architect: Perception, Vocation, and the Laboratory Cultures of Modernism, 1914-45” to be 
submitted as a Ph.D. diss. at Columbia University. 
82 Gropius to Grünow, n.d. 1925. Getrud Grünow Dokumente, Mappe 1, Bauhaus-Archiv, Berlin. 
83 Grünow, “Natürliche Formentwicklung”, Kunst und Jugend, Februar, 1938.  
„Wie Sehweisen und Hörarten einander wirklich verwandt sind“ Kunst und Jugend, August, 1937: 179-180. 
See also: Hildegard Heitmeyer, „Der Aufbau der lebendingen Form durch Farbe, Form, und Ton“ Die Tat, 
März, 1920: 1-4 
84 Itten, Design and Form: The Basic Course at the Bauhaus, Revised ed. (London: Thames and Hudson, 
1975). See esp.: pp. 6 and 12-31. 
85 Ibid: 21 and 31. 
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86 Leah Dickerman also discusses Itten’s establishment of “basic units” and the importance of his emphasis 
on abstraction to later Bauhaus work. See: “Bauhaus Fundaments” in: Barry Bergdoll and Leah Dickerman, 
Bauhaus 1919-1933 : Workshops for Modernity  (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2009): 17-19.  
87 The text reads: „Alles, was wir sehen, hören, riechen, schmecken, tasten, fühlen, ist in Relation gesetzt zu 
einem Zweiten, das dem Ersten entgegengesetzt ist.  Tagebuch von Johannes Itten  (Berlin: Verlag der Itten-
schule, 1930) : 54. 
88 Of note here is the recent collection of essays edited by Kathleen James-Chakrobarty, which includes an 
essay on the uncanny, and the recent exhibition catalog for the MoMA, whose treatment of certain 
Expressionist artists, such as Kandinsky, Lothar Schreyer, and Itten emphasizes their mystic tendencies. See: 
Juliet Koss, “Bauhaus Theater of Human Dolls”, Kathleen James-Chakraborty, Bauhaus Culture : From 
Weimar to the Cold War  (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006). Also: Barry Bergdoll and 
Leah Dickerman, Bauhaus 1919-1933 : Workshops for Modernity  (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 
2009).  
89 Dickerman observes that after Itten’s departure, the school shed its romanticism and mysticism. See: 
“Bauhaus Fundaments” in Bauhaus 1919-1933 : Workshops for Modernity: 19. 
90 Bergdoll sees Breuer’s and Stölzl’s African chair, compared to Breuer’s later tubular steel chair, as 
indicative of the Bauhaus “paradox” between craft and machine; whereas, I argue that an imagined “Africa” 
was already bound up with the prerogatives of technological reproduction. See “Bauhaus Multiplied” in 
Bauhaus 1919-1933 : Workshops for Modernity: 52-53. Also in this volume, see Christopher Wilk, "Marcel 
Breuer and Gunta Stölzl, 'African Chair', 1921: 100-102. 
91 Kandinsky outlines a codified aesthetic system arising from assumptions about the spiritual underpinnings 
of perception and representation. Wassily Kandinsky, Concerning the Spiritual in Art  (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1977).  
92 Itten writes of the Vorkurs exercises: “Das hatte nichts mit dem üblichen Expressionismus zu tun, wohl 
aber mit dem Grundlagen der bildenden Kunst.” [This has nothing to do with typical Expressionism, but 
rather with the Foundations of the visual arts.”](emphasis added). “Autobiographisches Fragment” in 
Johannes Itten, Willy Rotzler, and Anneliese Itten, Johannes Itten. Werke Und Schriften  (Zürich,: Orell 
Füssli, 1972): 32. 
93 Paul Klee to Lily Klee, Jaunary 16, 1921 in Whitford and Engelhardt, The Bauhaus: Masters & Students by 
Themselves: 54. 
94 In my final chapter, “Media Arts”, I turn to the influence of Jean Piaget on the founding members of the 
MIT Media Lab. Piaget dedicated much of his research to developing his structuralist thesis of how children 
were able to independently build increasingly sophisticated thinking skills from previously established 
intellectual structures. 
95 Maarten Roy Prak, Craft Guilds in the Early Modern Low Countries : Work, Power and Representation  
(Aldershot, Hants, England ; Burlington, Vt., USA: Ashgate Pub., 2006). 
96 For discussion of the effects of visual technologies on vision, see: Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the 
Observer : On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century  (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990). 
 
289 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
97 Similarly, Dickerman and Bergdoll note that one of the major outcomes of the Bauhaus was 
the“redefinition of the artist as a designer of systems.” Bauhaus 1919-1933 : Workshops for Modernity: 13. 
98 Marx of course does not speak of the alienation (Entfremdung) of one’ “spirit”, but rather of the alienation 
of one’s “self” from one’s labor.  The Hegelian usage of “alienation” however—prevalent among 
Bauhaüslers—often cast it within this spiritual framework whereby mechanistic labor was seen precisely to 
segregate one’s spirit from one’s laboring activities. 
99 Lazlo Moholy-Nagy, who took over the Vorkurs following Itten’s departure, was particularly concerned 
with the idea of artistic production as an organic process, and therefore with understanding the artists as an 
organism. See: László Moholy-Nagy and Daphne M. Hoffmann, The New Vision, 1928, 3d Rev. Ed., 1946. 
And, Abstract of an Artist  (New York,: Wittenborn and company, 1946). 
100 Arguably, religious rituals have often effected a kind of mechanization of the soul.  The key difference 
between the spiritual exercises at the Bauhaus and those performed within a strictly religious context would 
be that the former were concerned with stimulating material productivity. 
101 Karl Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 1st ed. (Fairfield, IA: 1st World Library - Literary 
Society, 2006): 1-2. 
102 Leland, "Prophesies for the Twentieth Century." 
103 Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: Chapter 1 
104 Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Karl Marx, The German Ideology,ed. C.J. Arthur (London: ElecBooks, 
1998). [emphasis added]: 75. 
105 Ibid [emphasis added]. 
106 Leland, “Prophesies for the Twentieth Century”. 
107 “1996” in Leland, "Prophesies for the Twentieth Century." 
108 For a history of the concept of “objectivity” in modern scientific practice and discourse, see: Lorraine 
Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity  (New York / Cambridge, Mass.: Zone Books ; Distributed by the MIT 
Press, 2007). 
109 Leland, "Prophesies for the Twentieth Century." 
110 Paul Larmour, "The Art-Carving Schools in Ireland," The GPA Irish Arts Review Yearbook (1989). 
111 On a similar observation of the homologies being produced between human and machine producers, see: 
Chapter 5, “Cyborg/Artisan…” in Arindam Dutta, The Bureaucracy of Beauty : Design in the Age of Its 
Global Reproducibility  (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
112 Leland, Practical Education. 





                                                                                                                                                           
 
116 It has been noted that the beginnings of United States compulsory education were imbricated with the 
movement to assimilate and proletarize American Indians.  See: Jacqueline Fear-Segal, "Nineteenth-Century 
Indian Education: Universalism Versus Evolutionism," Journal of American Studies 33, no. 2 (1999); Donald 
A. Grinde, Jr., "Taking the Indian out of the Indian: U.S. Policies of Ethnocide through Education," Wicazo 
Sa Review 19, no. 2 (2004); Robert A. Trennert, Jr., "Selling Indian Education at World's Fairs and 
Expositions, 1893-1904," American Indian Quarterly 11, no. 3 (1987); Siobhan Maureen Wescott, "Educate 
to Americanize: Captain Pratt and Early Indian Education," Change 23, no. 2 (1991). 
117 Katharine French Steiger was one proponent of having children learn what were supposedly American-
Indian crafts.  See: Katharine French Steiger, "Weaving in the Elementary School," The Elementary School 
Teacher 8, no. 4 (1907). 
118 Marx and Engels write: “…[I]n communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but 
each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus 
makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the 
afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have in mind, without ever becoming 
hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic.”  The German Ideology : Including Theses on Feuerbach and 
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy.: 53 
119 Ibid.   
120 For Marx on abstract labor and profit, see: Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, V 1: 
Penguin Classics (London ; New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 1981).. 
121 Jane Guyer discusses pedagogical traditions in Atlantic Africa that teach the virtues of outwitting an 
economic system.  See: Marginal Gains : Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa, The Lewis Henry 
Morgan Lectures (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
122 Your Will Power; or, How to Develop and Strengthen Will Power, Memory, or Any Other Faculty or 
Attribute of the Mind by an Easy Process: 84. 
123 See Chapter XI, “Paracelsus” in Leland, Mystic Will. 
124 On intellectual property in relation to the concept of “design”, see: Dutta, The Bureaucracy of Beauty : 
Design in the Age of Its Global Reproducibility. For a general history of modern intellectual property in the 
British context (with ramifications beyond Great Britain) see: Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual 
Property Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
125  In contradistinction to pre- or early-modern patents, nineteenth-century “intellectual property” did not 
confer the exclusive right to manufacture one’s own designs, but rather to claim royalties from others 
manufacturing one’s designs. See: Bentley and Sherman, Introduction, “Towards a Property in Intangibles”. 
126 See especially Chapter 6, “The Buying and Selling of Labour Power” in Marx, Capital: A Critique of 
Political Economy. 
127 Vorkurs student Paul Citroen describes his first-hand experience of purging and fasting rituals in Whitford 
and Engelhardt, The Bauhaus : Masters & Students by Themselves: 62-63. 
128 “Schöpferische Automatismus” in Itten, Rotzler, and Itten, Johannes Itten. Werke Und Schriften. 
129 Máčel, "Avant-Garde Design and the Law: Litigation over the Cantilever Chair." 
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130 In the tradition of German Bildung, and as articulated by Friedrich Fröbel, “vocation” [Begabung], as 
distinct from a job or profession, indicated an occupation that one was innately called upon—whether by 
talent or destiny—to fulfill. 
131 Johannes Itten, Design and Form: The Basic Course at the Bauhaus, Revised ed. (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1975): 34 
132 Itten writes: that students “der Schöpfungstrieb… verwirklichen”.  Johannes Itten, “Rassenlehre und 
Kunstentwickling”.  See also: Idem. “Die Kunst der Gegenwart und die dreifache Veranlagung Grundlage 
des Menschen (Phränologie – Rassenlehre) ”.  
133 Ibid. 
134 Michael Taussig discusses how Europeans ascribed to American Indians the savage tendency to mimic, in 
disregard of their own preoccupations with modes of mimicry.  This observation might shed light on Itten’s 
exercises of mimicry. See especially Chapter 1, “In Some Way or Another One Can Protect Oneself from 
Evil Spirits by Portraying Them”, in  Mimesis and Alterity : A Particular History of the Senses  (New York: 
Routledge, 1993). 
135 Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Also, in this usage of “machine” I would refer to Marx’s 
distinction between tools and machines—namely, that the machine reconfigures bodily processes to operate 
according to its logic, rather than the other way around—we could add that the machine thereby defies 
comprehension. See especially Chapters 14 and 15 of Capital, Volume I. 
136 Etienne Balibar, "‘Possessive Individualism’reversed: From Locke to Derrida," Constellations 9, no. 3 
(2002). 
137 ibid.: 309 
138 The tradition of the Bildungsroman, emphasizes the search for a vocation as a long spiritual quest. Johann 
von Goethe’s Wilhelmmeister’s Apprenticeship is a classic example. There is an extensive body of critical 
literature on the Bildungsroman genre. 
139 Itten regarded the color palettes students used in their paintings as a way to help determine which 
workshop they should subsequently enter.  He relates one anecdote in which he advised a student, based on 
the cool, metallic colors he used, to enter the Metal Workshop. The student disregarded his advice and 
entered the Carpentry Workshop, but nonetheless revealed his true inner vocation by subsequently designing 
the famous tubular steel chair.  The student was Marcel Breuer.  See: Johannes Itten, The Art of Color: The 
Subjective Experience and Objective Rationale of Color, trans. Ernst van Haagen (New York: Van Nostrand 
Reinhold, 1973):28-29. 
140 Moholy-Nagy and Hoffmann, The New Vision, 1928, 3d Rev. Ed., 1946. And, Abstract of an Artist: 13. 
141 For Moholy-Nagy’s discussion of technological production as “organic” see especially “Introduction” in 
Moholy-Nagy and Hoffmann, The New Vision, 1928, 3d Rev. Ed., 1946. And, Abstract of an Artist. 
142 I use “primitive hut” to refer to Marc-Antoine Laugier’s discourse on the same and, more generally to a 
Team Ten discourse that sought standard types of a pure, originary architecture. See: Marc-Antoine Laugier, 




                                                                                                                                                           
 
143 Among the most vocal proponents of a new, contextually-relevant architecture were many of the Italians 
involved with C.I.A.M., most notably Ernesto Rogers, who stayed intermittently involved with Team Ten. 
See: Eric Paul Mumford, The Ciam Discourse on Urbanism, 1928-1960  (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
2000). 
144 A comprehensive compilation and analysis of Team Ten work is to be found in: Team_10. et al., Team 10: 
1953-81, in Search of a Utopia of the Present  (Rotterdam: NAi, 2005). 
145 At one end of the “vernacular architecture” spectrum, Modernist architects sought to learn from “native” 
techniques. Bernard Rudofsky’s exhibition at New York’s Museum of Modern Art was exemplary of this. 
On the other hand, architects such as Christopher Alexander sought to identify structuralist categories of 
architectural design in order to create computational systems of design. However, far from oppositional, both 
approaches were quite co-operative, as can be seen especially with the work of an architect like Yona 
Friedman. See: Christopher Alexander, Notes on the Synthesis of Form  (Cambridge,: Harvard University 
Press, 1964).  See also: Felicity Scott, "Bernard Rudofsky: Allegories of Nomadism and Dwelling," in 
Anxious Modernisms : Experimentation in Postwar Architectural Culture, ed. Sarah Williams Goldhagen and 
Réjean Legault (Montréal / Cambridge, Mass.: Canadian Centre for Architecture ;MIT Press, 2000). See 
also: Bernard Rudofsky, Architecture without Architects, an Introduction to Nonpedigreed Architecture, 1 
vols. (New York,: Museum of Modern Art; distributed by Doubleday, Garden City, 1964). 
146 Lévi-Strauss makes his most explicit argument about the relationship between his structuralist theories of 
the mind and cybernetics in a series of lectures published under the title Myth and Meaning. However, 
cybernetic theory also clearly forms a running subtext of Savage Mind, for example in its claim that human 
thought is all reducible to on-off binaries, forming the basic structural component of a vaster infrastructure. 
See: Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, The Nature of Human Society Series (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1966). See also: Myth and Meaning, 1st pbk. ed. (New York: Schocken Books : Distributed 
by Pantheon Books, 1979).  See also: Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings : Cybernetics and 
Society, A Da Capo Paperback (New York, N.Y.: Da Capo Press, 1988). 
147 I use “savage machines” to designate all those apparatuses of knowledge that aimed to break down the 
products of processes of the creative imagination into analyzable components. 
148 Photos and film footage of Haan among the Dogon depict him squatting and scampering around in a 
make-shift loin-cloth, his unkempt hair and beard streaming around him as the Dogon look upon his antics 
with polite bemusement. Herman Haan, "De Hol-, Stapel En Tentbewoners in De Saharate," (Netherlands: 
NAi Collection/  Herman Haan archive / HAAX/0010). See also: Herman Haan Archive / Hax0010, 
Netherlands Architecture Institute (NAi) . 
149 Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind; Myth and Meaning. 
150 I use “cybernetics” broadly to describe an interest in building self-sustaining systems based on 
informational feedback loops, and thus including a range of techniques for planning and monitoring growth, 
population, and development in cities. See: David A. Mindell, Between Human and Machine : Feedback, 
Control, and Computing before Cybernetics, Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). 
151 Vitruvius, most famously, told of the beginnings of architecture with an illustration of a “primitive hut”. 
For a discussion of this trope, see: Joseph Rykwert, On Adam's House in Paradise : The Idea of the Primitive 
Hut in Architectural History, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981). 
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152 Anthony Vidler has argued that Laugier’s origin-myth of the primitive hut must have been influenced by 
an eighteenth-century preoccupation with discovering the origin of language. Moreover, he shows Laugier’s 
hut to have likely been derived from the work of the missionary-ethnographer Joseph-François Lafitau who 
published (largely fanciful) material on the architectures of American Indians in the French colonies of North 
America. See: Chapter 1, “ “Rebuilding the Primitive Hut: The Return to Origins from Lafitau to Laugier,” in 
Anthony Vidler, The Writing of the Walls : Architectural Theory in the Late Enlightenment  (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton Architectural Press, 1987). See also: John H. Moran et al., On the Origin of Language  (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986). 
153 Apart from the Team Ten examples I discuss in this chapter, architects and architectural theorists 
throughout the twentieth century invoked a notion of underlying essences, myths, archetypes, and far-
reaching cultural roots in order to develop or justify modernist architectures. For example, proponents of 
Critical Regionalism were, in a sense, unwittingly arguing for modern architecture to translate “primitve 
huts” (e.g., to incorporate in translated form some distilled architectural idea pervasive in regional 
architectural heritage). See: Liane Lefaivre and Alexander Tzonis, Critical Regionalism : Architecture and 
Identity in a Globalized World, Architecture in Focus (Munich ; New York: Prestel, 2003). See also: Kenneth 
Frampton, John Cava, and Graham Foundation for Advanced Studies in the Fine Arts., Studies in Tectonic 
Culture : The Poetics of Construction in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Architecture  (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1995). 
154 Peter Smithson, "Interview Notes," in Team Ten papers (Netherlands Architecture Institute (NAi), c. 
1982). 
155 Alison and Peter Smithson were as interested in local, “indigenous” populations (e.g., using Nigel 
Henderson’s photographs of England’s urban working classes) as they were in local and foreign types of 
indigenous architecture. 
156Aldo  van Eyck, "Vers Une Casbah Organisée," Forum, no. 7 (1959).  See also: Oxman, Robert, Hadas 
Shadar, and Ehud Belferman. 2002. “Casbah: a brief history of design concept”. Arq: Architectural Research 
Quarterly. 6 (4): 321-336. 
157 Alexander, Notes on the Synthesis of Form: 32-54. 
158 See a related argument in: M. Ijlal Muzaffar, “The Periphery Within: Modern Architecture and the 
Making of the Third World” (PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007). 
159 Blom went on to have as productive career in architecture. Most famously, he designed the cube-houses 
(Kubuswoningen) in Rotterdam, in which something can be seen of Van Eyck ’s interest in manipulating 
simple geometric forms. 
160 For unedited transcript of Van Eyck’s presentation of Blom’s scheme, see :Team_10, "Transcripts from 
Abbé De Royaumont Meeting," in Team Ten papers (unpublished: Netherlands Architecture Institute, 1962).  
For Van Eyck’s ideas on metonymy—in relation to the Dogon and more generally—Aldo van Eyck, 
Collected Articles and Other Writings, 1947-1998  (Amsterdam: SUN, 2008).  For edited versions of Team 
Ten discussions, see: Team_10. et al., Team 10 : 1953-81, in Search of a Utopia of the Present. 
161 For Van Eyck’s ideas on metonymy, see: “A Tree is Like a  Leaf”; “Design Only Grace; Open Norm; 
Disturb Order Gracefully; Outmatch Need”; and “Basket—House—Village—Universe” in van Eyck, 
Collected Articles and Other Writings, 1947-1998. 
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162 Team_10, "Transcripts from Abbé De Royaumont Meeting." 
163 ibid. 
164 Jacques Derrida, "Des Tours De Babel," in Difference in Translation, ed. Joseph F. Graham and State 
University of New York. Research Foundation. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). See also : “Task of 
the Translator” in Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt, Illuminations  (New York: Schocken Books, 1986). 
165 For example, see: Vidler, The Writing of the Walls : Architectural Theory in the Late Enlightenment. See 
also: Alan Colquhoun, Essays in Architectural Criticism : Modern Architecture and Historical Change, 
Oppositions Books (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981). 
166 Claude Elwood Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication  (Urbana,: 
University of Illinois Press, 1949). 
167 Illuminations: 72. 
168 “On Linguistic Aspects of Translation” in Roman Jakobson, Krystyna Pomorska, and Stephen Rudy, 
Language in Literature  (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1987).See also Lévi-Strauss, Myth and Meaning. 
169 Myth and Meaning. 
170 This is reminiscent of the Bauhaus interest in synesthesia, discussed in Chapter One. 
171 Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind.  See also: Tristes Tropiques  (New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Penguin Books, 
1992). 
172 Van Eyck writes: The Dogon rely on an all-pervading framework which embraces every facet of their 
existence, material, emotional, and transcendental. Such frameworks are so self-contained that they may 
tend to leave little scope for the individual whose mental structure, though moulded by them to a large extent, 
nonetheless never coincides fully. Not so with the Dogon, for they include within the intricate, closely knit 
fabric of their system a gratifying kind of scope (flexibility) which permits circumstantial and incidental 
modification without transgressing against the system’s generative and protective potential… See: “Design 
Only Grace…” in van Eyck, Collected Articles and Other Writings, 1947-1998. 
173 For the concept of binaries in Lévi-Strauss, see: Myth and Meaning.  The Savage Mind. For Van Eyck’s 
idea of the paradoxical unity of antitheses, see: “Design Only Grace”; and “Labyrinthian Clarity” in 
Collected Articles and Other Writings, 1947-1998. 
174 On the collaboration between anthropologists and cyberneticists, see Lydia He Liu, The Freudian Robot : 
Digital Media and the Future of the Unconscious  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
175 Anon., “Herman Haan Bracht Water in Mali”. (newspaper clipping, unknown source: Haan, Herman 
Haan Archive / Hax0010.). 
176Marcel Griaule, Conversation with Ogotemmêli  (London: Published for the International African Institute 
by the Oxford University Press, 1965); Dieu D'eau; Entretiens Avec Ogotemmêli. Paul Parin, “The Dogon 
People” in van Eyck, Collected Articles and Other Writings, 1947-1998. 
177 See: Haan, "De Hol-, Stapel En Tentbewoners in De Saharate; Herman Haan Archive / Hax0010. 
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178 Information theorists did, however, propose that information could be measured on the basis of statistical 
predictability. 
179 To be fair, it should be noted that Van Eyck was less concerned with maintaining an international practice 
than were most other Team Ten architects. His work was mostly confined to the Netherlands, and, unlike his 
Team Ten colleagues, he really seemed to perceive the “gift” of knowledge as coming from Africa to Europe 
rather than the other way around. 
180 This project was announced publicly in a postcard that was circulated in 1981, although it does not seem 
to have been realized at the time. Giovanelli lists an event called “Intervention sur le dechet” in 1983. It is 
unknown whether there were prior or subsequent iterations of this project. See: Yona Friedman, Pour Une 
Architecture Scientifique, Art, Action, Architecture (Paris,: P. Belfond, 1971). 
181 Ibid. 
182 At Team Ten’s Abbé Royaumont meeting, Peter Smithson emphatically declared that when it came to 
building housing for the poor: “if you have to build for people who have no choice… that offer must not… 
be offered in any historically oriented way, that is, towards the reconstruction of an old way of life, but must 
be oriented towards the dream.”  That is to say, even in studying and diagramming a community’s existing 
way of life, an architect would still offer them something else, “a dream”. See: Team_10, "Transcripts from 
Abbé De Royaumont Meeting." 
183 For a detailed analysis on the work of Quatremère de Quincy, see: Sylvia Lavin, Quatremère De Quincy 
and the Invention of a Modern Language of Architecture  (Cambridge, Mass.1992), Revision of the author's 
thesis (Columbia University, 1990). See also: Anthony Vidler, "The Idea of Type: The Transformation of the 
Academic Ideal, 1750-1830," Oppositions, no. 8; The Writing of the Walls : Architectural Theory in the Late 
Enlightenment. 
184 Van Eyck and Haan had both been asked to contribute to Rudofsky’s “Architecture without Architects” 
exhibition. See: Rudofsky, Architecture without Architects, an Introduction to Nonpedigreed Architecture; 
Scott, "Bernard Rudofsky: Allegories of Nomadism and Dwelling." 
185 Quatremère writes that architects who reject the concept of imitation “confound the idea of type (the 
original reason of the thing), which can neither command nor furnish the motif or the means of an exact 
likeness, with the idea of the model (the complete thing) which is bound to a formal resemblance.” Antoine-
Chrystosome Quatremère de Quincy, "Type," Oppositions 8. 
186  Quatrmère complains of East Asian architecture (typified by pagoda roofs) that “there is nothing to 
imitate since there is not even any change of material [from its prior model to its architectural form].” 
Comparing Greek lithic architecture (derived from carpentry) to Egyptian architecture, Quatremère writes: 
“…[W]hen stone replaced timber, by conserving all the forms of the former material the art enriched itself 
even more by the means suggested by the latter and thus reunited the two…. However, there are many people 
who find fault with architecture for reducing itself to imitate the first constructions of timber: they find it 
wrong that stone is representative of another material… We have already shown that stone, in copying itself, 
or to put it better, by copying nothing, has offered no form to art… no relation to the spirit. That is proved by 
Egyptian architecture….  
Furthermore, Quatremère writes: “The energetic expression of strength and all the sentiments which bind 
themselves to this essential virtue depends especially on the same expression of essence of architecture or of 
the types that gave it its existence. For this reason, pf the three orders of architecture, the one which passes 
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for having and which really has the most character is the Doric, that is to say the primitive order where the 
expression of carpentry and of the constructive types of the art is stated and rendered with the greatest 
strength and obviousness. It is for this reason that Greek architecture… has more character than Roman 
architecture in which the characteristic imprint of the types begins to disappear and become confused. See: 
“Architecture” and “Character” in Quatremère de Quincy “Architecture, Character, Idea, Imitation: Extracts 
from the Encyclopédie Méthodique d’Architecture.”, ed. Tanis Hinchcliffe, 9H, no. 7, 1985:  25-34. 
187 Regarding critics of the Greek temple’s imitation of wood, Quatremère writes: “The tympanum and the 
façade have to be suppressed. All parts of the roof have to be servilely copied in detail. No convention can be 
admitted between wood construction and its translation into stone.” "Type." 
188 Quatremère borrows from a Platonic conception of eidos in his concept of “type”, but he also draws from 
Aristotelian ideas of a telos-driven unfolding. Indeed, the kind of embryonic development of “type” 
resembles nineteenth-century German concepts of Bildung, which he may have been aware of from 
Wincklemann. Ibid.  
189 This semiotic disjuncture would return with Postmodernist architecture that, in its interest in establishing 
an architectural “language”, often tended towards historical pastiche. 
190 This distinction between Europeans and “primitives” is hinted at by Lévi-Strauss, but where the 
distinction becomes much clearer is within the work of African ethnopsychiatrists and with the media 
theorist Marshall McLuhan. See: John Colin Carothers, The African Mind in Health and Disease; a Study in 
Ethnopsychiatry, World Health Organization Monograph Series, (Geneva,: World Health Organization, 
1953).  Leonard William Doob, Communication in Africa; a Search for Boundaries  (New Haven,: Yale 
University Press, 1961).  Marshall McLuhan and W. Terrence Gordon, Understanding Media : The 
Extensions of Man, Critical ed. (Corte Madera, CA: Gingko Press, 2003). 
191 Griaule, Conversation with Ogotemmêli. 
192 Ibid. 
193 “A Miracle of Moderation”, in van Eyck, Collected Articles and Other Writings, 1947-1998. 
194 Lévi-Strauss, in observing the structuring principles of taxonomies and “totemic” systems, rejects the 
strict distinction between scientific and mythic thought. Society’s “myth-based” systems for organizing the 
world’s abundance enable those societies to draw certain structural connections and also, in the absence of 
writing, to commit knowledge of the world to memory, by dint of associative techniques. He writes that 
“primitives” extensive knowledge of natural species does not derive from the useful ways that many species 
can be used. Rather, people know what kinds of natural products can be used because of their pre-existing 
taxonomic systems. Lévi-Strauss thus implies that the very act of ordering species is already a science or pre-
requisite to scientific knowledge. If this is the case, then the mind’s associative tendencies were certainly as 
scientifically “productive” as Vann Eyck and his colleagues believed them to be. See: Lévi-Strauss, The 
Savage Mind. 
195 My analysis of exchange in Dogon culture owes a debt to coursework and conversations with Paul 
Kockelman, as well as his writings on value and exchange. On the role of substitution in establishing use 
values see: Paul Kockelman, “Number, Unit, Utiliy in a Mayan Community: The Relation between Use-
Value, Labour-Power, and Personhood” in The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 13, No. 2 
(June 2007): 401-417. 
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196 Ogotemmêli then speaks of the first trade between cloth and cowries, explaining: 
‘But the objects traded were alive: they cowries were live shells, and the cloth was full of words.’ 
‘The seventh Nummo [divine spirits],’ said Ogotemmêli, ‘had stipulated that the objects to be exchanges should be 
placed facing one another and the words effecting the exchange spoken before them. It was as if the objects spoke 
through the mouths of their owners and heard each other in the subject of their own exchange…. This was to make 
sure,’ he said, ‘that the objects agreed to it.’ 
…. ‘The chief factor, he explained, in an exchange or sale is the spoken word, the words exchanged between two 
parties, the discussion of the price. It is as if the cloth and cowries were speaking. The goods come to an 
agreement with one another through the mouths of men. 
For there is a harmony between the life-force of the object and that of the owner…. This is the case with any object 
made by man: a little of his life-force passes into the work of his hands and the mere fact of possession introduces 
into the material object forces that, in a sense, represent the owner…. 
… Ogotemmêli brought the conversation to a close with an enigmatic sentence: 
‘To have cowries, he said, ‘is to have words.’ Griaule, Conversation with Ogotemmêli.: 201-202. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Derrida derides Marx for the passage in Capital Vol. I in which he speculates on what commodities would 
say if they could speak. However, what Marx does in this passage is to momentarily dissolve the strict 
ontological segregation between commodities and the people who make them, so as to elucidate what has 
been lost in the alienation between the worker who performs abstract labor and the commodity thereby 
produced. Marx uses the rhetorical device of a seemingly absurd hypothesis—“If commodities could 
speak”—in order to stress precisely what has disappeared through alienation, the sympathy between the 
producer and his or her products that might amount to a kind of ventrilocution. Indeed, Marx implies that this 
alienation is what commodities would speak of. They would attest that “we relate to each other merely as 
exchange values”. In contrast to commodity fetishism, the alienability of the Dogon commodity, still 
magically possessed of its maker’s life-force, depends on the ventriloquized consent of its maker to be 
alienated from the bonds between producer and product. See especially Part 5: “Apparition of the Inapparent: 
Conjuring Tricks” in Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx : The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and 
the New International  (New York: Routledge, 1994). 
199 Regarding “demand”, I am referring not only to Adam Smith’s and Classical economic positions on 
supply and demand determining natural prices, but also to a position that might be understood as 
intermediary between Smith’s and Ogotemmêli’s view on trade, namely Aristotle’s suggestion that the 
common denominator of “desire” made trade between unlike objects possible. Aristotle and D. P. Chase, 
Nicomachean Ethics, Dover Thrift Editions (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 1998).: 84-86. 
200 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo : Resemblances between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics  
(Greentop, MO: Greentop Academic Press, 2011). 
201 Marcel Mauss, The Gift; Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies  (Glencoe, Ill.,: Free 
press, 1954). 
202 On the ideological functions of Modernist housing projects in North Africa by the Team Ten architects 
ATBAT-Afrique, see: “An Alternative to Functionalist Universalism: Ecochard, Candilis and ATBAT- 
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Afrique” in Sarah Williams Goldhagen and Réjean Legault, Anxious Modernisms : Experimentation in 
Postwar Architectural Culture  (Montréal / Cambridge, Mass.: Canadian Centre for Architecture ; MIT 
Press, 2000). 
203 Team_10, "Transcripts from Abbé De Royaumont Meeting." 
204 Ibid. 
205 “Design Only Grace; Open Norm; Disturb Order Gracefully; Outmatch Need,” van Eyck, Collected 
Articles and Other Writings, 1947-1998. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Parin and Morgenthaler’s idealization of the Dogon and of Africans in general was close to Van Eyck’s 
position, albeit more condescendingly. Note the title of their work, White People Think Too Much. Paul 
Parin, Fritz Morgenthaler, and Goldy Parin-Matthèy, Les Blancs Pensent Trop  (Paris,: Payot, 1966).  
208 Ibid.  According to Parin and Morgenthaler, Africans present a psychic structure different from Africans 
given that Freud’s theories on psychic development depend heavily upon the presumed family structure of 
the bourgeois household. In Les Blancs pensent trop, Parin and Morgenthaler manipulate Freudian sexual 
pathology in such labyrinthine ways that one begins to suspect that Freudianism itself is the real magical 
semiotic framework, endowing the psychiatrist with an omnipotence of thought not dissimilar from that of a 
witch-doctor. Ibid. 
209 Van Eyck’s claim to have learned of the Dogon from an old issue of Minotaure seems suspect, given his 
acquaintance with Haan who had been traveling to Dogon land long before Van Eyck’s trip. 
André Breton was largely responsible for injecting Freudian concepts into Surrealist thought. Regarding the 
relationship between Freudianism and Surrealism, see: Hal Foster, Compulsive Beauty  (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1993).  
210 The Comte de Lautréamount (Isidore Ducasse)’s celebration of the chance encounter between a sewing 
machine and an umbrella, made famous by André Breton, suggested pregnant possibilities for 
meaningfulness within this seemingly banal—if nevertheless unlikely—juxtaposition. The Surrealist interest 
in the potential meaningfulnesss of chance encounters points, I would argue, to their sense that the mind 
could construct meaning—by drawing a series of associations—within any circumstantial presentation of 
objects. There is a curious correlation here to Cybernetics which posited that information could be measured 
by the statistical likelihood of a given arrangement of signs (with less likely or less predictable arrangements 
being more informative or—to depart from their own terminology—more meaningful). Hence, in cybernetic 
terms, an unlikely encounter between a sewing machine and an umbrella would provide more information 
than, say, an encounter between a sewing machine and a spool of thread. Regarding Yona Friedman’s ideas 
of having Africans make art from the scraps of Europeans’ “sophisticated technologies”, it would seem that 
in Cybernetic and Surrealist terms, this transformation imparted meaning to a non-meaningful object or 
information to a non-informative object precisely through the presumed unlikeliness of Africans’ 
encountering such technologies. 
211 Rosalind Krauss suggests that André Breton’s interest in artistic incorporations of “the primitive” was tied 
to a broader tendency to dissociate art from representing an external world: “In Breton’s account, then, the 
world of objects has nothing to do with an art of mimesis; the objects are in no sense models for the 
sculptor’s work. The world is instead a great reserve against which to trace the workings of the 
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unconscious…”. “No More Play” Rosalind E. Krauss, The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other 
Modernist Myths  (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).: 44-45. 
212 For an overview of Friedman’s writings and work, see his self-published monograph, which includes 
several of his essays: Yona Friedman, "Pro Domo," (Barcelona :: ACTAR, 2006). 
213 Friedman, L'architecture Mobile  (Tournai: Casterman, 1970). 
214 On Le Corbusier’s Algiers plan, see Zeynep Celik, Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontation: Algiers 
under French Rule (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press: 1997). See especially Chapter 
Two, “An Outline of Urban Structure”. 
215 Joseph Bain D’Souza, “Out in the Cold,” UNESCO Courier, June 1976; and Yona Friedman Dossier, 
“Housing à la Carte,” UNESCO Courier, June 1976. 
216 Friedman referred to bidonvilles as the workshops of the future for a world that is slipping towards a 
generalized poverty [“ateliers de l’avenir pour un monde qui glisse vers une pauvreté generalisée”]. See : “La 
ville pauvre” in  Yona Friedman, L'architecture de survie : Une philosophie de la pauvreté (Paris: Editions 
de l'Eclat, 2003): 131.  
Friedman’s attitude toward the bidonvilles can be contrasted to earlier efforts by Team Ten members, such as 
ATBAT-Afrique’s Nid d’Abeille housing project, which sought to relocate Moroccan inhabitants of the 
bidonvilles into modernized housing in the wake of anti-colonial protests in the bidonvilles. See: Muzaffar. 
217 Friedman’s ideas of self-help housing are detectable in the Grameen Bank’s later low-cost housing 
program. 
218 Muzaffar. 
219 Chinua Achebe, "An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad's 'Heart of Darkness'," (Lecture delivered ar the 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst1975). 
220 The literature on international development is too abundant to cite. For an overview, see: J. S. Crush, 
Power of Development  (London ; New York: Routledge, 1995). While I’m discussing the earlier version of 
this discourse in the 1950’s and 1960’s, Amryta Sen’s work forms a more recent and well-known example of 
developmental discourse. See, for example: Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom  (Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 
221 Herbert Bayer reported that the town’s population had dwindled from 18,000 to 600 by the time it was 
purchased by Walter Paepcke. See: Herbert Bayer, Herbert Bayer, Herbert Bayer: Visuelle Kommunikation, 
Architektur, Malerei  (Ravensburg: Otto Maier Verlag, 1967). 
222 James Sloane Allen disscusses the choice of Goethe for the inaugural Aspen festival in his chapter 
"Selling the Postwar Goethe" in The Romance of Commerce and Culture : Capitalism, Modernism, and the 
Chicago-Aspen Crusade for Cultural Reform  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983): 147-173. 
223 Walter Paepcke,  in Collected Papers of Walter Paepcke (University of Chicago). Boxes 76 and 99 
224 For background on Paepcke see Allen, The Romance of Commerce and Culture : Capitalism, Modernism, 
and the Chicago-Aspen Crusade for Cultural Reform. 
 
300 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
225 The Great Books program began during World War I with War Studies and Peace Studies at Columbia 
University. The professors John Erskine and Mortimer Adler believed that reading the “great classics of 
Western Civilization” would enable students to cope with present-day problems of international conflict. At 
Columbia University, this evolved into the undergraduate core curriculum. The program was taken up by 
Hutchins at University of Chicago in the 1940’s, expanded into a program for local business men, leading to 
the publication of a series of books glossed by experts in the Classics. For Paepcke’s correspondence with 
Mortimer Adler and Robert Hutchins on the Great Books Program, see Papecke, Box 86. See also: Allen, 
The Romance of Commerce and Culutre. 
226 Ibid. 
227 cf., Reinhold Martin, Utopia's Ghost : Architecture and Postmodernism, Again  (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2010): 49.  Timothy Mitchell discusses the "environment" redefined as an economic 
entity, see: Carbon Democracy : Political Power in the Age of Oil  (London ; New York: Verso, 2011): 176. 
228 This movement was associated especially with the School of Environmental Design at the University of 
California at Berkeley. 
229 For a discussion of the imbrication of scales forming conceptions of a global environment, see: Anna 
Lowenhaupt Tsing, Friction : An Ethnography of Global Connection  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2005). 
230 Schweitzer also describes how the gramophone is commonly used by Africans, but also how upon their 
first encounter with this device, they express terror and fears of demonic witchery. Michael Taussig explores 
exaggerated colonial constructions of “savage” encounters with the gramophone in Mimesis and Alterity : A 
Particular History of the Senses  (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
231 Michael Murray, Albert Schweitzer, Musician (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1994). See also: Charles Joy, 
Music in the Life of Albert Schweitzer (New York: Harper, 1951). 
232 Albert Schweitzer, Albert Schweitzer, and Charles Thomas Campion, On the Edge of the Primeval Forest 
& More from the Primeval Forest. Experiences and Observations of a Doctor in Equatorial Africa  (New 
York,: Macmillan Co., 1948): 100. 
233 Murray. 
234 Albert Schweitzer and Charles Thomas Campion, The Forest Hospital at Lambarene  (New York,: H. 
Holt and company, 1931): 101. 
235  Schweitzer, Schweitzer, and Campion, On the Edge of the Primeval Forest & More from the Primeval 
Forest. Experiences and Observations of a Doctor in Equatorial Africa : 93 [emphasis mine]. 
236 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media : The Extensions of Man, 1st MIT Press ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1994): 92. 
237 Likely influenced by the work of the typographer, Walter Porstmann, who worked for the Prussian 
National Railway, Bayer designed a “basic alfabet” that was stripped of unnecessary swoops, dots, and 
serifs.237  Porstmann had imagined an adjusted Roman-based alphabetic system through which all the 
languages of the world could easily be transcribed Jeremy Aynsley and Wolfsonian-Florida International 
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University., Graphic Design in Germany : 1890-1945, Weimar and Now (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2000). 
238 Emphasis added Bayer writes: “Damit will ich andeuten, dass wir weniger und weniger schreiben und 
lessen, und das Buch wird vielleicht vollkommen verschwinden.  Mag sein, dass eine Zeit kommt, in der wir 
Lesen und Schreiben uberhaupt nicht mehr zu lernen brauchen;  in der wir stattdessen Informaiton 
absorbieren und mitteilen nicht mit Auge, Mund und Ohrh, sondern mit übernatürlich Mitteln.”  See: Herbert 
Bayer, “Gestaltung und Industrie”, lecture delivered 1963  in Dokumentenssammlung Herbert Bayer 
(Bauhaus-Archiv). 
239 It was not until 2009 that the economist Amartya Sen made a mathematical algorithm that could factor a 
nation’s rate of literacy into the formula determining that nation’s state of “human development”. However, 
throughout the histories of the United Nations and the Aspen Institute, literacy was long regarded as a key 
component of developmental standards. See: Richard;  Emmerij Jolly, Louis and Weiss, Thomas G., "The 
UN and Human Development " in UN Intellectual History Project (New York: Ralph Bunche Institute for 
International Studies, CUNY Graduate Center, 2009). 
240 Carothers was one of a few British experts called in form the Committee to Enquire into the Sociological 
Causes and Remedies for Mau Mau. David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged : The Dirty War in Kenya and 
the End of Empire, 1st American ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005). 
241 This is not to say that climate had not, since the beginnings of colonialist ethnographies and philosophies, 
been invoked to explain social and behavioral differences between races. However, compared to those 
climate-derived cultural traits, the mid-twentieth century linkage between race and environment presumed 
that the environment produced different mechanisms of thought. 
McLuhan discusses Carothers’ The African Mind in Health and Disease and also an article by Carothers, 
“Culture, Psychiatry, and the Written Word” in the November 1959 issue of Psychiatry magazine. See: 
Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man: 16 and c.f. 362. 
242 Franz Boas, "The Instability of Human Types," in Papers on Interracial Problems Communicated to the 
First Universal Races Congress Held at the University of London, July 26–29, 1911, ed. Gustav Spiller 
(Boston: Ginn and Co., 1912). 
243 John Colin Carothers, The African Mind in Health and Disease; a Study in Ethnopsychiatry, World Health 
Organization Monograph Series, (Geneva,: World Health Organization, 1953). See esp: 120-124. 
244 Carothers, perhaps in response to criticisms that cited the cultural biases inherent to his IQ tests, also gave 
examples of comparisons between white and black American students, conflating Africans with African 
Americans, in contradiction to his explanation of the environmental causes of intellectual development. Ibid. 
245 Ibid. 
246 These accounts of African disinclination to labor might be contradicted, however, by his testaments of the 
atrocities involved in the practice of rubber-harvesting that had long been practiced in that region. See: 
Schweitzer, Schweitzer, and Campion, On the Edge of the Primeval Forest & More from the Primeval 
Forest. Experiences and Observations of a Doctor in Equatorial Africa. 
247 Frank Corfield was a historian commissioned by the British to help explain the causes of the Mau Mau 
rebellion: F. D. Corfield, "The Origins and Growth of Mau Mau : An Historical Survey," (Nairobi :: Colony 
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and Protectorate of Kenya, 1960). For a historical account, see: Stephen Chappell, “Air Power in the Mau 
Mau Conflict: The Government’s Chief Weapon” Rusi Journal February/March 2011 Vol. 156 No. 1: 64–70. 
248 McLuhan, Understanding Media : The Extensions of Man: 80 
249 Jakobson, “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances” in Roman Jakobson, 
Linda R. Waugh, and Monique Monville-Burston, On Language  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1990). 
250 Claude Elwood Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication  (Urbana,: 
University of Illinois Press, 1949). 
251 Here, McLuhan is citing a passage from Leonard William Doob, Communication in Africa; a Search for 
Boundaries  (New Haven,: Yale University Press, 1961).  See: McLuhan, Understanding Media : The 
Extensions of Man: 9-10. 
252 McLuhan, “The Medium is the Massage” in Aspen Magazine, no. 4. This essay was first published as a 
book. See: The Medium is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects (New York: Bantam, 1967).  
253 It should be noted that East and South Asian societies are relegated by McLuhan to the category of non-
literate despite the fact that writing in the Indus Valley and, most likely, in China as well pre-dates the 
development of writing in Ancient Greece.  
254 Maxwell Fry and Jane Drew, Tropical Architecture in the Humid Zone, Reinhold International Library 
(New York,: Reinhold, 1956). 
255 See: David N. Livingstone, “Tropical hermeneutics and the climatic imagination” in Geographische 
Zeitschrift, vol. 90 (2002): 65-88 
256 The Museum of Modern Art archives, Collection REG, Folder 236, “Airways to Peace” exhibition. 
257 Beatriz Colomina, “Enclosed by Images: The Eameses’ Multimedia Architecture” in Grey Room No. 2 
(Winter, 2001): 5-29 
258 See: Mark Wigley, “Planetary Homeboy” in ANY Magazine, no. 17 (January 1997): 16-23 
259 Felicity Dale Elliston Scott, Architecture or Techno-Utopia : Politics after Modernism  (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2007). 
260 Robert Maynard Hutchins, "The Great Conversation; the Substance of a Liberal Education," (Chicago: 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952); The Great Conversation : The Substance of a Liberal Education, Great 
Books of the Western World (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1955). 
261 Mortimer Adler, conference proceedings for Sixth International Design Conference. International Design 
Conference in Aspen papers, Special Collections and University Archives (Box 1, Folder 734) University of 
Illinois at Chicago [emphasis original]. 
262 Hutchins, The Great Conversation : The Substance of a Liberal Education. 
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Fig 1.1 and 1.2: Ambidexterity exercises at the Public Industrial Arts School of Philadelphia 
(Photographer unknown. J. Liberty Tadd, New Methods in Education, 1899). 
Fig 1.3: Designing from a rubric of simple forms at the Public Industrial Arts School of 
Philadelphia (Photographer unknown. J. Liberty Tadd, New Methods in Education, 1899). 
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Fig 1.4. Ambidexterity exercises in Itten’s course at the Bauhaus (Photographer unknown. 
Johannes Itten, Mein Vorkurs am Bauhaus, Otto Maier Verlag, 1963). 
Fig 1.5. Drawing a figure eight. (Drawing by Johannes Itten, Mein 
Vorkurs am Bauhaus). 
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Fig. 1.6  Hieroglyphics indicative of natural semiotic 
forms. (Drawing by Johannes Itten, Tagebuch 
 
Fig.1.8. Old Master’s Study in grayscale grid from 
Itten’s Vorkurs (Photographer unknown. Johannes 
Itten, Mein Vorkurs am Bauhaus). 
 
Fig. 1.7. Different line types and textures. Vorkurs 
exercise (Artist and photographer unknown, 
courtesy of the Bauhaus-Archiv). 
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Fig. 1.9, 1.10. Students’ texture studies from Itten’s (left) and Moholy-Nagy’s (right) Vorkurs. 
(Photographer unknown, Hans Wingler, Bauhaus: Weimar, Dessau, Berlin, Chicago). 
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Fig. 1.12. Diagram of the evolution of the division of labor. (Drawing 
by Lazlo Moholy-Nagy, The New Vision). 
Fig. 1.11. Diagram of Bauhaus curriculum. (Drawing by Walter Gropius). 
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Fig. 2.1. Haan with his aluminum ball. (Photographer unknown, courtesy of the Netherlands Architecture Institute). 
 
Fig. 2.2. Dogon granaries. (Photograph by Herman Haan, courtesy of the Netherlands Architecture). 
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Fig. 2.3. Frontispiece for Laugier’s  Essai sur 















Fig. 2.4. The architectural framework of 
Dogon’s taxonomic system of species. 
(Drawing by Marcel Griaule, Dieu d’eau: 
Entretiens avec Ogotemmêli [Paris: Editions 
du Chêne, 1948].) 
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Fig. 2.5. An angel admonishes a would-be homeowner to “translate” his or her own image of a house, 
and the homeowner concludes that knowing the language of architecture is therefore necessary. 
(Manual by Yona Friedman, n.d. Photo courtesy of the Bibliothèque Kandinsky. 
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Fig. 2. 6. “If each of us imagined his or her own house, while knowing that—fortunately—there 
exists a repertoire of all possible houses,  and while knowing that –fortunately—there also exists a 
warning concerning the consequences of using each house, then each of us can make our own 
choice with the help of this repertoire and warning.” (Manual by Yona Friedman, n.d.  Photo 
courtesy of the Bibliothèque Kandinsky). 
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Fig. 2. 7. “The material form of a collective infrastructure is an empty skeleton in which, with the help 
of partitions, each person can form his or her own apartment by separating certain enclosures.” 
(Manual by Yona Friedman, n.d.  Photo courtesy of the Bibliothèque Kandinsky). 
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Fig. 2. 8. Architecture becoming “virtual” per the resident’s creative imagination (Drawing 
by Yona Friedman, poster for Documenta 11, 2001. Photo courtesy of the Bibliothèque 
Kandinsky). 
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Fig. 2.9. Friedman’s New Year’s greeting card reads “Tour de Babel a louer / to rent”. (Yona Friedman, 
courtesy of the Bibliotheque Kandinsky).   
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Fig. 3.1. Advertisement for Aspen ski resort. (Graphic designer unknown, Walter 
Paepcke Papers, courtesy of the University of Chicago Library) 
Fig. 3.2. Land art at Aspen Institute (Artist and Photographer: 
Herbert Bayer, Herbert Bayer: visuelle Kommunikation, 
Architekt, Malerei, Ravensburg: Otto Maier Verlag).  
 
Fig. 3.3. Men clearing the forest at  Lambaréné. (Photograph 
by Albert Schweitzer, Zwischen Wasser und Urwald, 1926). 
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Fig. 3.4. R.B. Fuller’s “World Energy Map” comparing nations’ “energy slaves” (represented 
by black dots) relative to population density (represented by red stick figures). An energy slave, 
explains Fuller, is the fossil fuel use equivalent to one eight-hour day of a man’s labor. The map 
was commissioned for Paepcke’s and Bayer’s World Geo-Graphic Atlas (Drawing by R.B. 
Fuller and Herbert Bayer for the Container Corporation of America, 1953). 
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Fig. 3.5. The migration of races. (William Diller Matthew, Climate and Evolution, New York 
Academy of Science, 1939). 
Fig. 3.6. Isotherms and human history. (R.B. Fuller, Times Magazine, 1943). 
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Fig. 3.7. The earth as atmosphere. (Newspaper clipping from Monroe Wheeler’s files for 
Airways to Peace, artist unknown . n.d.c ourtesy of  New York’s Museum of Modern Art, 
folder 236.). 
Fig. 3.8. The Nature of Atmosphere. (Herbert Bayer, photograph by Grottscho-Schleisner, Inc. 
courtesy of New York’s Museum of Modern Art, 1943). 
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Fig. 3.10. Outside-in globe (Herbert Bayer, Airways to Peace, courtesy of  New York’s 
Museum of Modern Art, folder 236.). 
Fig. 3.9. Bayer’s display strategy for Bauhaus 
exhibition (Herbert Bayer, Herbert 
Bayer:visuelle Kommunikation, Architekur, 
Malerei, 1967)/ 
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Fig. 3.11. “How to Assemble the Globe” (R.B. Fuller, Times Magazine, 1943). 
Fig. 3.12. In contrast to those entrapped in the global sphere, these 
environmentalists are operators of that sphere (Photographer unknown, 
Whole Earth Catalog, March 1970). 
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Fig. 3.14 “Environmental Bridge” (Artists unknown, reproduced in 
William Houseman, The Harlem River Yards: Bridging a South Bronx 
Community Need, 1978). 
Fig. 3.13. Checkerboard pattern “to signal hope and despair” (Artists 
unknown, reproduced in William Houseman, The Harlem River 
Yards: Bridging a South Bronx Community Need, 1978). 
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Fig. 4.1. AGORA issue themed on 
agriculture and informatics (artist 
anon., AGORA, Vol. 1, issue 8 April-
June, 1982). 
 
Fig. 4.2. Electronic circuitry and 
jungle vines (artist anon., AGORA, 
Vol. 1, issue 7, January-March, 
1982). 
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Fig. 4.3. Sugar interface (One Laptop Per Child website). 
Fig. 4.4. Promotional material (One Laptop Per Child website) 
344
